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Whether through film, television, or popular fiction, horror engages audiences like no other genre. From the classic novel to the 
latest slasher flick, horror has struck fear in the 
hearts of generations of readers and viewers across 
the centuries. The thrill and exhilaration generated 
by a terrifying story not only excite the senses but 
also raise important questions about safety, justice, 
suffering, and other human concerns. 
The Philosophy of Horror examines why horror 
fascinates fans by exploring the social, moral, 
and artistic statements of the genre. Editor 
Thomas Fahy has assembled a team of scholars 
to investigate topics as diverse as the genre itself. 
From classic films such as Psycho (1960) and 
The Shining (1980) to contemporary and highly 
controversial torture-horror films like Hostel 
(2005) and the Saw series, the contributing 
authors trace the development of horror as a form 
of art and entertainment. The Philosophy of Horror 
explores the underlying philosophical concepts 
of classic horror fiction, such as Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, as well as works that have been 
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largely ignored in philosophical circles, including 
Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood and Patrick 
Süskind’s Perfume.
Together the essays follow the evolution of the 
horror genre across the decades, investigating 
the theoretical underpinnings of each work in the 
context of its time. This diverse collection explores 
horror from a variety of perspectives and draws on 
a wide range of interpretive approaches, including 
feminist, postcolonial, Marxist, and psychoanalytic 
criticism. The result is a comprehensive study of 
fundamental questions about morality, identity, 
social constructions, and other topics raised in 
horror narratives.
The Philosophy of Horror confirms what horror 
fans have known for decades—horror is not 
only entertaining but also deeply insightful. 
Inviting readers to ponder this genre’s various 
manifestations since the late 1700s, this collection 
of probing essays allows fans and philosophy 
buffs alike to view horror narratives with fresh 
eyes and consider their dark themes within the 
framework of philosophy. The Philosophy of 
Horror is a celebration of a strange, compelling, 
and disturbing tradition in art and entertainment. 
Horror not only excites and entertains audiences; 
it also leaves them searching for answers. 
 
thomas fahy, director of the 
American Studies Program at 
Long Island University, is the 
author or editor of numerous 
publications, including Freak 
Shows and the Modern American 
Imagination and two recent horror novels, 
Sleepless and The Unspoken. 9 780813 125732
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“The Philosophy of Horror captures some 
of the lively conversations occurring at the 
intersection of horror and philosophy. The 
volume collects a group of original essays 
that engage a wide variety of artifacts—TV 
shows like Ghost Hunters, classic films 
like The Black Cat, and novels such as In 
Cold Blood—and take up a wide variety of 
theoretical questions ranging from the ethics 
of retribution, to notion of the sublime, to 
human nature.”     
—kendall r. phillips, 
author of Projected Fears: 
Horror Films and American Culture
“A deadly serious contribution to scholarship 
on horror and a deliciously evil way of 
engaging philosophy.”                             
—eric bronson, 
author of Poker and Philosophy: 
Pocket Rockets and Philosopher Kings
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Introduction 
Thomas Fahy
Not long ago several friends invited me to go skydiving. The prospect of 
jumping out of a plane made my stomach tighten and my mouth go dry, 
but reluctantly I agreed. Part of me wanted to be perceived as adventurous 
and brave. I had always been afraid of heights, and this was an opportunity 
to confront that fear, to overcome it. The afternoon adventure included a 
fifteen-minute training course on leaping from the aircraft, arching one’s 
body during the fall, breathing, and, of course, pulling the ripcord. First-
timers (all of us) had the added benefit of making a tandem dive—in which 
an instructor was strapped to our backs to make sure we landed safely.
As the plane took off the dryness in my mouth became more acute. 
My heart pounded in protest, and I couldn’t remember why I had agreed 
to do something so stupid. While waiting for the jump all of us alternated 
between making jokes and sitting in silence. Then it was time. As my friends 
started leaping from the plane, I became more and more nervous. I walked 
unsteadily to the open door and glanced at the desert ten thousand feet below. 
I’m not sure if I jumped, fell, or was pushed out of the plane by my instructor. 
But I can remember moments of the experience vividly. The weightlessness 
of my body. The air pressing hard against my skin. The strange sensation of 
falling quickly and slowly at the same time. It was thrilling and terrifying, 
exciting and awful.
When it was over I felt a profound sense of relief.
But the story of my dive didn’t end there. After the jump each of us was 
encouraged to purchase a video of the event. The dive would be set to music 
(a song of our choice) and mailed to us a few days later. Now we could watch 
it again and again, sharing the experience with family and friends.
In many ways the horror genre promises a similar experience: the an-
ticipation of terror, the mixture of fear and exhilaration as events unfold, 
the opportunity to confront the unpredictable and dangerous, the promise 
of relative safety (both in the context of a darkened theater and through a 
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narrative structure that lasts for a finite amount of time and/or number of 
pages), and the feeling of relief and regained control when it’s over. As Ste-
phen King notes in Danse Macabre, we realize that “the worst has been faced 
and it wasn’t so bad after all.”1 King calls this moment “reintegration,” which 
he compares to the end of a roller coaster ride when one gets off unhurt. We 
have confronted the threat and survived. These feelings of anxiety, fear, relief, 
and mastery are certainly an integral part of the pleasure that people derive 
from the genre, as are the questions that horror typically raises about fear 
and suffering: Is the world a just place? Does our suffering have meaning? 
Is there justice and accountability? As these questions suggest, horror not 
only plays with our desire to encounter the dangerous and horrific in a safe 
context, but it also wrestles with the complex nature of violence, suffering, 
and morality.2
The pleasure of horror can also come from rewatching and rereading a 
text. I’ve enjoyed viewing my skydiving video several times because it allows 
me to relive the experience, but knowing the outcome certainly changes my 
relationship to it. Repetition creates a new space for elaborating on a nar-
rative (the stories told about the event) and, in some cases, for finding the 
humor in it. (One friend vomited during her dive, for example, and when 
retelling the story, she gleefully points out that the instructor still asked her 
out on a date when it was over.)
The humor in horror (intentional or not) eases tension, and on a second 
or third viewing/reading, it often comes from a recognition of the playful-
ness of the genre. When Freddy Krueger confronts Alice at her restaurant 
in A Nightmare on Elm Street 4: The Dream Master (1988), for example, he 
orders a pizza with pepperoni and sausages that have the screaming faces 
of his victims. The image is startling, disgusting, and, of course, completely 
ridiculous. But as numerous Web sites about Krueger demonstrate, this is 
exactly the kind of campy humor that many fans enjoy. Horror audiences, 
as Noël Carroll notes in The Philosophy of Horror; or, Paradoxes of the Heart, 
tend to “desire that the same stories be told again and again,” but they also 
find pleasure in subtle variations of the expected formula.3 This kind of 
repetition, both in varying the conventions of the genre and in the form of 
sequels, disrupts a fixed interpretation of the text. It opens up new possibili-
ties for frightening audiences, for innovation, and for fun.
Critics often acknowledge this aspect of horror, but play doesn’t tend 
to be the focus of most critical discussions. In Men, Women, and Chain 
Saws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film, Carol J. Clover argues that the 
genre has moments of “great humor, formal brilliance, political intelligence, 
psychological depth, and above all a kind of kinky creativity,” and she also 
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describes it as “the most self-reflexive of cinematic genres.”4 Such a sentiment 
is echoed by David J. Russell, who insists that any theory of horror needs 
to account for innovation, including “horror parody and horror comedies 
or, for that matter, . . . intergeneric hybrids such as combat horror, horror 
musical, romance horror, and horror westerns.”5 As Russell’s list suggests, 
horror is preoccupied with novelty, variation, hybridity (through monsters 
that are living and dead, human and animal, and so on), and collapse. It 
is self-referential and parodic. And it thrives on drawing from a range of 
genres (suspense, thriller, fantastic, science fiction, mystery, and the like) 
and themes in provocative and disturbing ways.6
This bricolage and constant reproduction (which are evident in titles 
such as Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein [1948], Dracula vs. Franken-
stein [1971], I Still Know What You Did Last Summer [1998], and Alien vs. 
Predator [2004]) are also integral to the genre’s ability to speak to/comment 
on contemporary issues. In Eli Roth’s Cabin Fever (2002), for example, five 
college friends take a vacation to a remote mountain cabin for a weekend of 
sex and drinking. As this description suggests, the film immediately invokes 
numerous slasher movie clichés. But instead of a predatory serial killer who 
punishes libidinous teens, the young protagonists of Cabin Fever become 
victims of a flesh-eating contagion. Roth uses horror here to explore mod-
ern-day fears about biological terrorism in post-9/11 America.7 This film 
illustrates the ways in which the genre can raise philosophical and social 
questions about our longing to find meaning in a chaotic, fragmented, and 
often violent world.
The versatility of horror is mirrored in this collection as well. In many 
ways, The Philosophy of Horror is about play. It explores some of the most 
current variations on the genre. It interrogates our desire to find justice 
amid the dangers and violence of the natural world. And it considers the 
crucial role of reproduction, adaptation, and humor in horror today. The 
title of this collection pays homage, in part, to Carroll’s influential study. His 
exploration of the genre has been the touchstone for philosophical analyses 
of this topic ever since, and this collection is part of an ongoing discussion 
that continues to be in dialogue with his work.8 Specifically, Carroll focuses 
on the emotional effect that horror is designed to have on audiences, ana-
lyzing the genre in terms of recurring structures, narratives, images, and 
figures with a particular emphasis on the monster. He labels this emotion 
“art-horror” to distinguish it from natural horror (the terrible things that 
happen in the everyday world).9
Art-horror can be found in various media such as novels, films, and 
television programs. People watch cable channels dedicated to horror, such 
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as Chiller and Monsters HD, rent horror films, and read books by Stephen 
King all in the same week. They seek out adaptations of their favorite 
books and enjoy the seemingly endless variations on vampire and zombie 
myths. They laugh at the parodies found in Scream and Scary Movie, and 
they consume many of these over and over again. The Philosophy of Horror 
puts discussions of horror in literature, film, and television side by side to 
reflect the ways in which audiences consume the genre. Such an approach 
cannot be comprehensive, of course, but arguably no study of horror can 
be. The genre has become too expansive and diversified for that. Instead, 
this collection attempts to balance classic horror “texts,” such as Mary Shel-
ley’s Frankenstein (1818), some of the horror films of the 1930s, Stephen 
King’s novels, Stanley Kubrick’s adaptation of The Shining, and Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), with works that have largely been ignored in 
philosophical circles. In addition to essays about Truman Capote’s In Cold 
Blood (1965), Patrick Süskind’s Perfume (1985), and James Purdy’s Narrow 
Rooms (2005), several contributors examine some of the most popular 
horror and torture-horror films of the twenty-first century, including Saw 
(2004), Hostel (2005), The Devil’s Rejects (2005), and The Hills Have Eyes 
(1977, 2006). Likewise, the essays on television acknowledge the ongoing 
popularity of horror on the small screen, including the newest hybrid of 
horror: reality-horror television.
In many respects, only the first two essays of this collection are about 
the “philosophy of horror.” The topic of the rest of the book might best be 
described as “philosophy and horror,” offering aesthetic, cultural, and post-
structuralist interpretations of the genre. Nevertheless, these opening essays 
raise crucial questions and provide an important jumping-off point for the 
interdisciplinary philosophical interpretations that follow. Many contribu-
tors draw on feminist, postcolonial, queer, Marxist, and/or psychoanalytic 
criticism, and this range of critical approaches mirrors the fluidity and 
hybridity of horror as well. Overall, these essays celebrate the rich, strange, 
compelling, and disturbing elements of this genre. They invite us to think 
about its various manifestations and transformations since the late 1700s, 
probing its social, cultural, and political functions. And they continue an 
ongoing discussion about the popular need for and interest in horror.
Overview
In keeping with this emphasis on play, each essay uses horror texts not 
only to animate philosophical and cultural discussions about the genre 
but also to demonstrate how horror “plays with” philosophy—bending or 
Introduction 5
twisting our notions of rationality and “nature.” Accordingly, the volume is 
organized around several philosophical concepts: morality (Philip J. Nickel, 
Philip Tallon, Jeremy Morris, Thomas Fahy), identity (Jessica O’Hara, Amy 
Kind, Lorena Russell), cultural history (John Lutz, Paul A. Cantor), and 
aesthetics/medium (Susann Cokal, Robert F. Gross, Ann C. Hall, and David 
MacGregor Johnston).
In “Horror and the Idea of Everyday Life: On Skeptical Threats in Psycho 
and The Birds,” Philip J. Nickel takes up the first topic of the volume, morality, 
by posing two questions: What is horror? and What is good about it? Most 
criticism has focused on why the genre is pleasurable, often demonizing 
the most violent examples as promoting corruption, but Nickel considers 
its moral value. He argues that the good of horror comes from its ability to 
challenge our commonplace assumptions about safety and security: “The 
idea of security in the everyday is based on an intellectually dubious but 
pragmatically attractive construction. We can hardly resist relying on the 
world not to annihilate us, and we can hardly resist trusting others not to 
do so.” Using Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds and Psycho as examples, Nickel 
argues that horror’s power comes from a “malicious ripping-away of this 
intellectual trust, exposing our vulnerabilities in relying on the world and 
on other people.” So what is good about this experience? Nickel concludes 
that the value of horror comes from reminding us of this vulnerability, 
demonstrating the importance of acting in the presence of fear, and mak-
ing us aware of the ways in which we have constructed a safe worldview in 
order to function.
Philip Tallon’s “Through a Mirror, Darkly: Art-Horror as a Medium for 
Moral Reflection” also investigates the ways that horror disrupts and chal-
lenges our perceptions. The value of art-horror, Tallon argues, comes from 
“reminding us of our inner moral frailty and . . . forcing us to take seriously 
the moral reality of evil.” Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein offers a portrait of 
this frailty through Victor Frankenstein. She uses his hubris to expose the 
dangers of scientific rationalism and exploration in the Enlightenment era. 
Tallon juxtaposes Victor’s moral weakness here with postmodern horror. 
Just as the Romantic era questioned Enlightenment attitudes about prog-
ress, postmodernism has attacked similar assumptions about progress in 
contemporary society. Even though the postmodern era has given rise to 
moral relativism, it has not removed a longing and desire for order. This is 
what makes horror so effective today: it offers audiences “a sense of moral, 
social, and aesthetic stability.” As Tallon explains through Stephen King’s 
’Salem’s Lot, “it seems, then, that horror not only provides a critique of our 
optimism about the world, but also expresses our pessimism about any 
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sense of order: horror helps to illuminate aspects of our commonly held, if 
explicitly denied, underlying objective view of morality.”
The extreme violence of torture-horror films, however, makes it difficult 
for many viewers to find the kind of moral value that Nickel and Tallon 
propose. But Jeremy Morris argues that understanding the moral issues at 
play in works like Saw,  Hostel,  and The Devil’s Rejects is essential for appre-
ciating them. Like other works of horror, these types of films strive to elicit 
fear in the audience, but they do so through torture. Some of the essential 
features of torture-horror include a role reversal between torturer and vic-
tim, realism, retributivist elements, narratives that seek an appropriate code 
of punishment, and sadism. These aspects ultimately raise questions about 
justification and pleasure: Is torture justified? Is the audience’s enjoyment of 
torture justified? Putting these questions in dialogue with Kant’s ideas about 
autonomy as they relate to retribution and sadism, Morris concludes that the 
audience’s pleasure comes from the ways in which the torturer’s pleasure is 
infectious. “Here is the genius of sadistic torture-horror: it transforms the 
source of fear from a distant other to something familiar in ourselves. The 
terror of the victim is supplanted by the delight of the torturer, which is being 
consciously shared by the audience: that is the source of horror.” Torture-
horror, therefore, requires an audience both to empathize with the victim and 
to share in some of the unsavory joy of the torturer/killer. This response is 
not a way of condoning torture; it merely acknowledges that an empathetic 
person can share in the pleasure of both moral and immoral acts.
Just as torture-horror films collapse this distance between self and other, 
Truman Capote suggests that violent crime can make us interrogate our own 
capacity for brutality as well. My essay, “Hobbes, Human Nature, and the 
Culture of American Violence in Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood,” explores 
some of the disturbing questions raised by this novel: How and why were 
Dick and Perry capable of such brutality? Could you or I do such things? 
These questions resonate with Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy about the in-
nate aggression and brutality of human beings. His pessimistic outlook can 
provide some insight into the source of terror in Capote’s work—that such 
violence, resentment, and anger are in all of us. Before discussing this con-
nection, I argue that In Cold Blood taps into the conventions of the horror 
genre by focusing on its use of a horrific event and the imagined encounter 
with the monstrous. I then discuss Hobbes’s notion of human nature and 
the sovereign—a figure that promises to provide moral justice and prevent 
mankind from being in a perpetual state of war. But what happens if this 
source of moral authority (the sovereign) is absent? If the veneer of civiliza-
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tion is removed? Capote’s answer, like the one offered by Hobbes, is clear: 
we will all act in cold blood.
Jessica O’ Hara turns our attention to the concept of identity (how in-
dividuals perceive themselves and the world) through the recent phenom-
enon of horror reality television. In “Making Their Presence Known: TV’s 
Ghost-Hunter Phenomenon in a ‘Post-’ World,” O’ Hara considers both the 
philosophical implications of these shows and their cultural significance right 
now. Since these programs are about the ways in which people perceive and 
experience the world, they often investigate whether or not familial dysfunc-
tion alters perception (causing people to see the normal as supernatural), 
or if this dysfunctionality actually invites in a supernatural presence. This 
raises concerns about the nature of perception, about whether or not one 
can prove the “real” existence of ghosts, and about the problem of evil more 
broadly. As O’ Hara explains, horror reality television tends to approach such 
phenomenological and metaphysical issues from a postmodern perspective. 
Noting the ways in which these shows lack resolution and a consistent view 
of the supernatural, she writes: “In these senses, ghost-hunter shows take 
a distinctively postmodern approach to discourse and narrative in their 
preference for micro-narratives over grand narratives and their practice 
of bricolage.” The play here comes from these micro-narratives and from 
the variety of perspectives and discourses they employ. Ultimately, O’Hara 
argues that the current popularity of horror reality television stems from 
our interest in evil, our need to mourn the dead as a way of seeking justice, 
and our focus on the sanctity of domestic spaces after the trauma of 9/11. 
“On September 11, public space had shown itself to be dangerous indeed. 
Thus, the idea of retreating from the public into the private sphere became 
all the more appealing.” Ghost hunting is therefore about mourning and 
remembering.
Amy Kind continues this discussion of television by looking at the in-
novative use of the vampire myth in Joss Whedon’s work. What if a vampire 
felt remorse for his actions? What if he had a conscience? In “The Vampire 
with a Soul: Angel and the Quest for Identity,” Kind discusses the ways in 
which the television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Angel explore identity 
and moral responsibility. Once a gypsy curse restores a soul to Angelus, he 
becomes Angel, a vampire with a conscience; subsequently he must deal with 
the guilt, shame, and remorse of his past actions. Kind ponders the extent to 
which we should hold Angel morally accountable for the actions of Angelus, 
since they can be considered separate individuals. As Kind notes, “There has 
been considerable philosophical discussion about the problem of personal 
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identity—the question of what makes an individual the same individual 
over time. This is often referred to as the problem of reidentification.” Citing 
Derek Parfit’s psychological theory of personal identity (inspired by John 
Locke), Kind argues that Angel is responsible for some of his actions, but 
not necessarily for all of them.
Lorena Russell moves the discussion from individual to familial identity. 
Specifically, her reading of two versions of The Hills Have Eyes considers the 
complex and often contradictory ideologies surrounding family and “family 
values” in America. By presenting the family under siege theme, both films 
question these culturally constructed ideologies and explore the repercus-
sions of state-sponsored violence. Using the post-structuralist theories of 
Althusser and Foucault, Russell first argues for the importance of cultural 
criticism in film studies (a claim that some philosophers reject) because it 
challenges us to recognize the sociopolitical significance of a work like The 
Hills Have Eyes. It also invites us to consider the ambiguities surrounding 
the production of meaning and the power that operates through ideological 
formations. In these ways, “film can at once further and challenge ideologi-
cal struggles around complex political concepts like ‘family values.’” The 
critique of government-sponsored violence and deception in The Hills Have 
Eyes, for example, comes from the ways in which the film invites us to sym-
pathize with the murderous outlaw family and, through Doug, Bobby, and 
Brenda’s transformation into warriors, to see our own capacity for violence. 
The inversion of self/other and “civilized”/“savage” suggests an ambivalence 
about family that Russell sees as in line with the complexities found in the 
horror genre. “ While on the surface The Hills Have Eyes rehearses the time-
worn theme of a family under siege, thus seemingly reiterating American 
family values, on another level the films radically revise assumptions about 
the legacy of the ‘nuclear family’ and its uneasy place in American history.”
Russell’s use of cultural criticism provides an effective segue for the next 
three essays, which focus on cultural history. In “Zombies of the World, 
Unite: Class Struggle and Alienation in Land of the Dead,” John Lutz ex-
plores the similarities between the economic system in George Romero’s 
Land of the Dead and Karl Marx’s view of capitalist society, arguing that the 
film is an allegory for “America and its relationship to the underdeveloped, 
exploited nations on the periphery of empire.” He begins with a discussion 
of the African American gas station attendant “Big Daddy.” Romero uses 
this figure to link issues of race and class in his critique of capitalism in the 
United States, as the character “[points] to the disproportionate number 
of African Americans in impoverished conditions and the role of violence 
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in enforcing this condition.” Lutz also argues that the allegory of the film 
functions as an indictment of America’s central place in global economic 
imperialism—a place that is maintained by violence and exploitation. This 
violence not only operates on a global scale, but domestically it also protects 
those of wealth and privilege. Ultimately, the living dead become metaphors 
for the working classes, who have been dehumanized by brutal working 
conditions, hunger, and poverty. And Romero’s film uses the zombie revolt as 
an image for socialist revolution; it even presents a revolutionary conscious-
ness as essential for the working class (zombies) to regain their humanity. 
“In an interesting parallel to Marx’s description of class consciousness as a 
product of revolutionary struggle,” Lutz points out, “the zombies begin to 
regain their humanity only when they revolt against the wealthy denizens of 
Pittsburgh who have been appropriating and consuming the commodities 
taken from their territory.”
Turning our attention to the golden age of Hollywood horror, Paul 
A. Cantor discusses the influence of German expressionism on American 
films in the 1930s. In “The Fall of the House of Ulmer: Europe vs. America 
in the Gothic Vision of The Black Cat,” Cantor examines the European and 
American aspects of Ulmer’s masterpiece. Ulmer’s idea, as Cantor explains, 
was to situate the film in the Gothic tradition, using its conventions to depict 
the horrific aftermath of World War I in Europe. In this way, “The Black Cat 
is a fascinating case study of how Europeans looked to Americans at one 
moment of cultural history and how Americans looked to Europeans—all in 
a film created by a man who, as an émigré filmmaker, was moving between 
the two worlds himself.” This dual function is somewhat paradoxical. On 
one hand, the tension between European sophistication and American in-
nocence in the film suggests that Americans fail to understand the depth 
of the tragedy of World War I in Europe. On the other hand, this tension 
portrays American innocence as essential for building a better future. Can-
tor concludes that the film “is a kind of elegy to a European high culture 
that seemed to have killed itself off in the cataclysm of World War I and 
its aftermath. But it is also a tribute to Ulmer’s new homeland, the United 
States, with all its optimism and moral decency.”
The impact of past violence on the present is also examined in the 
novel and film versions of The Shining. John Lutz’s essay “From Domestic 
Nightmares to the Nightmare of History: Uncanny Eruptions of Violence 
in King’s and Kubrick’s Versions of The Shining” pinpoints in these works 
three interrelated elements of what Freud called the “uncanny”—the do-
mestic abuse story, “the postcolonial narrative of American expansion at 
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the expense of nonwhite victims, and the desire for power and control 
that underlies commodification and the social hierarchies that reinforce 
it.” Specifically, Kubrick draws on a crucial moment in King’s novel when 
Danny compares his own feelings of vulnerability to a picture that challenges 
viewers to “find the Indians.” This image, Lutz argues, becomes the visual 
puzzle that Kubrick uses in his adaptation of the book to critique “the in-
ability of America to acknowledge or come to terms with the genocide of 
Native Americans.” While King’s novel focuses on domestic abuse, Kubrick 
gives the film a broader historical scope. The film “maintains the core ele-
ments of domestic violence but widens the scope of the past to incorporate 
European and American history.”
The uncanny also operates in Patrick Süskind’s Perfume through the 
protagonist, Grenouille. As Susann Cokal explains in “‘Hot with Rapture 
and Cold with Fear’: Grotesque, Sublime, and Postmodern Transforma-
tions in Patrick Süskind’s Perfume,” Grenouille is a quintessential figure 
of horror—a malevolent, deformed, ugly, and odorless monster who is 
associated with the grotesque and the sublime. Cokal argues that his quest 
for identity, which leads him to “destroy and deconstruct beauty in order to 
create something sublime, is part of the book’s ultimate horror, as Perfume’s 
readers (or moviegoers) hover between feelings of revulsion and the hope 
inspired by beauty.” In this way, Süskind invokes different aspects of the sub-
lime—contrasting its understanding in the eighteenth century (as influenced 
by Kant) with that of the postmodern era—to contemplate the plight of the 
artist. The tragedy and horror for Grenouille, as well as for the eighteenth-
century philosopher and for artists in general, are that he can recognize the 
sublime, can reproduce and even communicate it in his work, but he always 
remains aware of his own limitations. As a result, he can never experience 
his creation as others do.
Robert F. Gross continues Cokal’s examination of the aesthetics of hor-
ror in “Shock Value: A Deleuzean Encounter with James Purdy’s Narrow 
Rooms.” Gross navigates the slippery terrain of “interpreting” art through 
the works of Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze. These French philosophers 
rejected the practice of such interpretation, arguing that most critical schools 
tend to be reductive. It is in this spirit of rejecting such reductions that Gross 
uses Deleuze and Guattari to explore the multiplicity of meaning in Purdy’s 
novel. The multiplicities of Narrow Rooms challenge our understanding of 
the horror genre, society, and the nature of homosexual love. They yoke to-
gether opposites and combine the horrific with the beautiful, inviting us to 
embrace the former: “While horror is often configured or understood in our 
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culture as an impulse that turns us away from encounters, Purdy constructs 
an acceptance of horror as an expansion of our possibilities.” It ultimately 
“strengthens our ability to live creatively” and gives us insight into certain 
experiences without having to go through them ourselves.
Ann C. Hall takes up the problem of production and reproduction in the 
horror medium. In “Making Monsters: The Philosophy of Reproduction in 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and the Universal Films Frankenstein and The 
Bride of Frankenstein,” she considers some of the cultural anxieties about 
reproduction in Shelley’s novel and some of its filmic adaptations in the 
1930s. Using the writings of Luce Iragaray, Hall argues that male attempts to 
usurp female reproduction in the Frankenstein myth suggest profound fears 
about women’s roles in a patriarchal society: “Shelley communicates her own 
views about reproduction, views that challenge the patriarchal construct of 
motherhood . . . in a language that highlights the multiplicity of the female 
experience.” Just as Shelley resists patriarchal interpretations of femininity, 
the bride’s refusal of her bridegroom in The Bride of Frankenstein is also a 
statement of power and resistance.
Finally, in “Kitsch and Camp and Things That Go Bump in the Night; 
or, Sontag and Adorno at the (Horror) Movies,” David MacGregor John-
ston considers the importance of kitsch and goofy moments in the horror 
genre. Using the works of Clement Greenberg, Theodor Adorno, and Max 
Horkheimer, Johnston begins with an examination of the culture industry 
surrounding kitsch, which has traditionally been viewed as antithetical to 
avant-garde art, high culture, and good taste because of its sentimentality. 
Kitsch also relies on repetition, lending itself effectively to the horror genre: 
“Instead of appealing to sappy sentimentality, horror films are frightening, 
but generally they are frightening in ways that do not challenge us to ques-
tion these films, our responses to them, or the worlds they represent.” These 
works scare us in familiar ways. Johnston sides with critics who take issue 
with the more negative assessments of kitsch, reminding us of the need to 
distinguish between good and bad kitsch. One way to do this is through a 
camp sensibility. Camp, “a refined aesthetic taste for the vulgar,” embraces 
excess. Its excessiveness and artifice can help us appreciate kitsch, and 
Johnston concludes by discussing these elements in Scream (1996), I Know 
What You Did Last Summer (1997), and Scary Movie (2000).
As the essays in this collection suggest, horror is just as comfortable 
with the mundane as it is with social, political, and cultural critique. It can 
slide between highbrow and lowbrow, incorporating a range of genres and 
tones. It can be serious or kitschy, terrifying or ridiculous, and it can raise 
12 Thomas Fahy
profound questions about fear, safety, justice, and suffering. Just as audiences 
crave the fear it elicits, they also take pleasure in its predictability. It is this 
safety net of predictability—of closing a book, of leaving the theater when 
the lights go back on, or of knowing that a professional skydiver will pull 
the cord to your parachute—that enables us to enjoy the thrilling, horrifying 
journey. It is this safety net that makes horror so much fun.
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Horror and the Idea of  
Everyday Life
Philip J. Nickel
Sometimes art provokes outrage, fear, and disgust. In the case of horror, that 
is the point. Those who enjoy horror might seek no justification or defense 
for it. But because of the strong feelings elicited by horror and the outra-
geous acts that are depicted in it, to those sensitive to offense it is hard not 
to feel that some justification or defense is needed. There are some obvious 
strategies for this, for example, raising the flag of “art for art’s sake” (or “en-
tertainment for entertainment’s sake”); or, by contrast, explicating the value 
of horror (for example, its moral or educational value—see Nietzsche 1968, 
92–93). There are also strategies appealing to other categories of value, along 
the lines of Nietzsche’s explanation of the value of tragedy as a Dionysian 
rallying cry. In this essay I intend to explain the value of horror in terms 
that are neither aesthetic nor moral. My goal is to show that horror has an 
epistemological value.1
The Concept of Horror
In what follows I will use the term horror mostly to refer to a literary and film 
genre (or, more broadly, a motif) instantiated in artistic works. I will also 
occasionally refer to horror as a particular emotion or a kind of psychological 
experience. The defense I propose of horror in the first sense (as a genre or 
motif) requires us to take up two philosophical questions: What is horror? 
and What is good about it? My main interest here is not in defining what 
horror is but rather in exploring the defense of horror—the prospects of an 
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“apology” in the classical sense. But we cannot say in general what is good 
about horror unless we understand what it is. Thus I propose the following 
working definition. Horror has two central elements: (1) an appearance of the 
evil supernatural or of the monstrous (this includes the psychopath who kills 
monstrously); and (2) the intentional elicitation of dread, visceral disgust, 
fear, or startlement in the spectator or reader.2 On this understanding, some 
of the most popular and critically acclaimed works of art and entertainment 
contain elements of horror. It is instantiated not only in contemporary film 
but in the whole history of literary and representational art (Dante’s Inferno, 
Shakespeare’s tragedies, paintings by Caravaggio and Goya, to mention some 
obvious examples).
This definition builds upon others offered in the philosophical literature 
on horror. Noël Carroll defines horror as a genre representing unnatural, 
threatening monsters (1990, 15–16, 27–29). According to Carroll, the genre 
plays upon a viewer’s characteristic emotional aversion to the idea of such 
monsters as they are represented in his or her thoughts. For Carroll, monsters 
are essentially fictional, not something to be worried about in real life. The 
viewer knows that they do not exist. My definition is broader than Carroll’s 
in that it allows for horror with no specific monster and also allows for “re-
alistic” monsters. I have attempted in this way to respond to the criticism 
that Carroll’s definition is too narrow, excluding works like Psycho and The 
Shining.3 In my view, unlike Carroll’s, the threats that horror presents are 
not always fictional but can bleed into the actual world.
The Value of Horror
The question of horror’s value has been clouded in a couple of ways. First of 
all, some horror films emphasize graphic depictions of sadistic violence to the 
exclusion of almost everything else, in something like the way pornographic 
films focus on graphic depictions of sex to the exclusion of almost everything 
else. This has led many people to question the value of the horror genre as 
a whole. For example, Gianluca Di Muzio (2006) takes The Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre as a model. (In fact there is much more to this film than graphic 
violence, but let us set our quibbles aside.) In this film a few youths wander 
into the clutches of psychopaths who torture, murder, and eat them. The film 
depicts their sadistic torture and murder. One character narrowly escapes. Di 
Muzio argues that to enjoy such a film is to enjoy a depiction of the torture 
of children. He claims that it could only have a corrupting influence on one’s 
moral character since it involves “silencing one’s compassionate attitudes” 
in the face of (depictions of) terrific and pointless violence (287). Di Muzio 
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argues that the spectator of such a show risks “atrophying her capacity for 
appropriate compassionate reactions and her ability to appraise correctly 
situations that make moral demands on her” (285).
There is no doubt that the violence of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre is 
shocking and perverse. But the basic claim of Di Muzio’s argument nonethe-
less does not hold, even as applied to “slasher” horror. For it seems plausible 
to say that the experience of horror essentially involves the engagement of 
one’s compassionate attitudes. That is what makes horror horrifying. Suppose 
I cringe with dread while watching Pam (one of the characters in the film) 
being hung on a meat hook. Suppose I can hardly watch and I feel nause-
ated. Later I cannot get the image out of my head, particularly at night and 
during my visits to the butcher counter at the supermarket. Although these 
reactions may be unpleasant and it may be puzzling to some people why I 
should ever wish to experience them, they are not desensitized reactions. On 
the contrary, the reaction to terror appears on its face to be a morally engaged 
reaction. And although a sensitive viewer may be morally overwhelmed by 
the violence depicted in horror films, there is no obvious causal link between 
being overwhelmed in this way and the atrophy of moral sensitivity. If there 
is such a link, it requires proof not offered by Di Muzio.
In any case, we are concerned with the value of horror as a contribution 
to art and entertainment in general, not only with the most graphic instances 
of the horror genre. Di Muzio does not discuss whether, in principle, horror 
can contribute something to great art and entertainment. Elements of horror 
such as dread and the sense of the uncanny add something to the artistry 
and interest of Macbeth, for example. It is doubtful that Di Muzio would 
deny this. Thus the focus on the graphic character of violence in slasher films 
diverts attention from basic issues about horror’s value.
There is also a second way that the question of the value of horror has 
been improperly handled. Critical discussion has focused more on why hor-
ror is pleasurable rather than on why it is aesthetically or morally valuable. 
The appeal of horror as a theme or a genre, it has been said, is paradoxical.4 
Why should it be enjoyable or attractive to witness horrific events as they 
are depicted in films, fiction, and art? When Marion Crane is stabbed in 
the shower scene in Psycho, and when Norman Bates then disposes of her 
dead body, why do we enjoy watching it? (It is beautifully filmed, but then 
why don’t the other aspects of the scene override or outweigh its cinematic 
beauty?) These are indeed fascinating questions, and have been answered 
in various ways by theorists of film. The gamut of explanations runs from 
a theory of repressed drives that pleasurably return to the viewer in his or 
her identification with the monster and/or the victim of horror to a more 
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scientifically austere explanation of the neurophysiology of startle reactions 
and the social phenomenon of collective film-viewing experiences.5
The problem is that these are psychological answers to a psychological 
question, not philosophical answers to a philosophical question. Although 
philosophy certainly has something to contribute to the resolution of psy-
chological questions (for example, by clarifying psychological concepts 
and the nature of psychological evidence), it cannot resolve these questions 
completely on its own. “Why is horror pleasurable?” is at least partly an 
empirical or scientific question about people, requiring that we understand 
regular and general principles of human psychology and anthropology. 
This is why I take the paradox of horror in a different way. If there is any 
philosophical puzzle here, it concerns what is good about horror, not just 
what is pleasurable about it.
In this essay I will try to put the philosophical discussion of horror back 
on track. I will argue that there is something good about horror—I mean, 
aesthetically interesting and epistemologically good. I shall argue that by 
the threats it presents to the everyday life of the viewer, horror gives us a 
perspective on so-called common sense. It helps us to see that a notion of 
everyday life completely secure against threats cannot be possible, and that 
the security of common sense is a persistent illusion. In order to make this 
clear, I will compare horror and philosophical skepticism, arguing that the 
threats they pose are structurally similar.6 As with our purported philosophi-
cal solutions to skepticism, the idea of security in the everyday is based on 
an intellectually dubious but pragmatically attractive construction. We can 
hardly resist relying on the world not to annihilate us, and we can hardly 
resist trusting others not to do so. This is not because such reliance is ra-
tionally compulsory, but because we choose it as the most easy and natural 
strategy. One of the best things about horror is that it allows us viscerally 
to experience this as an epistemological choice.
Horror and Philosophical Skepticism
Philosophical skepticism deploys the following sorts of statements as prem-
ises in arguments intended to undermine our ordinary claim to knowledge 
or justified belief: Consistent with what I can verify in my experience, it could 
be the case that everything that appears to me is the creation of an evil demon 
and that the world as I know it does not exist.7 This statement is distinctive for 
its sweeping implications for the epistemic rationality of belief. This sweeping 
generality is characteristic of philosophical skepticism as contrasted with 
more mundane or local forms of skepticism. Philosophical skepticism holds 
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that no human being can have any knowledge or justification in a given 
area, for example, on questions of religion, the future, morality, or the ex-
ternal world. Global skepticism is a powerful philosophical weapon against 
ordinary belief. For ordinary believers it has the striking consequence that 
they should abandon their belief that the world is at all the way it appears. 
Philosophers often try to refute skeptical arguments, and surely this is one 
of the reasons why—because it threatens ordinary belief.
General skeptical premises similar to the one above are occasionally 
dramatized, as in the film The Matrix. But it is more common in works of 
art to dramatize local skeptical premises, such as: Consistent with what I can 
verify in my experience, it could be the case that I will wake up tomorrow as a 
giant insect (as in Franz Kafka, The Metamorphosis). Horror often dramatizes 
the ordinary or everyday world gone berserk and the transmogrification of 
the commonplace. The horror film makes the case that such a transmogri-
fication, so far as any one of us can tell, might happen at any moment, and 
this casts our reliance on the everyday world around us into shadow. The 
persuasiveness of the case that a given horror film makes depends on how 
vivid or real the film can make the premise seem and on our background 
susceptibility to doubt or anxiety about the thing that the premise concerns. 
For example, although from day to day we are not worried about the possibil-
ity of flesh-eating zombies, perhaps the premise Consistent with what I can 
verify in my experience, anybody I know (including myself) could turn into a 
rabid, contagious zombie (as in 28 Days Later) gains some of its psychologi-
cal force from the real-life plausibility of an outbreak of deadly influenza or 
plague. There is a distinctive way that horror fiction and film can bring this 
threat home to the reader or viewer. A documentary about the flu pandemic 
of 1918, or about avian flu, could raise fears about a deadly outbreak, but 
unlike horror it would not depict very specific evils associated with such 
a flu (the sudden violation of one’s body, the fear of death) as happening 
now. Hence it would not elicit fear in the same way that horror does when 
it represents events—even historical events—as happening in the present 
tense of the viewer with an open outcome.
The fact is, though, that even if horror does draw on everyday anxieties 
for its effectiveness, the connection with them does not have to be particu-
larly close. It does not seem to be generally true that horror must bear a 
relation of symbolism or similarity to any real-life threat in order to create 
its characteristic emotional response. Horror can present its threats in a 
“realistic” and genuinely terrifying way even when the members of its audi-
ence do not act as if these threats were real after they have left the theater. 
There seems to be a deep reservoir of anxieties capable of fueling horror: 
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about dying and those who have died, about technology gone amok, about 
the deterioration of the body, about the collapse and unknowability of the 
human mind. These are not just everyday worries. They are the worries of 
the horror realm, even when they are occasioned by real life.
This contrast between the horror realm and the realm of the everyday is 
much like the contrast between skepticism and “common sense” (ordinary 
life, everyday life). Consider David Hume’s famous account of skeptical 
philosophical arguments and their relation to everyday life. After present-
ing his own highly distinctive account of the “manifold contradictions and 
imperfections in human reason,” he claims that the authority and legitimacy 
of reason have been thoroughly undermined. He “can look upon no opinion 
even as more probable or likely than another.” The skeptical arguments he has 
put forward show that he is “in the most deplorable condition imaginable, 
environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every 
member and faculty.” Reason itself cannot save him from this condition, for 
it is an examination of reason that originally led him into this state. But there 
is a silver lining: “Since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature 
herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy 
and delirium. . . . I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am 
merry with my friends; and when, after three or four hours’ amusement, I 
would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and 
ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any further” 
(1969, 316). The return to everyday life restores our equilibrium.8
Something like this same return to everyday life and common sense is 
experienced as one walks out of the theater after a horror film into the park-
ing lot on a sunny afternoon. As moments pass the worry that a monster 
or psychopath is about to drain one’s blood into a tub is shaken off like the 
fears from a dream. Everyday fears and worries well up in the place of the 
“melancholy and delirium” induced by the horror.
Horror films often induce or suggest a particular state of uncertainty, 
experienced as epistemic anxiety, melancholia, or paranoia. My claim here 
is that this can be articulated as a kind of skeptical statement and forms the 
basis of a problematic argument that has no easy solution. Instead of trying 
to provide a general recipe for such a skeptical argument, I will take as ex-
amples two films by Alfred Hitchcock that are commonly said, individually 
or together, to be important milestones or turning points in the history of 
horror: Psycho and The Birds. These films initiate a new era of the horror 
genre in contemporary film, and each epitomizes different strands of that 
genre. The films are landmark horror films in part because, unlike some of 
their predecessors, they offer no moral reassurance that humans can dispel or 
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effectively fight against the threats they present. These films merit extended 
analysis in their own right (and have received it). Of necessity, in this essay 
we can focus only on a few aspects of each and cannot take up the critical 
literature in detail. But I hope nevertheless to see how a kind of epistemic 
uncertainty emerges from these films—not just as a part of the plot but as 
a general and unresolved epistemic anxiety for the viewer, which he or she 
can resolve only by turning toward everyday life once again.
Each of these films dramatizes a paranoid scenario.9 In The Birds the 
paranoid scenario is that, for all we can tell, a familiar and seemingly benign 
part of the background can suddenly change its basic nature and attempt 
to annihilate human life. In the case of Psycho the scenario is that for all we 
know a seemingly ordinary person (possibly including the viewer him- or 
herself) can turn out to be a homicidal “monster” without an integrated 
human mind. The way in which these films make an epistemological point 
is by making these scenarios vivid as terrifying alternatives to the everyday 
world. The situation at the beginning of each film is much like the everyday 
world. Their protagonists have ordinary kinds of motivations—love, sex, and 
money. But in each case their lives are thrown into a delirious rupture with 
expected patterns of nature and human interaction. These developments are 
presented as real in the films themselves. The crucial point is that the viewer 
is not in a position rationally to refuse the scenario of the film as impossible, 
and that the paranoid scenario thus threatens to annihilate the viewer. This 
is the similarity with philosophical skepticism, which threatens to annihilate 
our knowledge (including our knowledge of other minds and our own future 
existence). Viewers nonetheless return to their state of reliance on the world 
and on others as they go home after the film is over, because it is the only 
practical thing to do. One consequence of my account of these films and by 
extension of horror generally is that, as in Hume’s account of skepticism, 
there is no resolution of our fears except to go on.
Epistemology and The Birds
In The Birds the paranoid scenario is: Consistent with what I can verify in my 
experience, I could suddenly find that the birds of the world are now collectively 
trying to annihilate humans. The genius of Hitchcock’s film is partly that it 
makes this rather outlandish and unexpected specification of the skeptical 
premise seem so plausible. The plot is roughly as follows. Melanie Daniels 
arrives in Bodega Bay, a small coastal California town, to make a surprise 
delivery of two pet lovebirds to the young sister of a romantic interest, Mitch 
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Brenner. Just after she makes her delivery the seagulls begin to attack, peck-
ing her forehead as she makes her way back from the Brenners’ house to the 
town in a borrowed boat. Soon after birds kill a farmer by pecking his eyes 
out, and a schoolhouse is attacked by crows. After these attacks Melanie 
goes to a local diner to make some telephone calls. It is at the diner where 
the various reactions to this surprising and awful news are dramatized in a 
fourteen-minute “play within a play,” including “a full-scale philosophical 
symposium” on the question of the birds (Paglia 1998, 69, 71). One might 
expect such a symposium to put a drag on the film, but the practical urgency 
of the questions raised gives it dramatic life. Moreover, in the middle of this 
episode the full avian attack on the town begins. Melanie retreats with Mitch’s 
family to their house across the bay, where they board up the windows and 
doors and endure a harrowing battle with the birds. In the final scene of 
the film the birds are waiting outside in their millions as the humans try to 
creep away toward safety.
As Paglia suggests, the intellectual center of the film is the symposium at 
the diner concerning what to believe about the birds. In this episode Melanie 
has just experienced the birds’ aggression firsthand and come to believe the 
paranoid scenario of the film. Some of the customers believe her. The dull-
witted bartender, charmed by Melanie, gives her immediate and credulous 
support; the drunkard at the bar, citing scripture, hollers that it is the end of 
the world. But others at the diner react with caution or outright skepticism. 
The local cannery owner in the corner, Mr. Shoals, also has firsthand experi-
ence of the birds’ aggression, but he doesn’t believe they intend to start a war 
with humankind. There is also an amateur ornithologist present, the elderly 
Mrs. Bundy. After hearing Melanie’s story she states her scientific opinion 
that “birds are not aggressive creatures,” that different species do not flock 
together (“the very concept is unimaginable”), and that their “ brainpans” 
are too small to coordinate an attack on the town. Mrs. Bundy, who has 
spent time observing the birds and even doing a yearly count of those in 
the area, exhibits confident expertise in her judgment that a coordinated 
bird attack of the kind Melanie has witnessed is impossible. Her wisdom 
is our wisdom. It is exactly the sort of rationale one would articulate, and 
rightly so, to refute a lurid tabloid story about UFOs or vampires. Here it is 
intended to refute the paranoid scenario.
The debate over what to believe goes on for some time, escalating into 
an exchange between Mitch, who thinks they’re in “real trouble” and would 
be “crazy to ignore it,” the dismissive Mrs. Bundy, and Mr. Shoals, who 
wants to stick to the facts and not draw any sweeping conclusions (“All I’m 
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saying is that they attacked my boats”). Just a moment before a very wor-
ried mother dining with her two young children chided the others, “You’re 
all sitting around debating. What do you want them to do next, crash into 
that window?” Now her worries become real and the horrific interruption 
occurs. The birds themselves impinge on the philosophical debate. Melanie, 
looking out the window, watches as a bird strategically knocks over a gas 
station attendant, causing a gasoline explosion, and shrieking birds terrorize 
everybody outside.
The scene at the diner particularly emphasizes the epistemological issues 
at stake. The characters have their initial doubts about what is happening, 
at least before they witness the full-scale bird attack. But the film ventures 
to show that even reassuring common sense or scientific claims based on 
careful observation do not preclude the possibility of a sudden rupture of our 
everyday expectations. The paranoid scenario is presented to the viewer—to 
us, outside the picture frame—and concerns whether what is depicted in 
the film is possible for us. To the extent that we are drawn into the film, or 
find it realistic, we accept this scenario as at least a logical possibility and 
we experience it as plausible. One of the common reactions after seeing this 
particular film is to see birds in an ominous light. Paul Wells writes about 
one person’s recollection: “It was the day after The Birds had been shown on 
television and I was walking through Holland Park in central London. I saw 
a group of children, who had just visited the Commonwealth Institute, dive 
to the floor as a flock of pigeons rose into the air” (2000, 77). If we, like the 
children in the park, actually become fearful about the possibility of such a 
scenario even for a moment, we may find ourselves returning to the consid-
erations raised by Mrs. Bundy: “Scientific explanations of animal behavior 
do not allow for interspecies cooperation; Birds have no motive to attack 
humans; Why would the birds wait until now to launch an attack on humans 
(and why here)?” These are all cogent considerations, and in ordinary life 
we take them to be conclusive reasons eliminating the possibility that birds 
will collectively attack. But what I wish to say, along with Hume, is that we 
are not compelled to do so by epistemic rationality. For the characters in 
the film raise exactly these reassuring considerations, and only a moment 
later are fearing for their lives. Mrs. Bundy doesn’t say another word; she is 
cowering in the hallway with the others.
Thus, when we turn off the film or walk out of the theater, it is not as if 
we switch off our fear, or even reason our way back to an ordinary trust of 
birds (or whatever other forces in our everyday surroundings might sud-
denly and hideously turn against us—other films in this lineage such as Cujo, 
Horror and the Idea of Everyday Life 23
Christine, and Child’s Play exhibit variations). The fears are still there. They 
simply fade into the background as we go about our business, returning to 
conversation and backgammon, as Hume said.
Under the right circumstances most people can occasionally find 
themselves in a place where the paranoid scenario of horror is suddenly a 
live possibility. In 1992, while working part-time at the auditorium at the 
University of Colorado, I heard a story about a janitor who had worked 
there long before. In July 1966 he raped and murdered a woman in one of 
the towers of the neo-Gothic auditorium (Doligosa 2006). Campus folklore 
holds that her ghost haunts the building. One week I found out that I had to 
work alone in the building at night on the very anniversary of this horrific 
event. That evening I brought the vacuum cleaner up to the second floor 
and was just outside the spiral staircase to the tower. A chill crept over me, 
and I was ready to experience something bizarre—perhaps the ghost of the 
murdered woman would take her revenge on another employee. Then I went 
Tippi Hedren (as Melanie Daniels) in The Birds (1963). Directed by Alfred Hitch-
cock. (MCA/Universal Pictures/Photofest)
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on with my job, and when I was finished walked back to my apartment. The 
fears were in my mind all along—I did not need to be in the grip of a fiction 
to experience them. But then I was back to everyday life.
Psycho
Despite some thematic similarities to The Birds, Psycho raises a rather dif-
ferent set of worries for the viewer.10 In brief, Marion Crane, the short-lived 
protagonist of Psycho, steals forty thousand dollars from her employer and 
absconds from Phoenix to California. She is palpably alone. She cannot re-
turn to Phoenix (the city name is symbolic); she and her lover are separated; 
the journey away from her previous life is drawn out and lonely. Thus it is 
with a sense of relief that we find Marion striking up a conversation with 
the young clerk at the Bates Motel, Norman Bates. She goes back to her 
room, and she is murdered in the shower, apparently by Norman’s deranged 
mother. Then Norman cleans up, wrapping her dead body in a plastic shower 
curtain and sending it into a muddy pool in the trunk of her car. During the 
remainder of the film we gradually learn that Norman is the murderer. He 
keeps his mother’s dead body in the house and dresses in her clothes and a 
wig to enact his split personality. By the end of the film, after another killing, 
Norman is caught by the police. In the last scene we see him wrapped in a 
blanket and hear the inner voice of his mother asserting her innocence. A 
vision of his mother’s skull is superimposed on Norman’s face. Whereas in 
The Birds the threatening scenario is purely external, here it is psychological, 
arising from Norman’s mental disintegration.
Psycho’s psychological, internal orientation raises some questions of 
genre. According to Noël Carroll’s account of horror, it is not a horror 
movie because it doesn’t have a monster in the true sense: psychopaths are 
human beings, not monsters (except metaphorically). Vampires, zombies, 
even berserk birds can count as monsters. The weird guy running the motel 
off the highway cannot, at least not according to Carroll, because monsters 
exist only in fiction, whereas he exists (or might have existed) in reality. For 
Carroll, the fictionality of monsters is central to the account of what makes 
horror pleasurable: “The pleasure and interest that many horror fictions 
sustain . . . derive from the disclosure of unknown and impossible beings” 
(1990, 184). He continues, “Their [monsters’] very impossibility vis a vis 
our conceptual categories is what makes them function so compellingly in 
dramas of discovery and confirmation” (185).
Thus we should distinguish between two problems that Carroll’s ac-
count raises, a conceptual problem and a problem in explaining what is 
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good about horror. The conceptual question is whether Psycho counts as 
horror at all. To most people the answer to this question is straightforwardly 
yes. Conceptually, public sentiment and critical opinion do not square with 
Carroll’s definition of horror. If Carroll were right about what horror is, not 
just Psycho but even The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, based on the same “true 
story” as Psycho (serial killer Ed Gein), would not be horror.11 This can-
not be right. But setting this conceptual issue aside, Carroll’s analysis also 
presents a challenge to my account of why horror is good. “Internal” hor-
ror films such as Psycho traffic in abnormal psychology, not paranormal or 
supernatural phenomena. Hence they cannot offer the same epistemological 
fodder that a supernatural being could. For Carroll, the pleasure of horror 
is epistemological: it comes from “dramas of discovery and confirmation” 
that are uniquely exemplified in terms of supernatural creatures. Although 
my account of what is good about horror is different from Carroll’s account 
of what is pleasurable about it, there is nonetheless an objection to my ac-
count of a film like Psycho that one might lodge on Carroll’s behalf. One 
might argue that since psychopaths really exist, horror films such as Psycho 
and The Texas Chainsaw Massacre do not present a skeptical alternative to 
belief in everyday reality. Instead, they dramatize a scenario of which we 
are already aware within everyday reality. Hence they do not run in parallel 
with skeptical arguments.
My response to this challenge is to deny that the subject matter of Psycho 
and The Texas Chainsaw Massacre is a part of everyday reality. This is not 
to say that these films do not present their subject matter as real, nor is it to 
deny that serial killers exist in the real world. It is just to say that the everyday 
reality of the viewer—that is, the viewer’s idea of what is normal, expected, 
and commonsensical—is typically insulated from these sorts of scenarios, 
and therefore the viewer finds them threatening when they are presented in 
film. Thus the critical discussion of Psycho admits a striking contrast between 
the world into which Marion Crane stumbles and that of everyday reality. 
As Paul Wells writes, “Psycho locates shockingly transgressive events in an 
everyday context, subject to ordinary conditions” (2000, 75).12 Robin Wood 
writes of the opening sequence in which the camera zeroes in on a single 
window in a cityscape, which happens to be the hotel room of Marion and 
her lover, “This could be any place, any date, any time, any room: it could 
be us. . . . Psycho begins with the normal and draws us steadily deeper and 
deeper into the abnormal” (2004, 75). Whereas Carroll interprets the name 
Norman as “Nor-man: neither man nor woman but both” (1990, 39), I am 
more inclined to think of his name’s ironic suggestion of normalcy: a normal 
man, an everyman. Norman represents an everyday person whom we find, 
26 Philip J. Nickel
in the journey of the film, to have an abnormally dark side. The paranoid 
scenario of the film is about the dark side of seeming everymen.
As in The Birds, the first intellectual flash point of the film is a con-
versation that comes just before the full onslaught of horror. Norman had 
originally proposed that Marion have dinner in the house on the hill, but his 
mother loudly objected as Marion listened from her hotel room below. She 
ends up dining in the motel office and conversing with Norman. Norman 
seeks affable collusion in his resentment toward his mother. When Marion 
casually suggests that Norman might try putting her in an institution, 
Norman suddenly goes cold. The threat to his mother—who, as we learn 
later, exists only as a part of Norman—cracks the brittle edges of his goofy, 
boyish sociability. (One of the unanswered questions of the film is whether 
Marion Crane’s threatening stance toward Mrs. Bates in this scene is what 
leads to her murder, or whether she was already poised to become a victim.) 
Unlike the diner scene from The Birds, the conversation between Norman 
and Marion does not concern the paranoid scenario of the film, because 
the horror has not yet even started at that point in Psycho. But the scene is 
nonetheless pivotal in the epistemological drama, which in this case revolves 
around Marion’s vulnerability and dependence. Marion is in a condition 
of total social isolation from all stable institutions (the law, her employer, 
married life). Her question is therefore about whom she can trust. She 
leaves her familiar environment and her place in it, and she is immediately 
placed in a condition of flailing anxiety and vulnerability. For example, she 
is subject to unscrupulous dealings as she sells the car linked with her crime, 
and she finds herself alone on the highway except for a mysterious cop on 
a motorcycle who trails her for hours and then parts ways. Arriving in the 
dark and rain at a vacant motel, she is at the end of her rope, choosing to 
rely on a complete stranger. In the office scene, at first we have the reassur-
ing sense that there is nothing wrong with this choice. After all, Norman is 
sensitive enough to offer her dinner and polite enough to keep her company. 
She is not so vulnerable as to lose her composure and affability during their 
conversation even when it becomes uncomfortable.
But then her vulnerability is exploited. Norman first violates her privacy 
by peeping at her through a hole in the wall, and then he (as Mother) kills 
her in the shower. The particulars of Norman’s psychopathy, particularly as 
expounded in the psychoanalytic cant of the film, are of no importance to 
the film’s terror. What is fundamental is Marion’s vulnerability and aloneness 
(symbolized by her nakedness in the shower) and the shocking consequences 
of her mistaken reliance on Norman. This is why, for some viewers, it was 
“the first horror movie which they could not forget, and felt frightened about 
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it even within the apparent safety of their own homes” (Wells 2000, 31). Thus 
the paranoid scenario of Psycho is: Consistent with what I can verify in my 
experience, it could be the case that the seemingly ordinary person I now rely 
upon in a moment of human vulnerability will murder me. There are many 
details that make a crucial contribution to the horror of the shower scene: the 
gigantic knife, the translucent plastic curtain, the revolting sound the knife 
makes as it plunges into Marion’s body, the famous shrieking music, and so 
on. But Marion’s aloneness and vulnerability are fundamental. Moreover, 
the ordinariness of the beginning of the film and the viewer’s knowledge 
that the film is based on a true story amplify the personal interest we have 
in the paranoid scenario. It is the shocking transition from everyday life to 
a murder in one’s most vulnerable moment that gives the scenario its edge, 
Carroll’s objections notwithstanding.
Everyday Life and Its Alternatives
Everyday life is saturated with our apparently justified reliance on others 
and on the world around us—saturated with trust. As Annette Baier writes, 
trust is like the air we breathe in that we only notice it when it disappears 
or goes bad (1986, 234). It is by understanding trust better that we can un-
derstand how horror relates to everyday life. So far I have left the notion of 
“everyday life” mostly unanalyzed and intuitive. Now we are in a position 
to say more by relating it to trusting reliance. The “everyday” encompasses 
those tacit assumptions of reliability that allow us to negotiate the world from 
one moment to the next: this bird will not attack me (if I thought it would I 
would not be able to walk down the street without terror); this person will 
not murder me (if I thought he would I would not be able to stay the night 
at a hotel without terror).
In order to refine this point, suppose we distinguish between practical 
and cognitive trust. Practical trust is based on well-founded confidence in 
our ability to act and carry out our intentions, whereas cognitive trust is well-
founded confidence in our beliefs. Although they are conceptually different, 
these two kinds of trust are usually woven together. Suppose I want to cross 
a dark parking lot safely. On the one hand there is an action to be performed, 
crossing the parking lot. On the other hand there are a number of related 
beliefs I might have: there are no persons—or birds, or zombies—about to 
attack me, the surface of the parking lot will not rupture as I cross it, I am 
not in a nightmare induced by a demon, and so on. In most ordinary actions 
I have these backing beliefs implicitly and they make me feel confident or 
justified that my action will succeed. The beliefs are generally implicit or 
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latent rather than conscious or occurrent. It is common in philosophy to 
point out that I have many latent beliefs, such as the belief that my gas pedal 
is connected to the engine of my car, that I do not entertain consciously, 
even though they provide backing for my actions. The beliefs that express 
and justify our intellectual willingness to rely upon the world and on other 
people are generally like this. They are latent or implicit.
There are, however, some nonordinary cases in which I perform an 
action even though I do not have the usual backing beliefs (latent or oth-
erwise). I can walk across the parking lot even if I don’t believe I won’t be 
attacked by birds, just as Mitch walks out to his car at the end of The Birds 
as countless birds watch him ominously. I can act without having the usual 
backing beliefs by acting as if the relevant background propositions were true 
and simply stepping forward. If I am lucky, this as-if movement alone will 
carry me across the parking lot. But if so, I will be depending on luck, not 
on anything certain. It will be with no confidence that I will succeed in my 
action; it will be without the usual intellectual backing for practical trust.
With this discussion in hand I am now in a position to restate the thesis 
about horror and epistemology. As I have portrayed it, horror’s bite is ex-
plained as a sudden tearing-away of the intellectual trust that stands behind 
our actions. Specifically, it is a malicious ripping-away of this intellectual 
trust, exposing our vulnerabilities in relying on the world and on other peo-
ple. Psycho and The Birds exhibit this ripping-away for two different domains 
characteristic of the horror genre, the one for reliance on other people and 
the other for reliance on the natural world. Not all skepticism is based on 
malicious threats—some arguments for skepticism are based on reflections 
about human limitations or the possibility of sheer bad luck in the formation 
of beliefs. But there is a long tradition in epistemology of worrying about 
malicious threats to the possibility of justified belief. Descartes hypothesized 
that in the absence of a proof of the existence of God, there might for all we 
know be an evil demon manipulating our thoughts and our environment 
in such a way as to make our beliefs about the world radically mistaken 
(1986). More recent variants of this idea include the thought that we might 
be the puppets of a computer simulation (Bostrom 2003) or a mad scientist 
(Putnam 1982). Similarly, horror puts forward scenarios that through their 
vivid depiction threaten our background cognitive reliance on others and 
the world around us (and we should add, thinking perhaps of the films of 
David Cronenberg, our reliance on our own bodies and minds).
But what, it might be asked, could be good about that? There are three 
main things. First, it is a matter of not being deceived about the foundations 
of our practical trust. Horror helps us to experience the fact that the intel-
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lectual backing for our practical trust, consisting in the various background 
beliefs we have that our environment (natural and social) will behave in 
regular ways, cannot be made perfectly certain. Our reliance cannot be given 
a perfect philosophical “vindication”; all that can be done is to go on relying 
in the usual way. Once we give up the aim of providing a fail-safe intellectual 
backing for our actions, we gain intellectual clarity about our actual situation 
of dependence and trust on birds, people, cars, and ourselves. Our reliance 
on these things is inherently insecure, much more like Mitch’s walk to the 
car than we are at first inclined to think.
Just as important, horror makes us realize that we can still go on, even in 
the absence of perfect certainty. In the climactic final assault on the house in 
The Birds, Melanie goes up the stairs to the second floor despite (or because 
of ?) the fact that the birds are making a great stir up there. As noted in 
Urbano (2004), for many people Melanie’s behavior is frustrating: “Melanie 
. . . should be more than able to assume that the noises she hears are made 
by birds that have managed to invade the rooms upstairs. What does she 
think her searchlight is going to throw light on up there? Is she stupid or 
what?” Urbano himself rejects this question: “Unless one is willing to accept 
that Melanie’s reason for going upstairs is irrational, one will never be able 
to fully enjoy The Birds”—or the horror genre more generally (23). Urbano 
may be right to say this, but one thing the scene does illustrate is that Mela-
nie can act from her motive, whatever it may be (curiosity? investigation?), 
even when she herself knows that the backing for her actions is extremely 
insecure. Just as Sam and Lila do when they go to the Bates Motel at the end 
of Psycho to find out what happened to Marion, Melanie continues to walk 
up the stairs even though her trust cannot be secured. It demonstrates that 
similarly, we continue to act in the presence of fear.
Horror also brings a third epistemological insight, which is that the 
construction of the everyday is necessary. This insight arises from the first 
two: that the intellectual backing for our practical trust is not perfectly 
secure and that, regardless, we can continue to act as if it were. The third 
epistemological insight is that we cannot remain content with this situa-
tion. It is necessary that we construct an idea of the everyday in which the 
intellectual backing for our practical trust feels secure, even when we know 
it is not. We must fabricate for ourselves a sphere in which we will not be 
attacked in our kitchens or showers, in which our own bodies will not turn 
suddenly against us, and in which the birds perched on the jungle gym are 
benign. There are a number of psychological reasons why this construction 
of the everyday is necessary, but one is simply that we cannot focus on all the 
possible paranoid scenarios at once. There are too many ways the world can 
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threaten our trust for us to keep them all in mind. We must concentrate on 
the most salient threats to trust. This forces us to keep some of the myriad 
other paranoid scenarios off the table, at least provisionally. Once they are 
outside of the focus of our attention they are no longer threatening, and the 
idea of a regular, everyday world emerges. But the idea of a secure, regular 
everyday world is, then, a construction. One valuable thing about horror 
literature and film is that they keep this fact in view.
Notes
 1. Epistemology is that branch of philosophy concerning knowledge, justifica-
tion, and belief.
 2. This definition implies that some suspense dramas, like Klute, Basic Instinct, 
and No Country for Old Men, involve at least a motif of horror. And since this motif 
(as I define it) is very prominent in these films, it is a puzzle for my account that they 
are not acknowledged as being inside the margin of the horror genre. It may be that 
they are styled with too much dramatic realism to count as meeting element (1) of the 
definition.
 3. A criticism raised by Hills (2003), who cites Russell 1998; Schneider 2000; 
Jancovich 1992; and Freeland 2000.
 4. For this way of formulating the paradox of horror, see Levine 2004, 46; Gaut 
1993; and Turvey 2004, 70–71.
 5. On this topic see the essays in Schneider 2004.
 6. Here I am borrowing a theme about tragedy and skepticism from the philosopher 
Stanley Cavell, as developed in Cavell (2003) and earlier books.
 7. “I will suppose therefore that . . . some malicious demon of the utmost power and 
cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, 
the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions 
of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgment” (Descartes 1986, 15).
 8. Coincidentally, Hume’s view of tragedy has been deployed by Carroll (1990) to 
explain the pleasure of horror films.
 9. This is loosely connected with what Andrew Tudor (1989) calls the “paranoid” 
strand of horror. According to Tudor, horror films in which there is “an ultimately suc-
cessful struggle against disorder” are “secure,” whereas horror films in which human 
action is ineffective and the threat continues to loom are “paranoid” (215). These two 
Hitchcock films are surely among the transitional instances as the genre moved toward 
the paranoid strand.
10. The thematic similarities include some very broad ideas, such as Hitchcock’s 
preoccupation with mother-son relationships (and women’s agency, as embodied by 
Melanie and Marion), and also some very specific connections, like the stuffed birds and 
bird art in the Bates Motel that prefigure the monstrous birds of the later film.
11. See the references in note 3.
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12. Wells, however, does not convey much of the sense of contrast between the 
beginning of the film and the end: “[The world of Psycho] is everyday America, repre-
sented as an utterly remote place in which any semblance of moral or ethical security 
has been destabilized and proved to be illusory” (2000, 75).
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Through a Mirror, Darkly
Philip Tallon
The tale of the irrational is the sanest way I know of expressing 
the world in which I live. These tales have served me as instru-
ments of both metaphor and morality; they continue to offer 
the best window I know on the question of how we perceive 
things and the question of how we do or do not behave on the 
basis of our perceptions.
 —Stephen King, Four Past Midnight
The Poetics of Horror
Works of art provide a means by which humans express, intuitively and 
explicitly, their assumptions about the world. We have all been moved by 
a sad story, gladdened by a funny story, and frightened by a scary story. In 
each case, it is very likely that the emotion produced depended on the ef-
fectiveness of the work of art to elicit those emotions by presenting to us a set 
of circumstances that we perceived as unfortunate, amusingly unexpected, 
or frightening. In other words, stories tend to need specific characteristics 
to produce the desired effect on us. Though fiction often seems to be about 
falsehood, “making things up,” it actually very often adheres to a set of 
internal rules, specific to its genre type. To paraphrase The Big Lebowski’s 
Walter Sobchak: Art is not ’Nam; there are rules here.
In his Poetics Aristotle laid out the “rules” for tragic drama, dictating 
what could and could not be truly tragic. For instance, in Aristotle’s view we 
cannot be moved to pity by the downfall of a truly wicked man. Seeing the 
violent deposition of a cruel dictator on CNN or reading about the murder 
33
Art-Horror as a Medium for Moral  
Reflection
34 Philip Tallon
of a vicious drug lord, very few of us feel genuinely sad, and many of us may 
even take pleasure in the news. Our tears do not flow because our minds 
accept the violent death of an evil man as, if not perfectly just, at the very 
least a fitting end.
Aristotle’s approach to art assumes that narratives affect us in power-
ful ways because they interact with our intuitive understanding of life, the 
universe, and everything. For Aristotle, only the fall of a great man will move 
us to pity. Even better for tragic effect is if the great man has some flaw (like 
the rest of us) that brings him down, not randomly, but because of some 
mistake he has made. Our objective understanding of the man’s greatness 
activates pity—while our objective understanding of his fatal flaw increases 
our identification and adds the element of fear. This cocktail of pity and fear 
is, for Aristotle, the essential effect of properly constructed tragic drama, 
and all of it depends on a certain understanding of the world.
Though Aristotle’s Poetics discusses tragedy, much can also be said for 
the newer genre of horror as a medium for reflection on the ways that art 
interacts with, and disturbs, the way we see the world. In viewing a tragedy 
we grow to identify with the hero, especially with his inherent virtue, which 
is ultimately undone. In horror, however, what sympathy exists between the 
viewer and the victim will likely be visceral more than emotional. Seeing a 
woman hung on a meat hook, as The Texas Chainsaw Massacre invites us to 
do, isn’t “very sad”—it is terrifying and nauseating. Rather than experience 
a cathartic purge of the emotions, we are more likely to want to purge the 
contents of our stomachs. The connection between spectator and spectacle 
is further seen in the way that the emotions of characters within horror 
fictions mirror those of our own.  As Carroll points out, this is not the case 
with every genre of fiction. He writes,
Aristotle is right about catharsis, for example, the emotional state 
of the audience does not double that of King Oedipus at the end 
of the play of the same name. Nor are we jealous, when Othello is. 
Also, when a comic character takes a pratfall, he hardly feels joyous, 
though we do. And though we feel suspense when the hero rushes 
to save the heroine tied to the railroad tracks he cannot afford to 
indulge such an emotion. Nevertheless, with horror, the situation is 
different. For in horror the emotions of the characters and those of 
the audience are synchronized in certain pertinent respects, as one 
can easily observe at a Saturday matinee in one’s local cinema.1
This mirroring effect is found frequently in horror fiction, as described by 
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Jack Finney in Invasion of the Body Snatchers. In the book, the hero, Miles 
Bennell, encounters two of the alien pods that eventually take the form of 
humans. Finney describes Bennell’s reaction as he seeks to destroy them: 
“They were weightless as children’s balloons, harsh and dry on my palms 
and fingers. At the feel of them on my skin, I lost my mind completely, and 
then I was trampling them, smashing and crushing them under my plung-
ing feet and legs, not even knowing that I was uttering a sort of hoarse, 
meaningless cry—Unhh! Unhh! Unhh!—of fright and animal disgust.”2 
Bennell’s horrorified trampling of the soon-to-be-human pods is easy to 
identify with. Similar examples can be seen in nearly any horror story where 
the protagonist or secondary character must enter a forbidding basement, 
venture out into the dark, or confront the monster. Like the character in the 
story, we are intended to feel fright and revulsion.
As genres go, horror is also the least friendly of the storytelling patterns. 
If genres were houseguests, romantic comedies would always be cooking 
you dinner, while historical dramas regaled you with stories, and science 
fiction kept you thinking about big ideas. Perhaps the broad comedies might 
leave the toilet seat up or fart at the dinner table, but, generally speaking, all 
these genres would behave themselves compared to horror. If horror were 
a houseguest, it would smash the china, flood the bathroom, and while you 
were cleaning off the gum it stuck to the living room TV, it would be trying 
to burn the house down.
As a genre, horror doesn’t like you. Horror doesn’t care if it causes you 
to lose sleep. Horror doesn’t mind if it frightens you so much it makes you 
swear off something you love, like camping or swimming in the ocean. 
In essence, horror is a jerk. As an artistic category, horror trades in the 
random and meaningless: hence this description of The Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre, a movie whose story of innocent tourists caught in a house of 
horror clearly portrays cruelty and violence as meaningless, and thus de-
fies positive description: “The film’s archetypal structure is borrowed from 
fairy tales: this isn’t far from Hansel and Gretel, with its children lost in 
the woods who find an attractive house inhabited by a fiend who kidnaps 
and wants to eat them. But while fairy tales tend to serve the function of 
preparing children for the rigors of adult life, and thus present a positive 
face for all their often considerable violence, Texas inverts their traditional 
values and presents an apocalyptic vision of unremitting negativity.”3 This 
unremitting negativity further calls into question the value of horror as an 
art form for consumption.
So what, then, can be learned from this most unpleasant of artistic 
genres? What of value could be uncovered about the way that we see the 
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world by looking at horror’s internal logic? In this essay I will look at the 
contribution horror makes to our thinking, arguing that horror can “illu-
minate” the way we see ourselves by showing us a much darker picture than 
we are used to seeing. Despite its frequent kinship with dark humor and its 
tendency toward vulgarity and schlock, I will suggest here that horror as a 
genre is worth taking seriously (at least for a while) because of how well it can 
inform and enlighten our vision of the world by reminding us of our inner 
moral frailty and by forcing us to take seriously the moral reality of evil.
John Ruskin, the famous artist and art critic, writes, “Great nations write 
their autobiographies in three manuscripts;—the book of their deeds, the 
book of their words, and the book of their art. Not one of these books can 
be understood unless we read the two others; but of the three the only quite 
trustworthy one is the last.”4 Art, then, following Ruskin, may be a better 
guide to understanding ourselves than even our words or deeds. I want to 
show that this is especially true of horror, as it clashes with and critiques (both 
explicitly and implicitly) two broad cultural movements (modern hubris and 
postmodern skepticism) by puncturing their philosophical posturing.
The Monsters Within: Horror and Enlightenment Hubris
There may be no more famous work of horror than the nineteenth-century 
masterpiece Frankenstein. It was a work both of its time and against its time. 
Created at the cusp of the modern scientific age, Shelley’s work captures 
something of the spirit of the time, especially with regard to the sense that 
science would soon unlock the very secrets of life. In the preface to her book 
Mary Shelley wrote, “The event on which this fiction is founded has been 
supposed, by Dr. Darwin, and some of the physiological writers of Germany, 
as not of impossible occurrence.”5 By this Shelley meant to indicate that there 
was nothing, as far as she saw it, inherently supernatural about the tale she 
was about to tell. Though the stitching together and reanimation of corpses 
was not then (or now) possible, Shelley did not believe Frankenstein to be 
a story of “supernatural” terror. As such, Shelley’s work of horror functions 
not so much as an external critique of the prevailing notions of the time—a 
strong affirmation of scientific investigation and a powerful faith in progress 
(compare Denis Diderot’s statement “Free yourself from the yoke of religion 
. . . [and] submit to nature, to humanity, to yourself again, and you will find 
flowers strewn all along the pathway of your life”6)—but rather can function 
as an internal critique of the mood of the time.
Yet despite the fact that Shelley thought the events in the book were 
technically possible, she did recognize that they were also extraordinary, 
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and extraordinarily disturbing. So she justified the tale in that it “affords 
a point of view to the imagination for the delineating of human passions 
more comprehensive and commanding than any which the ordinary rela-
tions of existing events can yield.”7 What passions, then, did Shelley think 
these extraordinary events could help us see and understand? What does 
Frankenstein show us?
First, it must be noted that when people say “Frankenstein” the first im-
age that pops into our heads is the lumbering monster, with its flat forehead 
and the bolts emerging from the side of its neck. Yet in both the popular 
1931 film version of Frankenstein and the novel on which it is based, “Fran-
kenstein” properly refers to the creator, not the creature. This confusion is 
telling. In both the movie and the book, there is an essential humanity to 
the monster that, at moments, makes him a greater object of sympathy than 
his creator. Though we, like Dr. Victor Frankenstein, are horrified at the 
monster’s destructive behavior (in the movie, most famously, the monster 
drowns a little girl; in the book the monster murders Frankenstein’s new 
bride), in reality, it is the monster’s abandonment by his creator that has al-
lowed this to happen. Victor is unable to handle the work of his own hands; 
his attempt to play God turns into a nightmare as his scientific domination 
of “nature” overreaches his modest abilities to “nurture” what he has brought 
to life. Victor reaches beyond the normal limits of science, and manages 
to pluck the very secret of life from the heights of human knowledge. Yet 
here Victor destructively overreaches. The book’s subtitle—“The Modern 
Prometheus”—echoes the theme of tragic overachievement, as it brings to 
mind another doomed attempt to bring divine “fire” down to the world of 
mortals. By painting a vivid picture of the horrific result of certain “human 
passions,” Shelley seems to be showing the inherent dangers of scientific 
exploration, and more generally the weakness of Enlightenment hubris that 
Victor Frankenstein represents. 
Now, of course, not all scientific exploration produces lumbering, 
fearsome monsters, but it is significant that the chaotic, regressive, and 
often supernatural genre of horror was born so closely together with the 
rise of Enlightenment values such as rationality, progress, and a generally 
naturalistic understanding of the world. Noël Carroll, writing about the 
genre of horror, therefore appropriately calls horror the “underside of the 
Enlightenment.”8
The Enlightenment, of course, represented huge leaps forward in terms 
of human understanding of the world—the advance of scientific progress 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was astounding. But with every 
scientific advancement, new possibilities open up for abuse and corruption. 
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It is impossible to list every horror movie or work of fiction that raises a 
similar doubt to Frankenstein, but it is helpful to mention just a few examples 
in which we see similar themes: The Fly, Jurassic Park, 28 Days Later, The 
Invisible Man, The Brain That Wouldn’t Die, The Host, Them, Godzilla, and 
The Stand. All of these stories cast doubt, in some way, on the human as-
sumption that progress in knowledge is always good. All of them tell about 
human inventiveness unleashing destruction on humanity itself.
Horror, in this way, shows us our inherent skepticism about absolute 
progress. As we gain more and more mastery of the world, it can be easy to 
forget that, deep down, we still lack mastery of ourselves. Likewise, other 
works, such as Dracula, The Call of Cthulu, or The Island of Dr. Moreau, 
present a dark, regressive shadow image of the bright and progressive veneer 
of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century optimism. The origins of modern 
horror provide a vivid presentation of the inherent moral weakness and 
often-present darkness in the human condition. The presence of horror in 
the popular imagination suggests our cultural need to be reminded of our 
fallen state. Monsters like Mr. Hyde or the Wolfman make visible our inner 
corruption. Godzilla and “the Fly” metaphorically embody the dangers of 
recklessness and pride. Like Dorian Gray looking in horror on his portrait, 
the revulsion we feel at horror can be, in a sense, a revulsion at ourselves.
The Monsters Without: Postmodernism and Horror
However, as culture has shifted from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
optimism to a deeper suspicion of traditional universal values, horror’s 
function as a medium for reflection has (to some degree) changed. Where 
the Enlightenment placed great confidence in our ability to understand and 
organize the world according to overarching “meta-narratives” (big stories), 
postmodern thinkers like Jean-François Lyotard (1924–98) have described 
our current condition as defined by “incredulity towards meta-narratives.”9 
For Lyotard, postmodernism represented the failure of all large-scale sys-
tems to adequately explain the world. Where once Christian theology or 
Enlightenment rationalism attempted to understand everything (reality, 
morality, and aesthetics), we now get by with smaller narratives specific to 
our own contexts.
Often this incredulity toward meta-narratives shows itself in our casual 
attitude toward moral objectivity. Moral relativism, the view that moral 
evaluations are not universally true, is often found in public discourse. “To 
each his own,” we find ourselves saying, trying not to pass judgment on the 
behavior of others. Tolerance, always a virtue for humans, has now become 
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one of our highest virtues as we try to live peacefully in a broadly pluralistic 
society. Relativism is also seen regarding aesthetics. As we divide sharply 
over musical interests or favorite movies, our cultural “To each his own” 
philosophy expresses itself in phrases like “There is no accounting for taste” 
or “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.”
Yet there seems to be, despite the widespread trend toward relativism in 
morality and aesthetics, a deep human desire for bedrock order. Moral and 
aesthetic judgments, if much more difficult to make about many matters 
involving beauty or goodness, are still much easier to make about evil or 
ugliness, especially as they are taken to their extreme in horror. Philosophers 
like Cynthia Freeland have pointed out that horror involves a severe viola-
tion of our sense of moral, natural, and social order. Think of just about any 
horror film and you will find that it works upon us by tearing down some 
boundary we had in place, but perhaps forgot was there. Freeland writes 
that “monsters [are] beings that raise the specter of evil by overturning the 
natural order, whether it be an order concerning death, the body, God’s 
laws, natural laws, or ordinary human values.”10 The key element is a sense 
of violation. Thus horror is often rooted in what feels most safe and secure: 
the home (The Haunting or The Sixth Sense), the family (The Exorcist or The 
Shining), or innocent and mundane activities such as checking into a motel or 
babysitting (Psycho or Halloween). So recent works of horror, from Halloween 
and Psycho to The Birds on to The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, all depend for 
their effect on an intuitive sense of order to the world. This is a discomfort-
ing aspect to horror, but there is also a desirable quality to it. It terrifies us 
and gives us a sense of moral, social, and aesthetic stability. Recently, sitting 
in a movie theater watching a screening of Alfred Hitchcock’s 1960 classic 
film Psycho, I was struck with how the audience all startled at the same mo-
ments of surprising violence. The experience was communal in a way that 
few other experiences are: we all jumped together at the sudden appearance 
of “Mother” wielding a butcher knife. As a nation, of course, we have never 
been closer in recent memory than after the horrors of 9-11. Despite the 
divisions and problems that have followed in its wake, 9-11 itself provided 
a strong sense of national identity and purpose. Part of having moral order 
in the world necessitates having a real understanding of evil.
This is nowhere clearer in fiction, perhaps, than in Stephen King’s 
modern retelling of Dracula, ’Salem’s Lot. Where Bram Stoker’s 1897 clas-
sic assumed much more easily the idea that there could be evil forces at 
work in the world, Stephen King’s comfortable, peaceful twentieth-century 
Americans struggle to grasp that the nice new man who moved to town, Mr. 
Straker, could actually be a monster. Even the town priest must struggle to 
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come to grips with the reality of absolute evil as represented by the town’s 
vampire visitor. Yet in an extended passage, we hear in the priest’s effort to 
accept the idea of evil the need for some rock-bottom reality: “He was being 
forced to the conclusion that there was no evil in the world at all but only 
evil—or perhaps (evil). At moments like this he suspected that Hitler had 
been nothing but a harried bureaucrat and Satan himself a mental defective 
with a rudimentary sense of humor—the kind that finds feeding firecrackers 
wrapped in bread to seagulls unutterably funny.”11
This view of the world, however, the priest finds unutterably dull. In-
stead, as King writes, “[The priest] wanted to see evil with its cerements of 
deception cast aside. . . . He wanted to slug it out toe to toe with evil, like 
Muhummad Ali and Joe Frazier.”12 Fortunately (or unfortunately, depending 
on how you look at it), the priest does get a chance to face this evil, as does 
the rest of the town of ’Salem’s Lot, and it destroys most of them. These days 
we often find ourselves in the position of the priest in King’s novel, desiring 
to find a deeper meaning to our lives. Horror attempts, in the crudest and 
cruelest way possible, to give our world a shared sense of order.
The Dark Mirror: Horror and Moral Reflection
It seems, then, that horror not only provides a critique of our optimism 
about the world, but also expresses our pessimism about any sense of order: 
horror helps to illuminate aspects of our commonly held, if explicitly de-
nied, underlying objective view of morality. Stephen King, in his full-length 
treatment of horror, wittily describes the conservative moral core of horror 
as a “Republican in a three-piece suit” hiding underneath a rubber monster 
costume.13 Horror makes us recognize evils that must, if we know anything 
about the world at all, be wrong. Horror in this way is constructive.
Yet there is also something skeptical, or perhaps anarchical, about hor-
ror’s view of the world. In criticizing postmodern relativism, horror pushes 
us to take seriously our deepest moral convictions, but in criticizing lofty 
Enlightenment values, it also casts doubt on our highest moral intentions. 
Horror forces us to take seriously the darkness within our own nature, which 
cannot be overcome with technological wizardry. In fact, the opposite is often 
true, as the twentieth century (and its horror stories) bluntly attest.
Horror, therefore, provides a dark mirror in which we can examine 
ourselves by honestly facing the shadow side of the human condition as 
well as our deepest intuitive (and inviolate) sense of right and wrong. If 
horror does not reassure us with glad tidings, it does provide us with the 
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comforting sense that, while all may not be right with the world, or even 
within ourselves, there is order and meaning to the world. Monsters, inside 
us and outside us, still exist.
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The Justification of Torture-
Horror
Jeremy Morris
Among other vices, I cruelly hate cruelty, both by nature and by 
judgment, as the extreme of all vices. But this is to such a point 
of softness that I do not see a chicken’s neck wrung without 
distress, and I cannot bear to hear the scream of a hare in the 
teeth of my dogs, although the chase is a violent pleasure.
—Michel de Montaigne, “Of Cruelty” 
Some of these movies are so viciously nihilistic that the only 
point seems to be to force you to suspend moral judgments 
altogether.
—David Edelstein, “Now Playing at Your Local  Multiplex: 
Torture Porn”
When in a decisive 1988 presidential debate Bernard Shaw asked Michael 
Dukakis what he would do to someone who had raped and murdered his 
wife, the response was supposed to be obvious; but it was not so for Dukakis. 
He stated his opposition to the death penalty without a trace of vengeful 
passion.1 Last House on the Left (1972), on the other hand, indulged in its 
answer to the same sort of question: the film ends with the parents torturing 
and slaying their child’s murderers. Last House on the Left became a classic 
model for some of the most popular horror films. Dukakis’s answer became 
a model in its own right—for what not to do. It is now widely accepted, even 
by Dukakis himself, that his loss was partly due to that answer. To avoid 
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Dukakis’s fate, presidential candidates must express hatred and even violent 
intentions toward the criminal when asked that sort of question. For instance, 
in a 2004 debate John Kerry answered: “My instinct is to want to strangle 
that person with my own hands. . . . I understand the instincts, I really do.”2 
Though such a response is immediately tempered with a statement of the 
politician’s real position, cruel and vengeful feelings toward the criminal are 
a must and are taken as a sign of empathy with the victim.
Cruelty is about as vivid an expression of immorality as there is, and yet 
cruelty is a perennial source of entertainment in our culture. We should resist 
the temptation to ascribe the popularity of films such as Saw (2004), Hostel 
(2005), and The Devil’s Rejects (2005) to some exceptional depravity of our own 
time. A sober appraisal must recognize that torture-horror is a manifestation 
of a recurring form of recreation whose milestones include gladiator battles, 
inquisitions, and public executions. To dismiss the current popularity of the 
torture subgenre as a passing cinematic fetish is to ignore the depth of the 
important, if disturbing, questions raised. Is torture ever morally permissible? 
Is the enjoyment of torture ever morally justified? In what follows, I will explain 
how these questions relate to torture-horror movies. Whether or not torture 
can ever be justified, rationales for it, such as retribution, are important ele-
ments of the genre. A careful analysis of such elements may shed light on some 
of the moral issues raised by torture-horror. At the very least such an analysis 
can provide a deeper critical appreciation of torture-horror itself.
Elements of Torture-Horror
In true torture-horror, torture is the source of horror and not merely an ac-
cident of plot or character. It must include depictions of noninterrogational 
tortures that are realistic, accusatory, and essential to the narrative. Not every 
film that includes explicit depictions of torture is an example of the torture-
horror genre, for at least the reason that not all depictions of torture occur 
in horror films. For example, the fact that a central character is tortured in 
Syriana (2005) does not mean that it is a torture-horror film. Rather, the 
apparent intent of Syriana is to lead its audience through situations that 
include torture for the sake of a story about international politics. Horror is 
very different: generally speaking, the intent is to lead the audience through 
horrifying experiences for the sake of those experiences. The larger horror 
genre has other distinctive features, but it should suffice to say that whatever 
features are essential to horror are also features of the torture subgenre. If the 
general aim of a horror film is to develop a frightening scenario that is to be 
enjoyed for the fear it creates, then the general goal of a torture-horror film 
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is to develop such a scenario with depictions of torture. For torture-horror, 
it is important that torture and the characters of the torturers and tortured 
drive the narrative as the primary source of fear.
The different ends to which torture might be a means correspond to 
distinguishable elements of torture-horror.3 Each purpose lays the ground-
work for its particular answer to the justification questions: Is the torture 
justified? Is the audience’s enjoyment of torture justified? These purposes 
include interrogation, punishment, deterrence, terrorism, and sadism. 
Torture is interrogational when its purpose, misguided or not, is to glean 
information by means of torture. Torture can also be used as a means of 
either punishment or deterrence. The purpose of terroristic torture is to 
subdue or otherwise manipulate a larger group by means of random tor-
ture of some of its members. The purpose of sadistic torture is to provide 
enjoyment to the torturer or a third party. Although a given act of cruelty 
often has more than one of these purposes, each can be distinguished and 
evaluated on its own merits.
Interrogational torture is prominent in many films, but not in torture-
horror. The television series 24 includes, and in an important sense features, 
interrogational torture, but it is not torture-horror. Nonetheless, the series 
presents an answer to the justification question: extremely high stakes in 
the form of terrorist attacks are purported to justify the torture performed 
in interrogations. The recent fury of political debates over this answer gives 
the false impression that such scenarios are newly discovered possibilities, 
when in fact such high-stakes scenarios have for a long time figured in phi-
losophers’ arguments. For instance, high stakes are the basis of many argu-
ments against utilitarianism, a view that seems to allow for the justification 
of torture in some cases. Even Aristotle comments on torture as a form of 
interrogation, rejecting it as unreliable.4 I will leave these issues aside, since 
interrogational torture is not a distinctive feature of torture-horror. However, 
it is worth emphasizing an analogy between 24 and torture-horror. Both 
attempt to address the justification question through the intentions of the 
torturer. Although torture-horror must include noninterrogational torture, 
the intention of the torturer must be on display to or an issue for the audi-
ence. In torture-horror, the vengeful or sadistic purposes of the torture are a 
source of horror beyond the depiction of the torture itself, and it is through 
the torturer’s purpose that the justification questions are addressed.
Another theme of torture-horror is the transformations of torturers and 
victims. Victims or their survivors sometimes return for retribution (for 
example, the Collingwood parents in Last House on the Left and Paxton in 
Hostel) or acquire an appreciation of torture themselves (Amanda in Saw 
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II–III) or both (Sheriff Wydell in The Devil’s Rejects). Also, as in all of these 
films, the original torturers become the victims. In most torture-horror, one 
or more of the victims acquires at some point the intentions of a torturer. 
Such role reversals are one technique that encourages the audience to “be 
on the side of ” the torturer. In this way the justification question is foisted 
on the audience.
Finally, there is an important realist element to torture-horror. Unlike 
other types of horror, torture-horror is never supernatural, magical, or 
religious—at least not primarily. Although reference is sometimes made to 
such common horror ingredients, for example, the sarcastically religious 
sacrifice in House of 1000 Corpses (2003), they are not real in the world of 
torture-horror. When the supernatural becomes a real part of a story that 
might be otherwise torture-horror, the story is transformed into something 
else, for example, From Dusk Till Dawn (1996) and Videodrome (1983). That 
torture-horror is naturalistic is integral to its other elements. Appreciation of 
the intentions and emotions of the victim and the torturer as well as recogni-
tion of their role reversal is facilitated by a realistic narrative undistracted 
by the wildly unfamiliar. The realism in torture-horror is thus relevant to 
justification as well. The less real the depictions of torture, the less real and 
the less pressing are the questions, asked of the audience, of whether the 
torture and its enjoyment are justified.
The distinctive features of torture-horror, besides those that are distinc-
tive of horror generally, relate to the justification questions. These include 
focusing on realistic depictions of torture as the primary vehicle of fear, 
providing the torturer with a rationale, and the transformation of victims 
into torturers. Each can be found separately outside of the genre. Torture is 
by no means the exclusive province of horror. Role reversals can be found 
in almost any genre, as can realism. It is the particular combination of these 
elements that makes for torture-horror.
Retribution
A theory of retributive justice is defined by the claim that punishment is 
morally justified and made morally obligatory by the actions of the guilty. 
Immanuel Kant is perhaps the best defender of this view: “Juridical punish-
ment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another 
good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must 
in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted 
has committed a crime.”5 In a retributivist theory, the type of punishment 
that should be employed is also settled by the nature of the crime commit-
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ted. The most basic standard is the principle of equality, according to which 
“If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, 
you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill 
another, you kill yourself.”6 Now, it is not difficult to see how this principle 
can lead to absurdities: a rape for a rape, a mutilation for a mutilation, and 
so on. A code that assigns particular punishments to particular crimes, lex 
talionis, is an attempt to mitigate such complications. The same absurdities 
and compromises are present in torture-horror, a great deal of which can 
be understood as an exploration of lex talionis.
Kant’s classical defense of equal-punishment retributivism is couched 
in terms of individual autonomy and responsibility. In Kant’s conception, 
my autonomy is disrespected when another reaps the rewards or penalties 
of my actions. For instance, if every time I place a losing bet you are there 
to pick up the debt, it is not my gambling but our gambling. Something of 
mine other than money has been lost. In order to be really free, I need the 
world to react to my action without someone else in between. The same is 
true of my immoral acts if they go unpunished. If I am treated as a patient 
rather than an agent in action, then my action is no longer fully my own. 
Without responsibility, my sense of ownership of my actions is undermined. 
In Kant’s view, my responsibility is to live by the rules I expect others to live 
by. By acting in a certain way toward others, I am accepting that others can 
act in that way toward me. If I murder and I am autonomous in this sense, 
then I should be treated as a murderer. In murdering I have chosen murder 
as the rule, and so I may be justly killed. The justification of punishment that 
is equal to its crime is a consequence of an immoral and autonomous act. 
By killing a murderer, we are doing no more than respecting his autonomy. 
According to this argument, the retributivist view of equal punishment is 
the only view that respects autonomy.7
Such retributivism and its related conceptions of responsibility and 
autonomy are frequent themes of torture-horror. Last House on the Left, as I 
have already mentioned, is a classic example. When young Mari Collingwood 
and her friend go to a concert, they happen upon a band of criminals on 
the run and are tortured, raped, and murdered in the first part of the film. 
By coincidence, the criminals are invited into the home of Mari’s parents 
under the pretence of their being traveling salesmen with a broken-down car. 
Upon discovering that their houseguests are responsible for their daughter’s 
death, the parents seek retribution. The roles are reversed; Mari’s parents 
become the torturers. We are led by our empathy with Mari to our hatred of 
those who torture her, and so we find ourselves on the side of the parents. 
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The crimes against Mari serve as a retributivist justification for the cruel 
acts of her parents.
The retributivist element is developed in more elaborate ways in Seven 
(1995) and Saw. In both films the story centers on a torturer who devises 
ingenious punishments for various crimes. In Seven detectives Sommerset 
and Mills investigate a series of grisly murder scenes that are arranged to 
correspond to each of the seven deadly sins. A gluttonous man is force-fed 
until he literally explodes, a slothful man is bound to a bed for so long that 
he slowly wastes away, and so on. After turning himself in, the designer of 
these crimes announces that his purpose is to teach the world a lesson about 
human responsibility. This is also the purpose of the “Jigsaw Killer,” John 
Kramer, who, in the Saw series, devises numerous torture traps that usually 
drive their victims to kill others or themselves. Scratchy recordings of Jigsaw’s 
instructions to his victims explain the trap, how it can be escaped, and the 
lesson he intends to teach them. “Hello, Mark. If you’re so sick, then why do 
I have so many photos of you up and about? Let’s put your so-called illness to 
the test. Right now, there’s a slow-acting poison in your veins. The antidote 
is inside the safe, the combination to the safe is written on the wall. Hurry 
up and program it in but watch your step. By the way, that’s a flammable 
substance smeared on your body, so I would be careful with that candle, if 
I were you, or all the people you’ve burned with your act just might have 
their revenge.” It is hard to miss the retributivism in Jigsaw’s message to 
Mark. Mark does not die of the poison but, in a desperate attempt to avoid 
that fate, catches himself on fire and is burned to death. Mark’s demise is 
only a brief flashback, but it illustrates the essentials of the multiple Jigsaw 
traps that drive the plots of each film in the series. Unlike Last House on the 
Left, the crimes of the victims in the Saw films are complex and not always 
explicit. There is no clear equivalent to lying, as in the case of Mark, or voy-
eurism, as in the case of Adam. Jigsaw has to compose his own lex talionis. 
The complex traps reveal the flaws and strengths of the victims’ characters 
in ways that are intended to support Jigsaw’s purposes. It is for the audience 
to decide the extent to which Jigsaw’s tortures “fit” their victims, and this is 
undoubtedly a large part of the appeal.
What is common to Saw, Seven, and Last House on the Left is a theme 
of torture-horror generally: a narrative seeking for an appropriate code 
of punishment. Note that in this regard, the appeal of torture-horror is 
not unlike that offered by the carnival atmosphere of public executions, 
common until the last century. Now, before going any further, let me state 
clearly that I am not claiming that retribution is justification of torture in 
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any case. I claim only that torture-horror offers a modern presentation of the 
implications of retributivism and that alone may be sufficient to justify the 
enjoyment of torture-horror. Retributive justice in film is no more immoral 
than witnessing actual retributive actions: “When someone who delights in 
annoying and vexing peace loving folk receives at last a right good beating, 
it is certainly an ill, but everyone approves of it and considers it as good in 
itself even if nothing further results from it.”8
The appeal of retributivist torture-horror consists in a comprehension 
and evaluation of the torturer’s motives and methods.
Sadism
Role reversal is sometimes employed to illuminate retributive intentions: our 
empathy with the victims is transformed into a shared feeling of vengeance 
when they perform retributive acts of torture. As I argued above, the pro-
tagonists of Last House on the Left become the torturers, and the audience 
is led to share their feelings not only as victims but as torturers.
It is difficult to find an instance of torture-horror that is completely 
devoid of retributivism. Nonetheless, it would be both inaccurate and naive 
to claim that retributivism can explain the appeal of all torture-horror films, 
since many focus more intently on a different kind of torture: that which is 
purely sadistic. Moreover, even with torture that is depicted as retributive, 
there is often a suspicion that there is something else going on as well. It is 
relatively easy to see that the retributivist rationale does not apply to most 
of the torture depicted in The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (1974), Hostel, or 
The Devil’s Rejects.
Sometimes the motivation for cruelty is purely the pleasure and profit 
that torture brings to its practitioners. Pleasure and profit are the predomi-
nant motivations in Hostel: while touring Europe, a group of thrill-seeking 
young Americans is captured and sold to an industry that caters to thrill-
seeking millionaires who pay to torture. Given that the torture is driven en-
tirely by consumerism, justification questions go unanswered on retributivist 
grounds. So at first glance it may appear that enjoying Hostel is tantamount 
to partaking in the sadism. As it turns out, there is a last-minute retributiv-
ist aspect to Hostel: having escaped the torture factory, Paxton, one of the 
young tourists, corners and murders the Dutch businessman who, in one of 
the most intense torture scenes of the film, dismembered his friend. In this 
sense, Hostel provides a retributivist back door so that in the final scenes 
the audience is not left with the moral weight of pure sadism.
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There is less room for retributivist justification in The Devil’s Rejects. 
Although part of the story is driven by Sheriff Wydell’s quest for revenge 
for his brother’s murder, the most prominent torture scenes of the film have 
no such retributive purposes. The scenes just after the Firefly family’s initial 
escape from Wydell fill the first half of the film with seemingly pointless tor-
ture. Otis and Baby spend their time waiting for a rendezvous with Captain 
Spaulding by tormenting a hapless troupe of traveling musicians. Devoid of 
retributivism, these torture scenes display perhaps a deterrent, terroristic 
purpose, insofar as Otis and Baby need to control and ultimately employ 
their victims in uncovering a cache of weapons. Yet there is an undeniable 
emphasis placed on the sadistic joy of Otis and Baby as they torment their 
victims. By the second half of the film Otis and Baby are the heroes, remi-
niscing about their shared experiences as they plummet to their deaths while 
being chased by the police. The audience is left to accept their acts of torture 
as a kind of quirkiness to be appreciated for its uniqueness. Even in those 
scenes where retribution is the initial motivation, such as Sheriff Wydell’s 
murder of Mama Firefly and later his torturing of Spaulding and Otis, his 
pleasure, even sexual pleasure, is emphasized.
Sid Haig (as Captain J. T. Spaulding) in The Devil’s Rejects (2005). Directed by Rob 
Zombie. (Lions Gate Films/Photofest)
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What is morally wrong with this type of sadistic torture can be explained 
by a number of different principles. It is interesting to note that Kant’s ex-
planation of the wrongness of sadism is powered by the same arguments 
regarding autonomy that are invoked to explain the rightness of retributive 
punishment. Purely sadistic torture is by definition a violation of the victims’ 
autonomy since it is a use of people merely as a means to pleasure. Though 
there is something right about the Kantian explanation, it is a bit peculiar, in-
sofar as one might think the more natural explanation is that sadistic torture 
is wrong due to the intense suffering that it causes its victim. The concept of 
autonomy would hardly seem to exhaust the wrongness. Another explanation 
can be given by the utilitarian principle that the rightness or wrongness of 
an act is determined by its consequences with respect to the happiness or 
interests of those affected. Sadistic torture is wrong because on balance there 
is more harm caused to the victim than there is pleasure generated for the 
torturer (or others). However, the problem with the utilitarian explanation 
is that it allows that sadistic torture could be justified if a sufficient amount 
of pleasure is generated, such as a case with one victim and a large number 
of sadists. An even better explanation involves a condemnation of the inten-
tions of the torturer: sadistic torture is wrong both because it causes harm 
to its victim and because it is the expression of a misguided sensibility—one 
that delights in controlling others and making them suffer.9
Given these arguments against sadistic torture, how can enjoyment of 
purely sadistic scenes in torture-horror be justified? One answer is that en-
joyment, even that which is sadistic, is infectious. As an example, consider a 
torture-horror film that is totally devoid of the usual retributivist elements: 
The Texas Chainsaw Massacre. Explicit sadistic torture scenes include those 
that lead up to the grandfather’s feeble attempts to murder Sally. After seeing 
her brother murdered by Leatherface, Sally escapes, only to be recaptured 
by Cook. As they return in Cook’s truck to the house where Sally’s friends 
have already met their end, Cook strikes Sally with the end of a broomstick 
while she is bound and covered in the passenger seat. Though the physical 
assault is minor relative to those that occur in the rest of the film, this is one 
of the most horrifying scenes. The source of horror and enjoyment is the 
infectious glee expressed by Cook with each jab of the broom handle. He 
has successfully duped Sally into thinking he would help her and is now on 
his way home with his prize: his satisfaction is something that is meant to 
be shared or at least recognized by the audience. It is not as if the audience 
empathizes with Cook’s suffering; he is not suffering at all. It is Sally who is 
being tortured, but she is hidden in this scene and we hear only the faintest 
whimpers of pain. Rather, it is Cook’s delight that is on display and it is an 
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independent source of fear. That Cook’s acts of cruelty are so clearly wrong 
implicates those in the audience led to giggle along with him.
An analogous explication can be given for the sadistic scenes in The 
Devil’s Rejects. The persistent lightheartedness of Otis and Baby is always 
on display while they are taunting their victims. Their good cheer is made 
all the more contagious through their banter and joking with their victims 
and each other. Also, the classic rock and roll that plays as a soundtrack to 
their torture adventures works to further induce the audience to share their 
experiences. Here is the genius of sadistic torture-horror: it transforms the 
source of fear from a distant other to something familiar in ourselves. The 
terror of the victim is supplanted by the delight of the torturer, which is being 
consciously shared by the audience: that is the source of horror.
The appeal of sadistic torture-horror consists in careful manipulations 
of our moral sensibilities. The ability to share the suffering and joy of others 
naturally varies from person to person. Those that lack the ability completely 
are morally deficient, incapable of living a full life. Some sensitivity to the 
emotions of others is an obligatory characteristic of a morally good person. 
Yet, and this amounts to a serious theoretical difficulty much discussed in 
philosophy, according to rationalist theories such as Kant’s, such empathic 
sensibilities are irrelevant to moral evaluation. In contrast, sentimentalist 
theories hold that empathic abilities are crucial to morality: we should be 
emotionally repulsed at the suffering, as well as partake in the happiness, 
of others. Our moral status is at least partially based on our capacity to feel 
the pain or the joy of others.
There are really two opposites to empathy: not sharing the feelings of 
another and sharing the feelings with an opposite effect. The former is a 
lack of empathetic ability, and the latter is when that ability is misguided. 
As wrong as it is to have no empathic abilities, it is every bit as immoral to 
have misguided sensibilities, for example, feeling pleasure at the suffering 
of others. In this way, sentimentalism can explain why the sadistic char-
acters are immoral: they have misguided sensibilities. Yet torture-horror 
does not require an immoral audience, even according to sentimentalism. 
Torture-horror requires an audience both capable of empathy with the 
victims and able to share something of the joy of the torturers, however 
unsavory. Someone without both of these emotional capabilities does not 
get torture-horror and is morally deficient for the same reason. In order to 
enjoy sadistic torture-horror, the audience must experience both of these 
conflicting sentiments. Being conflicted in that way is not the mark of im-
morality; on the contrary, it is a moral vindication of the audience.
Utilitarianism gives another, albeit weaker, answer to the question of 
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whether enjoyment of sadistic torture-horror can be justified. Utilitarian-
ism holds that every interest, including the audience’s, should be considered 
impartially. Now, this allows that sadistic torture will be justified just in 
cases where the harm caused is less than the resulting good, all things con-
sidered. Although it is not clear what numbers and intensities are involved 
in actual cases of sadism, in torture-horror, there is apparently no actual 
harm caused.10 Enjoyment of sadistic torture-horror is, then, clearly justi-
fiable according to utilitarianism. However, as I have already mentioned, 
utilitarianism has the implausible consequence that real sadistic torture 
itself may be justified.
As important as it is to defend the enjoyment of torture-horror, it is 
at least as important to condemn actual acts of sadistic torture. So a sen-
timentalist answer to the justification question is more plausible. A fully 
empathetic person can share the suffering of the victim but can also share 
the joy of the torturer. Our ability to share the joy of others is not limited 
to their morally permissible actions. Although one believes that torture is 
wrong, that does not mean that one thereby ceases to be sensitive to the 
amusement of sadists. This sort of sentimentalist account does not require 
that the audience condone or otherwise justify the torture itself, but it does 
explain how a good person can justifiably enjoy torture-horror.
From retributivist elements of torture-horror to sadistic elements, it 
is significant how the genre entangles moral questions about torture with 
moral questions about its own audience. Retributivist elements play on our 
sense of justice and vengeance, whereas sadistic elements can implicate our 
empathetic sensibilities. Pure cruelty obviously has no rationalistic justifi-
cation along the lines of interrogation or retribution, but it may trouble us 
nonetheless as something we would enjoy if we were in the torturer’s shoes. 
The implication of the audience through the torturer’s purposes and experi-
ences is both essential to the genre and a primary source of its appeal.
Realism
The attention to realistic detail in torture-horror is at least one reason critics 
have pigeonholed the genre as possessing a preoccupation with the newest 
advances in special effects. So why is torture-horror so realistic? Part of the 
answer has to be that realism supports the other elements discussed so far. 
Fantastical turns reduce our ability to identify with the characters, and the 
more visceral the violence, the more vivid are the impressions of empathy 
and cruelty. Being told about cruelty creates less of an impression than 
witnessing it. One sure way to induce sentiment is to make depictions of 
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suffering and joy as vivid as possible. The retributivist and sentimentalist 
elements in torture-horror are amplified by such realism.
Few torture-horrors have dealt recursively with the realist element, 
save one possible example: Videodrome. In an attempt to gratify his taste for 
greater realism in depictions of torture, an obscure network executive, Max 
Renn, is willing to exploit pirated snuff films, first with foreign victims, then 
with familiar ones, and eventually with himself. One of the themes of Video-
drome is that by seeking more realistic depictions of torture, we identify more 
with the victims as well as the perpetrators of the torture.11 This summarizes 
one of the points of realism in torture-horror. One way to induce feelings of 
empathy is via self-identification with those whose feelings we empathize 
with. Realism, by definition, facilitates this identification and thus aids the 
implication and ultimately the fear and enjoyment of the audience.
Deriding our amusements is nearly as common as experiencing them. 
Boxing,  sportfishing, and pornography are just some of the targets of moral 
denunciation.12 Among the arguments one finds against these forms of enter-
tainment are those that would seem to apply to torture-horror. For instance, 
the enjoyment of pornography is wrong, according to Helen Longino, since 
pornography features and endorses actions that are degrading to women: 
“Pornography is not just the explicit representation or description of sexual 
behavior . . . it is material that explicitly represents or describes degrading 
and abusive sexual behavior so as to endorse and/or recommend the behavior 
as described.” She argues that pornography so defined should be restricted 
since its availability encourages harm to women: “As much as the materials 
themselves, the social tolerance of these degrading and distorted images of 
women in such quantities is harmful to us, since it indicates a general will-
ingness to see women in ways incompatible with our fundamental human 
dignity and thus to justify treating us in those ways.” For this reason, “both 
the manufacture and distribution of pornography and the enjoyment of it 
are instances of sexist behavior” and should be controlled.13
Is this kind of condemnation supported by the moral theories discussed 
so far? Because pornography endorses the use of women merely as means 
to sexual pleasure, it is clearly wrong on Kantian grounds. Moreover, por-
nography causes harm to women by promoting a general acceptance of 
violence toward them. If Longino is right, its enjoyment encourages harm-
ful behavior. So it is wrong according to utilitarianism as well. But if these 
theories support the condemnation of pornography, is it then consistent to 
justify torture-horror on those same theories? That depends both on whether 
torture-horror is pornography, as some have claimed, and on whether the 
arguments for torture-horror and against pornography are all sound.
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If we merely substitute the words “human being” for “women,” Longino’s 
argument against pornography applies easily to torture-horror: “As much 
as the materials themselves, the social tolerance of these degrading and 
distorted images of human beings in such quantities is harmful to us, since 
it indicates a general willingness to see human beings in ways incompat-
ible with our fundamental human dignity and thus to justify treating us in 
those ways.” In fact, such comparisons have bestowed on torture-horror the 
derisive nickname “torture-porn.”14 The anti–torture-horror/pornography 
arguments, in order to be sound, must assume the truth of the following 
type of entailments: Degradation of women is wrong. Therefore, enjoyment 
of such degradation (for example, pornography) is wrong. Cruelty is wrong. 
Therefore, enjoying cruelty (for example, torture-horror) is wrong. But these 
entailments are not generally sound. To avoid begging the question, consider 
a case of dishonesty enjoyed by all. Assuming that lying is wrong in a given 
case does not show that enjoying lying, whether on your part or someone 
else’s, is wrong. Consider the number of lies that it might require to arrange 
a surprise birthday party or the proliferation of lies in a typical comedy. 
Also, though some practical jokes are immoral, some are clearly morally 
permissible though they involve some lying. Whatever distinguishes morally 
permissible enjoyments from those that are wrong, it is not the moral status 
of the act that is enjoyed itself. This shows that anti-amusement arguments 
of this type are invalid. Thus Longino’s argument fails in a general way even 
if it is assumed that torture-horror is a form of pornography.
As for whether torture-horror is really pornography, it should not be 
assumed that torture-horror endorses torture in any sense other than as a 
source of horror. The attempt to implicate the audience through retributivist 
justifications or with identification with the torturer is not the same thing 
as endorsing the torture committed. I have conducted this discussion with 
the less tendentious term torture-horror rather than torture-porn because it 
is not clear that torture-horror meets the endorsement condition.
The question of whether it is morally permissible to enjoy pornography 
parallels the justification question for torture-horror. But as I hope to have 
made clear, there is as much a distinction between an act of torture and 
enjoying an act of torture as between other immoral acts and the enjoyment 
of such things. This is not to say that pornographers or the makers of torture-
horror films do not also enjoy what they are doing, but that such enjoyment, 
also shared by others, can be separated from the act itself. Insofar as cruelty 
is endorsed by one’s enjoyment of torture-horror, such enjoyment is wrong. 
However, being disturbed, and enjoying being disturbed, by depictions of 
torture, or even the enjoyment of being confounded by the justification 
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question itself, is not to endorse the torture. That the question is open as to 
whether the torture might be justified may itself be a source of horror.
The enjoyment of torture-horror is not necessarily immoral. The prevail-
ing theme of the torture-horror genre is the attempt to share the purposes, 
intentions, and feelings behind realistic torture. By putting the audience on 
the side of the torturer in some way or other, the audience is disturbed in a 
way that goes beyond the fear generated by bare depictions of torture.
Notes
My epigraphs are taken from Michel de Montaigne, “Of Cruelty,” in The Complete Works, 
trans. D. Frame (New York: Knopf, 2003), 372; and David Edelstein, “Now Playing at 
Your Local  Multiplex: Torture Porn,” New York Magazine, January 28, 2006.
1. The actual question was “You have two minutes to respond. Governor, if Kitty 
Dukakis were raped and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable death penalty for 
the killer?” Quoted from the transcript of the 1988 presidential debate provided by the 
Commission on Presidential Debates.
2. Quoted from the CNN transcript of the 2004 primary debate hosted by CNN 
and the Los Angeles Times.
3. Here I mean types distinguished not by technique but by intent. A similar dis-
tinction can be found in C. Tindale, “The Logic of Torture,” Social Theory and Practice 
22, no. 3 (1996): 349–77. “While the nature of the torture may vary very little from one 
case to another, the justification used to defend it may differ. . . . We can identify three 
distinct types, each distinguished by the goals that motivate the torturer” (350).
4. “Examination by torture is one form of evidence, to which great weight is often 
attached because it is in a sense compulsory. Here again it is not hard to point out the 
available grounds for magnifying its value, if it happens to tell in our favor, and arguing 
that it is the only form of evidence that is infallible; or, on the other hand, for refuting 
it if it tells against us and for our opponent, when we may say what is true of torture of 
every kind alike, that people under its compulsion tell lies quite as often as they tell the 
truth, sometimes persistently refusing to tell the truth, sometimes recklessly making a 
false charge in order to be let off sooner. We ought to be able to quote cases, familiar to 
the judges, in which this sort of thing has actually happened. [We must say that evidence 
under torture is not trustworthy, the fact being that many men whether thick-witted, 
tough-skinned, or stout of heart endure their ordeal nobly, while cowards and timid men 
are full of boldness till they see the ordeal of these others: so that no trust can be placed 
in evidence under torture.]” Aristotle, Rhetoric, book 1, chapter 15, [1377a].
5. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. J. Ladd (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 99–107.
6. Ibid., 99.
7. Since it is not clearly horror, it is not clear whether Kubrick’s A Clockwork Or-
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ange (1971) is a torture-horror, but it is clear that the “rehabilitation” of Alex, a sadistic 
torturer, destroys his sense of self in a way that echoes the Kantian view of autonomy 
and responsibility.
 8. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. Beck (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1949), 170.
 9. Montaigne’s expression of his natural disgust at cruelty in the first epigraph is 
a reference to his occasional preference for this type of sentimentalist virtue. See his 
“Of Cruelty,” 372–86.
10. It is far from uncontroversial to state that no actual harm is caused by violent 
films, for example, those in the torture-horror genre. H. Longino argues that even if no 
one is actually harmed in filming, depictions of violence may cause violent behavior 
in their audience and thus actual harm (“Pornography, Oppression, and Freedom: A 
Closer Look,” in Social Ethics, ed. T. Mappes and J. Zembaty [New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1980], 234–41). I discuss Longino’s argument in more detail below.
11. Ironically, Videodrome is itself too unrealistic to be clearly in the genre of tor-
ture-horror. Before taking his own life, for instance, Max is transformed into a video 
machine.
12. D. De Leeuw argues against the permissibility of sportfishing as a form of 
entertainment since he regards sportfishing as torture (“Contemplating the Interests 
of Fish: The Angler’s Challenge,” Environmental Ethics 18 [1996]: 373–90). L. Olson’s 
criticism of his argument against sportfishing helped to inspire my response to moral 
attacks on torture-horror. See “Contemplating the Intentions of Anglers: The Ethicist’s 
Challenge,” Environmental Ethics, 25, no. 3 (2003), 267–79.
13. Longino, “Pornography, Oppression, and Freedom,” 238, 240, 241.
14. See Edelstein, “Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex.”
Hobbes, Human Nature, and  
the Culture of American 
Violence in Truman Capote’s  
In Cold Blood
Thomas Fahy
The life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
—Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
[Men are] creatures among whose instinctual endowments is 
to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, 
their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual 
object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their ag-
gressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without 
compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize 
his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture 
and to kill him.
—Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents
On November 15, 1959, Dick Hickock and Perry Smith drove several hun-
dred miles to the small town of Holcomb, Kansas, and brutally murdered 
four members of the Clutter family. Armed with a hunting knife and a 
twelve-gauge shotgun, the two men entered the house through an unlocked 
door just after midnight. They had been hoping to find a safe with thousands 
of dollars, but when Herb Clutter denied having one, they tied him up and 
gagged him. They did the same to his wife, Bonnie, his fifteen-year-old son, 
Kenyon, and his sixteen-year-old daughter, Nancy. Afterward, they placed 
each of them in separate rooms and searched the house for themselves. When 
they found no more than forty dollars, Smith slit Herb Clutter’s throat and 
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shot him in the face. He then proceeded to execute the rest of the family. 
Each one died from a point-blank shotgun wound to the head.
One month later, Truman Capote, who had first read about these crimes 
in the New York Times, arrived in Holcomb with his longtime friend, the 
author Nelle Harper Lee.1 Both the horrifying details of the murders and the 
strangeness of the place appealed to Capote. Everything about Kansas—the 
landscape, dialect, social milieu, and customs—was completely alien to 
him, and he was energized by the prospect of trying to capture this world 
in prose. He recognized that the case might never be solved, since the po-
lice had no clues about the identity of Hickock and Smith at the time, but 
that didn’t concern him. He primarily wanted to write about the impact of 
these horrific killings on the town. As biographer Gerald Clarke explains, 
Capote was less interested in the murders than in their potential “effect on 
that small and isolated community.”2 Six years later, after the execution of 
Hickock and Smith, he completed his “nonfiction novel” In Cold Blood: A 
True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences—a work that offers 
a chilling portrait of violence and fear in American culture.
But why is this book so terrifying? Before reading the first page, we know 
the outcome. Even if we haven’t heard of the Clutter family, the description 
on the back of the book tells us that there is no mystery here. Capote even 
announces as much at the end of the first short chapter: “four shotgun blasts 
that, all told, ended six human lives.” We know the Clutters will die and that 
the killers will be caught and executed. So what makes Capote’s narrative so 
frightening and unsettling? The author gives some clue in the next sentence: 
“But afterward the townspeople, theretofore sufficiently unfearful of each 
other to seldom trouble to lock their doors, found fantasy re-creating them 
over and again—those somber explosions that stimulated fires of mistrust 
in the glare of which many old neighbors viewed each other strangely, and 
as strangers.”3 In Capote’s rendering of this event, we, too, re-create “those 
somber explosions” and share in the fearful mistrust of others. We try to 
grapple with what these killings suggest about human nature, and in the 
process our neighbors become strangers, too. They become potential threats, 
undermining our own sense of safety and security.
Capote’s book raises several disturbing questions for the reader as well: 
How and why were Hickock and Smith capable of such brutality? Could 
you or I do such things? These questions resonate with Thomas Hobbes’s 
philosophy about the innate aggression and brutality of human beings. His 
pessimistic outlook can provide some insight into the source of terror in 
Capote’s work—that such violence, resentment, and anger are in all of us. 
Before discussing this connection, I will situate In Cold Blood in the horror 
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genre by focusing on its use of a horrific event and the imagined encounter 
with the monstrous. I will then discuss Hobbes’s notion of human nature 
and the sovereign—a figure that promises to provide moral justice and 
prevent mankind from being in a perpetual state of war. But what happens 
if this source of moral authority (the sovereign) is absent? If the veneer of 
civilization is removed? Capote’s answer, like the one offered by Hobbes, is 
clear: we will all act in cold blood.
The Horror of In Cold Blood
The horror of In Cold Blood operates on several levels: its realism, the bru-
tality of the crime, the random selection of victims (Smith and  Hickock 
had never met the Clutters before the night of the killing), the incongruity 
between the primary motive (theft) and the ultimate outcome (multiple 
murders), the fear that swept through the state in its aftermath, and the cal-
lous indifference and lack of remorse on the part of Hickock and Smith. So 
can In Cold Blood, which promises a journalistic account of actual events, 
be understood in terms of the horror genre as well?
By making this connection I’m not trying to minimize the real tragedy 
of these crimes. I’m merely suggesting that Capote uses some of the conven-
tions of horror, as well as the suspense/thriller genres, to craft his rendering 
of these events. Capote himself labeled the work a nonfiction novel, and this 
invites us to think about the literary devices shaping In Cold Blood. “Journal-
ism,” he said, “always moves along a horizontal plane, telling a story, while 
fiction—good fiction—moves vertically, taking you deeper and deeper into 
character and events. By treating a real event with fictional techniques . . 
. it’s possible to make this kind of synthesis.”4 Capote’s fusion of reporting 
and fiction here enabled him to present Hickock and Smith’s crime and its 
subsequent investigation as a novelist. He could make choices to create a 
certain effect and to manipulate the reader’s response.
As suggested above, part of the momentum of In Cold Blood comes 
from the details that resonate with suspense/thriller fiction. A crime has 
been committed that launches a nationwide manhunt. Lead detectives work 
around the clock, piecing together clues and interviewing suspects in hopes 
of a lucky break. At one point, the special agent in charge learns that the 
men are back in Kansas, and the chase intensifies. But the facts of the case 
undermine these familiar-sounding conventions at every turn. The crime 
has been “solved” for the reader before the first page. The identity of the 
criminals is discovered by accident when Hickock’s former cellmate, who 
told him about the Clutters in the first place, hears a radio broadcast about 
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the murders and reveals Hickock’s identity to the authorities. Smith and 
Hickock are caught not because of Special Agent Dewey’s hard work and 
ingenuity; they are apprehended because of their own incompetence and 
arrogance. The book also suggests that Smith’s abuse as a child, his family’s 
neglect, his inability to pursue an education, and his association with people 
like Hickock helped shape him into a killer. Such revelations often occur in 
the suspense/thriller genres as well, but Capote is using them here to create 
sympathy for the killer—a response that complicates our response to his 
execution. When the people of Holcomb first see Smith and Hickock after 
they have been apprehended, for example, Capote notes that they all respond 
with stunned silence. “But when the crowd caught sight of the murderers, 
with their escort of blue-coated highway patrolmen, it fell silent, as though 
amazed to find them humanly shaped” (248). When faced with such horrible 
crimes, we expect the monstrous, the inhuman. Yet Capote’s sympathetic 
characterization of Smith, in particular, makes it difficult for the reader to 
view him as a monster.
This is where In Cold Blood intersects with the horror genre as well—an 
encounter with the monstrous. Noël Carroll, in his influential work The 
Philosophy of Horror; or, Paradoxes of the Heart, argues that monsters are the 
central feature of horror. Vampires, werewolves, and zombies, for example, 
are recognizable threats, and the danger they pose must be destroyed/de-
feated to restore harmony. Monsters also elicit the emotional effect that 
the genre seeks—horror—because they literally embody the abnormal. As 
Carroll explains, “The objects of art-horror are essentially threatening and 
impure.”5 They inspire revulsion, disgust, and nausea.
A number of scholars have criticized this narrow definition, arguing 
that serial killers and more realistic monsters must be accounted for as well. 
David Russell, for example, offers a broader taxonomy for the horror genre, 
arguing that “some types of monsters may be explained as ‘real’ . . . [in that 
they] are not remarkable in any physical sense. Their threat to normality is 
manifested solely through abnormal behavior challenging the rules of so-
cial regulation through ‘monstrous’ and transgressive behavior.”6 He labels 
these monsters “deviant”—a category that includes stalkers, slashers, and 
psychokillers. Critic Matt Hills also responds to Carroll’s limited framework 
by suggesting an event-based definition of the genre (as opposed to Carroll’s 
entity-based definition) so that “we can take in the widest possible range of 
texts that have been discussed as ‘horror’ by audiences and labeled as such 
by filmmakers and marketers.”7 Both of these characteristics are evident in 
Capote’s book. As a ruthless killer, Smith is certainly a realistic monster, and 
the Clutter murders qualify as horrific events.
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But let’s return to Carroll’s emphasis on monsters for a moment. Even 
though In Cold Blood doesn’t fit the supernatural requirements of his defi-
nition of horror, Capote does present Hickock and Smith as monstrous on 
physical and psychological levels. His descriptions of their anomalous, dam-
aged bodies attempt to ascribe some physical difference to their aberrant 
behavior. Smith is first depicted as a man with “stunted legs that seemed 
grotesquely inadequate to the grown-up bulk they supported” (15), and 
Special Agent Dewey takes note of Smith’s disproportionate body at his ex-
ecution: “He remembered his first meeting with Perry in the interrogation 
room at Police Headquarters in Las Vegas—the dwarfish boy-man seated 
in the metal chair, his small booted feet not quite brushing the floor” (341).  
Likewise, Hickock has a tattooed body, serpentine eyes “with a venomous, 
sickly-blue squint,” and a face “composed of mismatched parts . . . as though 
his head had been halved like an apple, then put together a fraction off center” 
(31). As a boy-man (dwarf/adult) and serpent-man (with a divided face), 
Smith and Hickock are hybrid figures like the monsters that typically appear 
in horror fiction. Their bodies, like their actions, violate social norms and 
categories (moral/immoral, good/evil, human/inhuman), and this element 
resonates with Carroll’s argument about monsters as repelling and compel-
ling “because they violate standing categories.”8
At the same time, these physical aberrations are not so pronounced that 
the townspeople of Holcomb can comfortably “Other” Hickock and Smith. 
Their bodies do not live up to the monsters whom they imagined responsible 
for the killings. As noted above, they initially responded to these men with 
stunned silence, “as though amazed to find them humanly shaped,” but in 
many horror stories unreal monsters come in human form. The horror, in 
other words, resides within. Just like a serial killer who seems like a nice guy 
to his neighbors, werewolves “hide” inside human beings until a full moon; 
vampires can “pass” as human until they reveal their fangs. The notion of 
a threat from within is integral to the terror of In Cold Blood.9 Smith isn’t a 
werewolf or a vampire. He is a person just like us, but a killer lurks inside. 
Like these supernatural counterparts, he can transform at any moment from 
charming loner to ruthless murderer, which is evident in his confession: “I 
thought [Herb Clutter] was a very nice gentleman. Soft-spoken. I thought 
so right up to the moment I cut his throat” (244). What makes Smith so 
terrifying is not simply the suddenness of his transformation here, but the 
fact that he doesn’t physically turn into a monster. At some level, the town 
of Holcomb, as well as the reader, fears this lack of visual otherness because 
it implies that anyone can be like Smith.
This implication also fuels fears in the community that the killer lives 
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among them. On hearing the news of the murders, one townsperson re-
sponds: “If it wasn’t him, maybe it was you. Or somebody across the street” 
(69). Another remarks: “What a terrible thing when neighbors can’t look 
at each other without a kind of wondering!” (70) And even when the kill-
ers are apprehended, their suspicions don’t vanish. “For the majority of 
Holcomb’s population, having lived for seven weeks amid unwholesome 
rumors, general mistrust, and suspicion, appeared to feel disappointed at 
being told that the murderer was not someone among themselves” (231). 
Once they admit that anyone has the potential to be a monster, they can’t 
stop being afraid of one another.
State of Nature: Man and the Need for Society
Thomas Hobbes makes this kind of fear the basis for his analysis of human 
nature in Leviathan, which was first published in 1651. For Hobbes, the 
natural state of man, which exists outside the context of society, is one of 
war. In this condition we are constantly pursuing pleasure, vying for power 
over others, and doing everything possible to avoid death. This creates an 
environment in which every man is “against every man,” and he feels entitled 
to “every thing, even to one another’s body.”10 Not only do these impulses 
motivate human action, they also cause us to live in constant fear. We rec-
ognize that even the strongest individual can be killed by the weakest and 
that we are continually at risk of having everything taken from us at any 
moment (including life itself).
Not surprisingly, morality is relative in this context. There is no absolute 
“good” and “evil” in a state of nature, only desire and aversion. “Good, and 
evil, are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different 
tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different.”11 Each individual, 
in other words, determines morality: we desire what is good and have an 
aversion to what is bad. But because these things differ for everyone, we 
often pursue them at the expense of others. As Helen Thornton explains 
in State of Nature or Eden? Thomas Hobbes and His Contemporaries on the 
Natural Condition of Human Beings: “In the state of nature, every man, by 
right of nature, could do whatever he liked to whomever he liked. He could 
possess, use and enjoy anything, even another’s body. Nature made men 
desire what was good for them, and avoid what was evil. Death, and the pain 
that accompanied it, was the greatest enemy of nature, so it was not against 
reason for an individual to do everything he could to preserve himself.”12 
This instinct for self-preservation applies even to murder. Since everyone is 
against everyone else and the struggle for survival is paramount, the act of 
Hobbes, Human Nature, and the Culture of American Violence 63
killing is not evil. It is completely justified. And this leads Hobbes to conclude 
that “the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”13
As an early Enlightenment figure, Hobbes believed that reason ultimately 
led to the formation of society. People realized that living in constant fear of 
someone taking their property or attempting to kill them was no way to live. 
Therefore, they came together in a large group and made agreements with 
one another to remove fear. Of course, society can’t get rid of fear entirely. 
If it could, Hobbes points out, we wouldn’t feel the need to lock our doors 
at night. But a social contract does provide some measure of security, and 
it keeps most of us from reverting to a warlike state.
At the same time, Hobbes insists that society must be governed by 
an individual or group of individuals with absolute authority. His central 
analogy for this society (commonwealth) is the leviathan—a large, healthy 
body with various parts that cooperate. It functions much like the parts 
of a human body, which work together to perform tasks, such as walking 
down the street or typing a sentence. In the social body, the sovereign is 
both the soul, giving it moral purpose by determining right and wrong, and 
the law, handing out rewards and punishment. It is important to note that 
the people agree to the decisions of this figure. As Hobbes explains, men 
“have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth; so also they 
made artificial chains, called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual 
covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to 
whom they have given sovereign power; and at the other end to their own 
ears.”14 We choose to subject ourselves to this authority because it holds 
together the commonwealth and maintains peace and security. It keeps us 
from being at war with our neighbors.
In many ways, Hickock and Smith operate in a state of nature through-
out In Cold Blood, wantonly pursuing their own pleasure and power at the 
expense of others. Describing his own motivations, for example, Hickock 
explains that “at the time I never give any thought to whether it’s right or 
wrong. The same with stealing. It seems to be an impulse” (278).  Dr. Jones, 
the psychiatrist who examines him before the trial, comes to a similar 
conclusion: “[Hickock] is a person who is impulsive in action, likely to do 
things without thought of consequences or future discomfort to himself or 
to others” (294–95).  Like a man in Hobbes’s state of nature, Hickock pursues 
immediate pleasure without the thought of social (or personal) consequence. 
His penchant for statutory rape offers one example of this. When his desire 
for young girls comes into conflict with social norms, he simply rationalizes 
his behavior. “Seducing pubescent girls, as he had done ‘eight or nine’ times 
in the last several years, did not disprove [his normalcy], for if the truth were 
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known, most real men had the same desires he had” (201). For Hickock, 
these urges are natural in men and shouldn’t be considered wrong. This 
assertion of his own normalcy also gives Hickock another way to distance 
himself from social mores and the judgment of others.
Hickock is also motivated by what Hobbes describes as a “perpetual 
and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”15 As 
the narrator of In Cold Blood explains, “Envy was constantly with him; the 
Enemy was anyone who was someone he wanted to be or who had anything 
he wanted to have” (200). Envy causes Hickock to remain in a warlike state. 
He sees everyone and everything as something to conquer, and he feels 
completely justified in doing whatever he likes to others—including theft, 
rape, and murder. Hickock achieves this power primarily through violence. 
“With a knife in his hand, he, Dick, had power” (201). As Smith explains 
about his partner, “the glory of having everybody at his mercy, that’s what 
excited him” (239). It is Hickock’s use of violence that gives him both power 
and immediate pleasure (it “excited him”)—the two impulses that determine 
human behavior for Hobbes.
Smith is also motivated by pleasure and power. In Capote’s account, 
there is an underlying homoerotic attraction between the killers (Hickock 
even refers to Smith as “Honey” throughout the text), and Smith derives real 
pleasure from this relationship. “Dick’s literalness, his pragmatic approach 
to every subject, was the primary reason Perry had been attracted to him, 
for it made Dick seem, compared to himself, so authentically tough, invul-
nerable, ‘totally masculine’” (16). In a sense, Smith is not only “charmed” 
(124) by Hickock, he also experiences a vicarious power through him—an 
authenticity he lacks otherwise. Even after their arrest, which was largely 
due to Hickock’s insistence on returning to the United States after they had 
successfully escaped to Mexico, and his confession blaming Smith for the 
murders, Smith misses him intensely. “Many thoughts of Dick, he wrote one 
day in his makeshift diary. . . . What he most desired [was] to talk to Dick, 
be with him again” (259). His greatest desire isn’t freedom or forgiveness. 
It’s to be with Hickock again because this relationship arguably fulfills his 
Hobbesian need for pleasure and power.
The lack of remorse from Hickock and Smith also resonates with the 
moral relativism in Hobbes’s state of nature. As mentioned above, Hickock 
never thought about right and wrong while breaking the law, and Smith 
was also viewed as having no moral compass. “The rights of other people 
mean nothing to Smith,” his sister explained. “He has no respect for anyone” 
(181). Smith later admits this lack of feeling about the Clutter murders. “I 
don’t feel anything about it. I wish I did. But nothing about it bothers me a 
Hobbes, Human Nature, and the Culture of American Violence 65
bit” (291). Smith and Hickock define right and wrong in Hobbesian terms 
of appetite and aversion, not social responsibility. This explains Smith’s 
anger toward his sister, who rejects this kind of callous self-interest: “You 
are a human being with a free will. Which puts you above the animal level. 
But if you live your life without feeling and compassion for your fellow 
man—you are as an animal—‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’ . . . All 
of us are responsible to the community we live in & its laws” (142). Smith’s 
sister clearly believes in the commonwealth, in a society of laws and justice, 
crimes and punishment. But Hickock and Smith, acting in accord only with 
their desires, see themselves as outside of the social contract. They remain 
outcasts, wanderers, “brothers in the breed of Cain” (260),16 whose only 
purpose, as Hobbes would argue, is “to come prepared with forces united, 
to dispossess and deprive [another], not only of the fruit of his labour, but 
also of his life, or liberty.”17 Furthermore, since each individual defines right 
and wrong differently in a state of nature, men invariably come into conflict 
with each other. Hickock and Smith are no exception, and the gradual ero-
sion of their friendship stems from the ways in which their different desires 
begin to clash.
Sovereigns and Eden on Earth
In Cold Blood also presents the sovereign (in this case two sovereigns) as 
essential for peace and safety: Clutter and Truman Capote himself. Accord-
ing to Hobbes, the sovereign establishes security and order, enforcing our 
agreements with others, resolving disputes, and imposing punishment. He 
also determines the ideology of the state (what is right and wrong, just and 
unjust). Under his authority, therefore, good and evil are absolute. And this 
is the kind of worldview that Clutter imposes on those around him.
In the first part of In Cold Blood, Clutter functions as a sovereign figure 
both for the community and for his family. He has a privileged place in and 
around Holcomb. He was “the community’s most widely known citizen . . . 
and his name was everywhere respectfully recognized” (6). The narrator even 
describes him in regal terms: “Like royalty, he was famous for never carry-
ing cash” (46).  As a man with a large farm and the need to hire numerous 
employees, he has a certain power over others, which for Clutter includes 
issues of morality:
The truth was he opposed all stimulants, however gentle. He did not 
smoke, and of course he did not drink. . . . While he was careful to 
avoid making a nuisance of his view, to adopt outside his realm an 
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externally uncensoring manner, he enforced them within his family 
and among the employees at River Valley Farm. . . . [Every appli-
cant had to] sign a work contract containing a clause that declared 
an agreement instantly void if the employee should be discovered 
“harboring alcohol.” A friend . . . had once told him, “You’ve got no 
mercy. I swear, Herb, if you caught a hired man drinking, out he’d 
go. And you wouldn’t care if his family was starving.” (10)
Clutter determines what is acceptable behavior for his employees, and his 
friend’s response suggests that Clutter perceives his own moral authority 
as absolute. He even enforces this ideology in legally binding contracts. 
This moralistic quality is apparent to the rest of the community as well, 
and it goes hand in hand with Clutter’s privileged place. “There wasn’t any 
other family like them. . . . Mr. Clutter may have been more strict about 
some things—religion, and so on—but he never tried to make you feel he 
was right and you were wrong” (50). The verb “tried” suggests that this is 
exactly what Clutter did, however. He may not have wanted to make others 
feel “wrong,” but the town was completely aware of his moral expectations 
and judgment.
Clutter exercises similar authoritarian rule over his family. He not 
only demands that his daughter stop seeing her boyfriend, Bobby (he was 
Roman Catholic, while the Clutters were Methodist), but he also keeps his 
children in the local high school, as opposed to sending them to a better 
institution in Garden City. In short, he “considered such defections an af-
front to community spirit” (21). This decision reflects not only his belief in 
the importance of society; it also demonstrates his essential place in it. He 
recognizes his power to hold the community together, and he doesn’t want 
to erode Holcomb’s sense of solidarity by abandoning its school system.
Like the role of the sovereign in Hobbes, Clutter’s “reign” is associated 
with social stability. He presides over a peaceful, Eden-like atmosphere, 
and he “often remarked, ‘an inch more of rain and this country would be 
paradise—Eden on earth’” (12). He even plants an orchard—“a patch of 
paradise, the green, apple-scented Eden” (13)—to reinforce this illusion. 
Hobbes reminds us that man needed a sovereign only after the Fall. Once 
Adam and Eve were banished from the Garden of Eden, human beings lived 
in a fallen world in which pain, suffering, hardship, and death were possible.18 
The sovereign can’t restore Eden but, like Clutter in his influence on his estate 
and the town surrounding it, he can help establish a safe, secure, and peaceful 
community. Not surprisingly, Holcomb is described in these terms. The locals 
talk about it as a place where one couldn’t ask for “friendlier people or fresher 
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air or sweeter drinking water.” Folks passing through often stay because of 
the community. “Good neighbors, people who care about each other, that’s 
what counts” (33). And this caring includes social equality, too: “All equal, 
regardless of wealth, color, or creed” (34). The narrator acknowledges that 
some of this rhetoric might overstate the case, but the people living there 
clearly perceive this community as beneficial and safe. And it’s a place that 
Clutter’s larger-than-life reputation seems to preside over.
For Hobbes, who was a monarchist, the power of the sovereign figure 
has to be absolute. There is no case in which overthrowing a sovereign is 
acceptable because without a ruler we will “return therefore to the sword 
again.”19 Thus a bad sovereign is better than having no society, and the death 
of Clutter illustrates this danger—a shift that is evident in the landscape itself. 
After the murders, the place itself becomes unnerving. “Monsters howling 
the bloody night long. A horrid racket. . . . That hateful prairie wind” (115). 
This description comes right before the town learns that two of its longtime 
residents are moving away—not just from Finney County but from the state. 
The Eden-like home of the Clutters also changes after the murders. Now, 
people can smell “the odor of windfall apples rotting under the apple trees” 
(121), and the home, which had been under the meticulous care of Clutter, 
shows “the first threads of decay’s cobweb. . . . A gravel rake lay rusting in the 
driveway; the lawn was parched and shabby. . . . The Clutter place seemed 
shadowed, and hushed, and motionless” (206–7). Howling monsters, rotting 
food, and decay now characterize the landscape. The loss of the sovereign 
here suggests a kind of Fall—from a verdant, Eden-like landscape to a place 
marked by desolation and decay.
This transformation also parallels a psychological shift in the community 
from comfort to fear. People can no longer sleep after the murders. No one 
feels safe—even the wife of Special Agent Dewey changes the locks on the 
house. And everyone becomes suspicious of everyone else. In short, these 
changes in Holcomb reflect Hobbes’s view of the state of nature as a post-
Edenic condition. “All the neighbors are rattlesnakes. Varmints looking for 
a chance to slam the door in your face. It’s the same the world over. You 
know that” (69), one resident states, and the narrator summarizes the overall 
condition: “Old friends had suddenly to endure the unique experience of 
distrusting each other; understandably, they believed that the murderer was 
among themselves” (88). This intense mistrust and fear comes, in part, from 
the loss of the sovereign. Most of Holcomb acknowledges that the crime 
was worse because it happened to the Clutters: “Of all the people in the 
world, the Clutters were the least likely to be murdered” (85). One resident 
explains: “Feeling wouldn’t run half so high if this had happened to anyone 
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except the Clutters. Anyone less admired. Prosperous. Secure. But that family 
represented everything people hereabouts really value and respect, and that 
such a thing could happen to them—well it’s like being told there is no God” 
(88). Clutter symbolizes safety, and the reference to God, like his comparison 
to royalty, suggests his sovereignlike status in the community.
We can also see Capote himself acting as a kind of sovereign. He rules 
over the text, shaping our responses to the Clutters, to the town of Holcomb, 
and to Hickock and Smith. Critic Trenton Hickman suggests this kind of 
reading in “‘The Last to See Them Alive’: Panopticism, the Supervisory Gaze, 
and Catharsis in Capote’s In Cold Blood.” Hickman argues that the structure 
of the book parallels Foucault’s discussion of Bentham’s panopticon, placing 
the characters under the constant scrutiny of the narrator. “This strategy 
offers not only an angle into the criminal mind but a catharsis for an audi-
ence that can vent its own destructive energies through interaction with 
this novel rather than through violent action in the community.” Capote, 
in other words, viewed the book as providing a safe outlet for the violent 
impulses of the reader. He stands in as a sovereign, dictating our response 
to the events and ultimately providing catharsis. He claims to have included 
so many details about Hickock’s intention to rape Nancy, for example, as a 
“healthy form of release” for the reader. This strategy would, as Hickman 
explains, “[alleviate] the sorts of pressures that might drive someone into a 
pathological state if not released.”20
Perhaps Capote’s view of this healthy release and his role as sovereign 
in the text is best illustrated by the fictionalized ending of In Cold Blood. 
One of the questions that preoccupy the characters (and by extension the 
readers) after the arrest of Smith and Hickock is: What will restore peace 
and a sense of security to the town? That the crime’s perpetrators are in 
captivity doesn’t make the townspeople feel better. They remain suspicious 
that the killer is still in their midst. After the men were caught, one person 
believed that “there’s more to it than that. Wait. Some day they’ll get to the 
bottom, and when they do they’ll find the one behind it” (231). Hickock’s 
and Smith’s confessions don’t provide a satisfactory explanation or rationale 
for the crimes: “But the confessions, though they answered questions of 
how and why, failed to satisfy his sense of meaningful design” (245). And 
the executions don’t offer closure either. As the narrator explains, “Dewey 
had imagined that with the deaths of Smith and Hickock, he would experi-
ence a sense of climax, release, of a design justly completed” (341). But his 
own sympathy for Smith, who reminds him of a wounded, exiled animal, 
doesn’t bring Dewey closure, and for him (as well as the reader), the violent 
potential of human nature lingers at this moment. Capital punishment is 
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just another form of brutality. It, too, speaks to our innate tendency toward 
violence. Once again, this is the source of In Cold Blood’s terror: the nagging 
reminder that we all have the potential to be killers. Capote isn’t suggesting 
that we’re all one Orange Blossom away from being psychopathic killers. 
(Orange Blossoms were Hickock’s favorite alcoholic beverage, and he downed 
several to muster up courage to break into the Clutter house.) But the fear 
we share with the residents of Holcomb comes from our understanding that 
human beings all have this potential under certain circumstances. Perhaps 
this message isn’t entirely surprising since the author felt a disconcerting 
kinship with Smith, who represented what Capote could have become under 
different circumstances—“the embodiment of his own accumulated angers 
and hurts.”21
Nevertheless, Capote didn’t want this Hobbesian message to close the 
book. He wanted to provide some kind of catharsis, and he fictionalized 
the ending to achieve this. Aristotle’s notion of catharsis in Greek tragedy 
is that the final effect of this drama is to release or purge pent-up emotions. 
It restores a kind of equilibrium to the viewer, who has built up dispropor-
tionate levels of pity and fear. Capote achieves this release by having Dewey 
recall an encounter with Nancy’s best friend, Susan Kidwell, at the graves 
of the Clutter family. Susan is now a junior at the University of Kansas. She 
is beautiful and thriving. “Her smooth hair swinging, shining—just such a 
young woman as Nancy might have been,” Dewey thinks. The fact that her 
life has continued, that she is happy, gives Dewey hope, and he is able to walk 
away from the cemetery, “leaving behind him the big sky, the whisper of wind 
voices in the wind-bent wheat” (343). The story of this crime (the voices 
of the Clutters, of Smith’s and Hickock’s confessions, of the townspeople’s 
speculations) are now whispers, and the image of rich land with its big sky 
and wind-bent wheat replaces that of the noose.
Capote once remarked: “I was criticized a lot for [the ending]. People 
thought I should have ended with the hangings, that awful last scene. But I 
felt I had to return to the town, to bring everything back full circle, to end 
with peace.”22 He takes on the role of the sovereign here to allow us to walk 
away from the story of this crime, too. The book restores the kind of peace 
that Holcomb felt before the murders. Late in the story, we even get a glimpse 
of the Clutter estate that shows hints of this renewal: “Mr. Clutter’s orchard 
of pear and apple trees, the elms shading the lane—were lightly veiled in a 
haze of virginal green. The fine lawn surrounding the Clutter house was also 
newly green” (270). Virginal grass has replaced the rotting fruit and decay, 
suggesting that life goes on, wounds heal. Ultimately, this fictionalized ending 
demonstrates that Capote doesn’t want to share Hobbes’s pessimism about 
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human nature. He incorporated this Hobbesian outlook as part of his use of 
the horror genre, recognizing that we all fear these darker sides of humanity. 
But Capote couldn’t end with such a vision. He is more optimistic about our 
future, about our innate characteristics than Hobbes. Yet as In Cold Blood 
moves from nonfiction to fiction in these final moments, it leaves us with a 
more hopeful sense about our own humanity—but ironically, Capote’s role 
as sovereign also suggests that Hobbes was right all along.
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Making Their Presence Known
Jessica O’Hara
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
  than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
—Hamlet, act I, scene V
In this young millennium, the television landscape has been shaped by a 
groundswell of reality-based and scripted shows investigating the super-
natural, such as A Haunting, Paranormal State, Most Haunted, Ghost Hunt-
ers, Ghost Hunters International, Ghostly Encounters, Ghost Trackers, Ghost 
Adventures, Haunted History, Ghost Whisperer, Medium, and a landslide of 
one-off shows featuring things like the top ten most haunted hotels. What 
has caused this conspicuous “presencing,” aside from the obvious cost sav-
ings that reality-based shows offer over scripted shows? And why is it that 
so many of our restless channel-surfing spirits find release in these shows?
The quick answer might be that spooky ghost stories are a staple of the 
human imagination—indeed, many cultures devote a whole holiday to the 
horrific. Thus, while TV’s otherworldly programming dips into a deep well 
of cultural tradition, perhaps these shows also fascinate us because they 
plumb the depths of timeless philosophical questions and problems. For this 
piece we will focus specifically on ghost-hunter shows with a reality-based 
format that routinely consider these classic puzzlers: How can we trust our 
senses or truly know what we are experiencing? Is there an afterlife? What 
is the soul? Does God exist? Does evil—or even the demonic—exist? How 
do we deal with the so-called problem of evil? These, the themes that have 
occupied philosophers through the ages, bring us back again and again to 
ghost-hunting programs. Yet while ghost-hunter shows take on some classic 
philosophical questions, as we shall see, they do so with a distinctly post-
modern approach to knowledge, discourse, and narrative. Moreover, their 
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appearance at this particular moment may have as much to do with our own 
troubled, post-9/11 present day as with the ghosts of the past.
Plumbers of the Paranormal
The philosophical problem of verifying happenings outside of or in addi-
tion to sensory experience seems to be an overarching preoccupation on 
most of these shows, but none more so than on Ghost Hunters. Jason Hawes 
and Grant Wilson, who work for Roto-Rooter by day, lead the paranormal 
investigation team TAPS (the Atlantic Paranormal Society). For the major-
ity of episodes the primary aim of TAPS is to validate what its “clients” are 
experiencing by using a wide array of ghost-detecting technologies such 
as electromagnetic field scanners (EMFs), digital thermometers, enhanced 
voice recorders, and night-vision and infrared cameras. The team also seeks 
to gather anecdotal “human” evidence as corollaries to the primary evidence 
provided by the technology. Unlike the investigators on Paranormal State, 
who do not assume a skeptical stance, the members of the TAPS team actively 
try to debunk the claims and experiences of the clients and themselves by 
privileging scientific methodology, which provides a kind of escape from 
the thorny problem of our fallible senses and easily deceived selves. Thus, 
that which cannot be explained is deemed not necessarily paranormal, but 
not normal either. When presenting its findings to the client, TAPS again 
highlights technology-based evidence, sprinkling in the team’s human en-
counters during the investigation. The clients are usually pleased with “The 
Reveal,” as it is called, for they are happy to have their experiences in the 
back bedroom, down the hall, or in the shed captured by technology and 
confirmed by experienced others. Thus, despite its relative skepticism, Ghost 
Hunters often validates our intuition and senses, as the client “knew there 
was something on the stairs” all along. When the evidence is inconclusive, 
it always disappoints.
Ghost Hunters, in particular, showcases some of the problems Des-
cartes pondered centuries ago in Meditations on First Philosophy. In his 
First Meditation, Descartes names his foremost philosophical enterprise: 
“to demolish everything completely and start again right from the founda-
tions if I wish to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and 
likely to last.” He considers, “Whatever I have up until now accepted as most 
true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from 
time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never 
to trust completely those who have deceived us just once” (1990, 12). Des-
cartes’ endeavor to treat the epistemological problem of the fallible senses 
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in order to discover objective reality and to establish the existence of God 
is not unlike the project of the ghost hunters: they, too, are pursuing proof 
of the supernatural and need a way to isolate and examine their evidence. 
In Descartes’ time, a scientist was one who engaged philosophy and all the 
phenomena of the universe—even the mysteries of heaven and earth, as it 
were. Thus, the ghost-hunter teams (and their TV audiences) are aspiring 
“Renaissance” men and women, seeking to reintegrate the metaphysical 
domains of inquiry, which contemporary science has relegated to religion 
or quackery, with scientific methodology. Indeed, the TAPS investigators 
claim to apply such rigor and skepticism to their findings precisely because 
they would like to attract more “real” scientists, as it were, to investigate 
such phenomena (“The Converted Church” 2004).
Philosophers since Descartes have hardly given up on the question of 
how we experience the world. Rather, many of the great twentieth-century 
philosophers, such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, formalized and developed the field of phenom-
enology which, at its base, interrogates how we encounter phenomena, how 
consciousness operates in our encounters with the world, how things appear 
to us, and how we situate the meaning of our experiences. Ghost-hunter 
shows engage these questions because a haunting is inexorably a human 
perceptual experience. For instance, the investigators often implicitly deal 
with Edmund Husserl’s concept of “intentionality.” Husserl’s idea of inten-
tionality is described by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith as
a characteristic feature of our mental states and experiences, es-
pecially evident in what we commonly call being “conscious” or 
“aware.” As conscious beings, or persons, we are not merely affected 
by the things in our environment: we are also conscious of these 
things—of physical objects and events, of our own selves and other 
persons, of abstract objects such as numbers and propositions, and 
of anything else we bring before our minds. Many, perhaps most, of 
the events that make up our mental life—our perceptions, thoughts, 
beliefs, hopes, fears, and so on—have this characteristic feature of 
being “of ” and “about” something in our world. (1989, 148)
Thus intentionality, which Husserl deems “the fundamental property of 
consciousness,” means that our experience is “directed toward—represents 
or ‘intends’—things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, im-
ages, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and 
are distinct from the things they present or mean” (Smith 2008, sec. 1). The 
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implications of Husserl’s notion of intentionality loom large on ghost-hunter 
shows because if our individual consciousnesses do so much work to situate 
experience and even to order perception, then it seems like the investigators 
need to know the near impossible: the mostly unconscious inner workings 
of the clients’ minds who have come to perceive that they might be haunted. 
More so, the investigators must somehow possess an incredibly heightened 
awareness of themselves as individuals and investigators. The shows often 
take refuge in the idea that if multiple people, all possessing varying frames 
of reference, attitudes, and knowledge about the space in question, report 
the same feelings and experiences, then there must be something going on 
outside of their individual minds. But truly, how different are their frames 
of reference? And how susceptible might they be to groupthink?
Paranormal State is perhaps more implicitly attuned to this issue of 
intentionality, at least with respect to the clients, than the other shows. As 
a prerequisite to be on the show, clients must submit to a psychiatric evalu-
ation. Then, too, the investigators bring aboard a counselor to meet with 
the haunted, and the Paranormal Research Society (PRS) team probes the 
family situation, emotional state, and temperament of the clients. PRS is not 
necessarily questioning the sanity of the clients but rather exploring what 
aspects of their backgrounds or present situation might be causing them to 
interpret events in a certain way. For instance, in the episode “The Devil in 
Syracuse” (2007), which seemed to be a case of demonic haunting, inves-
tigation leader Ryan Buell perceives that the constant presence of a family 
friend might be “promoting fear and hysteria in the home.” The house itself is 
shockingly cluttered and disorganized. The couple is unhappy in their mar-
riage and on the verge of divorce. The PRS team cleans house, literally and 
figuratively. They perform a ritual religious cleansing, led by demonologist 
Keith Johnson, only after recommending that the living space be unclut-
tered and cleaned, the couple undergo marriage counseling, and the friend 
be removed as a constant presence. After the ritual the paranormal activity 
subsides, and the family feels that the oppressive presence has lifted. In the 
final interview the client Teena tells Ryan that “hope found [me].” She thanks 
Ryan for recommending the “baby steps” that have led to “a giant step” toward 
a brighter future for her and her family. Here the concept of intentionality 
inserts itself, as if a haunting is all in the attitude—a state of mind, as it were. 
Another Paranormal State episode, “The Fire” (2008), features estranged 
siblings being haunted by the spirits of their murdered parents. The sisters 
half suspect their estranged half brothers of committing the murder. In 
the end the murders remain unsolved, but PRS manages to reconcile the 
siblings, and once again the hauntings cease. Despite the seeming severity 
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of the cases, we are left to wonder in these two episodes and many more if 
the family dysfunction precipitates the perception of “normal” phenomena as 
paranormal disturbance, as a metaphor for their “haunted” family dynamic. 
Or does their dysfunction actually invite in the supernatural, making their 
home “a playground for the demonic,” as Episcopal priest Andrew Calder 
suggests in “The Devil in Syracuse?”
Ghost Hunters also worries about the role of intentionality in paranormal 
investigation. “The Converted Church” episode showcases a couple whose 
home is crowded with all things Gothic and macabre, and the incongruity 
of such items in the space of a former church creates a distinctly ghoulish 
vibe. During the investigation lead investigator Jason Hawes approaches 
demonologist Keith Johnson and starts up a conversation implicitly about 
intentionality:
“So what do you think? You getting any feelings?”
“Not so much impressions of the house, but after looking around, 
of course, and talking to Justin, I’m wondering if they so much 
wanted this house to be haunted that maybe they’re seeing some-
thing they want to see. I mean, it’s a possibility.”
“All the collections, and everything, ah, that’s just—that breeds 
negativity.”
“Well, we know when someone has a preoccupation with the ma-
cabre, the fantastical, that that can produce phenomenon.” (2004)
Hawes and Johnson’s speculations move in two directions at once, much 
like the narrative arcs of the Paranormal State episodes in which the haunt-
ings diminish as the family dysfunction is mitigated. Is it the case that the 
clients simply think they are experiencing a haunting because they wish it 
to be happening or because it is a projection of their dysfunction? In other 
words, can we apply Husserl’s idea of intentionality to these situations? Or do 
these clients invite a real haunting because their “bad energy” or wishfulness 
brings it on? In other words, can you bring upon yourself a real haunting 
or only a fake one?
The implications of postmodern theorist Jean Baudrillard’s work on simu-
lation and the hyperreal certainly pose an enormous problem to those who 
wish to prove the real existence of ghosts. Baudrillard writes of simulation:
To dissimulate is to feign not to have what one has. To simulate 
is to feign what one hasn’t. One implies a presence, the other an 
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absence. But the matter is more complicated, since to simulate is 
not simply to feign: “Someone who feigns an illness can simply go 
to bed and pretend he is ill. Someone who simulates an illness pro-
duces in himself some of the symptoms” (Littre). Thus, feigning or 
dissimulating leaves the reality principle intact; whereas simulation 
threatens the difference between “true” and “false,” between “real” 
and “imaginary.” Since the simulator produces “true” symptoms, is 
he or she ill or not?” (1988, 168–69)
Something similar could be asked of a person simulating a haunting: is he 
or she haunted or not? Would not both a simulated and a real haunting 
produce the same terror? This is the big question that ghost hunters often 
leave to the viewers’ imaginations, sidestepping the issue, for the investiga-
tors claim that their work is finished if they manage to stop the clients from 
feeling haunted.
Evil Happens
While ghost-hunter shows call forth a range of phenomenological questions, 
they wrestle with metaphysical ones as well. The concepts implicitly advanced 
by ghost-hunter shows about relationships between good and evil, heaven 
and hell, and the living and the dead draw upon millennia of theological and 
philosophical argument and speculation. For instance, let us reexamine Jason 
and Keith’s conversation, which presents the troubling idea that “negative 
energy” can call forth the demonic or “bad spirits” of sorts. How are they 
conceptualizing the nature of ghosts? How do they frame our relationship 
to the diabolic? If the diabolic exists, is this evidence that God exists as well? 
Paranormal State and, to a lesser extent, Ghost Hunters sometimes will posit 
that this “negative energy,” which can be a demonic entity or a disturbed 
spirit who was once touched by evil in life, either as victim or perpetrator, 
has manifested itself because of an absence of “positive energy,” a Neoplatonic 
notion that conceives of evil as a privation of good.
Curiously, these shows put together this idea of privation with the bibli-
cal notion of Lucifer’s fall and the “free will” hypothesis for the “problem 
of evil.” On these shows the demons are really out there, functioning as a 
force opposed to good, which can be connected to the Manichean dualistic 
conception of darkness and light. Demons (who were never human) show 
up from time to time, especially on Paranormal State. Evil entities also 
seem capable of tethering spirits to the earth, preventing them from “going 
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to the light,” as it were. This seems like traditional biblical stuff, in which 
God and Satan battle over souls. However, Satan and his minions usually 
lose once again when some religion is applied to the situation, either as an 
expressly Catholic ritual or some other kind of cleansing that is associated 
with holiness.
But how does this evil make its way into our world to harass the living 
and the dead? Is God not paying attention? Did we do something wrong? 
These questions relate—at least obliquely—to the “problem of evil,” a massive 
and incredibly intricate debate in the philosophy of religion which, at its 
heart, attempts to reconcile contradictory premises: How could God—who 
is all good, omniscient, and omnipotent—allow evil to happen? One answer 
to this problem is the free will defense, or greater good defense, which has 
been taken up by countless philosophers throughout the centuries. As Alvin 
Plantinga, a contemporary defender of the free will defense, argues, evil in 
the world exists because God gave us free will; as such:
A world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free 
(and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, 
all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. 
Now God can create free creatures, but he cannot cause or determine 
them to do only what is right. For if he does so, then they are not 
significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To 
create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, he must create 
creatures capable of moral evil; and he cannot leave these creatures 
free to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing 
so. God did in fact create significantly free creatures; but some of 
them went wrong in the exercise of their freedom: this is the source 
of moral evil. The fact that these free creatures sometimes go wrong, 
however, counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor against his 
goodness; for he could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil 
only by excising the possibility of moral good. (1974, 30)
The possibility for evil, then, allows for creating more “good” because it 
provides the opportunity for us to pursue what is a moral good.
Paranormal State tacitly subscribes to these notions of free will and 
evil, since the show often suggests that humans, though their bad choices, 
dysfunction, and ungodly ways of living, often create a space for evil to enter. 
Then, too, the haunted bear witness to the poor deployment of free will from 
the past, as evil seems to collect around sites of trauma—places where evil 
rather than good was chosen or experienced. Usually, the haunted and the 
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spirits can be set back on the path to moral good by choosing reconciliation, 
love, care for others, or, in the case of the spirit, “going to the light,” and evil 
is vanquished by good with relatively little trouble.
However, A Haunting presents a more terrifying conception of the 
demonic and hell itself. By far the scariest of the ghost-themed shows, A 
Haunting deals almost exclusively with cases of demonic possession or 
harassment. Presenting itself as a documentary on past events, A Haunting 
mingles hair-raising reenactments, testimony from those involved with 
the case, and a narrative voice-over. The bad news in A Haunting is that we 
do not have to use our free will poorly to attract the demonic. Rather, evil 
preys upon the innocent and vulnerable, as it does in episodes in which a 
child is possessed (“The Demon Child” and “Spirits of the Dead”), another 
in which a mentally disabled young girl is the target of a demonic entity 
(“The Diabolical”), and yet another in which a pregnant woman is physically 
harassed and terrorized (“Gateway to Hell”). And the worse news? This evil 
is much more pesky to shake. The story arc will often feature the victims 
acquiring a talisman of sorts or procuring a quick blessing that might result 
in some temporary abeyance of the haunting but will ultimately prove to be 
inadequate protection. Then, even after a lengthy ritual cleansing or exor-
cism, an uneasy peace ensues, though the victims sometimes experience a 
recurrence of the haunting or a feeling of foreboding that the evil entity is 
plotting its return. Some episodes end with the victims simply abandoning 
their homes. On A Haunting you can never really beat the devil.
A Haunting and Ghost Adventures also present the idea that certain 
portals to hell exist. The voice-over introduction of every episode of A 
Haunting affirms this conception of our relation to all things hellish: “In 
this world, there is real evil in the darkest shadows and in the most ordinary 
places. These are the true stories of the innocent and the unimaginable. . . . 
Between the world we see and the things we fear, there are doors. When 
they are opened, nightmares become reality.” As we know, these doors are 
not necessarily opened by our bad use of free will: we are more or less “in-
nocent.” In a sense, though, humans are culpable on A Haunting when they 
naively get in over their heads, inviting in the demonic by messing around 
with Satanic ritual, playing with a Ouija board, or uttering a curse. While 
humans can create these portals, these doors can also exist “naturally,” an 
idea that Ghost Adventures floats by claiming that a particularly haunted 
site, Goldfield Hotel, is said to be built on certain “lay lines” to the seventh 
portal of hell (Ghost Adventures: A Raw Documentary into the Paranormal 
2006). And on these two shows doors to hell are tough to close—or, at best, 
let in quite a draft.
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Postmodern Ghost Stories
Despite their search for Truth, ghost-hunter shows resist offering consistent, 
definitive accounts of what they observe. Most of the shows conclude with 
no conclusion at all, thereby beginning and ending with uncertainty. Nor do 
the shows advance a consistent vision of the supernatural. In these senses, 
ghost-hunter shows take a distinctively postmodern approach to discourse 
and narrative in their preference for micro-narratives over grand narratives 
and their practice of bricolage.
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, François Lyotard 
defines the postmodern broadly as “incredulity toward meta-narratives” 
(1989, xxiv). Lyotard identifies meta-narratives, otherwise known as grand 
narratives, as the sweeping stories that order our understanding of history 
and knowledge itself. Meta-narratives offer a narrative for all narratives, 
so to speak, by developing a totalizing explanation for all stories, thus pro-
viding some kind of universal truth. Examples of meta-narratives are the 
theologies of the world’s major religions and the Enlightenment belief in 
human progress. Lyotard and others point out that meta-narratives have 
lost their power because they fail to account for that which is incompat-
ible with their schema. As postmodern subjects, we have become aware 
of—and have embraced—difference and heterogeneity and have recognized 
that no narrative can be totalizing or representative; as such, we prefer 
localized “micro-narratives.” Lyotard writes, “The postmodern would be 
that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation 
itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a 
taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for 
the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order 
to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable” 
(81). Lyotard advocates that we “wage a war on totality; let us be witness 
to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of 
the name ” (82).
Ghost-hunter shows offer micro-narratives, since each ghost story stands 
on its own, and each haunting is specific and localized. While some common 
themes do emerge, the shows resist situating those themes and the episodes 
themselves into recognizable schema. Likewise, though scientific discourse 
is privileged in ghost-hunter narratives, these shows depend upon a variety 
of discourses, none of which are complete or authoritative and some of 
which would be traditionally considered mutually exclusive. This interplay 
of discourse allows for the convention of the “investigative team,” which 
could include a medium, a priest, a building contractor, an occult expert, a 
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pet trainer, a tech specialist, and a historian. This paradigm creates—with-
out irony—a sense of incredible possibility and play yet also a measure of 
indeterminacy. Indeed, the shows practice “bricolage,” which postmodern 
theorist Michel de Certeau describes as a “poetic ‘making do’” (1988, xv). 
In “Structure, Sign, and Play,” Jacques Derrida speaks of the bricoleur as 
one who forages among discourses without regard for disciplinarity: “The 
bricoleur, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who uses the ‘means at hand,’ that 
is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which 
are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye 
to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by 
trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it 
appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and 
origin are heterogeneous” (quoted in Bruns 1998, 96). Thus, the ghost-
hunting shows are more interested in efficacy than consistency and are 
not concerned if their experiences or practices do not hook up to a larger 
system of knowledge or belief. If it cannot hurt to say a Native American 
prayer while burning sage in addition to putting up crosses and sealing the 
entrances with a consecrated host, then why not do it? While the shows 
keep their distance from totalizing narratives, the relics, talismans, and 
tactics that come out of those systems are embraced, thus demonstrating 
Lyotard’s assertion that micro-narratives and bricolage are preferred over 
meta-narratives in the postmodern age.
Specters of 9/11
We have established how ghost-hunter shows engage some of the great 
philosophical questions of the ages, and we have examined how they reflect 
both the dispositions and dominant narrative style of postmodernity. Thus 
ghost-hunter shows are both timeless and very now in their forms, but we 
may ask why now: why have they made their presence known at this par-
ticular cultural moment?
Perhaps it has something to do with September 11, an event that created 
seismic shifts in American thinking. That day of horror and tragedy, during 
which the scenes of sublime terror in a blockbuster disaster film became 
all too real, has prompted a collective interest in the nature of evil, haunted 
spaces (such as the destroyed World Trade Center towers), enduring trauma 
and mourning, and the debt the living owe the dead in seeking justice and 
reparation. Indeed, “We will never forget” is the motto that emerged in the 
aftermath of September 11; yet “not forgetting” is hardly an action in itself, 
and it remains unclear how we might go about remembering. In this post-
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9/11 climate, it is thus not surprising that we have become so interested in 
ghosts, for they might provide just the metaphor we need to conceptualize 
the nature of history, trauma, and our relationship with the dead. Indeed, 
this is not the first time America has become interested in ghosts after 
national trauma: the Spiritualism movement became quite popular in the 
aftermath of the Civil War.
Jacques Derrida’s work on ghosts has particular resonance when con-
sidering their meaning in the post-9/11 era. In his 1994 work Spectres of 
Marx Derrida develops a “hauntology” in which he theorizes the “spectre” 
and argues that mourning is work—the work of seeking justice. To animate 
his analysis Derrida examines the opening act of Hamlet, during which the 
ghost of King Hamlet appears. Derrida notes that the ghost demands that, 
above all, we listen as he issues an injunction for justice that we, as the living, 
must obey. The ghost also disorders time. “The time is out of joint,” as Hamlet 
observes in the play and, as Derrida argues, the ghost calls upon his son “to 
put time on the right path, to do right, to render justice, and to redress his-
tory, the wrong [tort] of history” (21). The living then must work to reorder 
time through mourning, which is “in fact and by right interminable, without 
possible normality” and “responds to the injunction of a justice which, beyond 
right or law, rises up in the very respect owed to whoever is not, no longer or 
not yet, living, presently living.” Thus the work of mourning, “which always 
follows a trauma,” is without end, but has as its end acknowledging those not 
living and seeking justice and reparation on their behalf (97).
Since 9/11 history has presented itself as trauma, which invites us to 
imagine history’s task as uncovering and authenticating sites of disturbance 
and tragedy, the haunts of restless spirits. This is certainly the work of ghost-
hunter shows, which seek to recognize, acknowledge, and mourn the dead, 
thereby putting time in order again. Indeed, participants of the shows often 
“speak back” to the ghosts by acknowledging the spirits’ presence and the 
injustice they suffered or caused. For instance, on Ghost Adventures, the team 
reassures the spirit of Elizabeth, a woman who was brutalized in Room 109 
of Nevada’s Goldfield Hotel, that they know what happened to her (Ghost 
Adventures: A Raw Documentary into the Paranormal 2006). More so, they 
call the spirit of her murderer a “coward,” as if to work for justice on her 
behalf. The rhetoric of mourning and acknowledgement abounds on these 
shows, perhaps reaching its apex on an episode of Paranormal State in which 
the PRS team decides to hold a ceremony to bury an urn of cremated re-
mains. Ryan, the director of PRS, approaches team member Eilfie, a pagan, 
to discuss the matter of the burial:
Making Their Presence Known 83
“I’ve never had to do this before . . . I never had to do a crash 
funeral. So what I was thinking is having a Christian burial; if you 
want to be there, you can be there, you know, just to pay respects 
or whatever.”
“I think that’s one of the main things. We don’t know who the 
person was, but at least whoever is in there, we can give them re-
spect.” (“The Cemetery” 2008)
After we witness the funeral Ryan says into his director’s log, “It’s true charity, 
doing something for someone you don’t know at all, with nothing to gain.” 
The task of ghost hunting is thus the task of mourning and charity and, as 
those living in a post-9/11 world, we all must seek out the ghosts, as it were, 
so that we may “never forget.”
September 11 casts its shadow in other ways as well. It has perhaps 
intensified a trend toward “nesting” and perfecting the home space, a trend 
that, oddly enough, can help to account for the popularity of ghost-hunting 
shows. On September 11 public space showed itself to be dangerous indeed. 
Thus the idea of retreating from the public into the private sphere became 
all the more appealing. The rhetoric of the home as “sanctuary” has certainly 
dominated the television airwaves over the last decade or so, perhaps because 
of this post-9/11 turn “inward.” Another possibility for the HGTV orgy of late 
could be the secularization of our culture and our postmodern skepticism 
toward meta-narratives. If more and more of us do not regard churches as 
“sanctuaries” and have trouble believing in the meta-narratives of official 
religion, why not find spiritual solace and sanctuary—quite literally—in the 
comfort of our own homes? (And, of course, corporations promote such 
an ideology of the home, for it is a great engine for our consumer-based 
economy.) In any case, the home-improvement show trend is massive, and 
ghost-hunter programming can certainly be seen as an extension of the 
genre. Consider the home-improvement and ghost-hunter shows’ common 
elements: clients call in experts to solve a problem with their home; the said 
problem compromises the clients’ ability to enjoy the home as a sanctuary; 
the team applies its expertise and solves the problem. The only difference 
is that instead of moving a cooking island, adding granite countertops, and 
replacing tacky linoleum with earth-toned tile, ghost-hunting shows work 
on getting rid of the spirit hanging out by the refrigerator. Indeed, Ghost 
Hunters directly imitates the conventions of the home-improvement genre, 
including the up-tempo music, the infighting among team members, and 
the dramatic “reveal” to the clients, whose reaction of being pleased or not 
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pleased draws upon the narrative structure of shows like Trading Spaces or 
While You Were Out. More so, in both kinds of shows, the home is fetishized 
and its space is made “holy.”
Ghost-hunting and the Sublime
While it is easy to take a snarky stance toward ghost-hunting shows, in 
truth, they offer their viewers a bit more than most television programming, 
and that is the experience of the sublime. In A Philosophical Inquiry into 
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, eighteenth-century 
philosopher Edmund Burke understands the sublime to be an aesthetic 
experience: “Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and 
danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about 
terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of 
the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind 
is capable of feeling” (1844, 51). We thus experience the ideas of terror, yet as 
Burke, Kant, and others assert, we are not in any physical danger. Burke also 
develops the idea that ugliness has its own aesthetic, as does beauty, which 
is helpful for us to understand the pleasures of the Gothic. Lyotard, through 
Kant, configures the sublime as that which disturbs us and tests the limits 
of our reason: “Sublime feeling is analyzed as double defiance. Imagination 
at the limits of what it can present does violence to itself in order to present 
that which it can no longer present. Reason, for its part, seeks, unreasonably, 
to violate the interdict it imposes on itself and which is strictly critical, the 
interdict that prohibits it from finding objects corresponding to its concepts 
in sensible intuition. In these two aspects, thinking defies its own finitude, 
as if fascinated by its own excessiveness” (1994, 17).
Ghost-hunting shows, both by the nature of their content and through 
their style, offer us this aesthetic experience of the sublime. We witness that 
which tests the boundaries of our imagination and reason and that which 
creates a frisson of fear as we lounge on our couches. The hair on our necks 
stands on end as we glimpse the terrified faces of those in the presence of 
something, made more terrible by the chaotic movements of a night-vision 
handheld camera. As we get up to go to the bathroom, our chests tighten 
and our eyes widen as we take in the montage of fear-inducing images that 
often precede a commercial break. It is this Kantian mixture of terror and 
pleasure, as much as anything else, that makes our remote control stop at 
a ghost-themed show as abruptly as a Ouija board planchette during a sé-
ance. While these shows satisfy our desire to traffic in the great questions 
of heaven and earth, to feel as though we are closing in on a mystery, a part 
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of us always remains unconvinced—and that doubt fuels both our pleasure 
and our addiction.
Note
My epigraph is taken from William Shakespeare,  Hamlet, rev. ed., ed. T. J. B. Spencer 
(New York: Penguin, 1981), act I, scene V.
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The Vampire with a Soul
Amy Kind
To hell with you and your souls! . . . Why do you plague me about 
souls? Haven’t I got enough to worry, and pain, and distract me 
already without thinking of souls?
—R. M. Renfield to Dr. John Seward, Dracula
Perhaps no creature is more commonplace in horror fiction—both on 
the page and on the screen—than the vampire. As typically depicted, the 
vampire rises from the grave to a potentially immortal undead existence, 
sustaining himself by drinking the blood of the innocent. With the kind of 
charisma and cunning that is born only of evil, the garden-variety vampire 
takes special pleasure in his actions, delighting in his wanton destruction 
of human life.
Recently, however, the ingenious imagination of writer Joss Whedon has 
given the classic vampire tale a new spin. What if a vampire had a conscience? 
What if he could feel remorse? How could he live with what he has done? 
Answers to these intriguing questions are explored through the character 
Angel (David Boreanaz), initially introduced in the television series Buffy 
the Vampire Slayer and then given an eponymous spin-off series.1 The vam-
pire Angelus had prided himself on the creativity he brought to the sadistic 
seduction—and destruction—of his victims. But after a gypsy curse restores 
his soul, everything changes. Tormented by his past evil deeds, he enters a 
hell of his own making. Ultimately, renouncing his past identity, he renames 
himself “Angel.” Like an unhappy addict who wishes he could put an end to 
his insatiable compulsion, Angel is repelled by his own unquenchable thirst 
for blood. Neither comfortable nor welcome in either human or vampire 
society, he struggles to find meaning in his continued existence and to make 
his way in the world.
In addition to making for compelling television, the depiction of Angel/ 
Angelus presents an interesting test case for philosophical theories of 
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identity and moral responsibility. The people with whom he interacts are 
conflicted about what to make of his dual identity. His friends who reassure 
him that he’s not Angelus nonetheless remind themselves not to forget who 
he really is. While some hold Angel accountable for the actions of Ange-
lus, others convince themselves that they should think of those horrors as 
perpetrated by someone else. In this essay I explore how we should think 
about the identity of a vampire with a soul and what this means about the 
identity of us all.
Metaphysical Misfits
Buffy Summers (Sarah Michelle Gellar) may look like a typical teenage girl, 
but she’s not. She’s really a vampire slayer. The opening narration of Buffy 
the Vampire Slayer provides some background: “In every generation, there 
is a Chosen One. She alone will stand against the vampires, the demons, and 
the forces of darkness. She is the Slayer.” Among other superhuman pow-
ers, a slayer has extraordinary strength and agility, heightened perceptual 
awareness, and the ability to heal far more quickly than a normal human. 
Each Slayer is also assigned a Watcher—a sort of mentor/adviser/coach on 
all matters relating to her special mission. Buffy’s Watcher, Rupert Giles (An-
thony Head), works by day as a librarian at Buffy’s high school. Along with 
Giles and a group of friends referred to as the “Scooby Gang,” Buffy saves 
the world, again and again, from the forces of evil. (Because her hometown 
of Sunnydale, California, is built on a hellmouth, it is a particular magnet 
for such forces.)
The show, which ran for seven seasons, featured Angel as Buffy’s love 
interest during the first three seasons. When it becomes clear that a relation-
ship between a vampire slayer and a vampire—even a vampire with a soul—is 
hopeless, Angel leaves Sunnydale for Los Angeles and gets a television series 
of his own. In Angel, which ran for five seasons (the first four concurrent 
with the final four seasons of Buffy), Angel opens a supernatural detective 
agency and continues the fight for good along with a motley assortment of 
supporting characters, including Cordelia Chase (Charisma Carpenter), 
formerly an occasional member of the Scooby Gang. The fight morphs into a 
personal crusade for Angel once he learns that he may have a special destiny. 
Contained in the ancient Scrolls of Aberjian, the Shanshu Prophecy predicts 
that the vampire with a soul, after enduring numerous trials and playing 
a key role in the apocalypse, will be rewarded with the gift of human life. 
Much of the series is thus framed by Angel’s quest for redemption.
The Buffyverse—the world depicted in Buffy and Angel—is a lot like 
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our world, only its evil is a lot more tangible. Importantly, the everyday 
folk in the Buffyverse don’t easily accept the fact that there are vampires 
among them. When confronted with evidence of vampiric violence, they 
assume it must be the product of psychosis or pharmaceuticals. And even 
when they encounter vampires face-to-face, they’re almost always unwilling 
to believe what they see with their own eyes. In this way the vampires and 
demons that populate the Buffyverse fit the standard horror prototype. As 
described by Noël Carroll in his influential work The Philosophy of Horror, 
what’s distinctive about monsters of horror is that they disturb the natural 
order. Monsters appear in fairy tales as well as in works of horror, but in 
the latter, “it would appear that the monster is an extraordinary character 
in an ordinary world, whereas in fairy tales and the like the monster is an 
ordinary creature in an extraordinary world” (1990, 16).
Monsters of horror are thus “metaphysical misfits” (Carroll 1990, 54). 
Like zombies and ghosts, vampires are neither living nor dead—or perhaps 
they are both. In one of his many studies of occult phenomena, Montague 
Summers (no relation to Buffy) offers a similar assessment: “The vampire 
has a body, and it is his own body. He is neither dead nor alive; but living in 
death. He is an abnormality; the androgyne in the phantom world; a pariah 
among the fiends” (1960, 6).2 Vampires thus fall between the cracks of our 
usual categories; in Carroll’s terms, they are categorically interstitial or cat-
egorically contradictory (1990, 32).3 In fact, their transgression of standard 
categorical and ontological boundaries is part of what makes the monsters 
of horror so horrific. We are both physically and cognitively threatened by 
their unnaturalness, their impurity, and we thus react to them with both 
fear and repugnance.
While all vampires defy easy classification, Angel presents a particular 
puzzle. Born as Liam in Galway, Ireland, in 1727, he is reborn as Angelus 
when sired by the vampire Darla (Julie Benz) in 1753. After discovering the 
pleasure of his first kill, he unhesitatingly murders his entire family—the 
first steps in a sociopathic rampage that lasts almost a century and a half. As 
Angel later describes that time: “I offered an ugly death to everyone I met. 
And I did it with a song in my heart.” Even other vampires are awestruck by 
his capacity for evil; the legendary vampire known as the Master considers 
Angelus “the most vicious creature” he has ever encountered.4 But with his 
murder of a gypsy girl in 1898, everything changes for Angelus. The gypsy 
elders conjure a perfect punishment to avenge their loss by restoring the soul 
that had departed from his body when he became a vampire. Regaining one’s 
soul means regaining one’s conscience. Instantly, he becomes tormented by 
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his past. Able to remember in agonizing detail every life that he took, he now 
empathically experiences the incredible anguish of his victims. The crushing 
waves of guilt, shame, and remorse drive him to the brink of insanity.5 He 
spends the next century trying to come to grips with his predicament. As 
Angel puts it, “You have no idea what it’s like to have done the things I’ve 
done . . . and to care” (Buffy: “Angel”).
When Buffy wonders whether it’s possible for a vampire to be a good 
person, Giles responds negatively: “A vampire isn’t a person at all. It may 
have the movements, the memories, even the personality of the person that 
it took over, but it’s still a demon at the core. There is no halfway.” But the 
case of Angel threatens to prove him wrong. Angel is not quite a vampire, 
but he’s not quite human either: 
Darla: Guess what precious?  You’re not one of them, are you?
Angel:  No. But I’m not exactly one of you, either. (Buffy: “Angel”)
Angel thus perfectly epitomizes the kind of categorical contradiction de-
scribed by Carroll. He’s dead, but he’s still living. He’s a demon, but he has 
a soul. And he’s in love with Buffy, a vampire slayer whose mission is to kill 
creatures like him. In fact, the mutual affection between Buffy and Angel 
leads to one of the most intriguing elements of his plight. When their ro-
mantic relationship is consummated, they discover an additional twist to 
the punishment inflicted by the gypsies: “Angel was meant to suffer. Not to 
live as human. One moment of true happiness, of contentment, one moment 
where the soul that we restored no longer plagues his thoughts, and that 
soul is taken from him” (Buffy: “Becoming,” part 1). The upshot is that sex 
with Buffy might be said to literally make Angel a new man. His soul leaves 
his body and he once again becomes Angelus.6
A New Man?
During the eight years of events depicted on Buffy the Vampire Slayer and 
Angel, Angel twice makes the transition to Angelus and back again. After 
several months wreaking havoc as Angelus in Buffy, season 2, Angel returns 
in the closing moments of the season finale when Scooby Gang member 
Willow (Alyson Hannigan) is able to replicate the long-lost magic of the 
gypsies and restore his soul. Five years later, during Angel, season 4, Angel 
and his friends come up against a terrible demon, the Beast, who has turned 
Los Angeles into a land of permanent midnight as a first step toward the 
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destruction of the world. When the gang discovers that Angelus might 
have information that Angel cannot access about how to stop the coming 
apocalypse, they engage a shaman to bring forth Angelus by extracting the 
vampire’s soul. Later, after the Beast is defeated, Willow makes a guest ap-
pearance on Angel to once again perform the restoration spell and change 
Angelus back to Angel.
The Angel/Angelus duality suggests yet another categorical contradic-
tion. We are encouraged to think of Angel and Angelus as being the same, 
and yet we are also encouraged to view them as different. During the time 
that the vampire’s soul is restored, does Angelus cease to exist, or is he merely 
suppressed underneath Angel’s humanity? Likewise, when the soul again 
departs his body, is Angel still somewhere deep inside? Do we have two dif-
ferent vampires here, or just one—albeit a fractured one? These questions 
are not easily answered.
Often Angel is presented as just the yin to Angelus’s yang—two very 
different personalities, to be sure, but nonetheless personalities of the same 
vampire. The vampire himself—whether appearing as Angel or Angelus—at 
times describes the situation as a sort of multiple personality disorder, with 
one personality temporarily suppressed or cloaked by the other. Angelus 
claims that “I’m always here, deep in. I’m deep in . . . soul or no soul” (Angel: 
“Orpheus”), and he describes his time as Angel as having been just a phase 
he was going through:
Jenny Calendar:  He’s not Angel anymore.
Angelus:  Wrong. I am Angel . . . at last. (Buffy: “Innocence”)
This way of looking at the relationship between Angel and Angelus gains 
further support from the ongoing debate among other characters about 
which personality represents the vampire’s true nature. Connor (Vincent 
Kartheiser), the son of Angel and Darla, gives Angelus primacy, referring to 
Angel as merely something that Angelus is “forced to wear” (Angel: “Soul-
less”). Darla takes a similar view. Trying to encourage Angel to return to 
the dark side, she warns him that he will not be able to suppress his “true 
nature” forever (Buffy: “Angel”). Angel’s human friends disagree, trying to 
convince Angelus after he loses his soul that somewhere deep inside he 
must remember who he really is (Buffy: “Innocence”). Whatever the correct 
hierarchy of the personalities, this disagreement is framed by the shared 
presupposition that there’s really only one vampire.
But this conclusion should not be too hastily accepted. Further reflec-
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tion on individuals with multiple personality disorder muddies the picture, 
because it is not clear that they should be unequivocally seen as a single 
person. Consider Christine Beauchamp, whose consciousness fractured into 
three distinct personalities (called B1, B4, and Sally by her doctor) at the age 
of eighteen. Philosopher Kathleen Wilkes, in an interesting discussion of 
this case, notes that B1 was a refined and reticent saint, Sally was devilish, 
and B4 was an independent and aggressive woman. Sally and B4 loved to 
smoke and drink; B1 attended church and knitted. B4 and B1 were fluent 
in both English and French and well educated; Sally had poor command of 
English grammar and vocabulary, and spoke no French at all. According to 
Wilkes, each of the three personalities is best described as an independent 
character—“internally consistent and coherent”—and each differed dra-
matically from the others in terms of her “preferences, prejudices, outlooks, 
moods, ambitions, skills, tastes, and habits” (1988, 123). Ultimately, Wilkes 
concludes that we have good reason to maintain that three distinct persons 
occupied Beauchamp’s body (128).7
The relationship between Angel and Angelus is often presented in a 
way that’s similar to the relationships among the personalities of Beau-
champ. One of the first things Angelus does when he returns is to light 
up a cigarette, whereas Angel doesn’t smoke. Angelus mocks the clothes 
that Angel chooses to wear and hates his taste in music, particularly his 
fondness for Barry Manilow. Moreover, Angel and Angelus are generally 
taken to be mutually exclusive of one another. Despite Angelus’s comment 
that he’s always “deep in,” the characters in the Buffyverse usually assume 
that Angel’s presence means that Angelus has at least temporarily gone out 
of existence, and vice versa. In this way of looking at things, Angel and 
Angelus are best seen as two distinct vampires who alternately inhabit the 
same physical body.
Sorting out the relationship between Angel and Angelus is thus not 
easy, but it is an issue that matters deeply to the characters who interact 
with him—or with them. For example, when Angelus first returns after his 
century-long absence, he kidnaps, tortures, and brutally kills Jenny Calendar 
(Robia LaMorte), a teacher at Buffy’s school who happens to be descended 
directly from the gypsies who originally cursed him with his soul. She also 
happens to be Giles’s lover. Angelus then kidnaps and brutally tortures Giles 
as well, though he is ultimately thwarted from killing him. When Angel’s 
soul is restored, should he be held accountable for these acts? Is he to blame 
for what Angelus did?
Here we need to be careful; as stated, these questions are ambiguous 
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between legal accountability/blame and moral accountability/blame. While 
the two often go hand in hand, there are many cases in which they diverge. 
When your friend breaks a promise to pick you up at the airport, she may 
deserve your moral condemnation, but there are no legal consequences to 
what she’s done. Conversely, when a motorcyclist fails to wear a helmet, her 
action is illegal—and imprudent—but not immoral.
Let us here restrict our focus to moral, not legal, responsibility. Criminal 
laws, after all, were not written with vampires in mind. So the issue before 
us is whether to hold Angel morally responsible for the actions of Angelus, 
whether Angel is morally blameworthy for what Angelus has done. To answer 
these questions it looks like we would first have to settle the issue of whether 
Angel should be identified with Angelus. If they’re different individuals, then 
punishing Angel for what Angelus does is as arbitrary as punishing one iden-
tical twin for what the other does. We don’t usually find it appropriate to hold 
one person accountable for what another person does; generally speaking, 
a person is morally responsible only for actions that are his own. 8 There are 
some obvious exceptions to this general rule: parents, for example, are often 
held responsible for the actions of their children, particularly their young 
children; military officers may be held responsible for the actions of troops 
under their command; and criminal accomplices may be held responsible 
for actions that they aid and abet but do not themselves commit. Moreover, 
in all of these alleged counterexamples, the moral responsibility in question 
seems merely derived or inherited from the individual’s moral responsibility 
for actions of her own.9 We hold the parent responsible for what the child 
does only because of the parent’s prior actions in raising the child; we hold 
the officer responsible for the actions of someone under her command only 
because of the prior orders that she’s issued. But the relationship between 
Angel/Angelus is not plausibly like parent/child or officer/subordinate; if 
Angel and Angelus are distinct individuals, there would be no reason that 
Angel should inherit responsibility for what Angelus has done. Thus, when 
it comes to all the horrible atrocities committed by Angelus, Angel should 
be held morally responsible only if those actions can be said to be his own. 
How can we make this determination?
Identity Revamped
Although philosophers have not been much concerned with issues relating to 
vampire identity, there has been considerable philosophical discussion about 
the problem of personal identity—the question of what makes an individual 
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the same individual over time. This is often referred to as the problem of 
reidentification: what conditions must be met so that an individual in one 
context, under one name or description, and at one particular time, can be 
reidentified as the same individual in a different context, under a different 
name or description, or at a different time? As an example, consider author 
Anne Rice. Born Howard Allen O’Brien in 1941, she adopted the name 
Anne as a young girl. She started her adult life as an insurance claims agent 
but soon switched to writing. In the 1970s she authored numerous vampire 
tales including Interview with a Vampire. Then, in 1998, she rediscovered 
Catholicism. Since 2002 she has decided to write directly for Jesus Christ, 
consecrating her work to him.10 So what makes it the case that, throughout 
all these changes, the same person has remained?
Philosophically, issues concerning personal identity date back at least 
to the British philosopher John Locke (1632–1704). In his Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding, Locke claims that personal identity consists in 
consciousness: “As far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to 
any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the 
same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that 
now reflects on it, that that action was done” (1975, 39–40). Locke’s notion 
of consciousness is usually understood in terms of memory. What it means 
for someone’s consciousness to extend backward to one of her past actions 
is for her to remember it, experientially, from the inside. In contemporary 
discussion Lockean-inspired views typically broaden their focus from con-
tinuity of memory to continuity of psychology more generally. Derek Parfit, 
whose work on personal identity has been extremely influential, explicitly 
includes continuity of character, intention, belief, and desire along with 
continuity of memory (1984, 204–9). Parfit’s view has become known as 
the psychological theory of personal identity: an individual at one time is 
identical to an individual at another time if and only if there are chains of 
psychological continuity between them.
Although the psychological theory is by far the dominant view in con-
temporary philosophy, some philosophers argue that the focus on psycho-
logical continuity is mistaken. Proponents of the bodily theory argue that 
an individual’s personal identity consists in the continuity of his body, not 
the continuity of his psychology. Eric Olson, for example, notes that em-
bryos and anencephalic babies “are human animals that manage to survive 
without having any psychological features at all,” a point that casts doubt 
on the psychological theory (1997, 18). Olson describes his own view in 
terms of biological continuity: a person’s survival through time consists in 
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the continuity of his “purely animal functions—metabolism, the capacity 
to breathe and circulate one’s blood, and the like” (16).
Although there is much to say about the relative merits of these two 
views, the events depicted in the Buffyverse generally support the psycho-
logical theory of personal identity. In season 4 of Buffy, the rogue vampire 
slayer Faith (Eliza Dushku) uses a mystical ring to “swap bodies” with Buffy 
(“This Year’s Girl”). While Faith is wearing the ring, she and Buffy clasp 
hands. A glowing light flows through them, and then their “energies” switch. 
Although it takes everyone else a while to catch on, the magic of the ring 
has transported Buffy into Faith’s body and Faith into Buffy’s. Likewise, in 
season 3 of Angel, an elderly man who longs for his youth performs a spell 
in order to swap bodies with Angel and thereby escape the assisted living 
facility in which he’s confined (Angel: “Carpe Noctem”). And in an odd turn 
of events in Angel, season 5, Angel is temporarily turned into a felt puppet 
(“Smile Time”). Though he no longer has a human body, he retains all of 
his psychological states. All of these body swap scenarios presuppose that 
personal identity consists in psychological continuity. We identify Buffy by 
where her psychology is, even if it is temporarily housed in Faith’s body, and 
we identify Angel by wherever his psychology is, whether in his own body, 
the frail body of an elderly man, or the felt body of a puppet.
In fact, psychological theorists have long used thought experiments 
involving body swaps to motivate their views. Locke himself notes that 
“should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s 
past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his 
own soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, ac-
countable only for the prince’s actions” (1975, 44). Here Locke also intro-
duces the notion of accountability, and we can see how naturally one is led 
to a psychological theory of personal identity when thinking about moral 
responsibility. In fact, it may even seem that giving an adequate account of 
moral responsibility requires us to adopt a psychological theory of personal 
identity.11 For example, assuming we knew about the body swap, we would 
be strongly disinclined to hold Buffy responsible should Faith commit a 
murder while inhabiting Buffy’s body. Fingerprints and DNA would confirm 
that Buffy’s body committed the crime, but can they show that Buffy herself 
was responsible for the action? In this case, though the murder would have 
been committed by Buffy’s body, it seems implausible to suppose that it was 
something that Buffy herself did. For the action to be her own she must be 
psychologically connected to it in some way.12
The psychological theory, however, suggests that Angel and Angelus are 
one and the same vampire. Although many psychological connections are 
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broken when Angel becomes Angelus or vice versa, there is still psychologi-
cal continuity between them because they share memories. “I remember 
everything Angelus did,” says Angel. “Every family butchered, every child 
slaughtered, every throat ripped out. I remember every detail” (Angel: 
“Awakening”). And this in turn seems to suggest that Angel is responsible 
for Angelus’s actions. If the psychological theory of identity is correct, and 
if that theory suggests that Angel is identical to Angelus, then it would seem 
that any action undertaken by Angelus must be an action attributable to 
Angel. When it comes to all those butchered families, all those slaughtered 
children, all those mangled throats, Angel must be held responsible.
Crime and Punishment
But perhaps this reasoning is too quick. Earlier we said that an individual 
can be responsible only for actions that are her own. That does not mean, 
however, that an individual must be responsible for all of the actions that 
are her own. Identity may be necessary for moral responsibility, but that 
doesn’t mean that it is sufficient for it. To some extent this is an obvious point. 
When an individual is brainwashed or coerced, the actions she performs are 
still her own, but that does not mean she is morally responsible for them. 
Granted, the situation involving Angel and Angelus is not similar to coercion 
or brainwashing, but the relation between them offers us a different kind of 
case in which identity comes apart from moral responsibility.
To see this it will be helpful to invoke a distinction made by Parfit be-
tween psychological continuity and psychological connectedness. Psychological 
continuity is all or nothing. There either is or is not a psychological chain 
from the present to the past, but there can be significant variation in the 
strength and number of the psychological connections that constitute the 
chain. As Parfit says, “Connectedness can hold to any degree. Between X 
today and Y yesterday there might be several thousand direct psychological 
connections, or only a single connection.” Though a single weak psycho-
logical connection is not enough for psychological continuity, it is hard to 
specify exactly how much would be required. Parfit himself notes, “Since 
connectedness is a matter of degree, we cannot plausibly define precisely 
what counts as enough” (1984, 206).
Just as we cannot pinpoint exactly how much connectedness is needed 
to support psychological continuity, we also cannot pinpoint exactly how 
much psychological connectedness is needed to support moral responsibil-
ity. Certainly, when there is an unusual psychological disconnect between 
an individual’s present self and the past self that committed some awful act, 
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we are often conflicted about whether, and to what extent, we should hold 
the present self accountable. To her friends and neighbors in St. Paul, Min-
nesota, Sara Jane Olson appeared to be a typical suburban mom of three 
teenage girls. Married to an emergency room physician, she attended the 
local Methodist church, where she sang in the choir and cooked meals for 
the homeless. But it was discovered in 1999 that she was really Kathleen 
Soliah, a former member of the Symbionese Liberation Army who in the 
mid-1970s had allegedly planted pipe bombs under two Los Angeles police 
cars and participated in a bank robbery that left one person dead. At the 
time of her arrest there was considerable public hand-wringing about the 
extent to which Olson should bear responsibility for the crimes. According 
to one local newspaper story:
For nearly 25 years, the question was “Where is Kathy Soliah?” If that 
question has been answered—if St. Paul model citizen Sara Jane Olson 
is Kathleen Soliah, the fugitive and alleged 1970s terrorist—two more 
questions take center stage. Can she be tried for crimes committed 
a quarter-century ago? Should she be tried for crimes committed a 
quarter-century ago? The first question is legal, procedural, practical. 
. . . The second question is moral, political, philosophical, but it is at 
the heart of the debate raging now over breakfast tables and on radio 
talk shows and in Internet chat rooms. (Haga 1999)
A similar situation had unfolded a few years earlier when Alice Metz-
inger, a chef and restaurant owner in Lebanon, Oregon, surrendered to police 
and revealed herself to be Katherine Ann Power, a former Vietnam War 
protester who had driven the getaway car during an armed bank robbery 
in 1970 that led to the killing of a police officer. A fugitive for twenty-three 
years, Power pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to a prison term 
of eight to twelve years; she ultimately served six years before her parole. 
Writing about the case in the New York Times, columnist Anna Quindlen 
captures well our tangled intuitions about cases like these. While arguing that 
we must not forget that Power’s actions left a woman widowed and a young 
girl to grow up without her father, Quindlen perceptively notes the difficult 
questions raised by Power’s “odyssey” from radical activist to middle-aged 
mom: “Oh, do I recognize Katherine Power. She is the embodiment of the 
chasm between the 60’s and the 90’s, like someone with a multiple person-
ality disorder. It is almost as though a different Kathy drove three ex-cons 
and her roommate to the scene of the crime. The other personalities, the 
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cook, the mother, the middle-aged woman, perhaps feel as if they scarcely 
know her, as we scarcely know our younger selves” (1993). Should we take 
Quindlen literally here, that is, was it really a different woman who com-
mitted the crime? Had Katherine Power become a different person in 1993 
from the one she was in 1970, and had Kathleen Soliah become a different 
person in 1999 from the one she was in 1974?
The conclusion that is beginning to emerge from this discussion is that 
these are the wrong questions to ask. Emotions run high about these real-life 
cases, in which real lives were lost, so it may be helpful to imagine a hypo-
thetical scenario in which we just stipulate that the fugitive has changed so 
dramatically and so genuinely that the psychological connectedness between 
her present self and her former self is significantly diminished. Though she 
still remembers her past actions, she is now horrified by what she’s done. 
She has completely repented, and having undergone a thoroughgoing 
transformation of character, she now lives an upstanding life. In this kind of 
situation, when psychological connectedness has significantly diminished, it 
seems reasonable to adjust our assignment of moral responsibility accord-
ingly. But what’s important to see is that we can do this without settling the 
question of identity, and in fact, the question of identity becomes essentially 
irrelevant. There may be enough psychological connectedness for us to find 
that the model citizen of the present is strictly identical to the criminal of 
the past, or there may not be. But making a judgment about identity does 
not itself settle the question of moral responsibility. Even if there is enough 
psychological connectedness for identity, that alone does not mean that 
there is enough psychological connectedness for us to hold someone mor-
ally responsible.
Lawrence Locke has helpfully presented these considerations in an es-
say on moral responsibility and personal identity: “Even if persons, in fact, 
last a lifetime, what is reprehensible or blameworthy about them does not, 
or might not” (1990, 62). In cases like the one we’re imagining: “The facts 
about the persons before their character changes are especially galling, yet 
the end result is that we have little or no psychological connectivity and we 
are left with persons to whom the reasons we had for moral condemnation 
no longer apply. If we punish, we punish someone whose character is so far 
removed from that of the original person that we might as well be punishing 
a different person. In a sense, we would be punishing the son for the sins of 
the father” (63; my emphasis).
Above we suggested that we would need a theory of vampire identity 
in order to determine whether an action performed by Angelus could be 
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justifiably counted as one of Angel’s own. But it now seems that judgment 
was mistaken. In fact, the question of identity is orthogonal to the question 
of moral responsibility. We need to separate two questions, which might 
have different answers: (1) Who did the action? (2) Who should be held 
morally responsible for the action? Strictly speaking, Angel might be the 
same vampire as Angelus. The psychological continuity between them might 
be sufficient for the psychological theory of personal identity to reidentify 
them as one and the same person. But that is not enough to settle the ques-
tion of moral responsibility. For moral responsibility we need not just bare 
identity, which arises from psychological continuity, but also significant 
psychological connectedness. Normally the two do not come apart. But 
when they do, as in the case of Angel/Angelus, we see that identity alone is 
not what matters for moral responsibility.13 Even if Angel and Angelus are 
the same vampire, that does not mean Angel should be held responsible 
for the actions of Angelus. As Cordelia tells him, “You need to know that I 
can look back and see every horrible thing you’ve ever done as Angelus and 
it doesn’t matter anymore because when I’m with you all I feel is the good 
you’ve done as Angel” (Angel: “Awakening”).
Soul Justice
Given the unmitigated horror of Angelus’s actions, we want clear-cut an-
swers. And his victims understandably want justice. Unfortunately, however, 
this might be a case where there is no justice to be had, as Angel himself 
recognizes:
Holtz:  I will have justice.
Angel:  No, I don’t think you will. There’s no justice for the things 
I did to you. (Angel: “Lullaby”)
In fact, there is something deeply ironic about the gypsy’s curse that restores 
Angel’s soul. By its very nature the curse is unable to achieve its intended 
purpose of causing Angelus torment. In one way of looking at things, 
Angelus’s soul sends him out of existence and creates a new vampire. Angel, 
not Angelus, is thus the one who undergoes perpetual suffering. But even if 
Angel is identical to Angelus, by restoring the vampire’s soul the curse itself 
has caused such psychological disconnect that the gypsies still seem to miss 
their target. Either way, the curse in and of itself ensures that its victim does 
not bear responsibility for the acts that motivated it in the first place.
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Can we go so far as to say that the curse does Angel an injustice, that 
it is unjust for the gypsies to have caused him this perpetual suffering as 
revenge for acts for which he bears no responsibility? Here we might usefully 
recall the famous claim of John Stuart Mill: “It is better to be a human being 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied” (2001, x). Surely, too, it is better to be Angel burdened by suffering 
than to be Angelus unburdened. As hard as it often is to have a soul, Angel 
is better off with one than without one—and so, too, are we all.
Notes
My epigraph is taken from Bram Stoker, Dracula (New York: Pocket, 2003), 324.
1. The television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer is loosely based on the 1992 movie 
of the same name, also written by Joss Whedon. Other than Buffy, who is played by 
Kristy Swanson in the movie, there is no character crossover between the movie and 
the television show.
2. Interestingly, Buffy herself—while not a monster—also fits the description of 
metaphysical misfit. She is human but superhuman. And she, too, is both living and 
dead, having been brought back from death . . . twice. She experiences clinical death 
in the season 1 finale before ultimately being revived. She is also killed (and buried) in 
the season 5 finale, though she is brought back from the dead through dark magic the 
following season.
3. In addition to the categorical transgressions already noted, Cynthia Freeland 
(among others) has argued that the vampire also “violates the norms of femininity and 
masculinity.” According to Freeland, “Vampires are polymorphously perverse: In their 
search for blood, they can find physical intimacy with a person of almost any gender, 
age, race, or social class. . . . Transgressive and violent eroticism links the vampire’s 
monstrousness to revolution against norms established by patriarchal institutions of 
religion, science, law, and the nuclear family” (2000, 124).
4. Having sired Darla, who in turns sires Angelus, the Master is essentially Angelus’s 
vampiric grandfather.
5. The vampire Spike (James Marsters), who regains his soul at the end of Buffy, 
season 6, subsequently descends into madness as a result. As he describes the experi-
ence, “They put the spark back in and now all it does is burn” (“Beneath You”). The case 
of Spike raises several interesting issues of its own, but I do not have the space here to 
pursue them.
6. To simplify matters I will always refer to the soulless vampire as Angelus and 
the ensouled vampire as Angel.
7. Walter Glannon concludes something similar about individuals who suffer 
from disorders like schizophrenia or manic depression. These illnesses cause what 
he describes as “recurrent” or “successive” selves: “The self with normal mental states 
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develops into the self of schizophrenic delusion, which then once again returns to 
the self of normal mental states, and similarly for the self that moves back and forth 
between depressed and manic phases.” In some cases these disorders may cause such 
severe breaks in psychological continuity between these selves that “affected individu-
als effectively become different persons from what they were at an earlier time” (1998, 
240; my emphasis) And Schechtman argues that it is “at least uncontroversial to claim 
that in Multiple Personality Disorder we are not presented unproblematically with a 
single person. The fact that these cases seem to present, at least sometimes, genuinely 
independent streams of consciousness, which may have no awareness of one another, 
seems reason enough to say that there is some very important sense in which distinct 
persons co-occupy a body” (2005, 11).
 8. For discussion of this claim, see Schechtman 1996, 14, 157–59; Sider 2001, 
203–8.
 9. Schechtman makes a similar point: in all of the alleged counterexamples, “we 
are holding the person responsible for actions that result from his prior actions, and so 
the assignment of responsibility for someone else’s actions is always via a more primary 
ascription of another action to the person who is being held responsible” (1996, 14).
10. See http://www.annerice.com/Chamber-Biography.html.
11. In defending his own biological approach to personal identity, Olson vigorously 
rejects this claim (1997, 57–62).
12. For further discussion of this point, see Shoemaker 2008, particularly section 5.
13. This is directly in line with Parfit’s (1984, 245–80) influential arguments that 
identity is not what matters for survival. According to Parfit, an individual may survive 
into the future even if no one exists who is strictly speaking identical to him. 
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Ideological Formations of  
the Nuclear Family in  
The Hills Have Eyes
Lorena Russell
Horror and Ideology in The Hills Have Eyes
The Hills Have Eyes was originally filmed in 1977, directed and written by 
Wes Craven.1 The 2006 remake (this time produced by Craven and directed 
by Alexandre Aja) revises the central concept of a family under siege to 
redirect the film’s focus more pointedly toward a critique of the intensified 
discourse around “family values.”2  Both versions pit family against family, 
with violence marking the contact zone. But whereas Craven’s 1977 film 
describes a mainstream American family under siege by an outlying “wild 
family” of hippies gone awry, in Aja’s version the “wild family” are mutant 
miners living in the aftermath of the U.S. government’s nuclear experi-
mentations of the 1950s. In their explorations of the conflict between two 
families—one lawful, one outlawed—the films offer unique comment on 
the ideological force of this basic social unit. Both films mobilize the horror 
genre to discuss ideologies of family and the repercussions of state-sponsored 
violence, with the 2006 Aja film more clearly illustrating the links between 
family ideology and state power.
I want to begin my discussion of this dynamic by outlining my approach 
to film. In general, I understand film as a medium that holds the capacity to 
both reflect and challenge social values. In particular, horror, as a genre that 
appeals to its audience through multiple and contradictory modes of violence 
and disgust, complicates the way we view and understand the world. It is 
horror’s close affinity with psychological processes that accounts in part for 
its uniqueness. As Rick Worland points out, “While we are likely to experi-
ence anxiety and fright in other violent genres—a war story, disaster movie, 
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or crime drama, for instance—a horror film evokes deeper, more personal 
psychological fears in the starkest terms.”  It follows that horror has lent 
itself to critiques based on psychoanalytical criticism, largely based on the 
Freudian notion of repression, whereby the fear or terror that horror incites 
has a cathartic effect on our innermost traumas and anxieties. Catharsis 
may take place on a personal and individual level, but the anxieties and 
traumas themselves typically emerge out of a cultural context. As a result, 
we are ultimately dependent on a social framework for their psychological 
meanings. Worland describes how recent film critics extend their reading 
of psychoanalytical processes to include a sociopolitical critique, one that 
is based on an understanding of horror as “resonating with the return of 
any number of actions and desires repressed by the dominant social order.” 
Horror functions in both the private and the public sphere: “A horror film 
may conjure private fantasies and dreads; its reception and interpretation 
remain a public and social phenomenon.”3 The divide between public and 
private is troubled by the psychological dynamics of horror, and that link 
between the social and psychological is strengthened.
Violence is another mechanism of horror that bridges the psychological 
and the ideological. In his analysis of the 1977 film, D. N. Rodowick maps 
out how “an ‘ideology’ of violence is an essential, if repressed, component in 
the figuration of the bourgeois family.” He notes several narrative conventions 
regarding violence in horror films that help to maintain an opposition between 
the rationality of the bourgeois family and the manifestation of violence, and 
subsequently provide a “satisfying” conclusion that maintains the status quo 
of family. Violence in The Hills Have Eyes, however, repeatedly violates these 
conventions.4 Thus The Hills Have Eyes may resonate with our own anxieties 
regarding sexuality or death, yet the very meanings of these seemingly primal 
elements are ultimately social in their expressions and effects. Social eras differ 
in their dominant issues. The ideology of family values has emerged as a par-
ticularly charged discourse in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century 
United States. The function of horror in The Hills Have Eyes is centrally linked 
to a critique of conservative American ideologies of family and family values. 
This analysis seeks to explore some of the nuances of cultural interpretation 
in its reading of the Craven and Aja versions of The Hills Have Eyes, and to 
do so through a reading of these films’ complex relationship to the changing 
expressions of the ideology of family.
Cultural Criticism and Philosophy
In my reading of The Hills Have Eyes, I am drawing from post-structuralist 
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theories, employing ideas from traditional Marxist as well as psychoanalyst 
thought. My claim that the films (both the 1977 and 2006 versions) are cen-
trally concerned with family depends on an analysis that can account for 
how we understand family as an ideological construction. Recent articles 
outline a tension between scholars who approach film as philosophers and 
those who approach film as cultural critics. Members of the former group 
emerge out of an Anglo-American philosophical tradition and typically 
seek theoretical frameworks that help them to provide unified readings. 
Cultural critics tend to work from post-structural theories to understand 
the complex and sometimes contradictory ways meanings (and culture) are 
produced through textual forms like films. In their text Film Theory and 
Philosophy, Allen and Smith reject cultural film criticism largely because of 
its reliance on the “wholesale relativism” of post-structuralist theorists like 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida.5
I believe that film holds the power to express the complexities of cultural 
attitudes around the political issues that mark a particular social period. 
As Henry A. Giroux puts it: “Films do more than entertain, they offer up 
subject positions, mobilize desires, influence us unconsciously, and help 
to construct the landscape of American culture. Deeply imbricated within 
material and symbolic relations of power, movies produce and incorporate 
ideologies that represent the outcome of struggles marked by the historical 
realities of power and the deep anxieties of the times; they also deploy power 
through the important role they play connecting the production of pleasure 
and meaning with the mechanisms and practices of powerful teaching ma-
chines.”6 Giroux’s claims about films point to the underlying complexity of 
this process of cultural production and political intervention. Readings of 
films, and this essay is no exception, typically draw from a range of theo-
retical schools, including psychoanalysis (primarily apparent in discussions 
of repression) and Marxist or materialist critique (primarily apparent in 
discussions of social power arrangements and class struggle).
My reading of the film is in part a response to Noël Carroll’s book on 
philosophy and horror;  I want to counter Carroll’s caricature of the politi-
cal critic by noting how discourse and ideology function in multivalent and 
sometimes contradictory ways. In The Philosophy of Horror; or, Paradoxes 
of the Heart, Carroll dismisses the validity of ideological readings of horror, 
objecting that sociopolitical analysis inevitably explains the genre’s appeal 
by virtue of its unilateral support of (or unilateral challenge to) the status 
quo. He objects to the reductive arguments of “[a] politically minded critic,” 
one who argues that “horror exists because it is always in the service of the 
status quo; that is, horror is invariably an agent of the established order.”7 
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For Carroll, any sociopolitical analysis will conclude that horror, insofar as 
it functions ideologically, works wholly at the service of the status quo or the 
state or, inversely, works wholly against the state. His concept of “ideologi-
cal readings of horror” allows for little nuanced analysis, based as it is on a 
single, monolithic concept of power.
But Noël Carroll’s imagined critic strikes me as unnecessarily rigid, 
and his extreme characterization ignores the more nuanced treatments of 
power and ideology that have evolved in post-structuralist thought. Carroll’s 
oversimplified position is, predictably, quite easy for him to dismiss on the 
very basis of the rigidity he just described. I agree with him that such a read-
ing practice would leave little space for nuance or for flexibility. What his 
position ignores, however, is the possibility of an ideological reading that 
would account for the complexity of ideological function, the gaps within 
the theory for partial resistance, and the allowance that a film might func-
tion as both resistant to and supportive of the dominant order.
Ideology and the State
For me, the ideological complications of The Hills Have Eyes (2006) can 
perhaps be best understood through the writings of Louis Althusser and 
Michel Foucault.8 In my use of these ideas, I am most attracted to the nu-
anced ways the theorists account for how power operates through ideological 
formations. Althusser builds from Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony9 
to distinguish between “Repressive State Apparatus” (RSA) and “Ideological 
State Apparatus” (ISA), while Foucault develops Althusser to offer a mul-
tivalent concept of “technologies of power.” Each of these theories seeks to 
accommodate the complexities of ideological formations such as “family” 
in ways that make sense given the plot, characters, and themes of The Hills 
Have Eyes.
Marxist theorist Louis Althusser (1919–90) explores how ideological 
formations (such as family, church, or education) might function to main-
tain, and in some cases resist, the status quo. In his 1970 essay “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” Althusser 
distinguishes between the above-mentioned RSAs and ISAs, noting how 
both these categories of social and political formations help to reproduce 
the dominant state power: “the Repressive State Apparatus functions ‘by 
violence,’ whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function ‘by ideology.’” 
The RSAs include structures like the army and police force, those social 
institutions that play an active, often forceful role in maintaining state 
order and promoting state futurity. For Althusser, the state functions as “a 
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force of repressive execution and intervention ‘in the interests of the rul-
ing classes’ in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies 
against the proletariat.” The so-called ISAs complement the functioning of 
the repressive state structures through their ideological work. Institutions 
such as church, schools, and family make up the ISAs, and they play an 
equally powerful role in maintaining the state as do more forceful institu-
tions like the army, but manage such intervention primarily through cultural 
and symbolic formulations. As Althusser describes it: “For their part the 
Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by 
ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, 
but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic.”10 
The symbolic function of narrative, here expressed in film, thus can work 
to promote ideology. Later Althusser notes the potential of artistic forms, 
such as film, to resist the workings of the status quo, with sites of resistance 
located within the organizing structures of the ideology itself. Thus, as his 
student Michel Foucault will later develop, there is the possibility of power 
carrying the impulses of its own undermining.
My use of Althusser marks a point of tension between Anglo-American 
philosophical approaches to film and my position as a cultural critic. While 
my reading of The Hills Have Eyes largely depends on Althusser’s accom-
modation of complexity, for philosophers Allen and Smith, it is this very 
complexity (and its violation of logical simplicity) that makes such ap-
proaches suspect. They argue that “the multiple confusions, ambiguities, 
and incoherencies that underlie the film theory derived from Althusser’s 
all-encompassing and yet extremely sketchy theory of ideology have now 
been thoroughly exposed.”11 I object to this claim on several points. For one 
thing, Althusser’s essay on ideology and the state is intentionally framed as 
tentative and preliminary. The essay’s subtitle is “Notes towards an Inves-
tigation,” and a footnote further invites the reader to consider the text as 
mere “introduction to a discussion.”12 This open-endedness is a large part 
of what makes the essay so useful and resists any claim of its status as “all-
encompassing.” But my primary difference is that where these critics see 
confusion, I see a level of complexity that brings us closer to understanding 
how art forms like film can at once further and challenge ideological struggles 
around complex political concepts like “family values.”
One of Althusser’s strengths is therefore that he complicates the ex-
planation of how the state reproduces and maintains its hold on power. By 
distinguishing between various aspects of power, he paves the way for later 
theorists, most notably Foucault, to describe power as a multivalent and 
in some ways contradictory force. Althusser himself notes that a place for 
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resistance may exist even within the ISAs, observing how “the Ideologi-
cal State Apparatuses, may be not only the stake, but also the site of class 
struggle.” Furthermore, his theory allows for intervention and resistance, so 
that even as cultural forms may function to replicate the dominant power, 
they also can reveal contradictions and breaks in the ideological formations: 
“the resistance of the exploited classes is able to find means and occasions 
to express itself . . . either by the utilization of their contradictions, or by 
conquering combat positions in them in struggle.”13 Althusser argues that 
art can find a way to highlight the gap between the ideological promise of 
the social forms and the lived reality, thus opening the way to resistance. 
The Hills Have Eyes operates in this gap between a conservative reiteration 
of family values (the standard plot of the family under siege) and, insofar 
as the films invite audience sympathy with the outlaw families, the radical 
possibility of how the social structure and ideological force of the family 
might assert itself against the state.
As Foucault describes it,
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather conse-
quently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation 
to power. Should it be said that one is always inside power, there is 
no escaping it, there is no absolute outside where it is concerned, 
because one is subject to the law in any case? This would be to mis-
understand the strictly relational character of power relationships. 
Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: 
these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power 
relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the 
power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no 
soul of revolt, or pure law of the revolutionary.14
Foucault’s characterization of ideological power takes it quite beyond a 
simplified notion whereby power can be understood as a monolithic, one-
voiced entity. The ideological power carried in The Hills Have Eyes functions 
on multiple levels as well, with some elements working in favor of the status 
quo and others inviting points of radical opposition. Critical readings of the 
film, most notably by Robin Wood, Tony Williams, and Carol Clover, further 
the sense of ideological complication as developed by Foucault.
The Nuclear Family
Both versions of The Hills Have Eyes basically tell the same story. The films 
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follow the misadventures of the Carters, a typical midwestern, middle-class 
family, as they travel across the American desert on their way to California. 
In both films, an ill-advised detour puts the family at the mercy of a murder-
ous outlaw tribe run by a patriarch called Jupiter, and after a grueling series 
of violent encounters— Big Bob is burned alive, one of the family’s dogs is 
killed and eaten, someone is raped, an infant is kidnapped—a remnant of 
the Carter family emerges from the fray. Both films contrast the families 
in terms of their class status, humanity, relationships, and loyalties, not to 
mention their propensity for violence. And both further place the stories 
in the context of the U.S. nuclear tests sites of the 1950s and 1960s though, 
as I will argue, the 2006 version accentuates the ideological powers of the 
state through its extended references to the nuclear military context, and in 
doing so speaks more directly to the complex interrelations between state 
and ideological influences.
On one level the films could be read as straightforward confrontations 
between good and evil. The Carters are clearly victims who stray into the 
nightmarish and violent world of social outcasts. But both films subtly 
manipulate audience sympathies and ultimately question clear distinctions 
between the “civilized” and “savage.” While Jupiter and his family clearly 
outpace the Carters’ capacity for brutality and evil, the audience is never-
theless repeatedly reminded to understand their disabilities and rage in the 
context of the hardships they have endured and to measure their violence 
against the specter of nuclear destruction and government deception.
While the original version of the film begins with a focus on the familial 
relationship between Ruby, Jupiter, and the gas station attendant (a connec-
tion not featured in Aja’s version), in the second film the opening sequence 
firmly identifies the link between the repressive state apparatus (as indicated 
in the history of nuclear warfare) and the ideological state apparatus of family 
values. The 2006 film begins with a history lesson. The opening screen offers 
white text against a black screen that reads: “Between 1945 and 1962 the 
United States conducted 331 atmospheric nuclear tests. Today, the govern-
ment still denies the genetic effects caused by the radioactive fallout.” This 
textual preface clearly provides the historical context and political position 
through which viewers are invited to consider the fantastic events that will 
follow. The introduction indicts the U.S. government for its destructive 
policies of warfare and denial.
From this static and textual historical context, the film shifts to the alien 
environment of the desert, with hazy smoke shifting across the landscape 
and scientists in white decontamination suits (who could be astronauts on 
an alien planet) testing radiation levels and catching fish from a stream. A 
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bloodied man approaches one of the scientists, pleading for help, before a 
pickax descends from offscreen, piercing the scientist’s helmet and skull. A 
harrowing scene follows wherein bodies are violently flung against boul-
ders before being dragged in chains behind a pickup truck. All the while 
the perpetrators remain unidentified to the viewer. From this surreal and 
bloody scene, the film shifts once again, to a 1950s commercial showing an 
iconic American housewife cooking in her kitchen and bragging about her 
new oven. The song “More and More I’m Forgetting the Past” plays in the 
background as the innocent commercial is displaced by images of nuclear 
blasts destroying test towns in the American desert. Mushroom clouds 
are then interpolated with images of mutations: several fetal images are 
positioned against circa 1960s mannequins in poses recalling the idealiza-
tion of the family. This opening sequence puts into play the film’s central 
concerns, linking the criminal negligence of the U.S. government with 
murderous violence and implicating the viewer’s amnesiac understanding 
of history with the ideology of family. The scene poses the question “Why 
are we ‘forgetting the past?’” One possible answer: we have been lulled into 
complacency through the ideological promise of family.
Urbanoia
The environmental destruction that this opening sequence describes pro-
vides another shared source of cultural anxiety and shame, and is cited 
as a recurrent motif in Carol Clover’s 1992 text, Men, Women, and Chain 
Saws. Here Clover analyzes The Hills Have Eyes (1977) as typifying one of 
the staple plots of the horror film, a rape-revenge narrative dependent on 
the “city/country split.” As in Deliverance, the evil country types represent 
“patriarchy run amok,” and part of the problem lies outside the action of the 
film. In Deliverance the rural “hillbillies” will be displaced by a dam, while 
the environmental disaster of nuclear testing in The Hills Have Eyes sets the 
conflict into motion. In both versions the urban-rural divide further high-
lights class difference as it reenacts “the confrontation between haves and 
have-nots, or even more directly, between exploiters and their victims.” But 
even though Jupiter’s tribe demonstrates a capacity for incest, cannibalism, 
and rape, the historical background of nuclear testing effectively muddles 
the category of victimhood. As in Deliverance, the beleaguered city folk 
come to understand the savage Other “as the rural victims of their own city 
comfort.”15
As Clover notes, it is in the challenge of boundaries that the basic 
element of horror resides, and a large part of what is so scary about both 
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versions of The Hills Have Eyes is this muddling of the categories of “self ” 
and “other.” The point that the feral family somehow derives from the state 
allows Clover to speculates how “if in fact the feral family . . . came into being 
as a result of radiation . . . then we have yet another way that country folk 
are the direct victims of urban interests (in this case the military-industrial 
complex).”16 One of the more horrifying implications of the film is that the 
cannibal mutants have basically emerged as part of the same system that 
has produced the “normal” Carter family. The families are linked, with the 
privileges and comforts the Carters enjoy dependent on the deprivation and 
miseries of an abused underclass.
Clover’s analysis of slasher films is largely focused on psychoanalytical 
processes of audience response. She describes a process of sympathies and 
antipathies that enables a cross-gendered identification of the male audience 
with the “last girl” who has survived the mayhem. But alongside her analysis 
of gender, she identifies the significance of class struggle as a backdrop for 
The Hills Have Eyes: “In what I have called the hybrid film—the rape-revenge 
film staged on the city/country axis—two sets of politics come into play and 
are played off against one another: the politics of gender and the politics of 
urban/rural social class.” While gender remains a central concern in Clover’s 
analysis, she also notes how class conflict is central to the psychological guilt 
that powers the horror of these films. Clover identifies how films like The 
Hills Have Eyes often begin by establishing the deprivations and disenfran-
chisement of the rural folk, so that “we know they have been (or are about 
to be) driven off their land, have been (or are about to be) deprived of their 
traditional livelihood, and so on.”17 Thus the strains of power dynamics in 
the films depend largely on audience identification and guilt, and in the case 
of The Hills Have Eyes, the points of identification and mobilization of guilt 
lead us paradoxically both toward the status quo and against it.
For Clover the emphasis on class difference often relates to a retelling of 
the Indian exploitation story: “In telling a new story, essentially a class story, 
about real estate plunder, we fall back on the terms of the older, originary 
story that haunts our national consciousness.” This reading works quite well 
in her analysis of the 1977 film, where Jupiter’s “tribe” clearly mimics Indians. 
As Clover describes it, “The mountain family of the Hills Have Eyes films is 
blatantly based on movie Indians (a tattered band of last survivors, living 
a subsistence life in the hills, wearing moccasins and headbands, engaging 
in pagan rites, and so on).” The link with Indians is perhaps less explicit 
in the 2006 film, where the mutants are set apart less by their primitivism 
and more by their physical abnormalities, mutations that define them as 
victims of an unjust and unaccountable industrial-military complex/state. 
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But in either case the resonance between racial and class struggle feeds the 
psychology of guilt underlying the plots. For Clover “urbanoia” describes the 
collective guilt behind so many horror films’ plots: “The story is a familiar 
one in American popular culture. The city approaches the country guilty in 
much the same way that the capitalist approaches the proletarian guilty (for 
plundering her labor) or the settler approaches the Indian guilty (for taking 
his land).”18 Again, Clover’s reading of the film depends on a recognition of 
the imbrications of ideology and psychology, a dynamic that creates a guilt 
response in the reader, but one ultimately linked to social inequalities.
Gender and Family Ideology
Gendered norms of masculinity and femininity provide a stable field of 
identification for the viewer, a stability that is often intentionally disrupted 
or exploited by the horror genre. The wild “Coyote family” in the first film 
in many ways invites viewer identification more directly than the inhuman 
mutants of the second. In the Craven film, the daughter, Ruby, appears in 
the opening scene looking a bit like a scrappy version of Little Red Riding 
Hood. With the exception of her rabbit-pelt choker, tooth decay, and dirty 
face, she appears quite normal. She carries a basket of items to trade for 
food and begs the decrepit gas station owner (who will be later identified 
as her paternal grandfather) to help her escape from her immediate family. 
He laughs at the thought of her “passing” in society, dismissing her because 
she “doesn’t know a knife and fork from her five fingers.” This breach of eti-
quette seems like a minor flaw when compared to the physical deformities 
that mark the mutants in the second film, most of whom don’t even have 
five fingers, let alone the use of language to distinguish them as human. In 
Aja’s version, Ruby lurks as a shadowy presence throughout the film, never 
speaking a word. In both versions Ruby ultimately functions as a sympathetic 
presence, intervening to save the son-in-law, Doug, and his baby, Katherine, 
at the films’ conclusions.
As is often the case in films centered on family ideology, gender identity 
and expression function as markers of individual growth. Ruby’s motherly 
instincts allow her to develop as a sympathetic individual. She seems to actu-
ally bond with the baby, saving it from its execution at great risk to herself. 
The largest shifts of gender expression happen with the Carter family sur-
vivors. The son-in-law, Doug, the character who becomes a central figure of 
action and heroism, must change in ways that ultimately involve an enhanced 
machismo. Doug’s initial clumsiness and effeminacy are associated with 
his technological dependence, a dependence that fatefully intersects with a 
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mechanical ineptitude. He makes his entrance doing figurative battle with 
the RV’s air-conditioning unit, and the air conditioner wins. The younger 
son, Bobby, though flawed by an arrogant impulsiveness, shows himself to 
be a more “manly man.” He easily fixes the air conditioner. And significantly, 
Bobby is not afraid to carry a gun, but Doug, identified as an emasculated 
Democratic liberal, shies away from doing so. Part of the transformation 
Doug undergoes is from pacifist to warrior. He learns to be ingenious and 
violent, and as he grows more aggressive and more deadly, he gains a certain 
elegance of motion and a remarkable level of self-control. In the film’s open-
ing he struggles with a screwdriver, but by the end he is handy with a pickax. 
He strikes the very image of a manly man, striding along the hillside with 
his German shepherd and weapon, exuding a macho strength and manly 
determination he decidedly lacked at the film’s start.
It is worth noting that Doug is not the only character who must “butch 
it up” in order to survive. The daughter, Brenda, begins as a timid and mind-
lessly seductive girl. When the trailer is stranded, she sets up a lounge chair 
and suns herself; creating her own imaginary world through a narcissistic 
gesture, she is delusional and seductive, recalling at once Blanche DuBois 
and Lolita. As the film progresses she is transformed through the violence 
she must endure, ultimately finding her way into the role of “Final Girl,” 
dressed in a gray T-shirt and exhibiting great physical strength and focus, 
not to mention an ability with a pickax that rivals Doug’s.
The 1977 version concludes with a focus on Doug’s devolution from 
civilized man to savage: as he brutally kills the “wild man,” the screen goes 
red, and the audience is invited to consider the horror that lies within the 
human capacity for violence, and to recognize that none of us are so dif-
ferent from the Others that haunt us. In an interview with Marc Mancini, 
Craven notes his early interest in individual psychology. Specifically, in his 
early films Craven was interested in exploring how the myth of the hero’s 
journey reveals the paradox that a person can contain an equal capacity 
for good and evil: “recurring patterns about heroes descending into hell to 
face themselves on a primal level, and that hero and villain are two sides of 
a single personality.”19 Certainly this focus is apparent in the 1977 version, 
which ends with a shot highlighting Doug’s descent into barbarianism, 
inviting viewer consideration of individual psychology, as opposed to the 
broader social implications of family or the state.
For Rodowick, the 1977 conclusion, with its freeze-frame on Doug, 
marks a potentially radical intervention in conservative ideology, set as it 
is against the ruin and devastation of what was once the Carter family. For 
him, “In a very real sense, the freeze frame which suspends the film is also 
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the signifier of an ideological stalemate which marks not the triumph and 
affirmation of a culture, but its internal disintegration.” He asks, “What 
kind of conclusion does this violence serve?” and then notes, with some 
relief, that “the film does not end with Doug reunited with his child or his 
brother and sister-in-law.”20 For Rodowick, such a resolution would have 
merely reiterated the survival of the bourgeois family against all odds, and 
therefore served a function of upholding the status quo.
The 2006 version notably ends with exactly the reconstituted family 
Rodowick imagines, as Doug, baby Katherine, Brenda, and Bobby (and the 
Beast) emerge as survivors against the backdrop of the destroyed trailer and 
charred family photos. For me, however, the conclusion lacks the sense of 
triumph that Rodowick imagines and, rather than reiterate cultural conser-
vatism, instead points to the wreck the family has become. Despite the family 
tableau, the emphasis in Aja still concludes on a note about the evil capacity 
within the normalized “family,” and raises the possibility of a new family 
emerging from the wreckage of their conservative past. Not only has each 
of these figures had to resort to extreme violence to survive, the configura-
tion of the remnants, with Brenda the lone female in a heterosexual unit, 
points toward further, incestuous devolution. The future that the Carters 
are left with is ambivalent at best, and the audience is left pondering less 
about individual human nature and more about the possibilities of family. 
The irony of a 1950s idealized family is further highlighted with the syrupy 
and dated country-and-western tune playing in the background, “In the 
Valley of the Sun.”
Cultural Repression and the American Family
In Hearths of Desire, Tony Williams describes the family as a “material cause 
of horrific events.” He develops his reading through a cultural materialism 
involving “a continuous interaction between ideology and the material forces 
of history.” In an approach that anticipates Clover’s attention to psychologi-
cal guilt and repression, he describes The Hills Have Eyes (1977) as typifying 
a class of films with a plot centered on a family under siege and struggling 
against outside forces: “These forces represent distorted embodiments of 
repressed tensions.” He quotes Wes Craven from a 1979 interview; Craven’s 
comments not only support Williams’s central concern with repression but 
further the reading of the “monster within”: “In The Hills Have Eyes, nobody 
even tells anybody what they saw. Everybody’s trying to protect everyone 
else, so nobody tells the truth, [which] costs us in time and unpreparedness 
because you’re not psychically facing what really is happening. So within the 
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family I feel there are all these things. It’s not that there are violent people 
waiting out there to break into our own affluent circle. No. We are those 
people.”21
Williams’s reading also points to class differences within the film, noting 
how “Craven’s dark family” stands as “an extreme example” of “losers in the 
affluent American Dream.” The battle between the families on one level rep-
resents a class struggle, as “Jupiter’s family . . . destroys Bob, the patriarchal 
beneficiary of an economic system that condemns them to starvation and 
historic erasure.” But on a broader, historical level, the central mechanism 
of repression Williams describes in the 1977 film is America’s denial of the 
Vietnam War, a specter recalled through the guerilla tactics of the “dark 
family.” The culture is at risk because of a shared historical repression, a re-
pression acted out by the seemingly banal Carter family, whose family dog, 
Beast, signifies the family’s “repressed violent tendencies.” Williams notes 
how the end of the 1977 version places both families on a level playing field 
of violence as they trade atrocities: “Civilized family values are nonexistent; 
both families are identical.”22
Whereas the 1977 film drew inspiration from American repression 
regarding the Vietnam War, the 2006 version and follow-ups use the desert 
setting to reference American wars in Afghanistan and Iran. The nuclear 
backstory is certainly present in the 1977 version of The Hills Have Eyes. 
The wild family in both films clearly stands outside the status quo, working 
against the normalcy and values the Carters represent. In the film the wild 
family launches raids using guerillalike tactics, military jets zoom danger-
ously close overhead, and the daughters read “Nuclear Testing Site” on 
the road map just before their trailer crashes. The specter of the military-
industrial complex is even more apparent in the 2006 version of the film. 
It is established by the opening sequence of the film, and then reinforced 
throughout as the miners’ mutated bodies bear the marks of oppression and 
deprivation. The nostalgia of the 1950s family is disrupted by the reality of 
the cold war and its victims, and the mutants themselves exist as “visible 
traces of the past’s presence in the present.”23
Both films refer to the cold war context that sets the scene, but the 2006 
remake comments more directly on the link between the material impact of 
nuclear testing and the role of the U.S. government in creating the outlaw 
family of mutant miners. The film thereby increases the role of Repressive 
State Apparatuses by emphasizing the role of the military. The elaborated 
historical context of the later film functions on several levels. The histori-
cal period of the cold war coincides with the era of what many today see 
as a “golden age” of family values. The implicit pun on the mutants as the 
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ultimate “nuclear family” is never stated, but nevertheless apparent. The 
use of mannequins as coinhabitants of the model nuclear town furthers 
the sense of family as constructed, comprising exchangeable individuals 
occupying established social roles. Again, the audience is reminded of the 
easy slippage of categories between “civilized” and “savage.” The concept of 
the “constructed family” of mannequins points to the brutal environment 
of nuclear devastation that has created such monsters.
The Hills Have Eyes demonstrates the complications and contradictions 
that are inherent in any treatment of family in the contemporary United 
States, where national identification and religious belief are integral elements 
of how the bourgeois family asserts itself. Upon first recognizing they are 
stranded and isolated in a potentially threatening environment, the Carter 
family, with American flags fluttering on their RV, responds with prayer (with 
the mother, Ethel, leading the family with an appeal to the ISA of religion) 
and guns (with the ex-cop father, Bob, leading the family with an appeal 
to the RSA of the police). The inadequacies of these defenses become clear 
upon the deaths of the mother and the father as they are besieged by the 
purely antisocial (and in some ways post-human) mutant family.
Patriarchal Displacement
A key component of the family dynamic in both films relates to the cycles of 
the deaths of both patriarchal and matriarchal figures in the film. The films’ 
treatment of patriarchal demise marks a key point of ambivalence in their 
treatment of the ideology of family. In his analysis of the 1977 film, Rodo-
wick notes that the death of Big Bob, a “literal representative of bourgeois 
authority in the text,” marks a critical moment in a cycle of displacement 
that sets off the action of the film. The violence in the film is in some sense 
centrally dependent on this displacement of patriarchal authority. Bob’s death 
follows the death of Fred (the gas station attendant and father of Jupiter) 
and opens a space for Doug to avenge the remaining family. For Rodowick, 
what is notable about how the revenge cycle operates as events unfold is 
how the violence becomes a part of the Carters, not the monsters. As he 
describes it, “The film moves towards a resolution, but this will not mean 
the restoration of order and ideological stability. It is, rather, a movement 
of equivalence in which the [Carters] will be identified with the ideology of 
‘violence’ previously reserved for the monsters.”24 It is this critical point of 
blurred identification between Big Bob’s conservative family and Jupiter’s 
outlawed tribe that creates one significant space for radical intervention.
Horror films are notorious for their exercise of violence against women, 
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and The Hills Have Eyes is no exception. Big Bob’s immolation is part of a 
violent sequence of action in which Jupiter’s sons invade the Carters’ trailer 
and wreak havoc upon the women in the family. In this disturbing sequence, 
the mutants set off the explosion that engulfs Big Bob in flames, creating a 
diversion that effectively draws Bobby, Ethel, and Lynn away while Mars and 
Pluto ravage the trailer, bite the head off the pet parakeet, rape Brenda, and 
ultimately kill Lynn and Ethel before absconding with the baby. For many 
critics, including Rodowick, such moments would inevitably point to a re-
assertion of patriarchal norms and the status quo. In her article “Breached 
Bodies and Home Invasions: Horrific Representations of the Feminized 
Body and Home,” Marcia England explores the ambivalent dynamic of the 
violence of penetration in three films, The Others, Evil Dead II, and I Walked 
with a Zombie, concluding that while home invasions and rape might in 
some cases be read as a violent transgression of patriarchal spaces and a 
radical disruption of boundaries, the conclusions of these particular films 
serve to reinstate patriarchal order, thereby reinforcing “gendered codings of 
space.”25 In The Hills Have Eyes, both the horror and the theme of patriarchal 
displacement come together in this pivotal scene of penetrative violence.
England does not specifically reference The Hills Have Eyes in her discus-
sion, but the dynamic whereby home invasion marks a radical intervention 
within the ideology of family certainly holds true in this film. As England 
comments, “The home becomes a conduit within these horror stories, one 
that is permeable to the outside. It is no longer isolated and segregated; it 
is invaded. It is from this fuzziness that we begin to see the fragility of the 
constructions of public and private space, of the home and of family, of 
society as a whole.”26 For England the level of extreme punishment that the 
perpetrators suffer serves to restore patriarchal norms, but for me the radical 
displacement of the normative family in The Hills Have Eyes contributes to 
the films’ ultimate critique of the dominant ideology.
The cycle of displaced patriarchal authority and the exercise of violence 
against women might seem to gesture toward a conservative ending, but the 
Carter family’s ability (in both films) to adapt to the same level of excessive 
violence as the monsters ultimately destabilizes the family’s ideological co-
herence. As Rodowick puts it in his description of the 1977 Craven film, “In-
stead of celebrating the triumph of the bourgeois family, the final moments 
of the film only serve to inscribe them in the place of their victimizers.”27 
While in the Aja 2006 version, the final shot of the reconfigured family might 
be seen as the family prevailing in a heroic tableau, the narrative excesses 
of violence undermine any conservative sense of reassurance. The strict 
boundaries of gender roles have been disrupted, and the haunting presence 
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of the sins of the past are ever present, effectively disrupting the ideological 
link between family, god, and country. The final shot of the Aja film, taken 
from the perspective of the mutants, signals that the threat is not over, and 
that the past is still very much present.
Conclusion
A key scene in the 2006 film exemplifies the concept of ISAs and also marks 
a departure from the 1977 original. As Doug develops as an action hero, he 
makes the critical decision to track the miners to their town and retrieve 
baby Katherine. As he emerges from the mineshaft with weapon and dog, 
he enters the ghost town that was once the village for nuclear testing, with 
tattered mannequins still in place. The mannequins, inanimate human 
replicates, are symbolic by their nature, and here their symbolism functions 
to mimic the everyday life of a bourgeois American family from the 1960s. 
A young boy and girl sit on the creaking swings in the yard of a house in 
a deserted middle-class neighborhood— a ghostly replication of normalcy 
in which mannequins “play” on swings and tumbleweeds blow through a 
bright desert day.
The mannequins’ symbolic force gestures to ways that we humans in-
habit social roles: more like puppets or dolls set in position than individual 
agents with free will, these figures have been placed into positions that mark 
them as inanimate leftovers, but they are still somehow are recognizable as 
“family.” The mannequins manage to be representative and ironic at once, 
straddling the ground between innocence and danger. These figures were 
pawns in the nuclear testing, and are therefore (like the mutants themselves) 
representative of devastation. As inhabitants of this ghost town, they fur-
ther signal danger insofar as they are “neighbors” of the mutant miners. 
Yet their iconic meaning as white, middle-class American children of the 
1960s strongly signals a nostalgic pull of normalcy, stability, and comfort. 
It is in this ironic play between the immediate danger signaled by the plot 
of the film and the iconic comfort of the symbolism of family that we can 
understand the strength of the ISA.28
The nuclear ghost town is an eerie echo of the middle-class 1960s, with 
mannequins standing in for neighbors and family units. It also holds the 
iconic appeal of the American Western, situating the miners within the 
symbolic framework of “Americanness.” Even the living rooms are set up as 
lifeless tableaux, with kids lounging on the floor before the television set. Yet 
all these signifiers of normalcy and family exist in a ghost town, an empty 
and evacuated scene of traces with no visible sign of life. Part of what makes 
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this all so scary is the way that the world of the mutant miners mirrors the 
world of the bourgeois Carter family and their symbols of normalcy. This 
is more like a fun-house mirror, with odd distortions and horrific violence 
displacing the banal predictability of the iconic American family. This group 
looks the part in many ways. In one shocking scene, Doug enters a room and 
comes across a pair of live little children sitting on the floor watching TV. 
After so many mannequins, their presence is shocking, as is their clichéd 
request to him: “Come play with us, mister.” Another shot of the mannequins 
shows them posed alternatively as family and then (in a quick shot almost 
beyond recognition) as a couple engaged in fellatio. A shadow of marginal-
ity, perhaps a technician’s prank, it nevertheless contributes to the uncanny 
feel of the ghost village, a place at once familiar and strange, and alienating 
largely because of the strong appeal of family ideology.
Mannequins point to notions of the sterility and exchangeability of 
the working classes. When Doug wakes up in the meat freezer, he finds 
himself surrounded by body parts, and it is only the blood that helps us 
realize the limbs are not from dismembered mannequins but from human 
victims. Disassembled, the limbs imply that the parts are in some sense 
exchangeable, subject to production and reproduction. The bodies have 
been cheapened through their “use value” of cannibalism and also through 
their association to the mannequins. As Robin Wood notes, “Cannibalism 
represents the ultimate in possessiveness, hence the logical end of human 
relations under capitalism.”29
While on the surface The Hills Have Eyes rehearses the time-worn theme 
of a family under siege, thus seemingly reiterating American family values, 
on another level the films radically revise assumptions about the legacy of the 
“nuclear family” and its uneasy place in American history. The mechanisms 
of horror and its relationship to family ideology demand a complex set of 
reading practices. My response to the films is in line with that of Rodowick, 
who concludes with a similar mixed response: “In the final analysis, I’m not 
sure whether I would consider The Hills Have Eyes to be a progressive text or 
not.”30 For me such ambivalence is in keeping with the complexities of the 
horror film, as well as the ambivalent and often mixed nature of ideologi-
cal power. Sociopolitical readings of film must account for the paradoxical 
complexity of ideological discourses that achieve their power by appealing 
on multiple, sometimes conflicting, levels. Althusser and Foucault’s theories 
of discourse, ideology, and subject formation allow a rich space for under-
standing the ideology of family values in America and the horror that such 
seemingly banal discourse carries in its wake.
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Zombies of the World, Unite
John Lutz
Mike: It’s like they’re pretending to be alive.
Riley: Isn’t that what we’re doing, pretending to be alive?
—Land of the Dead
In a 2005 review of George A. Romero’s Land of the Dead, Roger Ebert notes 
the class structure of the society of surviving humans residing in Pittsburgh, 
pointing out the contrast between the luxurious (and apparently completely 
idle) lifestyle of the residents of Fiddler’s Green, a luxury skyscraper at the 
center of the city, and the dehumanized condition of the poorer inhabit-
ants surrounding it. Ebert goes on to note how the functioning of money is 
never explained in this economy, “where possessions are acquired by loot-
ing and retained by force.”1 This provocative description is not pursued any 
further in the review, but it provides a point of departure for examining the 
film’s satiric treatment of American capitalism and, by extension, a global 
economic order predicated upon class exploitation. Indeed, the economic 
system depicted in Land of the Dead has a remarkable parallel with Marx’s 
representation of capitalist society. According to Marx, capitalism is defined 
by an unremitting conflict between classes with antagonistic and irreconcil-
able interests. In the Marxian view, class struggle represents a central feature 
of human history. This is a struggle in which, from one economic system to 
its successor, oppressor and oppressed have “stood in constant opposition 
to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, 
a fight that each time ended, either in the revolutionary reconstitution of 
society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”2 One of 
the fundamental characteristics of Marx’s description pertains to the some-
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times “hidden” nature of class conflict. This insight suggests that members 
of classes with antagonistic interests may not always recognize themselves 
as representatives of a particular class, nor recognize the precise nature of 
their true interests. In the United States, a country where discussions of 
class rarely find their way directly into public discourse, representations of 
class conflict sometimes appear in unlikely places. Romero’s film is one such 
place: an ostensible representation of what is known as a survival narrative, 
that is to say, “a story in which a group of characters undergoes a crisis that 
tests their individual and collective capacity to survive,”3 that actually repre-
sents a complex, sustained allegorical treatment of class conflict in America 
and exploitation on a global scale. At the same time, the film represents an 
interesting variation on the genre of survival horror and, in particular, the 
zombie film, which, like its prototype The Birds, usually involves a relatively 
small group trapped in a house or mall. In Land of the Dead, this principle 
is applied on a grand scale. The besieged house is transformed into an entire 
city allegorically representing America and its relationship to the underde-
veloped, exploited nations on the periphery of empire.
Furthermore, like Romero’s earlier films in this genre, Land of the Dead 
seems preoccupied with making comparisons between the cannibalistic 
zombies and uninfected humans. The opening scene depicts members of 
a zombie brass band playing their instruments pathetically. A teenaged 
couple, the unlaced sneakers of the male very much like the style currently 
fashionable, parades past. And, when the gas station bell rings, the African 
American attendant, Big Daddy, who will later lead the zombie “revolution” 
against the businessman Kaufman, emerges to answer the bell and picks 
up the gas handle in imitation of his former life. The choice of an African 
American for this role contributes to the film’s allegorical exploration of 
class and privilege on two levels. Even as it evokes the zombie figure’s origin 
in the history of African slavery in the Caribbean, it comments upon the 
relationship between race and class in the United States by pointing to the 
disproportionate number of African Americans in impoverished condi-
tions and the role of violence in enforcing these conditions. Indeed, in a 
discussion of George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead cycle, Noël Carroll 
points out that these films are “explicitly anti-racist as well as critical of the 
consumerism and viciousness of American society.”4 Similarly, in a discus-
sion of the original Night of the Living Dead, Tony Williams suggests that 
the film represents “a devastating critique upon the deformations of human 
personality operating within a ruthless capitalist society.”5 Land of the Dead 
carries on this tradition, emphasizing how racism and brutally competitive 
consumerism function on a global level by reinforcing the underdevelop-
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ment and exploitation of nations primarily populated by nonwhites. Big 
Daddy’s response to the assault on his town is particularly suggestive here, 
since he clearly expresses rage over the killing of his fellow zombies. When 
provided with an opportunity, he grabs a gun from a soldier passing on a 
motorcycle and begins to teach himself how to use it. In arming himself, Big 
Daddy figuratively sets foot on the path of violent resistance and revolution. 
In this connection, it is worthwhile noting that “the original narrative of 
Caribbean cannibalism in Columbus’s journals rested upon a distinction 
between those who would work docilely for European colonizers, and those 
‘cannibals’ who staged resistance and could thus be enslaved or killed.”6 Like 
Columbus’s cannibals, these zombies will not stand peacefully by and allow 
their town to be emptied of its resources. As the soldiers leave the town, Big 
Daddy puts the gun over his shoulder in military fashion, begins walking in 
the direction of the departing soldiers, and successfully exhorts his fellow 
zombies to follow him.
Although Roger Ebert’s review mentioned earlier may seem to fore-
ground class, in the final analysis it proves to be quite typical of American 
public discourse to the degree that it fails to pursue the full allegorical im-
plications of the film. Early in the review, Ebert points out that the healthy 
humans surviving in Pittsburgh “have evolved a class system.”7 This is an 
Eugene Clark (as Big Daddy) in Land of the Dead (2005). Directed by George A. 
Romero. (Universal Studios/Photofest)
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interesting, if not symptomatic, phrase that directs attention away from the 
film’s allegorical treatment of class and race by suggesting that before the 
zombie outbreak there were no classes. Ebert’s use of the word evolved implies 
that the residents of Pittsburgh have constructed a class system in order to 
survive rather than merely reproduced the one that existed before. A full 
exploration of the film’s allegorical (and sometimes bitingly satiric) depic-
tion of American capitalism requires shifting from an exclusive focus upon 
the inhabitants of Pittsburgh and extending the analysis of class struggle to 
encompass the zombies as well. In many respects, the zombies prove to have 
more in common with the poorer inhabitants of the Pittsburgh fortress than 
these poorer inhabitants have with the wealthy residents of Fiddler’s Green. 
Ruled over by the dictatorial businessman Paul Kaufman, who enforces the 
city’s system of privilege with direct violence and allocates the resources 
pillaged from the surrounding countryside, Pittsburgh represents only an 
apparent oasis of partial stability in a world characterized by utter chaos 
and insecurity. Although initially Kaufman seems to exert absolute control 
over the city and the surrounding land of the dead, he can be viewed as a 
symbol of modern capitalist society with its exploitative class relations and 
inequitable distribution of property. Marx describes the modern capital-
ist with a provocative Gothic metaphor as one who has “conjured up . . . 
gigantic means of production and exchange” but “is like the sorcerer, who 
is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has 
called up by his spells.”8 The zombies surrounding the fortress of Pittsburgh 
are apt symbols of these “powers of the nether world” constantly threaten-
ing capitalist society with destruction. They signify not only the countless 
individuals impoverished by the system and the disruptive potential of 
their unrest, but also the commercial crises that periodically threaten the 
prosperity of the privileged classes.
In this respect, the film can also be seen as an explicit commentary upon 
America’s place at the center of global economic imperialism. Bordered by 
two rivers and an electric barricade, the city of Pittsburgh in Land of the 
Dead serves as a figure for America’s place (bordered by two oceans and a 
barricade between it and Mexico) in the global economic order. The milita-
rism apparent in the city emphasizes the degree to which America’s global 
hegemony is maintained by imperialistic violence while pointing out how 
the sharpening contradictions between capital and labor have created social 
instability and political chaos. Similarly divided between a class of wealthy 
survivors living in luxury in the city’s center and the poor living on its out-
lying edges, Pittsburgh exists in a permanently antagonistic relationship 
with the surrounding territory, populated by the undead. This relationship 
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signifies America’s exploitative relationship to the underdeveloped nations 
of the world. Using its heavy firepower and accompanying assault team to 
gather commodities from the territory of the undead, the armored vehicle 
named Dead Reckoning represents the military enforcement of U.S. economic 
imperialism as it relies upon violent coercion to appropriate raw materials 
and perpetuates the exploitation of cheap labor.
Furthermore, the subhuman condition of the zombie masses, perma-
nently afflicted with an insatiable hunger coupled with rudimentary intel-
lectual skills, serves as a powerful allegory for the condition of alienation 
described by Marx. The title of the film, Land of the Dead, metaphorically 
represents the living death experienced by the brutalized and exploited 
worker. The worker’s domination by the system of production has a de-
humanizing effect upon his or her psyche, creating psychological forms of 
degradation and impoverishment to accompany the physical ones. As Marx 
describes this process of domination:
They [conditions of labor] distort the worker into a fragment of a 
man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, 
they destroy the actual content of his labor by turning it into a 
torment; they alienate [entfremden] from him the intellectual po-
tentialities of the labor process in the same proportion as science is 
incorporated in it as an independent power; they deform the condi-
tions under which he works, subject him during the labor process 
to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform 
his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath 
the juggernaut of capital.9
More than the poor inhabitants of Pittsburgh, the zombies populating the 
surrounding land of the dead reflect this psychological condition. The hor-
rifying facial expressions, distorted posture, and subhuman grunting of the 
zombies clearly suggest a condition of unrelenting torment and misery. Their 
frequent appearance in clothing suggesting working-class roles (more on 
this later) and their wielding of various tools and vestiges of material culture 
all point to their dehumanized, alienated condition. 
Indeed, the metaphorical significance of the zombie as a representation 
of a victim of exploitation can be traced back to its origins in Caribbean 
folklore. In a book examining the consumption of the Caribbean from the 
initial stages of European conquest to the present, Mimi Sheller empha-
sizes its defining condition of enslavement and points out that the Haitian 
zombi, “a living-dead slave deprived of will and physically controlled by a 
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sorcerer,” functions as “the ultimate representation of the psychic state of 
one whose body/spirit is consumed.”10 Making a similar point, Joan Dayan 
views the zombie as a way of representing the twentieth-century history of 
forced labor and denigration during America’s occupation of Haiti, in which 
“the phantasm of the zombie—a soulless husk deprived of freedom—is the 
ultimate sign of loss and dispossession.”11 Although there is no apparent sor-
cerer controlling the zombies in Land of the Dead, unless it be the capitalist 
sorcerer described by Marx, they are clearly driven by forces beyond their 
own rational control and exist in a state of constant hunger. This condition 
reflects the physical impoverishment of the exploited worker. In this respect, 
the title of the film represents an ironic commentary upon the alienated 
condition of the mass of humanity under global capitalism.
In an interesting exchange that underscores this commentary, Riley, the 
leader of the strike team assembled to raid supplies from the region sur-
rounding Pittsburgh and the ostensible hero of the film, comments upon 
the similarity of the zombies to humans:
Mike: They’re trying to be us.
Riley: No, they used to be us. Learning to be us again.
Mike: No way. Some germ or some devil got those things up and 
walking . . . but there’s a big difference between us and them. 
They’re dead.
Mike: It’s like they’re pretending to be alive.
Riley: Isn’t that what we’re doing, pretending to be alive?
Riley alone seems to recognize the humanity of the zombies and later com-
ments that they are learning to be useful. This theme will come up frequently 
in assessing the value of various characters. The usefulness of the zombies 
serves as an implicit condemnation of the comparatively “useless” wealthy 
residents of Fiddler’s Green who spend all of their time in complete leisure. 
At the same time, Riley’s recognition of the humanity of the zombies initially 
only goes so far, since he is leading a raid against the town in which they 
reside. In several respects this raid resembles the military enforcement of 
U.S. imperialism. As Riley and Mike observe the gas station, Riley notices 
that Big Daddy seems to be communicating with the other zombies and 
even thinking on a rudimentary level. Riley’s perception of the zombies is 
quite similar to standard imperialist perceptions of colonized peoples dur-
ing the height of European imperialism. The grunts and groans that have a 
meaning opaque to Riley and Mike present the standard stereotypical view 
of the savage cannibal, and indeed, as Mimi Sheller points out, there is a 
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close association between zombies, cannibalism, and the exploitation of 
labor in which “the dialectics of eating and being eaten pertain as much to 
the hollowing out of human agency by degraded forms of labor (the zombie) 
as to the actual appropriation, objectification, fragmentation, and ingestion 
of the physical body itself (to be cannibalized).”12 
Furthermore, the fireworks display that is used to mesmerize the zombies 
signifies the superior technological and military might of the United States, 
a “shock and awe” display of force that is intended to make the zombies sub-
missive so that the strike team can gather the resources they need without 
interference. The raid itself, reminiscent of any number of Western imperial-
ist military adventures in which civilians have been indiscriminately killed 
alongside soldiers, quickly degenerates into the random gunning down of 
zombies in the street. The whooping and yelling of the members of the assault 
team as they leave the town evokes lawless pillage and presents the zombies 
as victims of random violence. This leads one of the soldiers on Riley’s team 
to comment, “I thought this was going to be a battle. It’s a fucking massa-
cre,” an observation no doubt made by more than one soldier enforcing the 
imperatives of U.S. economic and political hegemony abroad.
Riley’s attitude to all of this is clearly ambivalent, and we learn during 
the raid that this is his last night performing this kind of work. At one point 
Riley mentions that he doesn’t want anything to go wrong and expresses 
his commitment to getting the job done. Riley’s comment represents an 
interesting representation of the work ethic. Not unlike the character of 
Marlow in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, whose perception of Africans has 
some remarkable parallels with the film’s representation of the cannibalistic 
zombies, Riley places a value on work for its own sake, independent of the 
kind of work in which he is engaged. Evocations of imperialism are also evi-
dent in the way the zombies react to the raid. As the zombies are mesmerized 
by the fireworks display, that is to say, the superior technological might of 
Western capitalism, the African American zombie Big Daddy alone seems 
immune to it and attempts to rouse his companions.
In addition to its allegorical exploration of global capitalism, the film 
explores class relations in America by focusing upon the contrasting living 
conditions of Pittsburgh’s wealthy and poor residents. One focus of this 
exploration is the relationship between Kaufman and his henchman Cholo. 
Cholo has been procuring luxury items for Kaufman in the raids upon the 
countryside and disposing of the bodies of those whom Kaufman has had 
killed to preserve his power and position. In one of the more interesting 
segments of the film, a conversation between Riley and Cholo takes place 
underneath a television screen playing an advertisement for Fiddler’s Green. 
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In his review of the film, Roger Ebert takes note of the commercial and ex-
presses perplexity about its possible purpose in this world;13 however, even 
though there are no consumers left who can aspire to live in Fiddler’s Green, 
the entire segment represents a complex commentary upon the manner in 
which advertising works as a purveyor of what Marx referred to as ideology. 
Marx defined ideology as the “false consciousness” adopted by workers and 
capitalists alike that participates in the reproduction of the system by per-
suading the workers in particular that its institutions are arranged to support 
their interests. In his theoretical work, Marx frequently concerned himself 
with the role of ideology in capitalist society since he realized that it played 
a powerful part in preventing workers from developing a direct awareness 
of their exploitation. However, one of the most provocative descriptions of 
ideology in the Marxist tradition was arrived at by Louis Althusser, who 
defined ideology as “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence.”14 This definition represents an ideal characterization 
of Cholo’s initial perception of his place in the order of things. As the com-
mercial announces, “Life goes on in Fiddler’s Green in the heart of one of 
America’s oldest and greatest cities,” it advertises its six fine restaurants and 
endless shopping opportunities. When it goes on to point out that there is 
a difference between Fiddler’s Green and other places, Cholo announces to 
Riley his intention to have his own home in Fiddler’s Green. He then goes on 
to characterize the world as a place of ruthless competition where only those 
who act selfishly in their own interests can get ahead. Essentially, Cholo has 
fully internalized the competitive ethic of capitalism, subordinating all moral 
considerations to personal enrichment and drowning everything, like the 
capitalist whom he serves, “in the icy waters of egotistical calculation.”15
Cholo’s attitudes explain the continuing function of advertising even 
in this postapocalyptic world. Cholo announces his intention to gain entry 
to the Green as he is watching the advertisement. This detail participates 
in the film’s critique of how advertising functions not only to literally sell 
products but also to inculcate the lower classes with an ethic of consump-
tion and persuade them that they have the opportunity to join the ranks 
of the privileged. In his aspirations for a life of wealth and privilege, Cholo 
can be viewed as a direct representation of a worker whose investment in 
an “imaginary” relationship to the real conditions of his existence deludes 
him into believing that he can achieve the American dream. Later, when 
Kaufman rejects his bid to live in the Green and Cholo steals Dead Reckon-
ing, he continues to hold onto this delusion, believing that the power that 
the assault vehicle gives him will enable him to extort 5 million dollars 
from Kaufman and still achieve his goal of reaching a privileged lifestyle. 
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In the course of a conversation in which Cholo has come to understand the 
world as a place where all advantages are gained by the ruthless application 
of violent force, he glances at the monitor of the assault vehicle to see a La-
tino zombie pushing a manual lawnmower in meaningless circles. Before 
shooting the zombie, Cholo, Latino himself, points out that the power that 
Dead Reckoning gives him represents the only thing that sets him apart from 
the “Mexican bastard” with the lawnmower. In addition to directing social 
criticism at the racist tendency to label all Latino workers as “Mexicans,” 
the segment directly comments upon the widespread exploitation of un-
documented workers in the United States as landscapers. Simultaneously, 
it provides a powerful image of how the extensive use of machinery reduces 
the worker to an “appendage of the machine” from whom “only the most 
simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack” is required.16 
Although Cholo has developed a better understanding of his real place in 
the world, his individualistic focus compels him to see all human relations 
in terms of ruthless competition. The conversation between Riley and Cholo 
about Cholo’s aspirations provides additional insight into the function of 
ideology. Riley recognizes the absurdity of Cholo’s goals, assuring him that 
his desire to get a place in Fiddler’s Green, that is, become a member of the 
capitalist class, will never come to pass because both of them are the “wrong 
kind.” Cholo refuses to accept Riley’s point of view and, as their conversation 
ends, the camera returns to the television screen and the voice-over saying, 
“Isn’t it time? Isn’t it your time for Fiddler’s Green?” Taken as a whole, this 
segment of the film represents a caustic satire upon the vast discrepancy 
between the ideals of the American dream and the underlying brutal reality 
of American society.
Even though the world is in complete disorder and the Green is closed 
to any new members, the commercial still serves a crucial function as a 
source of ideology. It is intended to keep the poor surviving residents of 
Pittsburgh buying into the system in order to preserve the privileges of the 
ruling class. The final voice-over of the commercial comments upon the de-
lusional nature of Cholo’s aspirations, and allegorically exposes the imaginary 
nature of the American dream. It demonstrates how ideology functions as 
a means of getting people to reproduce the system without the state having 
to use direct repressive violence. After this exchange, it really comes as no 
surprise when Kaufman tells Cholo that there isn’t enough space for him in 
the Green. At the same time, not only does the commercial serve as a vehicle 
for reinforcing the aspirations of the lower class, but it also comments al-
legorically upon the American obsession with commodity consumption. In 
addition to being a place of residence, Fiddler’s Green is essentially a luxury 
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shopping and dining center. In one of the few glimpses we have of the inside 
of the tower, the wealthy white residents, none of whom are shown work-
ing, spend all of their time shopping and dining. As Cholo walks through 
the Green to deliver the whiskey he has procured for Kaufman, the viewer 
is given a glimpse of an insulated world of privilege with virtually unlim-
ited opportunities for consumption. This world of privilege stands in stark 
contrast to the conditions of scarcity and competition that exist in the rest 
of the city and the surrounding land of the dead.
However, the poor residents of the city and the zombies, despite their 
condition of deprivation, share with the wealthy residents of the tower an 
obsession with consumption. As in the second installment of Romero’s earlier 
trilogy, Dawn of the Dead, “humans and zombies become equal partners in 
a goal of conspicuous consumption dominating personal behavior.”17 The 
opening shot of the film emphasizes this point by lingering upon an old sign 
with the word “Eats” with an arrow pointing in the direction of zombies 
wandering in an abandoned churchyard. This segment provides a satiric 
commentary upon America’s origins in a Puritan ethic and its abandon-
ment of Puritan religious ideals for the ideals of unlimited consumption. 
The sign itself is ambiguous and raises interesting questions about the nature 
and limits of human consumption. While the main activity of the zombies 
is the consumption of human flesh, an activity that serves as a figure for 
capitalist competition and the social and economic construction of scarcity 
through the exploitation of labor and the unequal distribution of wealth, 
Riley’s team is also coming to the town to gather resources. If the zombies 
serve as a figure for the exploited workers of the underdeveloped world, 
then there is a clear sense in which they are being eaten as well. Marx’s 
understanding of how commodities are produced makes this process more 
explicit. According to Marx, commodities are a form of “dead labor,” that is 
to say, they represent living flesh transformed into a fetishized commodity 
available for consumption. Understood in this sense, those who consume 
commodities are consumers of bodies. Consequently, Riley’s raid on the 
town for commodities allegorically represents the Northern Hemisphere’s 
consumption of the “dead” labor of the underdeveloped South.
The link between consumption and human exploitation is made explicit 
in the segment of the film in which Riley and Charlie visit what is clearly the 
commercial hub of the city. This area serves as a marketplace, casino, strip 
club, and entertainment center. Interestingly, this mini Las Vegas is the only 
place where the wealthy are seen mingling with the poor. The one activity 
that apparently unites the residents of Pittsburgh is consumption. In this 
section of the city, zombies and humans alike are objects for exploitation. 
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Zombies are used as targets for  paintball guns and as props for the wealthy 
to pose with for pictures. However, the most overt example of exploitation 
is depicted when the young heroine Slack, a former soldier and prostitute 
who has challenged Kaufman’s authority, is placed in a cage with two zom-
bies in order to induce them to fight. The cage occupies the center of a strip 
club, and the spectators are placing bets on which zombie will get the food 
(Slack) first. In this context, the zombie fight serves as a clear example of the 
way in which the film uses cannibalism to characterize Western consumer 
culture as “a culture of excessive consumption and insatiable hunger, feeding 
off human bodies for profit.”18 At the same time, this segment represents a 
commentary upon the sexual exploitation of women as objects of consump-
tion. The literal threat of dismemberment that faces Slack is emblematic 
of the process of objectification of women’s bodies and the fragmentation 
(in this case, literal morselization) of women for economic gain. Although 
Slack finds herself in the cage as a result of her resistance to Kaufman, her 
exploitation there is merely the extension of the sexual exploitation she ex-
periences as a prostitute. With the exception of the forms of entertainment 
involving zombies, the remaining ones differ in no way from what can be 
found in any of the gambling centers of America or elsewhere. Later in the 
film, when Kaufman, like any good capitalist, takes credit for the privileges 
of the Green as the product of his ingenuity, he points out that it was his idea 
to set up the gambling and other vices to keep the poorer residents off the 
streets. The representation of Pittsburgh’s mini Las Vegas, in tandem with 
Kaufman’s explanation of its true purpose, offers a critique of the American 
entertainment industry and its role as a purveyor of an ethic of consump-
tion designed to distract the poor and exploited from their oppression and 
keep them from unrest and revolt. When these measures fail, Kaufman 
relies upon both overt and covert acts of direct violence to suppress any 
resistance to his regime.
Indeed, when Riley and Charlie put an end to the zombie fight and 
save Slack from certain death, they all find themselves in prison as a result. 
While in prison, they see Mulligan, a resident of Pittsburgh who has been 
calling for the overthrow of Kaufman, being led past. Lurking behind the 
apparent tranquility of the life of privilege in the Green and the fevered 
pursuit of consumption in Pittsburgh’s commercial hub and entertainment 
industry, one encounters the specter of a patriarchal and totalitarian political 
regime driven by the vicissitudes of profit. This regime is appropriately sur-
rounded by a wasteland that, following the logic of competition, is presided 
over by the last capitalist left standing. Evoking the conflict between Harry 
and Ben in the isolated farmhouse in Night of the Living Dead, Land of the 
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Dead exhibits a similar awareness “that the competitive arena of patriarchal 
aggression is no solution for the besieged humans.”19 Through its represen-
tation of the antagonism and conflict between the survivors in Pittsburgh, 
the film explores not only the institutionalized forms of violence endemic 
to American society, but also the violent coercion that lies in wait for those 
who pose an actual threat to the system. 
Furthermore, the existence of a repressive military apparatus in posta-
pocalyptic Pittsburgh serves as a means of allegorically exploring the forms 
of militarism that emerged in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. When Riley and Charlie are about to 
enter Pittsburgh’s entertainment center, they are stopped by two guards in 
front of a barricade. In a remarkable image, one of the soldiers stands in front 
of a mural of the Statue of Liberty. The arm of Liberty’s torch is outstretched 
and the soldier stands directly beneath and next to it. The soldier appears 
seamlessly nestled beside her in an image intended to demonstrate the dis-
crepancy between the ideology of American democracy, with its promise of 
freedom, and the violent coercion that the system relies upon to perpetuate 
the exploitation of one class by another. Directly invoking the environment 
of New York City after 9/11, the deeper aim of the image is to point out the 
sham character of American democracy, a system reinforced by imperialist 
violence abroad and more subtle repressive measures on the domestic front, 
where wealth and property are protected by the threat of violence should 
ideology fail. These repressive measures extend beyond the borders of the 
United States but are justified by pointing to real or imagined threats to those 
borders. Unlike the soldiers who stop Riley and Charlie, who are present to 
exert control over Pittsburgh’s poor population, the soldiers who guard the 
only overland access to the city play a different role. They patrol the border 
in order to protect the survivors of the city from the zombies. However, 
viewed allegorically, the fences barricading the third side of Pittsburgh 
signify the border between the United States and Mexico and, by extension, 
the underdeveloped, exploited countries of the Southern Hemisphere. The 
soldiers who guard the overland access to the city refer to it as the “throat.” 
This description provides yet another image of consumption that meta-
phorically registers America’s consumption of a disproportionate quantity 
of the world’s resources and its exploitative relationship to the underdevel-
oped world. At the same time, the rigorously patrolled border allegorically 
represents the attempt to limit the flow of undocumented workers across 
the U.S./Mexican border. The threat of invasion by the zombies provides a 
means of representing American xenophobic anxiety about immigration. As 
it turns out, the zombies will not invade the city by the overland route; they 
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will cross the water by walking on the bottom of the riverbed and emerge 
(literally with wet backs) on the other side.
In addition to metaphorically representing the class character of Ameri-
can society and the global contradictions between capital and labor, Land of 
the Dead ultimately finds a way to figuratively present socialist revolution. 
Early in the film Riley encounters Mulligan in the poor section of the city 
exhorting his fellow citizens to overthrow Kaufman, who didn’t “build” 
Fiddler’s Green but merely took it over. He goes on to point out that if they 
all joined together they could transform the city into a fit place for all of 
them to live. When he speaks to Mulligan, Riley observes that although they 
may be locked out of the Green, they’re also locked in the city. He goes on 
to say that he is “looking for a world where there are no fences.” If the fences 
signify the differences between the American ruling class, the American 
working class, and the classes of the underdeveloped world, Riley’s state-
ment amounts to the search for a world without classes and, by implication, 
a world without exploitation. 
At the same time that Mulligan is involved in generating a revolt among 
the citizens of Pittsburgh, the zombies are pursuing a parallel revolt of their 
own. The assault on the city led by Big Daddy is accompanied by a process 
whereby the zombies begin to regain social skills from their former lives. 
This development of intellectual capacities signifies the growth of class con-
sciousness among the alienated “undead.” In an interesting parallel to Marx’s 
description of class consciousness as a product of revolutionary struggle, the 
zombies begin to regain their humanity only when they revolt against the 
wealthy denizens of Pittsburgh who have been appropriating and consum-
ing the commodities taken from their territory. The long march from their 
town ends with Big Daddy learning how to cross the bottom of the river. 
This act is preceded by an image of the crowd of zombies lined up on the 
river’s edge, looking longingly across at the lit-up tower of Fiddler’s Green 
at the center of the city. Figuratively, this is a powerful image of depriva-
tion and the longing for a decent life, an image of the masses of deprived 
humanity looking at America with desire but also with rage at those who 
have exploited them. The emergence of the zombies from the river after 
crossing is perhaps the most frightening scene in the film and was used in 
the advertising trailer. The camera pans over the seemingly endless crowd 
of zombies as they rise from the water to begin their assault on the city. This 
metaphorical rebirth signifies the awakening of the masses as they develop a 
revolutionary consciousness. As they draw closer to the tower, the zombies 
begin to learn how to use tools. They begin to recover their lost human-
ity in the process of revolt. At one point Big Daddy even teaches a female 
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baseball player how to use a gun, taking away the bat she is carrying and 
demonstrating to her how to fire the weapon.
While all of this is going on, Riley and his team have regained control 
over Dead Reckoning, and Cholo, bitten by a zombie, decides not to kill 
himself, claiming that he always wanted to “see how the other half lives.” 
This satiric comment adds emphasis to the film’s treatment of class, as does 
Cholo’s confrontation with Kaufman once he has transformed into a zombie. 
Kaufman refers to him as a “fucking spic bastard,” echoing Cholo’s earlier 
reference to the Mexican zombie as a bastard and reinforcing the ethnic and 
racial dimension of the privilege enjoyed by the white residents of Fiddler’s 
Green. As Cholo and Kaufman struggle and the zombies eat the wealthy 
residents of the Green, Big Daddy returns to the scene. After having earlier 
pumped gasoline into Kaufman’s Cadillac, Big Daddy rolls a burning can 
down the slope of the garage and kills both Kaufman and Cholo in a mas-
sive explosion.
The killing of Kaufman and the destruction of the Green effectively 
abolish the economic system as well as the classes it supports. In an echo of 
Marx’s description of the revolutionary association of the proletariat in the 
Manifesto, those who have the least to lose and the most to gain by abolish-
ing the system, the zombies, prove to be, in a wonderfully ironic twist, the 
“grave-diggers” of the ruling class.20 The allegorical revolution undertaken 
by the zombies is given further emphasis when it turns out that many of 
the poor residents of the city have survived and are led by Mulligan. Mul-
ligan has armed himself and his companions and encourages Riley to stay 
and “turn this place into what we always wanted it to be.” Mulligan and his 
companions are an allegorical representation of socialist revolution, inspired 
with the goal of transforming America into a place more consistent with its 
democratic ideals. The destruction of the wealthy center of the city along 
with its privileged citizens, in tandem with the survival of the city’s poor 
inhabitants, suggests a common set of economic interests between the zom-
bies and the impoverished inhabitants of Pittsburgh. As in Romero’s earlier 
zombie trilogy, “the real threat to survival [proves to be] the class-based 
verbal savagery different characters exhibit towards each other rather than 
the zombies outside.”21 The common ground discovered with the zombies 
points toward a resolution of the global contradictions between capital and 
labor as well as the universal economic exploitation endemic to capitalism. 
The destruction of the city effectively abolishes the class system dominat-
ing the city and, in a displaced form, offers a representation of socialist 
revolution. Still resolved in his intention to go north to Canada, Riley is 
concerned about what Mulligan and his comrades might turn into in the 
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process of rebuilding the city, a possible reference to the failures of historical 
communism that Mulligan optimistically responds to with a noncommittal 
“We’ll see, won’t we?”
As Riley leaves for Canada, he spares the life of Big Daddy and the re-
treating zombies, claiming, “They’re just looking for a place to go. Just like 
us.” With the zombies as the primary agents of change, all of the fences have 
been destroyed. On an allegorical level, it turns out that the most wretched 
of the earth, that is to say, the exploited and impoverished masses of the 
underdeveloped world, serve as the primary agents of this transformation. 
The poor and working class of the developed world follow their lead. With 
the departure of the zombies, class distinctions and privilege have been 
abolished, but it remains to be seen what kind of world will replace the capi-
talist one. At the same time, Riley’s perception of some common interests 
with the zombies humanizes them and metaphorically suggests a common 
set of needs and desires between America and the rest of humanity in the 
underdeveloped world that transcends the barriers of race, class, and ethnic-
ity. Indeed, if we understand the figure of the cannibal as Elsbeth Probyn 
does in her work Carnal Appetites as “a historicized spectre of Western 
appetite” offering a critique of excessive consumption that points to an “an 
ethics and practice of restraint,”22 and the cannibal/zombie as a metaphor 
for a society in which consumption has exceeded all moral limits, then the 
film can be viewed as a powerful condemnation of capitalist society and its 
economic imperatives that require human beings to consume one another 
in order to survive. The final moments of the film even hint at an ethical 
alternative to capitalism. As Dead Reckoning heads north, it fires off the rest 
of its fireworks in an evocation of freedom that deliberately echoes Fourth 
of July celebrations. However, in a significant departure from other install-
ments in this genre, the zombies turn out to be among the survivors, and the 
enemy is not a monster but the monstrous exploitative institutions of global 
capitalism. After all, in this postapocalyptic land of the dead characterized 
by insecurity, scarcity, and profound deprivation, the zombies have nothing 
to lose but their chains.
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The Fall of the House of Ulmer
Paul A. Cantor
The American public apparently does not want us to give screen-
plays a natural ending, because movie fans really do not want 
motion pictures like the books from which they are adapted.  
. . . In Europe a realistic production is considered splendid 
entertainment by the masses, even though it is a stark tragedy. 
In America, however, every picture must end with the hero and 
heroine dying in each other’s arms. They must live happily ever 
after, but life isn’t like that.
—Carl Laemmle Sr.
Importing Horror
The horror story is one of the many exotic goods that Americans have tra-
ditionally imported from Europe. This was already true in American Gothic 
fiction in the early nineteenth century, but the situation persisted even in 
the twentieth century and the new medium of cinema.1 To be sure, the hor-
ror movie seems at first to be a quintessentially American phenomenon—a 
rite of passage for American teenagers and a genre in which America has 
come to dominate the world. It is due to American movies that the faces of 
Dracula and the Frankenstein monster are known all around the globe. Yet 
both these creatures were originally the creations of European authors (Bram 
Stoker for Dracula and Mary Shelley for the Frankenstein monster). Even 
as motion picture figures, they can be traced back to European precursors 
in German expressionist cinema—Nosferatu (1922) for Dracula (1931), and 
The Golem (1920) and Metropolis (1927) for Frankenstein (1931).
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Europe vs. America in the Gothic Vision  
of The Black Cat
138 Paul A. Cantor
An excellent example of the equivocally American character of the hor-
ror movie is The Black Cat (1934), one of the highlights of the groundbreak-
ing series of horror movies that the Hollywood studio Universal turned 
out in the 1930s.2 Several commentators regard it as one of the all-time 
greatest achievements in the genre.3 As its title indicates, The Black Cat was 
intended to evoke the spirit of America’s most famous native exponent of 
the horror story, Edgar Allan Poe.4 But at the same time, the movie was 
made to capitalize on the popularity of Universal’s two most famous—and 
exotic—horror movie stars, an Englishman named William Henry Pratt, 
who had adopted the very European-sounding stage name of Boris Karloff, 
and a Hungarian actor with the equally European name of Bela Lugosi.5 
The director of the film, Edgar G. Ulmer, was an émigré from the defunct 
Austro-Hungarian Empire who had worked with several German expres-
sionist film directors, including the great F. W. Murnau.6 The film has a 
European feel in all its aspects, including the art direction and the cast-
ing of the minor roles (Ulmer drew upon fellow émigrés to fill several of 
the parts).7 With its abstract, geometric sets, unusual camera angles and 
tracking shots, and artful use of light and shadow, The Black Cat at times 
looks like pure German expressionism on the screen.8 The musical score 
is one of the most remarkable in Hollywood history for its unabashed use 
of European classical music, with passages from Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, 
Chopin, Liszt, Schubert, Schumann, and Tchaikovsky, often used as Wag-
nerian leitmotifs to highlight the action.9
Thus, one of the greatest of American horror movies appears, upon closer 
inspection, to be European through and through. Moreover, the film turns 
out to have Europe as a theme. It stages a confrontation between the Old 
World and the New and attempts to define the one way of life by comparison 
with the other. Ulmer draws upon the European Gothic tradition to create 
a ruined castle for the twentieth century, a haunted house shadowed by the 
new horrors of the modern world, specifically the nightmare of the Great 
War, 1914–18. Faced with the task of creating an American horror movie, 
Ulmer had a brilliant idea. He realized that if Americans wanted to see 
something horrific in 1934, all they had to do was to look across the Atlantic 
to a European landscape permanently scarred by World War I. But at the 
same time, as a sophisticated European himself, Ulmer could not avoid a 
certain condescension in the way he portrays his American protagonists in 
the film.10 He sees something childish in his Americans, with their naïveté 
and lack of culture.
Ulmer thus joins a long line of Europeans who regard the United States 
as posing a philosophical problem, as offering an alternative to Europe as 
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a way of life and thus a challenge to its assumptions. If Americans have 
been fascinated by Europe as the source of their culture, Europeans have 
been obsessed with America as “the child that got away,” the offspring of 
Europe that rebelled against it and in many ways went on to surpass it, but 
only by taking culture in a democratic direction that Europeans, with their 
aristocratic traditions in the arts, looked down upon. Like many Europeans, 
Ulmer could not help treating Americans with a mixture of admiration and 
contempt. Yet in the end he seems to turn to them as the only hope of escap-
ing, as he himself had just done, from a Europe morbidly fixated on its own 
conflicted past and becoming self-destructive in its obsessions. The Black 
Cat is a fascinating case study of how Europeans looked to Americans at one 
moment of cultural history and how Americans looked to Europeans—all in 
a film created by a man who, as an émigré filmmaker, was moving between 
the two worlds himself.11
The Haunted House of Edgar Ulmer
The Black Cat tells the story of Peter and Joan Alison, an American couple 
who have come to central Europe for their honeymoon. Boarding the Ori-
ent Express, they are thrown together in the same train compartment with 
a cultivated European gentleman, a Hungarian psychiatrist named Vitus 
Werdegast (played by Lugosi). Soon they transfer to a bus and set off with 
Werdegast to their hotel; he is headed for the home of an old friend, an 
architect named Hjalmar Poelzig (played by Karloff). In a rainstorm the 
bus overturns; the driver is killed and Mrs. Alison is injured; Werdegast 
takes the young couple to Poelzig’s house. Due to this series of accidents, 
the Americans get caught up in a European power struggle, as Werdegast 
fights bitterly to revenge himself on Poelzig for wrongs done to him fifteen 
years earlier.
The backstory of the revenge plot emerges only gradually in the course of 
the movie, and it turns out to be rooted in the genuine horrors of World War I. 
The ill-fated bus driver sounds the keynote of the film when he narrates a 
grim travelogue for his passengers just before his own death: “All of this 
country was one of the greatest battlefields of the war. Tens of thousands of 
men died here. The ravine down there was piled twelve deep with dead and 
wounded men. The little river below was swollen, red, a raging torrent of 
blood.”12 The driver’s catalogue of the carnage of the Great War culminates 
in his description of Fort Marmaros, “the greatest graveyard in the world.” It 
turns out that Poelzig commanded Marmaros, and we later learn that he sold 
out the fort to the Russians, saving his own skin but sending thousands of 
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men to their deaths and condemning the others to imprisonment in Siberia. 
Werdegast was one of those prisoners; after fifteen years he has returned to 
Hungary to get his revenge on the man who betrayed him and his country. 
He has tracked Poelzig down to his magnificent new home, a showcase of 
modernist architecture constructed on the ruins of Fort Marmaros.
Upon this very real foundation of the horrors of the war, Ulmer builds 
up one Gothic element upon another. Werdegast has come back not only 
to avenge his wrongs but also to regain his wife and daughter. After the war 
Poelzig told Werdegast’s wife that he was dead and stole her from him, mar-
rying her and running off with her and the daughter she had with Werdegast 
(both wife and daughter are named Karen). To his horror Werdegast now 
learns that his wife is dead; he suspects that Poelzig killed her; what he can 
see with his own eyes is that Poelzig has embalmed her corpse and keeps it 
in a display case in a room of the old fort that lies beneath his house. Earlier 
we have seen several other dead women mysteriously on view in the fort’s 
nether regions. The Black Cat consists of a series of increasingly disturbing 
revelations. Eventually Werdegast learns that his daughter did not die, as 
Poelzig originally claimed. Instead the architect went on to marry his step-
daughter, and in the course of the film he kills her, too, intending to add her 
to the gruesome collection he keeps below his house.
To the Gothic motifs of necrophilia and incest, Ulmer adds Satanism to 
the morbid mix of Poelzig’s perversions. He is the high priest of a Satanic 
cult, and with a Black Mass scheduled for the night of the full moon, he de-
cides to take advantage of the accident that has brought Joan Alison within 
his grasp and to use her as a sacrifice in the ceremony. Much of the movie 
is devoted to a battle between Poelzig and Werdegast over the fate of the 
young and innocent Americans, played out literally and figuratively as a chess 
match. At the last minute Werdegast manages to rescue Joan from Poelzig’s 
evil clutches. In the ensuing combat between them Werdegast overpowers 
his mortal foe with the help of his faithful servant. Together they stretch the 
architect out on his own embalming rack, and the crazed doctor proceeds 
to flay him alive, to tear the skin from his body, “slowly, bit by bit,” while 
Poelzig can only howl like an animal. Werdegast shows the Alisons the way 
out of what has come to seem like a madhouse to them. He then pulls the 
“red switch,” initiating a self-destruction sequence in the old fort, which is 
still thoroughly undermined with dynamite. The Americans barely escape 
in time to watch Werdegast achieve his revenge (though at the cost of his 
own life)—he blows Poelzig and his “rotten cult” sky-high.
Even in a bare summary, the plot of The Black Cat seems extraordinarily 
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daring, especially for the 1930s, and one wonders how Ulmer managed to get 
some of the film’s elements past studio censorship.13 Such a story of father-
daughter incest would still be shocking today.14 The Black Mass is vividly 
realized on the screen, centering on a crooked, modernistic cross, with Ulmer 
making full use of every cinematic trick he had learned from German expres-
sionist cinema. The scene would have done Murnau himself proud. But The 
Black Cat has more to offer than just its shock value. The horror of the film 
does not depend on monsters or special effects. It is genuinely psychological, 
growing largely out of Poelzig’s fiendish obsessions.15 Moreover, the horror 
is ultimately rooted, as we have seen, in something very real—the horror of 
the Great War.16 In an interview with Peter Bogdanovich, Ulmer traced the 
genesis of The Black Cat back to a conversation he had in the 1920s with 
the novelist Gustav Meyrinck (best known for having written The Golem): 
“Meyrinck at that time was contemplating a play based upon Doumont, 
which was a French fortress the Germans had shelled to pieces during World 
War I; there were some survivors who didn’t come out for years. And the 
commander was a strange Euripides figure who went crazy three years later, 
when he was brought back to Paris, because he had walked on that mountain 
of bodies. I thought it was an important subject, and that feeling was in the 
air in the twenties.” Ulmer went on to explain that he made The Black Cat 
in order to counter falsely idealistic views of the war that had prevailed in 
Europe: “because I did not believe the literature during and after the war, on 
both sides: in Germany and in England, it was very much the heroic thing, 
where enemies were friends like you never saw before.”17 To show the true 
horror of World War I, Ulmer turned to the Gothic tradition and shaped 
an unnerving parable of Europe in the aftermath of a monstrous conflict, a 
whole continent that seems incestuously turned in upon itself, in love with 
death, and headed toward an orgy of self-destruction.
Chez Poelzig is immediately recognizable as the haunted house of the 
Gothic novel cleverly transposed to a modern setting, a sort of Bauhaus 
version of Castle Dracula.18 Beginning with Horace Walpole’s The Castle 
of Otranto in the eighteenth century, the Gothic novel is typically set in a 
ruined castle, which symbolizes the waning power of the Old Regime. The 
crumbling of the castle shows that the aristocracy is in decay, and yet its 
walls are still powerful enough to imprison a young hero and/or heroine. The 
castle usually has a dungeon below, where unspeakable acts can take place, 
forms of torture hidden from the prying eyes of the outside world. Ghosts 
often walk the castle’s corridors, reminders of ancestral crimes committed 
on the premises, and it may be filled with moldy tombs and surrounded by 
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a melancholy graveyard. The haunted castles of the Gothic novel embody 
the nightmare of the European Enlightenment: a powerful image of the way 
the Old Regime crushed freedom, of a past that stubbornly refused to let go, 
of a world of death that would not make room for the living.
Ulmer manages to maintain the Gothic symbolism of the haunted castle 
in The Black Cat, while adding a few modern touches of his own. As seen 
from afar and in interior shots, Poelzig’s creation is a model of modernist 
architecture, with sleek lines, geometric forms, and a number of up-to-date 
gadgets, such as an intercom system and digital clocks. But this triumph 
of modernist art literally and figuratively rests upon a dark foundation. As 
Werdegast describes it: “The masterpiece of construction built upon the ruins 
of the masterpiece of destruction, the masterpiece of murder. The murderer 
of ten thousand men returns to the place of his crime.” Poelzig’s architectural 
wonder conceals the dungeonlike vaults of the old Fort Marmaros. It is truly a 
haunted house, redolent of its master’s crimes, suffused with “an atmosphere 
of death,” as Werdegast explains. In one of the most famous lines in the film, 
when Poelzig learns that his telephone is not functioning, he says: “You hear 
that, Vitus? The phone is dead. Even the phone is dead.” The dynamite that 
lies under the fort, threatening to blow it up at any moment, is an emblem 
of the psychological tension between Werdegast and Poelzig that figuratively 
is just waiting to explode in the course of the movie.
Gothic Archetypes
The dungeonlike corridors in the depths of the old fort conceal reminders 
not only of Poelzig’s military crimes during the war but also of his sexual 
crimes since. As we have seen, he keeps the embalmed corpses of women 
(presumably sacrifices at earlier Satanic ceremonies) on display in glass 
cases in the rooms of the old fort. As he explains to Werdegast about his 
long-lost wife: “You see, Vitus, I have cared for her tenderly and well. You 
will find her almost as beautiful as when you last saw her.” A frightening 
caricature of the modernist aesthete, Poelzig is obsessed with the female 
form: “I wanted her beauty always.” The key element in Poelzig is his pos-
sessiveness; he prefers the embalmed woman to the living one, because only 
in that state can he make her completely his own and enjoy her in a state of 
perfection forever.19
There is something profoundly compulsive about Poelzig’s behavior. He 
is fixated on the past and obsessively keeps coming back to it. As Werdegast 
realizes, Poelzig in building his home has deliberately returned to the scene 
of his crime and he also collects women like trophies. In his obsessions he 
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descends from a long line of Gothic villains who represent the dead hand 
of the past trying to maintain its grip on the living. He is a kind of vampire 
who preys upon young women and can hardly wait to drain them of their 
blood and make them immortal in his possession.20 At the deepest level 
of the movie, this is Ulmer’s symbol of the way World War I drained the 
lifeblood out of European culture and fixated it on death. Werdegast is just 
as implicated as Poelzig in this world of death. He speaks of the Russian 
prison he has returned from as a place “where the soul is killed slowly.” 
Poelzig hurls this claim back at him in one of his few sympathetic speeches: 
“You say your soul was killed and that you have been dead all these years. 
And what of me? Did we not both die here in Marmaros fifteen years ago? 
Are we any the less victims of the war than those whose bodies were torn 
asunder? Are we not both the living dead?” “The living dead” is a term used 
of vampires—the undead—and here we see how the Gothic symbolism 
of The Black Cat merges with the very real issue Ulmer treats in the film, 
the way World War I scarred the European psyche. Everyone in Europe 
is now a victim of the Great War, caught up in the poisonous atmosphere 
of death it spread throughout the continent. Poelzig goes on to challenge 
Werdegast: “We shall play a little game, Vitus. A game of death, if you like.” 
In Ulmer’s portrayal, postwar Europe has become the grim playing field for 
a grand—and gruesome—game of death.
The vampire motif of The Black Cat is linked to the motif of father-
daughter incest, another one of the disturbingly Gothic elements in the 
film. Incest epitomizes the transgressive force of the Gothic, its implacable 
urge to go beyond all boundaries, especially the bounds of conventional 
law and morality. Incest generally comes in two forms in the Gothic, with 
opposed symbolic valences: brother-sister incest and father-daughter incest. 
Brother-sister incest is symbolically rebellious—it represents the revolt of the 
younger generation against the older, the breaking of a fundamental taboo 
in a quest for absolute happiness (the perfect union of like with like). One 
finds this symbolism throughout Romantic poetry and fiction, especially 
in the writings of Lord Byron, and the motif culminates in truly operatic 
fashion in the Siegmund-Sieglinde story of Richard Wagner’s Die Walküre. 
Father-daughter incest reverses the symbolic thrust of brother-sister incest. It 
represents the unwillingness of the older generation to yield to the younger. 
The father who sexually possesses his own daughter is refusing to turn her 
over to the next generation and allow her a life of her own. If brother-sister 
incest represents all the revolutionary forces that were sweeping through 
Europe from the late eighteenth century on, father-daughter incest represents 
the Old Regime against which they were rebelling.
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Percy Shelley’s play The Cenci is a good example of the Romantic arche-
type of father-daughter incest. Filled with Gothic paraphernalia of dungeons 
and prisons, the play tells the story of Beatrice Cenci, an innocent young 
maiden who is raped by her father, the vicious Count Cenci. Symbolically 
linked with the Catholic Church through his alliance with the pope, the 
aristocratic Cenci is a perfect image of the Old Regime in all its oppres-
sive power and obsession with stifling the live-giving forces of the young. 
Cenci is a kind of vampire, unnaturally prolonging his own vital force by 
preying upon his daughter.21 By the same token, vampirism is symbolically 
a form of father-daughter incest, as is clear in the Dracula myth in its many 
incarnations. Count Dracula—another predatory aristocrat—represents an 
older generation that will not make room for the new. The vampire is an 
older man who exerts a hypnotic fascination over a young woman, thereby 
coming between her and the young man she has fallen in love with. Using 
the greater sophistication that comes with age, the aristocratic vampire 
makes the young boyfriend look callow by comparison and attracts away 
the young woman. Dracula comes to her at night and merges with her in her 
bed, mixing his blood with hers and thereby artificially prolonging his own 
life. The sexual symbolism of the vampire has long been recognized, and 
its political symbolism as well. It is no accident that in traditional vampire 
stories the monster is always an aristocratic figure: Count Dracula.22 As an 
undead creature, centuries old, emerging out of a ruined castle to suck the 
blood of the young, the figure of the vampire sums up the Gothic nightmare 
of a revolutionary Europe haunted by frightening memories of its aristocratic 
past, a past that simply refuses to die.
The traditional vampire myth splits the ambivalent image a young 
woman has of her father into its two “pure” sides—the benevolent and the 
malevolent parent. A woman is likely to have mixed feelings about her 
father. Insofar as he nurtures her, she looks up to him, but insofar as he 
stands in the way of her independence in life—her marriage to a younger 
man—she fears him. The vampire is the “evil twin” in the father archetype, 
the parent who will not allow his children to flourish on their own. As is 
clear in Bram Stoker’s original Dracula and in many of the film versions 
of the story, the myth typically pairs the vampire with an opponent who 
represents everything good about the older generation, a benevolent father 
figure. In Stoker’s version, Abraham Van Helsing, though obviously not the 
same age as Dracula, still stands for the older generation, and he must use 
its greater wisdom not to prey upon the young but to nurture them and 
liberate their energies. In contrast to Dracula, Van Helsing does not show 
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a sexual interest in the young women he is called upon to protect. Instead 
he labors to thwart the vampire’s designs upon them and to free them from 
his spell. The enduring power of the vampire myth rests partly on the way 
it captures the intergenerational psychodynamics of family life.
Strictly speaking, The Black Cat is not a vampire story, but it seems 
reasonable to think that a movie coming out of Universal and starring Bela 
Lugosi might show the influence of Dracula. The pairing of Poelzig and 
Werdegast is modeled on that of Dracula and Van Helsing. Poelzig is the 
evil father archetype. He has married his own daughter, and he keeps Karen 
Werdegast imprisoned in his house. Evidently he will not even allow her out 
of the bedroom, and he kills her when he discovers that she has disobeyed 
him and crossed its threshold. Symbolically, for Joan Alison he plays the 
role that Dracula does for the young women in his story. Although fright-
ened by him, Joan also seems fascinated by his aristocratic bearing and his 
sophistication (her husband offers Poelzig little competition in these areas). 
Clearly Poelzig means to possess her and prevents her from leaving his home. 
Thus it becomes necessary for Werdegast to help her, using the wisdom that 
comes with age to free her from Poelzig’s spell (it is appropriate, then, that 
Vitus is a psychiatrist). The callow young man she loves, Peter Alison, has no 
chance of saving her on his own. Thus, in the symbolic pattern of The Black 
Cat, Werdegast at first sight seems to represent the good side of the parent 
archetype—during the film’s crisis he addresses Joan as “dear child”—with 
Poelzig representing the evil side.23
The Black Cat complicates this simple opposition by suggesting that, deep 
down, Poelzig and Werdegast are mirror images of each other. Unlike Van 
Helsing in Dracula, Werdegast does at times display a sexual interest in the 
young woman he is supposed to protect. In the early scene in the train com-
partment, a dozing Peter Alison opens his eyes to catch Werdegast caressing 
his wife’s hair. Werdegast hastily explains that she reminds him of his own 
wife, Karen. Since “Karen” is also the name of his daughter, one can say that 
in his attraction to Joan, Werdegast, like Poelzig, is confusing his daughter 
with his wife. In any case, he is showing interest in a woman young enough 
to be his daughter. Evidently, in the original shooting script, Werdegast was 
an even more ambiguous figure, explicitly battling with Poelzig to possess 
Joan.24 Even in the film as it has come down to us, both Peter and Joan at 
one point or another regard Werdegast as in league with Poelzig and hence 
as their enemy. In his obsessiveness, he becomes a double for Poelzig. He 
is also fixated on the past, and by the end of the film Werdegast is just as 
crazed as his antagonist, and ultimately just as destructive.
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Innocents Abroad
The genius of The Black Cat lies in the way it maps the Gothic psychodynam-
ics of the family onto a political landscape. At the heart of the film stands a 
conflict between the older and the younger generations, and the older genera-
tion must destroy itself if the younger is to be freed. What is fascinating about 
the film is the way Ulmer identifies the older generation with Europe and the 
younger with America, thus creating an allegory of European-American rela-
tions in the post–World War I era. America is the child of Europe, but a child 
that needs to get free of its parents, or go down to destruction with them. 
Poelzig represents the Satanic fascination of the European past, the force 
of the undead trying to draw the youth of America into its vampiric grasp. 
Werdegast represents a more benign aspect of European culture, willing to 
let America go free. Poised between these two antagonists, the Americans 
are presented as naive and unsophisticated compared to the Europeans.25 
When Werdegast asks Joan Alison if she has ever heard of Satanism, she 
stares at him with a blank expression, as if to say, “What in the world are 
you talking about?” The Americans have evidently led sheltered lives and 
have been shielded from the kinds of shattering experiences the Europeans 
have undergone, especially in the war. In comparison with the world-weary 
Europeans the Americans seem like children. Implicitly drawing a contrast 
with his American guests, Poelzig reproaches Werdegast: “Come, Vitus, 
are we men or are we children?” Werdegast is capable of cold-bloodedly 
skinning alive a fellow human being; Peter Alison winces when he simply 
has to watch the doctor injecting his wife with a sedative. Although the 
Americans are genuinely frightened by what they see of the Europeans, in 
their ignorance and superficiality they tend to laugh off whatever seems 
foreign and strange to them. Unable to pronounce a German umlaut, Joan 
jokingly refers to Poelzig as “Mr. Pigslow.”26 But Hjalmar turns out to be 
nothing to laugh about. The Americans in the film may think that they are 
in a comedy—they are, after all, on their honeymoon—but they have in fact 
wandered into a tragedy, a deeply European tragedy that they, as Americans, 
are incapable of understanding. In a strange way, The Black Cat fits into the 
familiar American genre of “innocents abroad” (to use the title of one of 
Mark Twain’s works). Already in the nineteenth century, American authors 
such as Nathaniel Hawthorne and Henry James were exploring the impact 
of European culture on Americans who travel across the Atlantic. Ulmer’s 
trick was to reconfigure the “innocents abroad” theme by developing it in 
the context of a horror story out of the European Gothic tradition.
The most striking fact about the Americans in The Black Cat is the 
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amount of time they spend unconscious. They are barely able to stay awake 
throughout most of the film. Both Joan and Peter fall asleep in the opening 
sequence in the train compartment. Joan is knocked out in the bus crash 
and must be carried unconscious to Poelzig’s house. That night the Alisons 
are both shown sleeping, while the wide-awake Werdegast and Poelzig begin 
their cat-and-mouse game. Given a “powerful sedative” by Werdegast to help 
her rest, Joan seems to be sleepwalking when she first gets up and meets 
Poelzig. Speaking later of the bus crash, she says: “I don’t remember anything 
after that.” She faints twice in the course of the action; Peter is knocked 
unconscious twice, first by Werdegast’s servant and then by Poelzig’s major-
domo. The suggestion seems to be that Americans are largely unconscious 
of what is happening in Europe. As an émigré to the United States, Ulmer 
may have wanted to give Americans a wake-up call about the European 
tragedy. His movie points to a genuine horror in Europe, a continent still 
playing out the feuds that sparked the First World War, making Europe a 
dangerous powder keg of violence just waiting to explode again.27 The Black 
Cat suggests that, unfortunately, Americans would not recognize a European 
horror story even if they wandered right into the middle of it. With World 
War II breaking out in Europe barely five years after The Black Cat, Ulmer 
turned out to be truly prophetic about the potential for catastrophe.28
The contrasts Ulmer develops between Europeans and Americans are 
not all to the advantage of the latter. To be sure, the Europeans in The Black 
Cat are deeply neurotic, obsessive-compulsive, and self-destructive, not to 
mention downright evil and even Satanic, while the Americans are free, 
open, good-natured, and optimistic. But at the same time the Europeans are 
simply more interesting than the Americans. The Europeans are intelligent, 
cultured, and artistic, while the Americans are bland, prosaic, and more than 
a little bit obtuse. This contrast emerges clearly when Poelzig, Werdegast, and 
Peter Alison formally introduce themselves to each other. Poelzig is “one of 
Austria’s greatest architects” and Werdegast is “one of Hungary’s greatest psy-
chiatrists.” Alison’s introduction starts off auspiciously but quickly collapses; 
he describes himself as “one of America’s greatest writers—of unimportant 
books.” Alison is in fact a writer of mass-market mysteries, and the film im-
plicitly contrasts his cheap melodramatic stories with the genuine European 
tragedy that unfolds before his uncomprehending eyes.29 Ulmer develops the 
European/American contrast along the lines of a high culture/pop culture 
contrast. The Europeans are consistently associated with high culture; they 
perform elaborate rituals in Latin to the music of J. S. Bach. Alison’s roots, 
by contrast, are in American pulp fiction, and he seems bewildered by the 
rarefied aesthetic environment he encounters in Europe.
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Confronted, for example, with the brilliance of Poelzig’s architectural 
achievement in the modernist house, Alison says to Werdegast: “I suppose 
we’ve got to have architects, too, but if I wanted to build a nice, cozy, un-
pretentious insane asylum, he’d be the man for it.” Alison’s low assessment 
of Austrian modernism actually displays a good deal of American com-
mon sense. Poelzig is mad, and his house reflects his mania. Still, there is a 
strong element of cultural philistinism in Alison’s failure to appreciate the 
subtleties of Poelzig’s art. On a simple level, Hjalmar must show Peter how 
to use a stylish art deco radio (and what comes on is Schubert’s Unfinished 
Symphony). On a more profound level, Alison proves blind to the depth of 
the evil all around him. Listening to talk of the black cat and its connection 
to deathless evil, Alison can only say: “Sounds like a lot of supernatural 
baloney to me.” In another one of the film’s most famous lines, Werdegast 
pointedly replies: “Supernatural, perhaps; baloney, perhaps not.” Then, 
echoing Hamlet’s famous words to Horatio, Vitus adds: “There are more 
things under the sun,” calling attention to Alison’s limited horizons. In 
Ulmer’s vision, American innocence and optimism keep passing over into 
a dangerous ignorance and naïveté.
The contrast between Europeans and Americans is neatly summed up 
in the fact that Werdegast and Poelzig play chess, while Alison can merely 
claim that he “used to play a very good hand of poker.” Ulmer emphasizes 
the cultural superiority of Europe by representing it in terms of Bauhaus 
architecture and Freudian psychoanalysis, two avant-garde movements that 
had come out of Europe and were being introduced into the United States 
in the 1930s, largely as a result of European émigrés like Ulmer himself. 
Psychoanalysis and modernism in architecture were still rather exotic phe-
nomena for the kind of audience Ulmer could expect for The Black Cat, and 
he does a good job of connecting the two. Poelzig’s house is at one and the 
same time a representative of modern architecture and a kind of Freudian 
symbol. The gleaming house up above, with its geometric structure, rep-
resents the rational ego; the dungeonlike fortress down below, with all its 
darkness and grim reminders of Poelzig’s madness, represents the hidden 
depths of irrationality in the id.30
Coming from the world of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ulmer 
no doubt admired the extraordinary achievements of his compatriots in 
the fields of architecture and psychoanalysis.31 Yet the complexity of The 
Black Cat can be seen in the way that Ulmer quite perceptively links both 
phenomena to the aftermath of World War I and even suggests that there 
is something potentially Satanic about them. The unprecedented new op-
portunities that arose for architects to rebuild Europe after World War I 
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were sadly linked to the unprecedented scale of the destruction the war had 
caused throughout the continent. In that sense, as we have already seen in 
Werdegast’s description of Poelzig’s house, modernist architecture rested on 
the ruins left by the Great War. Moreover, the radical character of the break 
modernist architects made with traditional styles and modes of building 
reflected their profound disillusionment with the whole of Western civili-
zation. The cultural traditions of Europe had failed to halt the catastrophe 
of the Great War; many Europeans wondered at the time if perhaps these 
traditions had even contributed to it. The contempt that modernists in all 
the arts displayed for traditional culture was rooted in their sense that it had 
let Europe down in a crisis. That is why there was a strong strain of nihilism 
in European modernism, even in its architecture, which seemed concerned 
as much with tearing down the old Europe as with building a new one.32
The war similarly gave a new impetus to psychoanalysis. Could this new 
science account for the violence that had suddenly taken the whole continent 
of Europe by surprise? Surely there was something lurking undiscovered in 
the depths of the human psyche that people had been unaware of. Psycho-
Bela Lugosi (as Dr. Vitus Werdegast) and Boris Karloff (as Hjalmar Poelzig) in The 
Black Cat (1934). Directed by Edgar G. Ulmer. (Universal Pictures/Photofest)
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analysts began to probe beneath the surface of the human mind in an effort 
to uncover the hidden sources of violent behavior and war. It is no accident 
that Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego came out in 1921. 
With his theory of the primal horde, the Austro-Hungarian scientist was 
seeking, among other things, an explanation for the catastrophe that had 
just befallen Europe. The thrust of Freudian psychoanalysis was to suggest 
that irrational, aggressive impulses are always lurking just below the surface 
of the rational ego, even in ordinary, law-abiding citizens.
Appropriately as the work of an Austrian and a movie that features 
a psychiatrist, The Black Cat reflects this Freudian understanding of the 
human psyche.33 Two respected professionals, a doctor and an architect, 
turn out to be monstrously mad, harboring murderous impulses. What is 
extraordinary about the Black Mass scene is the utter ordinariness of the 
participants. The men all appear to be respectable members of society; in 
their evening clothes, they look mostly like middle-class businessmen. The 
women look just as decent; we see nothing of the stereotype of the grotesque 
witch in the scene. As the participants in the Black Mass put on their robes, 
they could be getting ready for a college commencement. Ulmer’s point 
seems to be that the most ordinary human beings can be hiding Satanic 
impulses in their breasts.34 But this kind of psychoanalytic insight can itself 
be demonic. In seeking out the causes of evil and perversion, psychoanaly-
sis gives us a glimpse into the abyss, and risks unnerving and disorienting 
us with its revelations of human depravity. A strain of nihilism thus links 
modern architecture and psychoanalysis in the film, symbolically reflected 
in the way that Poelzig and Werdegast form mirror images of each other. 
For much of the film they act like opponents, but eventually Werdegast gets 
caught up in his rival’s cult.35 Representing the new cultural aristocracy of 
modern Europe, architect and psychiatrist are both Satanic. That is how 
Ulmer carries the Gothic tradition forward into the twentieth century. In 
a strange way, Ulmer portrays European high modernism as rooted in the 
horrors of World War I and, as a result, bordering on the brink of madness, 
ready to plunge into a nihilistic abyss.
We come away from The Black Cat, then, with a very disturbing and 
conflicted response. We have sensed that, compared to Peter and Joan Alison, 
Werdegast and Poelzig have seen much deeper into human life. But we are 
not convinced that the Austro-Hungarians are better off for all their insights 
into the depths of human evil. They seem to have been corrupted by their 
encounter with evil, perhaps even driven insane. The Americans might be 
all the healthier for turning their backs on this glimpse into the heart of 
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darkness. Early in the film Peter Alison has already sensed that something 
has gone terribly wrong with his honeymoon and vows never to leave North 
America again and expose himself to European horrors: “Next time I go 
to Niagara Falls.” The epilogue to the film stresses the limited character of 
American experience, the way its horizons are closed off from the European 
experience of tragedy and remain confined to the commonplace and every-
day. Returning on a train from his ordeal, Peter finds a newspaper review 
of his latest thriller, Triple Murder: “Mr. Alison has in a sense overstepped 
the bounds in the matter of credibility. These things could never by the 
furthest stretch of the imagination actually happen. And we would wish 
that Mr. Alison would confine himself to the possible, instead of letting his 
melodramatic imagination run away with him.” Ulmer is obviously having 
fun with his audience here, using the cheap melodrama of Alison’s fiction 
to set off the genuine European tragedy he has just portrayed in his movie.36 
Indeed, “there are more things under the sun” than the world of American 
popular fiction comprehends. By confining itself to the possible, which is to 
say the everyday, that fiction cuts itself off from the darker aspects of human 
existence that European culture has for centuries been daring to explore. As 
a novelist, Peter Alison is no Dostoyevsky.
Ulmer seems to be self-conscious about his own peculiar position—
working in the pop culture genre of the horror movie while trying to tell 
a deeply serious tale of European tragedy. That may be why he chooses to 
thematize the subject of pop culture vs. high culture in his movie. He shows 
that, as Americans, his hero and heroine cannot understand the very story 
that Ulmer as a European has tried to tell. And yet in a sense he suggests that 
Americans would be better off turning away from the tragedy of Europe. 
The ability of Americans to build a better future seems to depend on their 
shutting themselves off from the tortured European past. Peter and Joan 
share a remarkable talent for forgetting, of going through the most horrific 
experiences and remaining unscathed and unscarred. At the end of what 
ought to have been a deeply traumatic experience for them, they are prepared 
to laugh it off and go on with their lives. In this respect they contrast sharply 
with the Europeans Werdegast and Poelzig, who go to their destruction 
precisely because they cannot forget the past and move on.
Under European Eyes
In the end The Black Cat is an oddly self-reflexive film and in that sense can 
be considered philosophic. As an American film made by a European that 
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deals with the differences between America and Europe, it is a work that 
in effect meditates on its own origins. Ulmer was a European émigré mak-
ing a film for the American market, and he drew upon everything that he 
learned from European cinema to do so. The film becomes strangely auto-
biographical, or at least self-referential, dealing with what it means to move 
between Europe and America. Working on the film made Ulmer acutely 
aware of his European cultural heritage, and yet he chose to portray how 
problematic that heritage had become by the 1930s for Americans, whose 
best hope lay in looking forward rather than back in history. The film is a 
kind of elegy to a European high culture that seemed to have killed itself off 
in the cataclysm of World War I and its aftermath. But it is also a tribute to 
Ulmer’s new homeland, the United States, with all its optimism and moral 
decency, and what he hoped might be its immunity to the European disease 
of corrosive nihilism.
Ulmer’s conflicted feelings about his own film surface in what was 
originally intended to be the ending of The Black Cat: “The film ends on a 
light note, but the ultimate in-joke never made the release print. When the 
Alisons hail a passing bus, the driver was scripted as being none other than 
Edgar Ulmer, disguised in white beard and goggles. Speaking in Austrian 
[sic], he eyeballs the couple and shakes his head contemptuously. ‘Will you 
take us to Vizhegrad?’ asks Peter. ‘I’m not going to Vizhegrad,’ replies Ulmer. 
‘I’m going to a sanitarium to rest up after making The Black Cat in fourteen 
days!’”37 Here is cinematic self-reflexiveness with a vengeance—a moment 
straight out of Mel Brooks’s bag of tricks, rather than F. W. Murnau’s. With 
its postmodern archness, this epilogue would have broken the dark mood of 
the film in a way that the playful scene that really ends it does not.38 Still, in 
this projected epilogue, we do catch something of Ulmer’s self-consciousness 
about working in the world of American pop culture. Having grown up in the 
very different world of European high modernism, he is now in Hollywood 
making a crazy horror movie on an absurdly short shooting schedule, and 
it has driven him nearly crazy himself. We can feel both Ulmer’s humorous 
sense of detachment from his work on the film and his concern that the 
pressures of filmmaking can lead a true artist to madness. Ulmer shows that 
he is aware that The Black Cat is merely a work of mass entertainment, and 
yet at the same time he hints at how obsessively he labored on it. His mixed 
feelings about being a European artist working in American pop culture 
seem to cry out in this would-be comic epilogue.39
Ulmer is not unique in his ambivalent view of America from a European 
perspective. Many European observers over the years have shared his sense 
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that democratic America has purchased its freedom from the nightmares of 
Europe’s aristocratic and conflicted past only at the expense of its cultural 
development. In perhaps the best analysis ever written of the United States, 
Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the nineteenth century in his Democracy in 
America, argues that Americans will have a difficult time equaling European 
cultural achievements in the arts and sciences.40 The European tradition 
of dwelling upon America’s lack of high culture continued unabated into 
the twentieth century, in such movements as the Frankfurt School critique 
of mass entertainment in the United States as a soul-destroying culture 
industry.41
To focus on a single extreme example: in Martin Heidegger’s thought, 
America functions as an image of everything that Europe is not. It may seem 
bizarre to link a horror movie like The Black Cat with the author of Being 
and Time, and yet the symbolic geography of Heidegger’s philosophy bears 
a curious resemblance to the imaginative map of Ulmer’s film. Like Ulmer, 
Heidegger sees Europe as poised between two hostile and uncomprehend-
ing world powers, Russia to the east and America to the west.42 And also 
like Ulmer, Heidegger sees Europe as tragically on the brink of perishing of 
its own self-destructive tendencies: “This Europe, in its ruinous blindness 
forever on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in a great pincers, 
squeezed between Russia on one side and America on the other. From a 
metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same; the same 
dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the av-
erage man.”43 Heidegger’s equation of Russia and America may seem odd, 
but it rests on the idea that these two gigantic nations became the bastions 
of the common man and antiaristocratic leveling in the twentieth century, 
and thus threatened to undermine centuries of authentic European culture. 
Heidegger’s vision is actually far more extreme than Ulmer’s, and yet in 
Werdegast’s account of World War I and his Siberian imprisonment, The 
Black Cat does present Russia as an even more immediate threat to European 
culture than America; its prison system has destroyed the soul of a cultivated 
central European like Werdegast.
Heidegger dwelled upon the dual threat to Europe from the East and 
the West:
We have said: Europe lies in a pincers between Russia and America, 
which are metaphysically the same, namely in regard to their world 
character and their relation to the spirit. What makes the situation 
of Europe all the more catastrophic is that this enfeeblement of the 
154 Paul A. Cantor
spirit originated in Europe itself. . . . All things sank to the same 
level. . . . Intelligence no longer meant a wealth of talent, lavishly 
spent, and the command of energies, but only what could be learned 
by everyone. . . . In America and in Russia this development grew 
into a boundless etcetera of indifference and always-the-sameness. 
. . . Since then the domination in those countries of a cross section 
of the indifferent mass has become . . . an active onslaught that 
destroys all rank.44
Heidegger spoke these words originally in a lecture delivered at the Uni-
versity of Freiburg in the summer of 1935, that is, roughly one year after 
Ulmer created The Black Cat. As different as the German philosopher and 
the Austrian/American filmmaker undoubtedly were, when they looked at 
the world in the 1930s, they seem to have shared a common sense of Euro-
pean culture in peril.45 Both Heidegger and Ulmer saw the decaying of the 
aristocratic culture of Europe as proceeding hand in hand with the rise of a 
democratically leveling culture in the great non-European world powers of 
the day. With Heidegger in mind, we begin to find something ominous in 
the way Ulmer portrays the blandness of his Americans in The Black Cat. On 
the meta-level in the movie, American pop culture is obliterating European 
high culture—the mass-produced mystery novel is taking the place of the 
European high Gothic.
The European ambivalence toward the New World is encapsulated in a 
brief poetic tribute to America written by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in 
1827 called “To the United States”:
America, you’re better off than
Our continent, the old
You have no castles which are fallen
No basalt to behold.
You’re not disturbed within your inmost being
Right up till today’s daily life
By useless remembering
And unrewarding strife.
Use well the present and good luck to you
And when your children begin writing poetry
Let them guard well in all they do
Against knight- robber- and ghost-story.46
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Drawing upon the same Gothic conventions, Goethe contrasts Europe with 
America in exactly the terms Ulmer uses in The Black Cat. Goethe certainly 
seems to be celebrating the fledgling United States precisely for the way it 
differs from Europe. With its castles in ruins, Europe is the land of the dead 
past; for Goethe, America is the land of the living present. Europe remains in 
the grip of unproductive memories and “unrewarding strife.” Cut off from the 
nightmares of the European past, America will have the freedom to shape the 
future. But a hint of condescension is mixed with Goethe’s admiration for the 
United States. When he thinks of Americans, he thinks of children. He hopes 
that they will be spared from the nightmare of ghost stories (Gespensterge-
schichten) as well as tales of knights (Ritter) and robbers (Räuber). Yet Goethe’s 
friend and colleague Friedrich von Schiller was famous for a play called Die 
Räuber, and what is Goethe’s own masterpiece, Faust, if not the greatest of all 
Gespenstergeschichten? The European imagination had in fact fed itself for 
generations precisely on tales of knights, robbers, and ghosts. Goethe’s brief 
ode to the United States thus quietly sounds a cautionary note. The absence 
of castles in America points to something lacking in its imaginative horizons. 
Without antique monuments—a meaningful past and symbols rooted in tradi-
tion—how will America find nourishment for its artistic imagination?
Drawing upon European sources of inspiration for an American horror 
movie, Ulmer was perhaps troubled by the same question. He suggests that 
Americans might do well to sever their cultural ties to Europe, but at the 
same time he demonstrates exactly how important those ties have always 
been to the flourishing of culture in America. We think of Hollywood as 
an American institution, and yet a look at the film community in the 1930s 
shows it populated by boatloads of European directors, cinematographers, 
screenplay writers, actors and actresses, and technicians, without whom the 
movie industry as we know it would have been impossible. Ulmer hoped 
to warn Americans against their cultural links to Europe, and yet in The 
Black Cat he introduced them to strange new European imports, such as 
Bauhaus architecture and Freudian psychoanalysis. Along with all the other 
European émigrés who directed horror movies in the 1930s, he helped 
make the avant-garde cinematic techniques of the German expressionists 
part of the Hollywood mainstream. In the end Ulmer’s project in The Black 
Cat is internally contradictory—to create a very European movie to argue 
for the cultural independence of America. Fortunately for him and us, this 
self-defeating quest resulted in a horror movie masterpiece, an unusually 
thoughtful product of pop culture that philosophically reflects on the rela-
tion of pop culture to high culture.
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From Domestic Nightmares to 
the Nightmare of History
John Lutz
The past is never dead. It’s not even past.
—William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare 
on the brain of the living.
—Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
Jack Torrance: Mr. Grady, you were the caretaker here.
Delbert Grady: I’m sorry to differ with you, sir. But you are the 
caretaker. You’ve always been the caretaker.
—The Shining
Early in Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining, Dick Hallorann assures the appre-
hensive Danny Torrance that there is nothing in the hotel that can actually 
hurt him and explains that the terrible events of the past can leave behind 
a trace of themselves that is visible only to those who shine. As it turns out 
Hallorann is profoundly mistaken. In an ironic twist, he overlooks the one 
thing in the Overlook Hotel that will eventually kill him, Danny’s unstable, 
alcoholic father who, in the final shot of the film framing the photograph 
of the Fourth of July celebration in 1921, proves to have always been there. 
Hallorann’s mistake is based on the assumption that the past has no power 
over the present. Nonetheless, both Kubrick’s film and King’s novel each 
investigate the complex ways in which the past acts upon—indeed, lives 
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on in—the present. In King’s novel this past manifests itself through Jack’s 
growing abuse of Wendy and Danny, an abuse that is ultimately revealed 
to have its origin in Jack’s victimization by his own father. In Kubrick’s film 
the scope of victimization is much broader and encompasses the forms of 
systematic violence inflicted by American institutions upon oppressed and 
exploited groups. In effect, in Kubrick’s adaptation of the novel the frighten-
ing, evil world perceived by the victim of child abuse undergoes an allegorical 
transposition to the nightmarish violence lying hidden in the foundations 
of American society. In both the novel and the film the vehicle for depicting 
this hidden violence is what Freud described as the uncanny, or that which 
“belongs to the realm of the frightening, of what evokes fear and dread.”1
Kubrick’s overt interest in Freud’s work on the uncanny has been com-
mented upon by Diane Johnson, who collaborated with Kubrick on the 
screenplay. Johnson notes how she and Kubrick sought explanations in the 
works of Freud in general, and his essay on the uncanny in particular, for 
the key elements that make something frightening.2 Although it has been 
commented upon less frequently, some of the most terrifying moments in 
the novel—the jiggling handle of the door of Room 217 once Jack has locked 
it, the entity in the concrete ring in the snow-laden playground—conform 
equally to Freud’s description of the uncanny. These episodes can be con-
nected, as in Freud’s analysis, with something familiar that has been repressed 
but returns as a terrifying element.3 The woman in Room 217, “long dead 
and reclining in her bath, a bar of Lowila in one stiffening hand as she waited 
patiently for whatever lover might come,” has a clear connection to Jack’s 
submissive and abused mother, just as the child entity Danny encounters in 
the concrete ring with its head split open, “crawling after him in the dark, 
grinning, looking for one final playmate in its endless playground” evokes 
the history of child abuse lurking beneath the appearance of normality 
in the Torrance family.4  In each case, the past is, to paraphrase William 
Faulkner’s frequently quoted assessment of history, neither dead nor past 
but a concrete material force constantly threatening to emerge in the pres-
ent. A similar process is at work in Kubrick’s film, where evil is consistently 
represented as “a disembodied, vague state of cosmic affairs” and “the world 
as an evil and forbidding place” where violence can erupt unexpectedly at 
any moment.5 As Brigitte Peucker points out in her analysis of the uncanny 
in Kubrick’s film, “The ghost materializes and is revealed to have a body; 
Kubrick’s uncanny is decidedly corporeal.”6 Indeed, Kubrick’s use of the 
uncanny is concerned with rendering the past corporeal and registering 
the ways in which the nightmare of history continually impinges upon and 
defines the present. Taken together, both King’s novel and Kubrick’s film 
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adaptation explore psychological, historical, and economic traces of the 
uncanny. These three interrelated aspects of the uncanny are woven together 
thematically through the narrative of domestic abuse, the postcolonial nar-
rative of American expansion at the expense of nonwhite victims, and the 
desire for power and control that underlies commodification and the social 
hierarchies that reinforce it.
King’s Inverted Family Romance
In his comments upon the process of translating works of literature to the 
screen, Kubrick suggests that the most adaptable novels are ones that have 
an overt concern with the inner lives of their characters.7 Since King’s novel 
focuses on the inner life of its three central characters as well as the inner 
life of the family they comprise, Kubrick undoubtedly found it ideal for ad-
aptation. From the very first line of the novel, when Jack inwardly assesses 
Stuart Ullman as an “officious little prick” (3) while outwardly flashing his 
“big wide PR smile” (4), King invites the reader to consider the disjunction 
between the inner and outer worlds of his characters and privileges the inner 
one as the most significant indicator of identity. Like his father, Danny, too, 
experiences a profound gap between his inner and outer life. On the surface 
he appears to be a normal young boy playing with his toys. Nonetheless, his 
inner life is shot through with anxieties and fears focused upon the marital 
ambivalence of his parents and the hidden tension between them to which 
his ability to “shine” gives him privileged access. Danny’s anxieties are clearly 
centered upon his unpredictable, abusive father whose alcoholism, profes-
sional failures, and self-doubts have initiated a crisis in the family that is 
subject to repression but continually returns in the periodic reminders of 
the episode in which Jack dislocated Danny’s shoulder. At the same time the 
novel provides numerous examples of how Danny’s gift of insight initiates 
a process of learning about the world beyond his family that contributes to 
his ongoing psychological development. This process includes an element 
of estrangement from his parents as he encounters other adults like Dick 
Hallorann, with whom he shares the gift of shining.
Indeed, in many ways Danny’s experiences at the hotel conform to 
the period of a child’s development that Freud characterized by the term 
“family romance.” In this developmental stage, “the child’s imagination is 
occupied with the task of ridding himself of his parents, of whom he now 
has a low opinion, and replacing them by others, usually of superior social 
standing.” Freud goes on to note that this activity usually manifests itself in 
daydreams in which the child aims to replace the real father with a more 
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distinguished one. Freud viewed this imaginative recasting of the family 
not as an indication of the child’s desire to actually replace the father but 
as “an expression of the child’s longing for the happy times gone by, when 
his father seemed to him the strongest and most distinguished of men, 
and his mother the dearest and loveliest of women.”8 In other words, the 
family romances of children represent a desire to return to the past when 
they were still capable of completely idealizing their parents. Even though 
the novel’s depiction of Jack and Wendy’s relationship before the birth of 
Danny points out that the roots of their marital problems existed from the 
very beginning, from Danny’s perspective this ideal moment is clearly the 
period before his father dislocates his shoulder. However, as the subsequent 
events in the hotel will indicate, the ideal past to which Danny wishes to 
return is not what it seems. Rather than rediscovering the good qualities 
of his real father through his imagination, he discovers a monster, an ogre 
whose future violence Danny glimpses early in the novel when Jack arrives 
home in his Volkswagen and Danny sees “a short-handled mallet, its head 
clotted with blood and hair” (49), beside him on the front seat. In this sense 
King’s novel fails to conform to Freud’s pattern of family romance. Although 
it quite obviously explores the motif of father-mirroring and the father-lost-
and-regained obsession apparent in some of King’s other works,9 The Shining 
represents an inverted family romance in which the daydream of the more 
distinguished father is replaced by the nightmare of the monstrous one. In 
this connection it is extremely relevant that the replacement father whom 
Danny eventually discovers is not someone higher on the social scale but 
the African American cook, Dick Hallorann. At the end of the novel, after 
giving Danny fatherly advice about how to get on in the world, Hallorann 
sits on a dock with Wendy and Danny as Danny reels in a fish. In this closing 
image the family unit is restored. However, in an interesting variation on 
the pattern of family romance, the father with the good qualities proves to 
be someone who, in the larger frame of American society, occupies a lower 
social status rather than a more distinguished one.
Dealing consistently with the theme of duality and doubleness, King’s 
inverted family romance constructs numerous uncanny doubles who reflect 
the inner lives, ambivalent feelings, violent impulses, and frustrated hopes 
of its central characters. In his essay on the uncanny Freud points out that 
the duplicating, dividing, and interchanging of the self represent one source 
of the uncanny. Freud emphasizes that one can find embodied in the double 
“all the strivings of the ego that were frustrated by adverse circumstances, all 
the suppressed acts of volition that fostered the illusion of free will.”10 This 
description is particularly apt in reference to Jack, whose frustrated hopes 
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as a writer and blocked aspirations to a higher social and economic class 
not only are directly linked to the appearance of psychological doubles like 
his father and Delbert Grady but also prove to be the foundations of the 
violent rage directed at his wife and son. As Thomas Allen Nelson points 
out, the “novel associates Jack’s lapses into murderous rage with a pattern of 
father/son doubling, with his own father’s frustration and drunken failures, 
and with a latent wish to punish his wife and son for his inadequacies as a 
man and incompetence as a writer/teacher.”11
The connection between Jack’s frustrated ego and his own past as a 
victim of child abuse is rendered explicit in the novel when his father’s 
voice communicates with him on the CB radio, encouraging him to kill his 
wife and son:
—kill him. You have to kill him, Jacky, and her, too. Because a real 
artist must suffer. Because each man kills the thing he loves. Because 
they’re always conspiring against you, trying to hold you back and 
drag you down. Right this minute that boy of yours is in where he 
shouldn’t be. Trespassing. That’s what he’s doing. He’s a goddam little 
pup. Cane him for it, Jacky, cane him within an inch of his life. Have 
a drink, Jacky my boy, and we’ll play the elevator game. Then I’ll go 
with you while you give him his medicine. I know you can do it, of 
course you can. You must kill him. You have to kill him, Jacky, and 
her, too. Because a real artist must suffer. (341)
The reference to the cane evokes the episode described in the text when Jack’s 
father beats his mother into unconsciousness with his cane, and although it 
is never overtly stated, it is implied that this is the weapon that Jack’s father 
used to discipline him as well. In this passage all the elements of domestic 
abuse and the ambivalent feelings that it evokes in its victim and perpetrator 
alike are present. The voice of Jack’s father commands him to kill his wife 
and son in order to enforce a form of masculine, paternal authority rooted 
in male domination while also suggesting that it will help fulfill his artistic 
aspirations. While urging him on to commit brutal violence, his father’s voice 
simultaneously promises to reward him with the love that he never gave him. 
In effect, this episode presents the reader with a portrait of the child victim 
transformed into the adult abuser. The voice of Jack’s father represents one 
of his uncanny doubles, a powerful trace of the past provoking feelings of 
frustration, helplessness, and rage that will materialize in an eruption of 
violence directed at his wife and son.
Danny’s supernatural guardian, Tony, represents yet another uncanny 
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double that functions as a kind of father figure for Danny as well as a source 
of guidance that enables him to overcome the evil forces at work in the Over-
look. Tony provides one of the only sources of stability in Danny’s crumbling 
world. When his father comes to murder him and Danny intimates that it is 
not really his father but a manifestation of the evil force that “had accrued, 
as secret and silent as interest in a bank account” (639), Tony materializes 
before him and is revealed as an incarnation of himself in the future: “And 
now Tony stood directly in front of him, and looking at Tony was like looking 
into a magic mirror and seeing himself in ten years, the eyes widely spaced 
and very dark, the chin firm, the mouth handsomely molded. The hair was 
light blond like his mother’s, and yet the stamp on his features was that of his 
father, as if Tony—as if the Daniel Anthony Torrance that would someday 
be—was a halfling caught between father and son, a ghost of both, a fusion” 
(639–40). In the complete image of Tony, Danny is provided with an ideal 
image of self. The characteristics that he exhibits are wholly positive ones and 
exude a confidence and competence that ultimately elude Jack. Just as Jack 
and his father represent a ghostly fusion, so do Jack and Danny mirror each 
other since Danny is also a victim of his father’s violence. Jack’s victimization 
by his own father plays a central role in his gradual corruption. However, 
the supernatural forces that inhabit the Overlook Hotel, forces frequently 
referred to by the former caretaker Delbert Grady as the “management,” 
are of equal importance in the process by which the feelings of inadequacy, 
helplessness, and rage bequeathed to him by his abusive father are turned 
toward violence.
As a perpetrator of violence against his own wife and two daughters, 
Grady represents yet another one of Jack’s ghostly doubles, but the frustration 
upon which Grady attempts to capitalize is connected with Jack’s declin-
ing financial status and failure to achieve upward mobility for himself and 
his family. When Grady informs Jack of his son’s attempt to enlist the aid 
of Dick Hallorann, he offers him an opportunity for advancement in the 
Overlook’s hierarchy:
“And the manager puts no strings on his largesse,” Grady went 
on. “Not at all. Look at me, a tenth-grade dropout. Think how much 
further you yourself could go in the Overlook’s organizational 
structure. Perhaps . . . in time . . . to the very top.”
“Really?” Jack whispered. (535–36)
Grady’s offer elicits the larger social and economic frame contributing to 
Jack’s frustrated ego and exacerbating the suffering caused by his fractured 
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and divided self. Dominated as a child by the masculine power and abusive 
paternal authority of his father, he confronts a similar form of evil in the 
supernatural, impersonal hierarchy of the hotel. The management offers Jack 
the opportunity to take his father’s place. In this way the novel establishes 
the continuity between the private world of domestic abuse and the public 
world of American corporate power. Abusive paternal authority is equated 
with the exercise of social control by the management. This comparison 
is given further emphasis later, when Jack attacks Wendy with the roque 
mallet and insists that he will show her “who is boss around here” (564). By 
the same token, when Grady taunts him after Jack has been locked in the 
pantry by Wendy and Danny, he suggests that this “hardly sets [Jack] off as 
being of top managerial timber” (582). In effect, Jack chooses a course of 
action in which he has to prove his worth to the management of the hotel, 
a position that represents a mirror reflection of his relationship with his 
abusive father. As such, it comes as no surprise that when he goes after Dick 
Hallorann, he is motivated by the desire to show the hidden authority of the 
Overlook that he is “of managerial timber” (633). Just as Jack’s relationship 
with his father was characterized by a victimizer/victim paradigm, so, too, 
does he find himself in a relationship of domination and submission with 
the management of the hotel. Offered the opportunity to raise himself in the 
corporate hierarchy, Jack is willing to sacrifice Danny (and Wendy) as his 
“ticket of admission” (581) to greater power and affluence. However, there 
is a duality here as well since his betrayal of his son also entails a betrayal of 
the victim within himself. From a divided, conflicted figure who struggles 
to keep the violent legacy of his past at a distance, Jack is transformed into 
a brutal monster obsessed with power. He becomes a faceless “company” 
man, mindlessly doing the bidding of the invisible bureaucratic forces oc-
cupying the hotel.
Can You Find the Indians?
In the novel Danny’s awareness of these hidden forces finds expression by 
reference to a visual puzzle commonly given to children as a game. When 
Danny becomes aware that things are not in their proper place, he imagi-
natively compares the hotel to a picture in which one must find the hidden 
Indians:
But now things had been misplaced. Things were missing. Worse 
still, things had been added, things you couldn’t quite see, like in one 
of those pictures that said can you find the indians? And if you 
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strained and squinted, you could see some of them—the thing you 
had taken for a cactus at first glance was really a brave with a knife 
clamped in his teeth, and there were others hiding in the rocks, and 
you could even see one of their evil, merciless faces peering through 
the spokes of a covered wagon wheel. But you could never see all of 
them, and that was what made you uneasy. Because it was the ones 
you couldn’t see that would sneak up behind you, a tomahawk in 
one hand and a scalping knife in the other. (291)
Basing his assessment of the evil lurking in the hotel upon a familiar visual 
puzzle, Danny unconsciously makes use of a quite common stereotypi-
cal, racist image of Native Americans in order to understand the uncanny 
threat of violence that he senses closing in around him. Interestingly, the 
image of the evil, merciless brave prepared to inflict ruthless violence 
upon his unsuspecting victim reverses the historical relationship between 
white settlers and Native Americans by transforming the victims into the 
victimizers. This represents another device by which King emphasizes the 
intergenerational legacy of domestic abuse that transforms the victim into 
the tyrant. However, an equally fascinating aspect of this passage concerns 
how Kubrick makes use of it in his film version of The Shining to allude to 
the genocide of Native Americans during the founding of the United States. 
Although Diane Johnson mentions Kubrick’s interest in the extermination 
of Indian peoples, and many critics have noted the Native American mo-
tifs and images in the film, none have pointed out the connection between 
the reference to the visual puzzle in the novel and Kubrick’s use of it in the 
film.12 In effect, Kubrick takes Danny’s imaginative understanding of the 
uncanny evil lurking in the hotel in terms of a visual puzzle and creates a 
visual puzzle of his own that transforms the “merciless brave” in the novel 
into the victim of merciless American expansion. The images of Native 
Americans in the film serve as an elaborate visual puzzle for the viewer, an 
uncanny trace of violence that represents not Native Americans as agents 
of evil, but the inability of America to acknowledge or come to terms with 
the genocide of Native Americans.
Just as in the visual puzzle in King’s novel, so, too, in the film “Indians” 
constantly lurk in the background of the camera’s frequently elaborate 
tracking shots, emerging only when, as in Danny’s description, the viewer 
“strains and squints” to see them. Soon after Jack and Wendy arrive at the 
hotel and Stuart Ullman gives them a tour of the premises, he mentions that 
the Overlook Hotel was built on an old Indian burial ground. Ullman also 
notes that the builders were rumored to have repelled some Indian attacks 
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during construction. When the tour passes through the Colorado Room, 
Wendy notices the Native American motifs on the walls and floor. Ullman 
points out that they are authentic Apache and Navajo designs. As the tour 
moves behind the central staircase—where Wendy will later confront Jack 
with a bat—and the camera tracks the party from the opposite side of the 
staircase, a portrait of a Native American is barely visible on the wall op-
posite the fireplace behind the stairs. When Dick Hallorann shows Wendy 
the food locker, a can of Calumet baking powder with a Native American 
chief logo is clearly visible behind him. When Wendy and Danny enter the 
maze and Jack seems to observe them as he hovers above the model in the 
Colorado Room, Wendy’s hair is braided in a distinctively Native American 
style. When the first evidence of Jack’s instability begins to emerge and he 
throws the tennis ball against the wall in the Colorado Room, the wall has 
four traditional Navajo figures painted on it. When Wendy is beginning 
to feel isolated and uses the CB to contact the Ranger station, she is wear-
ing a yellow jacket with Native American motifs. In his conversation with 
the bartender, Lloyd, Jack alludes to “White Man’s Burden,” an allusion to 
“Rudyard Kipling and the Victorian notion of Europe’s duty to civilize the 
‘uncivilized’ nonwhite world” that conjures the period in which the Overlook 
was built.13 Finally, when Jack is locked in the food locker, the Calumet cans 
appear once again in the background.
Most of these images are offered in a context that suggests the repeti-
tion of acts of violence. However, unlike King’s novel, where the repetition 
of the past hinges almost exclusively upon domestic abuse, Kubrick’s film 
maintains the core elements of domestic violence but widens the scope of 
the past to incorporate European and American history. While serving as 
an explicit focus of Jack’s assault with the tennis ball, the Overlook’s Navajo 
and Apache designs and furnishings also serve as a reminder of America’s 
exploitation of Native Americans in the use of their cultural and religious 
symbolism for the purposes of decoration.14
At the same time, the picture of the Native American on the wall behind 
the staircase in the Colorado Room is located directly beneath the site at 
the top of the staircase where Wendy will later confront Jack with a bat. The 
implicit comparison between the genocide of Native Americans and the 
misogynistic violence Jack inflicts upon Wendy is given further emphasis by 
the two identical fireplaces: one behind and one at the top of the staircase. 
Wendy is literally standing in the same place as the Native American in 
the portrait below her. The violence that Jack attempts to inflict upon her 
signifies the enduring presence of patriarchal repression and its link to the 
doctrine of Manifest Destiny associated with white notions of masculinity 
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and power. Indeed, it is in the very passage below her, behind the staircase, 
where Stuart Ullman informed her and Jack that “all of the best people” 
in the century have stayed at the Overlook. In this context Jack’s efforts to 
“correct” Wendy and Danny represent an attempt to assert his male au-
thority and power. As Philip Kuberski aptly puts it, for Jack the Overlook 
hotel represents an “opportunity to recover the lost territory of American 
masculinity; it is a rich man’s hotel from an age of rich men, from the age 
of unrestricted capital expansion, before women’s suffrage, the income tax, 
civil rights and other indignities.”15 In assaulting Wendy, Jack repeats the 
history of American territorial expansion in an attempt to assert his mas-
culinity and dominance.
At the same time the mention that the hotel was built on an Indian 
burial ground and Indian attacks were repulsed during its construction 
participates in Kubrick’s critique of the forms of patriarchal, racist, and class 
domination that have informed the original creation and reproduction of 
American social and economic institutions. As David A. Cook eloquently 
notes in his assessment of Kubrick’s film, “The Shining is less about ghosts 
and demonic possession than it is about the murderous system of economic 
exploitation which has sustained the country since, like the Overlook Hotel, 
it was built upon an Indian burial ground.”16 Perhaps one of the most subtle 
allusions to the systematic murder of Native Americans and the forms of 
institutional domination that have arisen upon it occurs in the food locker 
when the can of Calumet baking powder appears behind Dick Hallorann’s 
head along with other brand-name goods. Significantly, this is the first time 
that Dick communicates with Danny telepathically. The eerie music in the 
background deliberately evokes the uncanny in association with the appear-
ance of the Calumet can in order to allude to Native American genocide. On 
the one hand, the use of the word Calumet and the Native American chief 
as a brand-name logo comment upon the exploitation of Native American 
culture for the purposes of commodity production and exchange. This idea 
is given further emphasis later in the film when multiple cans of Calumet 
baking soda appear on the shelf alongside other commodities when Jack is 
conversing with Delbert Grady. On the other hand, the word calumet itself 
has a great deal of significance, since a calumet is an elaborately designed 
pipe serving as a token of universal peace among the Illiniwek. Historically, 
the calumet was first presented in 1673 to Father Jacques Marquette, who 
founded Michigan’s first European settlement. Thus, the word not only 
furnishes a link to the early European incursions into Native American ter-
ritory (the mention of the Donner party represents another such allusion) 
but is also a profoundly ironic allusion to the betrayal of Native Americans 
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through the violation of treaties often ratified by sharing a peace pipe. Fi-
nally, the racist character of such betrayals finds one of its most powerful 
expressions in the murder of Dick Hallorann, who will be killed on the site 
of a Navajo circle design in front of the cashier’s cages.17 This detail provides 
yet another historical trace of violence that emphasizes the continuity be-
tween the genocide of Native Americans, the enslavement and oppression 
of African Americans, and America’s rapid growth in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as an economic power.
Violence and the Illusion of Mastery
Consistently throughout the film, Kubrick forges links between various 
victims of oppression in order to focus attention upon how the assertion 
of white male violence lies at the foundation of American society. The link 
between the oppression of Native Americans and the oppression of women 
emerges through the consistent comparisons made between the two that 
take place in the context of Jack’s fantasies of complete masculine freedom, 
paternal authority, and sexual license. One of the film’s most startling and 
enigmatic evocations of this triad of desires occurs when Danny and Wendy 
enter the Overlook’s maze and Jack is depicted demonically looking down 
at the exact replica of the maze in the Colorado Room. As he looks down at 
the maze from a vantage point implying the seemingly omnipotent power of 
his gaze, Wendy and Danny eventually arrive at its center. As noted above, 
Wendy’s hair is braided in Native American fashion. Jack’s vantage point 
overlooking the maze suggests a position of complete mastery and rational 
control over his wife and son and evokes one of the symbolic dimensions 
of the hotel’s name. Nonetheless, this perception of absolute power is ironi-
cally undercut by Jack’s eventual demise in that very same maze and Danny’s 
escape from it. In this sense the hotel is aptly named, since it simultaneously 
points in opposite directions. The word overlook suggests both a position of 
commanding height that grants one the capacity to see an entire landscape 
and the act of missing something that has significance—that is to say, the 
name of the hotel suggests both complete and incomplete acts of perception. 
Furthermore, Jack’s estimation of his ability to master his environment is 
fundamentally connected to the institutional hierarchy of the hotel. This 
connection is made initially with the living managers of the hotel and later 
with its supernatural overseers.
When Jack arrives at the Overlook Hotel for his interview, he is imme-
diately introduced to a formal chain of command in which he must operate. 
As Randy Rasmussen notes, “Stuart Ullman’s office is a modest statement of 
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collective authority” and the “small American flag on his desk places Ullman, 
the hotel, and Colorado within an even larger institutional framework.”18 
Geoffrey Cocks also takes note of the flag and points out the eagle behind 
Ullman’s desk and the fact that his transposed initials are “U.S.”19 Adding 
further emphasis to Ullman’s identification with American political author-
ity, a significant portion of the interview takes place with the camera tightly 
focused on Ullman and the window behind him. This viewpoint, along with 
the other allusions to American government, resembles a typical presidential 
address from the Oval Office. At the same time a clear continuity exists be-
tween the living management of the hotel and its supernatural inhabitants: 
Jack’s gradual corruption by the unseen residents of the hotel is facilitated by 
his desire to join the ranks of the wealthy guests who have vacationed there. 
As Greg Smith argues, if Jack wants to join the 1921 Fourth of July party, “he 
will have to shed his enlightened liberal schoolteacher/writer personality 
and adopt the racist views seen as constituting a valid claim to authority by 
wealthy, white, pre-Depression and pre–World War II American societal 
circles.”20 The continuing legacy of this viewpoint finds expression in the 
way Jack is manipulated to enforce a racist and sexist ideology that serves 
a set of class interests that are inimical to him and his family. The invisible 
management of the hotel is not unlike the frequently faceless directors of 
financial interests or corporations responsible for large-scale economic 
exploitation. In effect, Jack is offered admission to the ranks of the ruling 
class if he adopts the managerial/paternalistic standpoint intended to keep 
women, nonwhites, and unruly children in their place.
In Jack’s descent into madness, the film presents the viewer with a mirror 
image of the lower/middle-class conservative white male filled with misdi-
rected rage at minorities and women and faithfully serving the interests of 
the very group working against his well-being and happiness. Even though 
he will not benefit personally, the supernatural management of the hotel 
gradually moves Jack to embrace the misogynistic and racist attitudes of 
the wealthy white elite. The ghostly management’s ideology, conveyed most 
forcefully by Delbert Grady’s reference to Hallorann as a “nigger cook,” 
mirrors the dominant ideological attitudes of those managing American 
domestic, foreign, and economic policy. The extent to which Jack instantly 
finds the Overlook “homey” testifies to the uncanny presence of repressed 
violent impulses within him as much as it signifies his aspirations to join the 
class it represents and his willingness to become an agent of paternalistic, 
racist repression. All of Jack’s efforts are clearly directed at exerting mastery 
and control over his wife and son. 
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However, there is a consistent aspect of play and playacting to Jack’s 
violence that may seem to undercut its seriousness. Caldwell and Umland, at-
tentive to this aspect of Kubrick’s film, argue for “a cohesive metaphor of play 
which is far more significant than critics have been willing to acknowledge.” 
They point out that the hotel is comparable to “an enormous playground with 
limitless opportunities for play” but conclude that “Kubrick’s manipulation 
of the play metaphor in The Shining obviates the film’s aesthetic force and 
therefore undermines any ‘serious’ intent.”21 Although Caldwell and Umland 
make a convincing argument for the central significance of the metaphor 
of play in the film, they fail to consider the ways in which play may be a 
deadly serious activity. Applying the Freudian psychoanalytic framework 
that Kubrick consulted when writing the screenplay, one cannot fail to note 
Freud’s most well-known exploration of children’s play, the description of 
young Hans in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and the fort/da game he de-
velops to compensate for his mother’s absence. On several occasions Freud 
witnessed this young boy taking a wooden reel with a string attached to it 
and throwing it over the edge of his cot. When he threw it over the edge 
and it disappeared, he would exclaim, Fort! the German word for “gone.” 
When he reeled it back in he would cry out Da! or “there.” Freud interprets 
this game as the young child’s “great cultural achievement—the instinctual 
renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he 
had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting.”22
In Freud’s account, the game represents a form of compensation for 
loss that cannot be explained by reference to the motive of pleasure, since 
the loss of the mother was not pleasurable. Freud concludes that the child 
had another motive, explainable by reference to the existence of an instinct 
for mastery. Freud remarks, “At the outset he was in a passive situation—he 
was overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable as it 
was, as a game, he took on an active part. These efforts might be put down 
to an instinct for mastery.”23 In short, Freud discovers an underlying mo-
tive for play that is quite serious and, indeed, all important—the attempt 
to compensate for the original loss of the mother and return to a state of 
primary narcissism. Interestingly, several critics have pointed out that the 
interior of the hotel serves as a metaphorical representation of the interior 
of the mother’s body.24 Furthermore, the relationship between play and the 
playing or exchange of roles that constantly takes place in the hotel in con-
nection with doubling consistently returns to forms of patriarchal domi-
nation. These forms of domination are shown to be grounded in egoistic 
eruptions of sexual violence in which members of oppressed groups are 
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coded as feminine. At the same time this doubling process is responsible 
for generating uncanny reversals in which the violent pursuit of mastery 
proves to be profoundly self-destructive. Jack’s dual role as a protector of 
his family and a source of narcissistic violence against them points to the 
justifying paternalistic values of patriarchy even as it uncovers their uncanny 
roots in the desire for mastery.
In the final analysis, Jack’s pursuit of mastery and control represents a 
self-destructive illusion. His fantasies of power turn out to be secretly di-
rected and controlled by hotel management. Jack’s past—America’s past—ul-
timately masters him, and he becomes a willing pawn of history. There is 
perhaps no more powerful evocation of Jack’s illusion of mastery than his 
final pursuit of Danny in the hedge maze. As he is reduced to an inarticulate, 
raging monster, all of the remaining vestiges of Jack’s humanity fall away 
before he is transformed into a frozen figure trapped in the labyrinth of his 
own self-destructive desires. As Cynthia Freeland points out in connecting 
this moment with the uncanny, “the traditional masculine virtues have 
been perverted into abusive power as Jack merges with evil.”25 However, in 
taking for granted that these traditional masculine virtues must undergo a 
process of perversion, Freeland overlooks the real force of Kubrick’s critique 
Jack Nicholson (as Jack Torrance) in The Shining (1980). Directed by Stanley Ku-
brick. (Warner Bros./Photofest)
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of patriarchy as well as the subtlety of his use of the uncanny to comment on 
paternalistic ideology. Kubrick’s critique is far more radical. The traditional 
masculine virtues Freeland alludes to do not need to undergo a process of 
perversion because they already are the ideological representation of the 
real forms of power and domination they help to perpetuate. Jack’s vio-
lence merely represents the uncanny mirror reflection of masculine virtue 
in practice. Reason, control, and the command of language constitute the 
defining illusions of the patriarchal worldview and are progressively exposed 
as ideological distortions of real history and its brutal repetitions of the past. 
One of the most powerful messages of the film involves the revelation that 
so-called masculine virtues are indistinguishable from the abusive exercise 
of power in practice. This revelation points far beyond the scope of events 
at the Overlook Hotel to a critique of European and American history and 
the Enlightenment values that inform it.
The Nightmare of History
The concern with organized institutional forms of violence and power in-
forms the uncanny subtext of The Shining and, as others have pointed out, 
it represents a common focus in Kubrick’s films.26 The repetition of the past 
finds representation in the film in ways that are both overt and metaphorical. 
Nevertheless, in every case these repetitions suggest passivity or helpless-
ness before the onslaught of history. One of the most obvious examples of 
repetition revolves around Jack’s efforts to repeat the actions of the former 
caretaker Delbert Grady. At the same time Danny’s uncanny encounters 
with the ghosts of Grady’s daughters explicitly connect the repetition of 
history with violence. Furthermore, in his enigmatic encounter with Grady 
in the bathroom adjoining the Gold Room, Jack accuses Grady of being the 
caretaker and is told that he has always been the caretaker. Significantly, 
this encounter ends with Jack becoming convinced that he must “correct” 
Wendy and Danny. Soon after this real or imagined conversation, Jack sets 
out to kill Danny and Wendy, but only after repeating many of the same lines 
spoken by the ghosts of the hotel. This repetition of language signifies Jack’s 
imprisonment within the nightmare of history and emphasizes his subjec-
tion to powers beyond his control or understanding.27 Jack’s manuscript 
supplies a significant indication of his growing alignment with inhuman 
forces depriving him of all individual agency. The repetition of the same 
line—All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy—registers his entrap-
ment within an ideological system reinforcing patriarchal, class, and racial 
domination and links his attempts at mastery to the narcissistic motives of 
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play discussed above. To the degree that the manuscript emulates a wide 
variety of poetic and written forms of expression, it dramatizes a complete 
emptying of content from literary form that renders it meaningless. Subject 
to the commands of history, Jack’s personality undergoes a parallel emptying 
that dramatically points out how his unconscious allegiance to the past has 
destroyed his creative potential.
In effect, the haunting presence of history materializes and drives him to 
replace the possibility of fulfilling meaningful work or self-realization with 
a meaningless repetition of the past. As Thomas Allen Nelson points out, 
the manuscript “resembles a horizontal labyrinth . . . [suggesting] fate and 
psychological entrapment [and] associates Jack’s madness with an image of 
reduction and repetition.”28 Jack’s madness signifies the materialization of 
history and, on a symbolic level, the supernatural forces that nurture his 
growing instability function concretely in the film as historical ones.29 If Jack’s 
repetition of the same text points to his own progressive dehumanization 
into a figure whose narcissistic motives can be manipulated to transform him 
into an agent of brutal violence, the film, along with its historical subtext, 
points to the role of modern institutions in reproducing both domestic and 
global nightmares. Just as the Overlook Hotel is haunted by unseen evil and 
Jack Torrance is hunted by hidden forces bent upon his family’s destruction, 
so, too, are the seemingly benevolent faces of political, economic, and cul-
tural authority shown to be stalked by an uncanny double inflicting untold 
violence and harm upon the powerless. As Linda Holland-Toll points out, 
“It is not the idea that Jack is a monster which is so discomforting; it is that 
Jack Torrance reflects so many people in the society, who would not like 
to think of themselves as monsters, and who, indeed, to all appearances, 
are not monsters.”30 Holland-Toll is speaking of King’s novel; however, her 
insight can easily be applied to the Jack Torrance in the film, who initially 
no more appears to be a monster than do the monstrous institutions that 
Kubrick aims to unmask and expose.
These monstrous institutions show themselves in the form of concrete 
traces of the past. This past is registered not only in literal historical refer-
ences but also in the untold numbers of photographs that line the walls of 
the Overlook. In this sense Jack’s joining of the ranks of those who populate 
the hotel’s photographs is entirely appropriate, since it signifies the way in 
which the past exerts its concrete influence on the present. Indeed, Brigitte 
Peucker observes the degree to which The Shining is “haunted by photogra-
phy.”31 To the extent that photographs are a means of recording the past and 
assigning it a place and meaning, Kubrick uses photography as a metaphor 
for the helplessness and passivity of human beings before the onslaught of 
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history. The elaborate tracking shots of the camera, coupled with the vast 
visual puzzle or spatial labyrinth represented by the interior of the hotel, 
construct an uncanny space that frequently gives his characters a false as-
surance of being able to master it before their actual experiences violently 
shatter their illusions and demonstrate the degree to which it masters them. 
In this respect Kubrick’s characters may not be unlike the members of his 
audience, who, provided with a story ostensibly about the mental break-
down of an isolated man and the collapse of his family, are actually given a 
tale about the hidden brutality of their own institutions, an uncanny fable 
mirroring their own pursuit of mastery and their own subjection to the 
nightmare of history.
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“Hot with Rapture and Cold 
with Fear”
Susann Cokal
Jean-Baptist Grenouille, antihero of Patrick Süskind’s international best seller 
Perfume: The Story of a Murderer, is “one of the most gifted and abominable 
personages in an era that knew no lack of gifted and abominable personages” 
(Süskind 2001, 3). He is smart, talented, and completely amoral, shunned 
by his fellow humans from the moment he’s born. He commits crimes that 
shock the community with their apparent purposelessness, killing a total of 
twenty-six virgins (or, in the film version, fourteen women of varied sexual 
experience) and inadvertently leaving a trail of other bodies behind. He is a 
monster. He is a parasite. He is also the greatest creative genius of his era.
From birth, Grenouille has an uncanny power to sicken and terrify 
people. “I only know one thing,” says his wet nurse: “this baby makes my 
flesh creep because it doesn’t smell the way children ought to smell” (Süskind 
2001, 11). Specifically, “the bastard himself, he doesn’t smell” (10). In his 
odorlessness, Grenouille is (perhaps paradoxically) disgusting—and because 
of it (also somewhat paradoxically), he will eventually show a deep capacity 
for the sublime experience of speechless awe dear to eighteenth-century 
philosophers. Without the scent markers that might weave him into the 
social fabric, he grows up free of manners, morals, or compunctions about 
hurting others to get what he wants. He is an olfactory blank slate who 
reinvents himself by robbing others of their own odors.
Perfume has been described as “a very cleverly constructed and well-told, 
but essentially trivial, horror story with fantastic elements and just a whiff 
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of the conventional detective novel” (Durrani 1999, 228). But it is so much 
more. Both the 1985 novel and the 2006 movie undertake a philosophical 
meditation on expression and perception, using as their subject the ineffable 
(to some people trivial) sense of smell rather than the more often privileged 
sense of sight. Smell is particularly suited to the horror genre, which depends 
on shaking up the innermost part of our beings. It is the most primal sense, 
the one that develops first and stays with us; it can provoke visceral experi-
ences—vomiting, shudders, joy—even more immediately than sight and 
sound, for example, can do. Grenouille himself thinks of it as an ultimate 
power: “For people could close their eyes to greatness, to horrors, to beauty, 
and their ears to melodies or deceiving words. But they could not escape 
scent. For scent was a brother of breath” (Süskind 2001, 155). If we live, if 
we breathe, we find it almost impossible not to perceive odors.1
All-pervasive and inevitable, able to disgust, amuse, and delight, smell is 
fertile territory for both the disgusting grotesque and the uplifting sublime, 
two categories that have intertwined during the postmodern era. Through 
a misshapen, eerie character who both undergoes and provokes sublime 
olfactory experiences, Süskind explores the nature of aesthetics and artis-
tic creation. In this way, as Edith Borchardt has noted, “Süskind parodies 
Kantian theories of the origins and nature of knowledge by exploring the 
idea that the highest aesthetic abstraction can be achieved through the most 
primitive of the senses” (1992, 99). Ultimately, Grenouille’s crimes are the 
transgressive acts of an artist and a sort of unwitting natural philosopher 
attempting to forge a subjectivity. That his crimes destroy and deconstruct 
beauty in order to create something sublime is part of the book’s ultimate 
horror, as Perfume’s readers (or moviegoers) hover between feelings of re-
vulsion and the hope inspired by beauty.
Both horror and the sublime put us in touch with something beyond 
our ordinary lives. In her influential book Solitude and the Sublime, Frances 
Ferguson notes that any aesthetic experience involves an interplay between 
internal and external stimuli, with the effect registered on the body (1992, 6). 
That effect is perhaps most intense with the sublime, a category of experience 
that strikes wonder and terror into the beholder; it so palpably approaches 
the divine that it transcends physical form and leaves the perceiving sub-
ject. A response to a phenomenon beyond mere beauty, it is usually located 
in nature: a mighty waterfall, the Grand Canyon, a mountain range. The 
sublime was of particular interest during the Age of Reason, which (much 
like our own period) sought to define and explain what lies beyond reason 
itself. Describing the postmodern version of that experience, Jean-François 
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Lyotard elaborates: “The soul is . . . dumb, immobilized, as good as dead” 
(1993, 251). In any era the sublime is shocking.
Here is Grenouille’s first encounter with the sublime, embodied in a 
young Parisian girl discovered cleaning plums:
The scent was so exceptionally delicate and fine that he could not 
hold on to it; it continually eluded his perception . . . his very heart 
ached. He had the prescience of something extraordinary—this 
scent was the key for ordering all odors, one could understand 
nothing about odors if one did not understand this scent, and his 
whole life would be bungled, if he, Grenouille, did not succeed in 
possessing it.
He was almost sick with excitement. . . . 
Grenouille felt his heart pounding, and he knew that it was not 
the exertion of running that had set it pounding, but rather his 
excited helplessness in the presence of this scent. He tried to recall 
something comparable, but had to discard all comparisons. (Süskind 
2001, 38–39)
Though the novel doesn’t say so explicitly, this is a textbook description of 
the sublime experience, whether from the Enlightenment or the postmodern 
era. The encounter is extraordinary, unlike anything else; it makes him feel 
sick and helpless. It is, in a word, overwhelming, and it hints at some realm 
beyond our mortal earth; by touching the divine, it provides a potential 
organizing principle for our entire world. So when Grenouille strangles this 
girl and sniffs to heart’s content, experiencing “pure bliss,” he feels as if he 
has finally been born: “for until now he had merely existed like an animal 
with a most nebulous self-awareness. But after today, he felt as if he finally 
knew who he really was: nothing less than a genius” with a “higher destiny: 
nothing less than to revolutionize the odiferous world” (43). It is through 
the sublime that he begins to develop both an inkling of a self and an aspira-
tion to be more than that little self alone, and the category will continue to 
organize his attempted transformation.
The movie version (directed by Tom Tykwer) takes this passage a step 
further and, in a voice-over, explicitly calls the scent emitted by this first vir-
gin “sublime.” Courting its audience, the film also uses more conventions of 
traditional horror: an early murder of a household pet, Baldini’s cat; a display 
of dead bodies; a torture scene after Grenouille’s arrest; and attempts to make 
us sympathize with Grenouille. Tykwer softens Grenouille’s criminality and 
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makes the strangling an accident, coming about as Grenouille tries to hush 
the girl. In either case, sublime bliss—or the awareness of its potential—leads 
to a crime in which Grenouille will attempt to create himself first as a being 
conscious of itself, then as a god conscious of all things. The sublime will 
frighten Grenouille more deeply later on; for now it is dangerous primarily 
for the person who evokes it.
The grotesque is often a jollier category, though it can invoke a shudder 
of its own. It depends almost wholly on the physical—the ugly, misshapen, 
scatological—and produces a feeling of comedy as often as one of revulsion. 
As we’ll see, in Süskind’s eighteenth century everyone and everywhere, from 
palace to marketplace, is grotesque. That’s because everyone stinks—hy-
perbolically, exaggeratedly, superabundantly, amusingly. Everyone, that 
is, except for the misshapen main character, Grenouille, and the virgins 
on whom he preys. Grenouille, who is capable of sublime perception, is a 
grotesque figure par excellence: small, scarred, ugly, and freakishly without 
odor. He is variously compared to a toad (that’s what his name means), a 
tick (for example, Süskind 2001, 21, 33), a monster (17), and a mere thing 
(13). He can eat next to nothing—spoiled meat (20), bats (132)—and is able 
to survive all manner of diseases, including dysentery, cholera (20), and a 
near-fatal bout of anthrax (32). His very abhorrence allows him to become 
the greatest artist who ever lived, and his various apprenticeships to a tanner, 
a perfumer, and a distiller of essential oils give him the science he needs to 
create complex emotional responses.
Postmodernists love the grotesque body because it doesn’t fit precon-
ceived ideas of perfection—it keeps changing, becoming something else. 
Flowing through much postmodern art is a mortal fear of everything falling 
into place; hence the pastiche and bricolage that are hallmarks of the era. If 
an artist were to find the perfect form, he or she would have nothing more 
to express. The grotesque fascinates because it offers contact with another 
plane of existence. It is one way of reaching beyond ordinary, anodyne life, as 
it stirs the senses and creates excitement. Geoffrey Galt Harpham has written 
that the word itself “designates a condition of being just out of focus, just 
beyond the reach of language. It accommodates the things left over when 
the categories of language are exhausted” (1982, 3).
In designating the unrepresentable, in eluding language and definition, 
the grotesque is related to the sublime. What the two categories have most 
fundamentally in common is excess. Both transgress boundaries, whether 
through an exaggeration of body or a surplus of beauty; they bring us into 
contact with something beyond our ordinary experience. In Perfume that 
something beyond consists in the systematic crimes that Grenouille commits 
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in order to make one transcendent perfume, an “angel’s scent” (Süskind 2001, 
154) that will make him universally loved. Coldly cunning in their use of 
the perfumer’s science, horrifying in their apparent purposelessness, these 
murders produce the greatest and most ephemeral experience of divinity 
our little world has ever known, bearing out Lyotard’s claim that sublime 
art makes “a world apart . . . in which the monstrous and the formless have 
their rights because they can be sublime” (1993, 249). The two categories 
braid together here and produce a story unsettling in its own genius, ask-
ing and answering a question particularly relevant to the postmodern era: 
How is it possible for an artist such as Grenouille (or Süskind) to reconcile 
revulsion, awe, and uplifting beauty?
Everybody Stank
In Perfume everyone, even the charismatically aromatic virgins, inhabits a 
grotesque world. As the first page informs us, “there reigned in the cities a 
stench barely conceivable to us modern men and women. The streets stank 
of manure, the courtyards of urine, the stairwells stank of moldering wood 
and rat droppings. . . . People stank of sweat and unwashed clothes; from their 
mouths came the stench of rotting teeth, from their bellies that of onions, 
and from their bodies, if they were no longer very young, came the stench 
of rancid cheese and sour milk and tumorous disease” (Süskind 2001, 3). 
This description alone would be enough to brand Perfume a work of hor-
ror. But these are not unusual bodies, like Grenouille’s; these bodies belong 
to ordinary citizens, nobility, even the king and queen. When Grenouille 
concocts a perfume that will let him pass as human, he uses old cheese, cat 
dung, sardine oil, and other “ghastly” ingredients (150). As the category’s 
great theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin, has written, “Exaggeration, hyperbolism, ex-
cessiveness are generally considered fundamental attributes of the grotesque 
style” (1984, 303). Grenouille reveals humanity’s inherent repulsiveness: to 
be human, in Perfume, is in itself to be grotesque. Even those virgins would 
end up reeking if Grenouille didn’t kill them first.
Grenouille’s talent for discerning scent is itself a kind of grotesque 
feature, going beyond human and even typical animal ability to become 
another bodily exaggeration. No one, not even the perfumer Baldini, quite 
realizes how sensitive Grenouille’s nose is; they think it’s good, certainly, but 
they don’t realize it is supernaturally so.2 When his last and most desirable 
victim flees the carnage with her father, for example, Grenouille is able to 
follow her to a distant inn simply by smelling the traces in the air.
Grenouille’s ability to sift out scents becomes even more exaggerated in 
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the film version of his life, and therein lies much of his grotesque identity. As 
the newborn infant lies on the midden heap where his mother has thrown 
him—the nastiest spot in the nastiest marketplace in literary history—his 
luminous little nose quivers, catching scents of fish, rotting food, human 
breath. It is for smell alone that he seems to suck in enough breath of his 
own to make himself heard and draw people to his rescue.
The film, in fact, puts the greatest burden of grotesquerie on Grenouille’s 
sense of smell and his brute determination to find olfactory pleasure. The 
actor who plays him, Ben Whishaw, is quite handsome, with dark curls and 
a sculptured face. Only a layer of dirt marks his unsavoriness; he is generally 
much more appealing to look at than the black-toothed peasants, potbel-
lied nobles, and scarred workers who surround him. Without the novel 
character’s physical imperfections, his keen nose and willingness to kill 
become even more important to the definition of his character. Still, as we 
have seen, the film tries to soften the viewer’s distaste for its protagonist by 
making his first crime (the murder of the plum girl) an accident. Grenouille 
is a murderer, but a handsome and even understandable one.
Neither does Grenouille simply smell things; he lusts for smell. That lust 
is the same as a Rabelaisian gluttony or a Boccaccian priapism. His nose is 
his sexual organ; he is never tempted to rape or even make love to any of his 
victims; he merely wants to sniff them. All of his desire has been located in 
his nose—which makes him even more terrifying to the people of Grasse 
when he starts killing off their daughters: “Strangely enough, this knowledge 
only increased the sense of horror, for everyone had secretly assumed that 
the girls had been ravished. People had at least known the murderer’s mo-
tive. Now they knew nothing at all” (Süskind 2001, 197). A sexual crime is 
understandable; an unexplained one suggests that the perpetrator is beyond 
human, or at the very least beyond human comprehension. The murderer 
thus becomes an unknown quantity, truly a monster. Of course, if the 
townspeople knew that the girls are being killed in order to be coldly and 
scientifically distilled into a perfume, they would be even more horrified at 
the nature of the violation. (I will discuss his scientific method below.)
It may at first seem ironic that Süskind uses the word “grotesque” to 
describe Grenouille’s own lack of body odor: “It was grotesque” (“Es war 
grotesk” [Süskind 1985, 154]) that “he, Grenouille, who could smell other 
people miles away, was incapable of smelling his own genitals not a handspan 
away!” (Süskind 2001, 135).3 In this case, “grotesque” refers not to ugliness 
but to the unsettling effect of the uncanny, which Freud defines as something 
familiar made strange, therefore frightening and repulsive: “the ‘uncanny’ 
is that class of the terrifying which leads back to something long known to 
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us, once very familiar” (2004, 75).4 The uncanny comes associated with a 
sense of malevolence: “We also call a living person uncanny,” Freud writes, 
“usually when we ascribe evil motives to him. But that is not all; we must 
not only credit him with bad intentions but must attribute to these inten-
tions capacity to achieve their aim in virtue of certain special powers” (91). 
Grenouille’s odorlessness and his superhuman ability to detect scents make 
him a primal figure of horror. And he is aware of his own selfish evil: “He 
was not out of his mind . . . he wanted to do it [create the “superhuman . . . 
angel’s scent”] because he was evil, thoroughly evil” (Süskind 2001, 155).5
Grenouille even horrifies himself. Once he finds a mountain cave and 
grants himself time and solitude to craft an imaginary sense-world based 
on past experiences, he smells himself and experiences the same feeling of 
uncanny defamiliarization that made his first wet nurse’s flesh creep. Lying 
in his imaginary castle of scent memories, he tries to smell the odoriferous 
trace he himself leaves—and finds nothing: “Virtually drowning in himself, 
he could not for the life of him smell himself! . . . As this became clear to 
him, he gave a scream as dreadful and loud as if he were being burned alive” 
(Süskind 2001, 134). This terror is, finally, what brings him out of the cave, 
where he decides to create his “angel’s scent.” He dimly starts to realize that 
without a personal smell he is not a subject as other people are. (His lack of 
subjectivity helps to explain the unusually strong presence of an expository 
narrative voice in the novel and of voice-over in the film.) Trying to complete 
his angel’s scent, he will incidentally fashion what philosophers might call 
a sort of self—creating subjectivity by composing the proper fragrance to 
mimic it. But Grenouille doesn’t truly think in terms of a self; he sees the 
world in shades of presence and absence, transcendence and revulsion. For 
an illuminating exploration of solipsism and self in Perfume, see Jurich 1996. 
Jurich acknowledges that “Grenouille’s olfactory organ is virtually his only 
self—intellect, feeling, soul” (87). She compares Grenouille to Dracula and 
the child in the horror film The Bad Seed.
The term grotesque was coined to describe the exaggerated figures 
painted on the walls of Roman grottos or caves (Bakhtin 1984, 31–32). It’s 
appropriate, then, that when Grenouille emerges after seven years in his 
cave, he could be the textbook illustration of the term:
He looked awful. His hair reached down to the hollows of his knees, 
his scraggly beard to his navel. His nails were like talons, and the 
skin on his arms and legs, where the rags no longer covered his 
body, was peeling off in shreds.
The first people he met, farmers in a field near the town of Pier-
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refort, ran off screaming at the sight of him. But in the town itself, 
he caused a sensation. By the hundreds people came running to 
gape at him. (138)
His already scarred and misshapen body has become even stranger, allowed 
to grow beyond usual boundaries and social norms: the long hair and nails, 
the peeling skin—no wonder some townspeople say he’s “not really a hu-
man being, but . . . some kind of forest creature” (Süskind 2001, 138). This 
spectacle is alarming, but it is also irresistibly attractive, particularly to 
those used to living in urban centers where norms are constantly defined 
and reinforced.
This creature may seem an unlikely vehicle for supreme experiences 
of beauty, but his lack of personal odor makes him a blank slate on which 
to inscribe new identities. The grotesque body is a creative and destructive 
physical shapelessness, a formless lump of clay tied to both birth and death. 
Bakhtin describes it as “a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, 
never completed; it is continually built, created, and builds and creates 
another body . . . the essential role belongs to those parts of the grotesque 
body in which it outgrows its own self, transgressing its own body, in which 
it conceives a new, second body” (1984, 317). Bakhtin is writing about the 
bowels and phallus here, but the same holds true of Grenouille’s talents. 
In Grenouille’s case, olfactory shapelessness enables evil artistry. With no 
odor of his own, he can easily assume any smell, and thus any identity, he 
himself can create. By applying one mixture or another, he can eventually 
make himself smell like an ordinary, inconspicuous human (Süskind 2001, 
182) or one who inspires sympathy (183)—and, ultimately, like a god who 
might provoke a passionate sexual orgy or a cannibalistic carnival in which he 
himself is destroyed in perverted image of the Catholic Mass. He transcends 
his own bodily limits to create the impression of new bodies.
Only one of the emotional responses expected of the grotesque is a 
kind of benevolent disgust; another is laughter. As Bakhtin has written, 
“The cosmic, social, and bodily elements are given here as an indivisible 
whole. And this whole is gay and gracious” (1984, 19). Grenouille, however, 
is rarely comic; although the narrative voice’s detachment provides the dis-
tance needed to turn tragedy into comedy, the most we achieve is a certain 
irony—amusing, perhaps, and certainly biting, but not “gay and gracious.” 
The recipe for a human odor is grotesque here, and it may provoke a laugh 
or two; but the laughter comes at our own expense, ultimately more disgust-
ing than amusing. The comic elements of grotesquerie get plowed into the 
overall unsettling effects of the uncanny and sublime.
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Fatally Wonderful, Terrifyingly Celestial
The uncanny episode in the cave is actually one of the first intimations that 
Grenouille might reach the sublime, for both experiences feed on fear: in 
one case the fear of something half recognized and not quite right, and in 
the other the overwhelming terror of an encounter with awesome power. As 
the story progresses it peels back layers of sublime experience and explores 
numerous dimensions of the category. Grenouille must pass through that 
uncanny period in the cave before he decides to create perfumes that will 
not merely smell beautiful and create the illusion of humanity, of belonging, 
but also connect with the divine.
Even in the eighteenth century, when the concept of the sublime had 
its heyday, opinions were not unanimous as to what exactly constitutes it. 
Süskind is, moreover, playing here with multiple forms: eighteenth-century 
ideas, particularly influenced by Immanuel Kant, and a somewhat more 
complicated postmodern sense (after all, he is writing in the postmodern 
era). Most theorists agree that the sublime is on a register far above that of 
mere pleasure in beauty. Beauty allows the subject to feel superior, even by 
the act of judging the beauty, but the sublime is humbling. We see that no-
tion in Perfume: The girls who fascinate Grenouille, particularly Laure, are 
beautiful—though their lovely faces and bodies aren’t what attract him. Just 
as Humbert Humbert’s nymphets are otherworldly daemons rather than 
simply pretty little girls (Nabokov 1989, 17), Grenouille’s sublime virgins 
are more than merely good to look at. After he kills the Parisienne, it’s just 
a few hours before “he could no longer recall how the girl . . . had looked, 
not her face, not her body” (Süskind 2001, 44). What he remembers is “the 
best part of her,” her fragrance.
When he smells Laure and recognizes her sublimity, he meditates on 
the sensory confusion that comes from a heavenly odor: “People will be 
overwhelmed, disarmed, helpless before the magic of this girl, and they will 
not know why. And because people are stupid and use their noses only for 
blowing, but believe absolutely anything they see with their eyes, they will 
say it is because this is a girl with beauty and grace and charm. . . . And none 
of them will know that it is truly not how she looks that has captured them, 
not her reputed unblemished external beauty, but solely her incomparable, 
splendid scent!” (Süskind 2001, 171–72). 6 Smell may be primal and therefore 
scarcely considered in contemplations of beauty; but it can also fool the other 
senses, and therein lies some of its otherwordly power.
Beauty is tied to the world, but the sublime elevates the person who 
experiences it. Edmund Burke wrote that we register aesthetic power and 
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“know” objects through their effects on our bodies; aesthetic pleasure then 
arises from, as Frances Ferguson puts it, “the satisfactions that one can have 
in objects as extensions of one’s relations with other human beings” (1992, 
4) Thus for the English theorist the sublime is empirical and tied to social 
relationships. In Germany, Kant took a different stance, arguing that since 
objects lack consciousness, aesthetic experience depends on communication 
with intentionlessness, as found in nature—so his is an asocial, antiempiri-
cal vision: “It must be nature, or be thought of as nature” (Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, quoted in Ferguson 1992, 38)—that is, beyond human control.7
It would seem natural to assume that since Perfume is a German book, 
rooted in the German tradition of pure reason, Kant’s model would be domi-
nant in Süskind; and in fact, given Grenouille’s detachment from the world 
he inhabits, the antiempirical source of sublimity seems the most apparent. 
But it’s important to remember, as Ferguson points out, that while early critics 
saw sublime moments as a chance for the individual to become “a metonymy 
of his culture”—a representative of collective experience—modern critics 
posit the sublime as a moment in which subjectivity can be constructed 
(1992, 38). And, contradictory as it may seem, that is precisely how Süskind 
transforms Grenouille from a grotesque type into (occasionally) a modern 
rational creature: through experience of the irrational sublime.
In the movie the perfumer Baldini describes a fragrance’s potential 
for the sublime. Early in Grenouille’s apprenticeship Baldini tells him that 
most perfumes are made up of twelve notes or essences, though the ancient 
Egyptians believed in a thirteenth note that would “bring out and dominate 
the others.” He tells a story of an amphora in a pharaoh’s tomb that, when 
opened, released a scent “of such subtle beauty and yet such power that for 
one single moment every person on earth believed they were in paradise.” 
In that sample twelve essences were identified, but the thirteenth eluded 
everyone. Although Baldini dismisses the story as a legend, it serves as a 
model for the movie Grenouille’s own masterwork. We thus expect that he 
will slay thirteen girls to make his perfume in addition to the Parisienne 
with the plums.
In the novel Grenouille’s first explicitly acknowledged sublime expe-
riences come in the mountain cave where he lives alone for seven years, 
uncorking imaginary bottles of remembered scents (remember, the novel 
does not use the word sublime to describe his encounter with the plum girl). 
While his first memories are eminently nasty—for example, “the stench 
of raw, meaty skins and tanning broths” or “the collective effluvium of six 
hundred thousand Parisians” (Süskind 2001, 124), he avenges the assault on 
his “patrician nose” with the memory of distilled water. The first time the 
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word sublime is used it comes in a context of highly pleasurable violent rage: 
“Ah! What a sublime moment! [“Ah! Welch sublimer Augenblick!” (Süskind 
1985, 142)]. Grenouille, the little man, quivered with excitement, his body 
writhed with voluptuous delight and arched so high that he slammed his 
head against the roof of the tunnel, only to sink back slowly and lie there 
lolling in satiation. It really was too pleasant, this volcanic act that extin-
guished all obnoxious odors, really too pleasant. . . . It imparted to him the 
wonderful sense of righteous exhaustion that comes after only truly grand 
heroic deeds” (Süskind 2001, 124–25). The orgasmic nature of the experi-
ence needs no comment. Significantly for this discussion of the sublime, 
it combines “voluptuous delight” and pain, an overabundance of pleasure 
and a sense of heroism. Although banging his head against the tunnel roof 
might remind Grenouille of his physical limitations—and thus the boundar-
ies of his own existence—he has an overwhelming physical experience that 
produces a sense of mental and emotional expansion. If this is how he feels 
when rehearsing scents all by himself, imagine what creating new scents for 
an unsuspecting world can make him feel.
When he encounters his next and most sublime virgin, Laure, Grenouille 
is more open to the experience than in Paris, and even more frightened 
because he partially recognizes it. Standing in the streets of Grasse, he 
catches “a fatally wonderful scent,” one that turns him “hot with rapture 
and cold with fear” (Süskind 2001, 169) because “to have found that scent 
in this world once again brought tears of bliss to his eyes—and to know that 
it could not possibly be true frightened him to death” (170): Laure’s aroma 
is not yet ripe, but already it is “terrifyingly celestial” (171). This is a trans-
formative experience with a world beyond nature as he knows it—beyond 
civilization, too; for if finding the scent a second time is impossible, then he 
must be in touch with something beyond the possible. Hence the fear: there 
is something greater at work than Grenouille himself. And hence, too, the 
final inspiration for his angel’s scent.
Up to this point the sublime has been found in nature, particularly the 
girls’ natural smells. As we’ve seen, this is typical of philosophical concep-
tions. Even as he undergoes that sublime experience with Laure, Grenouille 
feels himself capable of dominating it and becoming the “omnipotent god 
of scent” of which he dreamed upon coming down from the mountain 
(Süskind 2001, 155). “No,” he thinks, “he wanted truly to possess the scent 
of this girl behind the wall; to peel it from her like skin and to make her 
scent his own” (172). That is, his original experience may be sublime, but 
he hopes to gain mastery over human souls by breaking his own bliss down 
into the merely beautiful, then rebuilding it as something apparently natural 
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but even better than nature. And in this he succeeds—though not in the 
way he first envisions.
Before Laure, the novelistic Grenouille kills two dozen other virgins of 
Grasse and perfects his technique for acquiring their scent. With all those 
odors blended together in a “diadem of scent” and Laure’s odor “at its sublime 
acme” (Süskind 2001, 193), his careful creation of the one ultimate perfume 
enables him to wield power over human response and even human nature. 
Those who smell this concoction experience it not as a heady artificial scent, 
like the elixirs he makes for Baldini, but as a natural phenomenon, a body 
odor that belongs to him and changes according to emotion and situation. 
He thus composes or “writes” an apparently authentic but actually fictive 
body through his perfume, and those who catch a whiff fall in love. But he 
remains himself, the malevolent, ugly little tick, and ultimately he will want 
to destroy himself as a hateful example of grotesquerie.
With Professional Circumspection, Not Really a Human Being
After leaving the cave Grenouille falls into the hands of the Marquis de La 
Taillade-Espinasse, who fancies himself a scientist and uses Grenouille’s 
spotted and scarred body as an example of a crackpot notion of the cor-
ruptive effects of gases on the body (Süskind 2001, 141). Silly as this idea is, 
and ugly as Grenouille’s body looks, the episode contextualizes a world of 
theory and experiment in which Grenouille’s scientific approach to robbing 
maidens of their scents seems to make some sense. He lives, after all, in the 
Age of Reason, and the rational is (hoped to be) supreme.
His years of apprenticeship have given him a coldly scientific approach 
to distillation, but when Grenouille begins to harvest human scents he has 
another uncanny experience. He takes the sheets of a dead sackmaker and 
performs an enfleurage (impregnating the scent in animal lard), only to 
find “the result was eerie: right under Grenouille’s nose, the sackmaker rose 
olfactorily from the dead” (Süskind 2001, 187). The familiar is again defa-
miliarized, or encountered in an unfamiliar form that is unsettling even to 
the man who produced the effect. But this time the uncanny is the desired 
effect; though Grenouille disposes of the scent he’s captured this time, he 
knows he’s accessed that realm of fear and illusion and is well on his way 
to the sublime.
The murders themselves are “gruesome” (Süskind 2001, 194), partly in 
the attitude of their dispatch. Grenouille has found that a blow to the head 
is the most effective way to kill without tainting maidenly odor with the 
stink of fear. He takes the girls’ hair and their clothes—at this point no one 
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realizes he’s also infusing their body odors—and he seems to have a magical 
ability to enter their homes undetected: “The murderer seemed impalpable, 
incorporeal, like a ghost” (197), and the lack of sexual perversion makes 
him all the more sinister. The townspeople guard their daughters fearfully, 
uselessly. They are relieved when, after twenty-four murders at home, a killer 
is caught in Grenoble.
The situation is, again, somewhat different in the film. As with the early 
plum girl, director Tykwer varies the motivation of some later murders; for 
example, Grenouille kills a prostitute in Grasse spontaneously, because she’s 
been insulting him. He extracts her odor not so much because it’s sublime as 
because it’s there; when he finally stands over Laure (Laura in the movie), he 
hesitates, lowers his arm, meets her gaze with remorse; and the deathblow 
comes offscreen. In Tykwer’s vision, then, he is a more commonly coded and 
understandable criminal—some of those women provoked him. And the 
first two girls who die in Grasse are not virgins but strumpets: that prostitute 
and a flower picker who’s been flirting with a fellow laborer. The well-known 
convention that sexually active girls are prime targets for a villain makes 
some of the movie’s cruelty more palatable and obscures a bit of Süskind’s 
brilliance. Only later will Antoine Richis (Alan Rickman) mention that the 
killer wants not the girls’ virginity but something as yet unknown. And in 
the sexual orgy in Grasse, Tykwer’s Grenouille imagines making love to the 
Parisian plum seller and sheds a wistful tear—something the truly monstrous 
character of the book would never think of doing.
In both movie and novel only Antoine Richis remains vigilant and at-
tempts to spirit his beautiful budding daughter away. “The murderer had 
opened his [Richis’s] eyes,” explains the novel’s narrator, and now he alone 
has a sense of the victims’ specialness and the murderer’s intention: “For 
if one imagined—and so Richis imagined—all the victims not as single 
individuals, but as parts of some higher principle and thought of each one’s 
characteristics as merged in some idealistic fashion into a unifying whole, 
then the picture assembled out of such mosaic pieces would be the picture 
of absolute beauty, and the magic that radiated from it would no longer be 
of human, but of divine origin” (Süskind 2001, 203). That higher principle 
is precisely the sublime of which Kant and Lyotard write; the beauty Richis 
imagines goes beyond earthly and participates in the divine. Thus, in an 
ironic way, Grenouille achieves his first sublime effect: he makes an anxious 
father realize what wonders his daughter offers, gives him intimations of 
the celestial and transcendent, and helps him reach a higher place in his 
own thinking.
To no avail. Antoine and Laure’s flight only prompts Grenouille to act 
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more quickly, and at last the novel’s readers see how Grenouille works—getting 
a glimpse into the rational though still grotesque man of science he has become. 
“With professional circumspection” (Süskind 2001, 214), he prepares a “scent 
diagram” of the body by applying oil to a large linen sheet; after bludgeoning 
Laure’s head, he wraps her in the cloth, cuts off her hair, and takes her clothes. 
Over the course of some hours her scent soaks into the linen, and Grenouille 
removes the cloth and scrapes her skin clean of oil. This is his proudest moment 
to date: “He was, now that he really considered it, a truly blessed individual!” 
and he thanks himself for being who he is (219).
Here Süskind’s Grenouille becomes a horror antihero, a cousin to Han-
nibal Lecter or the sinister gynecologists in David Cronenberg’s Dead Ring-
ers. He has a method; he is calculating; but he is also, by ordinary worldly 
terms, insane. The movie makes this point earlier by showing his first victim 
from Grasse being infused in a giant alembic, Grenouille working casually 
around her. The film character doesn’t express the same grandiose aspirations 
as the novelistic original; in a way, his “scent for scent’s sake” approach may 
produce a more immediate shudder, but it won’t have the lasting repulsive 
effect of that single-minded quest for subjectivity.
Thinking of himself as Grenouille the Great, he is much easier to capture; 
almost as if he is stupid, he doesn’t try to escape arrest and sits quietly in 
jail, looking like “this mediocrity, this miserable nonetity, this cipher”—not 
a murderer at all (Süskind 2001, 227). His character is particularly opaque 
in the novel’s trial scene, as if he has lost all sense of human subjectivity; 
he “received the verdict without emotion” and makes no last wish (229). 
This passivity and opacity are, of course, part of his simple plan. At his own 
scheduled execution he will try out his sublime perfume for the first time.
Pure Liquid, Boundless Fear and Terror
The film begins with the scene of Grenouille’s sentencing, setting up a horror 
to come—an expectation that will be satisfyingly dashed when Grenouille 
pulls out his scent bottle. As the novel describes that would-be execution 
scene, adopting the spectators’ point of view:
And then a miracle occurred. Or something very like a miracle, or 
at least something so incomprehensible, so unprecedented, and so 
unbelievable that everyone who witnessed it would have called it 
a miracle afterwards if they had taken the notion to speak of it at 
all—which was not the case, since afterwards every single one of 
them was ashamed to have had any part in it whatever.
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. . . The man in the blue frock coat who had just climbed out of 
the carriage could not possibly be a murderer. Not that they doubted 
his identity! (Süskind 2001, 235)
This miracle, an apparent manifestation of the divine on earth, renders 
the viewers sublimely speechless, awed and overpowered—exactly what 
Grenouille has been planning. Feelings overcome reason, and the specta-
tors fall in love with him: “and they were unable, unwilling to do anything 
about it. It was like a fit of weeping you cannot fight down, like tears that 
have been held back too long and rise up from deep within you, dissolving 
whatever resists them, liquefying it, and flushing it away. These people were 
now pure liquid, their spirits and minds were melted; nothing was left but 
an amorphous fluid, and all they could feel was their hearts floating and 
sloshing about within them” (236–37). What they are experiencing are the 
by now well-established effects of the sublime, that overwhelming sense of 
something greater than the human phenomenal world.
With little to which to compare this feeling, the townspeople translate 
it into the sexual. If spirits and minds are now liquid, bodies experience the 
same sort of fluidity and boundarilessness—and Grasse undertakes an orgy. 
In short, “They all regarded the man in the blue frock coat as the most hand-
some, attractive, and perfect creature they could imagine. . . . It was as if the 
man had ten thousand invisible hands and had laid a hand on the genitals 
of the ten thousand people surrounding him and fondled them in just the 
way that each of them, whether man or woman, desired in his or her most 
secret fantasies” (Süskind 2001, 238). They begin copulating hysterically, 
“all topsy-turvy” and “infernal” (239).
That orgiastic confusion is, not coincidentally, related to the grotesque 
by way of the carnivalesque, also described by Bakhtin. Old-fashioned folk 
festivals such as Carnival included this element of a world turned upside-
down, all hierarchies erased and a triumph of pleasurable rebirth: “it is a 
special condition of the entire world, of the world’s revival and renewal” 
(1984, 7). In Perfume the scene is bawdy, comic, ridiculous—and poignant. 
It is the outcome of Grenouille’s careful scientific method, brutal crime, 
and divine aspirations: a physically grotesque world brought into being by 
the sublime. As Geoffrey Galt Harpham has written, “Sex dramatizes the 
incongruity of the human: straining for sublimity, we ape the beasts” (1982, 
10). Grenouille has redeemed his own grotesque body and made it a source 
of joy, if not of bliss . . . thereby making others grotesque.
But Grenouille is disappointed. While congratulating himself on becom-
ing “in very truth his own God,” experiencing “the greatest triumph of his 
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life,” he is overcome with terror. This is no sublime terror related to bliss: 
“He was terrified because he could not enjoy one second of it”; although 
he longed to be loved, he now finds he loves no one and takes no pleasure 
in love anyway (Süskind 2001, 240). After all, he can’t help noticing that he 
is not among the writhing, delirious mass of bodies, simply standing over 
them and observing as any deity would. At that moment, he wants to “empty 
himself . . . to be like other people,” but he experiences another uncanny 
encounter with his own odorlessness: “he was filled with boundless fear 
and terror” (241), such that he welcomes Richis, who is approaching to kill 
him. At least then he will be truly participating in the scene, not simply 
causing it. But even Richis falls at Grenouille’s feet and asks for forgiveness 
and permission to adopt his daughter’s murderer (242).
Disgusted with humanity and all too aware of his own power, Grenouille 
realizes he may control people but will never actually know himself: “though 
his perfume might allow him to appear before the world as a god—if he 
could not smell himself and thus never know who he was, to hell with it, 
with the world, with himself, with his perfume.” Even that perfume is mean-
ingless: “The only one who has ever recognized it for its true beauty is me, 
because I created it myself. And at the same time, I’m the only one that it 
cannot enslave. I am the only person for whom it is meaningless” (Süskind 
2001, 252). This is his moment of greatest self-awareness, but he still hasn’t 
achieved the subjectivity he’s been seeking. He can’t transcend his grotesque 
and uncanny body either. This is the tragedy of Grenouille and perhaps of the 
eighteenth-century philosopher and artist: he might encounter the sublime, 
might even reproduce its effects in an artwork that appears to come straight 
from heaven into nature—but he will always be aware of his own limitations, 
and he himself will never communicate directly with the divine.
There is a second orgy scene, in the very brief fourth section of the 
novel; in the film it takes about four minutes. It is a literal carnival, an orgy 
of a different order—even more topsy-turvy, but sinister rather than bawdy, 
motivated by despair rather than joy, and this time Grenouille is bodily in-
volved. Disillusioned with the people of Grasse, Grenouille returns to Paris 
and the people among whom he was born, a pack of desperadoes near Les 
Halles. Here he douses himself with the bottle’s entire contents and “all at 
once” is “bathed in beauty like blazing fire.” If one drop made the citizens of 
Grasse express their joy sexually with each other, emptying the bottle cre-
ates a siren song of scent calling the desperadoes to Grenouille’s doom. The 
thieves, whores, and others first “fell back in awe and pure amazement” but 
are quickly “drawn to this angel of a man. A frenzied, alluring force came 
from him, a riptide no human could have resisted, all the less because no 
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human would have wanted to resist it” (Süskind 2001, 254). Soaked in “angel’s 
scent,” he is literally their angel, and he frees them of inhibition.
This time, however, the throng’s desires are not sexual: “They lunged at 
the angel, pounded on him, threw him to the ground. Each of them wanted 
to touch him, wanted to have a piece of him, a feather, a bit of plumage, 
a spark from that wonderful fire. They tore away his clothes, his hair, his 
skin from his body, they plucked him, they drove their claws and teeth into 
his flesh, they attacked him like hyenas” (Süskind 2001, 254). The imagery 
swoops from heavenly—the angel in his various parts—to the bestial hy-
enas, tearing Grenouille the Great down to the desperadoes’ own savage 
level. In short order they devour him, hacking at his body with cleavers 
and axes, gobbling up his flesh until he’s entirely gone. In a reversal of the 
usual order of progression, the sublime plummets to the grotesque, and a 
particularly shuddersome form that involves cannibalism. All that striving, 
all that wickedly inspired craftsmanship, and he ends on a more hideous 
and horrific note than he began. So much for sublime transcendence and 
aspiration. As in the Catholic Mass, this is the fate of a god: to be consumed 
by his devoted followers.
But in fact to the cannibals themselves there is a sort of redemption here: 
“They were uncommonly proud. For the first time they had done something 
out of love” (Süskind 2001, 255). With these lines, the final ones in the 
book, we return to the root of Grenouille’s own longing and the fulfillment 
of his disappointed hopes. He wanted to be loved; now he is, completely 
and consumingly, even if he still cannot love himself. His own longing for 
the virgins’ scent is echoed in the desperadoes’ longing for him, and crime 
again has braided the grotesque and the sublime together. The one thing 
lacking now is Grenouille; his nascent, ill-formed humanity has completely 
vanished along with his body.
Conclusion: Grotesque Crime, Sublime Art, and a Frenzied, Al-
luring Force
Grenouille’s story—starting with the body born uncanny and made mis-
shapen over time, moving through a crisis of subjectivity and aspiration 
toward the sublime—is at heart the story of many a good horror novel or 
film. Horror works by exciting fear and sometimes pity through the gro-
tesque, then building on that fear to create a sense of the sublime—often by 
destroying a beautiful woman or women along the way. The sublime expe-
rience of the horror reader or viewer may never truly approach the levels 
Grenouille reaches when smelling his virgins (or that the townspeople and 
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desperadoes enjoy during their orgies), but the genre plugs into the same 
sense of transcendence, an evil supernatural force that can transport us out 
of this world into the nebulous beyond.
Taking a cue from Edmund Burke, Lyotard writes that when experienced 
through art, the sublime has a distancing effect for the subject: “Thanks to 
art, the soul is returned to the agitated zone between life and death, and 
this agitation is its health and its life” (1993, 251). Art is supposed to be 
stirring and upsetting; Grenouille’s masterwork is this in spades. And it 
goes beyond beauty to stir the soul in an altogether more disturbing way, 
a way that can involve the ugliness of the grotesque. His crimes make him 
an author of both categories; he becomes “Grenouille the Great,” the god-
like persona he first dreams of in the cave and later assumes in that famous 
orgy scene. But, again, he never truly inhabits the divine; his aspirations 
have been narcissistic all along, aimed at making himself loved rather than 
at uplifting humankind.
To himself, such an artist can embody only the more ugly, perhaps 
laughable, aspects of the grotesque. His spirit now hovers between death 
(of his own body) and life (of the people who have consumed him), and 
he will never find that sublime bliss. In the end Grenouille’s horror and his 
tragedy lie in being unable to experience his own creation as transcendently 
as others can. In trying to build up a self, he has lost the ability to appreciate 
his creation.
Notes
1. One exception here is the character Madame Gaillard, who has no sense of smell 
left (Süskind 2001, 22) and is therefore willing to raise him with her other foundlings. 
That lack partly explains why she alone of all Grenouille’s hosts manages to live to old 
age: If she can’t perceive Grenouille’s lack of odor she can’t be unsettled by it, and thus 
she will never inscribe him into history. She is narratively safe.
2. As the movie Grenouille (more articulate than the one in the novel) tells Baldini, 
he knows “all the smells in the world”; he has the “best nose in Paris.” Tykwer paves the 
way for this assertion by showing Baldini (Dustin Hoffman) sniffing at a rival perfumer’s 
most successful scent through his own prominent proboscis; he is completely unable 
to pick out the ingredients that Grenouille can assemble in a hasty rummage through 
Baldini’s storeroom.
3. Elizabeth Guilhamon’s otherwise helpful article “La caution du grotesque” 
maintains that Süskind uses the term only once, and later on (“Dieser Gedanke war 
natürlich von geradezu grotesker Unbescheidenheit” [1995, 209]). The article is none-
theless a useful overview of grotesque theorization and Süskind’s use of under- and 
overstatement.
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4. For a definition see especially Freud 2004, 74–76. In his odorlessness Grenouille 
is like the strange wooden doll Coppelia, who seems human in many ways but disturbs 
the viewer with subtle signs that she’s an automaton. For a discussion of the uncanny 
in Perfume with a slightly different approach, see Woolley 2007. 
5. The filmmakers don’t show Grenouille’s awareness of evil as explicitly—the nature 
of the medium and marketplace requires some sympathy for the main character—so 
they imply that if Grenouille is bad it is partly due to circumstances. The novel is less 
easy on its protagonist, and thus may come off as more disturbing.
6. Kant locates a certain type of the sublime in relations between the sexes: “A woman 
in whom the agreeableness beseeming her sex particularly makes manifest the moral 
expression of the sublime is called beautiful in the proper sense” (1991, 87)—that is, 
female beauty depends on embodying the sublime on earth. Kant also opposes sublime 
beauty and merely charming beauty, a distinction that Süskind plays with here.
7. For a deeper discussion of both philosophers’ stance on nature and the sublime, 
see Ferguson 1992, especially 70–73. Kant, for example, thought that in order to be 
sublime in itself, a painting had to depict a sublime landscape.
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Shock Value
Robert F. Gross
There is no more a method for learning than a method for 
finding treasures.
—Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
The prospect of writing an essay on Narrow Rooms and the works of Félix 
Guattari and Gilles Deleuze is both inviting and challenging. Inviting, be-
cause this dynamic duo of French philosophy often investigated artworks 
as an important part of their philosophizing—the fictions of Franz Kafka, 
the music of Robert Schumann, the paintings of J. M. W. Turner, and the 
horror film Willard, to name only a few. Works of art, they asserted, had the 
power to challenge and break up deadening assumptions and habits not only 
of daily living but of philosophy as well. Great writers create “new forms of 
expression, new ways of thinking, and an entirely original language.”1
Challenging, because Deleuze and Guattari were quite explicit about 
how art should not be used in philosophy. Art, they argued, should not 
simply be used to furnish examples that illustrated preexisting philosophical 
concepts. If I wrote an essay that used Narrow Rooms to explain Deleuze 
and Guattrai’s concept of “de-territorialization,” I would be paying them the 
compliment of showing admiration for the concepts they developed, but I 
would be completely betraying their idea of what philosophy is all about. 
For them, philosophy is meant to venture into the realm of the unthought, 
to force us out of comfortable and lazy reassertions and into the construc-
tion of new connections and concepts.
Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari rejected the widespread intellectual 
habit of “interpreting” works of art, which they dubbed “interpretosis.” 
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The interpreter forces the artifact into the Procrustean bed of a preexisting 
system, whether Marxist (“It about class conflict”), Freudian (“It’s about 
Mommy, Daddy, and me”), or any number of other critical schools. Inter-
pretosis reduces the teeming, varied, “molecular” movements found in the 
work to simple “molar” oppositions—proletariat vs. bourgeois, mother vs. 
father, male vs. female, human vs. nonhuman, good vs. evil, and so forth. 
The goal of philosophy, science, and art is not to reduce experiences to mere 
oppositions but to render experience more complex, opening up new and 
vital possibilities for us. “Experiment, never interpret,” urges Deleuze.2 So to 
approach James Purdy’s novel à la Deleuze and Guattari is to avail ourselves 
of the tools that they devised but also to accept the joyous challenge of real-
izing that we are not working within a closed system of thought but are using 
tools that open up on the world and lead to innovation and construction. 
Deleuze once said that he would like to teach a course the way Bob Dylan 
sang a song, with room for playfulness, clowning, and improvisation. For 
him and Guattari, learning was not learning to mimic but learning how to 
generate something new: “We learn nothing from those who say: ‘Do as I 
do.’ Our only teachers are those who tell us to ‘do with me,’ and are able to 
emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures 
for us to reproduce.” Thought begins not with a preestablished method but 
with an encounter: “Something in the world forces us to think.”3 In this case 
the encounters are multiple: I encounter the writings of Deleuze and Guat-
tari, and I encounter Narrow Rooms, with each forcing me to think. You, in 
turn, encounter my essay here as well as, I hope, encountering the writings 
of Deleuze, Guattari, and Purdy for yourself. No encounter should close in 
on itself—it should proliferate, leading to ever-new connections.
But when I say “I” encounter the work, I misrepresent the encounter, 
because Deleuze and Guattari see each of us as a multiplicity. I am not only 
an assemblage of fairly obvious roles and identifications (male, gay, U.S. 
citizen, Euro-American, son, teacher, scholar . . . ) but a myriad of fugitive 
impulses, many of which may go unnamed or unidentified by me. The at-
tractions and aversions that arise one moment, only to vanish the next, as 
I walk down the street reacting to weather, facades, passersby, and ads, are 
evidence that I am a creature far more various than the self-descriptors I 
just listed in parentheses. Not only do art and philosophy help me be aware 
of these molecular movements of multiplicity, they foster new ones as well, 
and that—for Deleuze and Guattari—is all for the best. Each one of us is a 
multiplicity, and so is the work of art.
The concept of multiplicity provides a very useful tool for revealing the 
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brilliance of Narrow Rooms. While working in a genre that often achieves 
its effects and insights through strong and simple molar oppositions, Purdy 
complicates matters by presenting characters who are not confined to being 
opposed entities but who are caught up in complex becomings that reveal 
their multiplicities. In doing this he questions common ethical presupposi-
tions in both the horror genre and our society and challenges us to come to 
a deeper understanding of both horror and love.
Narrow Rooms: A Summary
Before going any further, it may be useful for me to provide a quick summary 
of the novel to clarify the discussion that will follow. I warn you, however, 
that it is impossible for any précis to do justice to this knotty, complicated, 
and elliptical work, with its leaps back and forth in time, shifting points of 
view, deeply ambivalent character relationships, and multiple revisions of 
motivation as the story unfolds. Here goes:
Sid and Roy had shared an intense and conflicted relationship since ado-
lescence. Roy grew up on the wrong side of the tracks and was obsessed with 
the star athlete, who came from one of the town’s oldest and most respected 
families. Roy would do anything for Sid, and the two shared secret sexual 
encounters, but Sid kept Roy at arm’s length in public, going so far as to slap 
him on graduation night when Roy demanded too much attention from him 
in public. Overcome with humiliation and rage, Roy used sex and drugs to 
gain a hold over the beautiful and patrician Brian, got Brian to seduce Sid, 
and set off a tumultuous affair that climaxed in Sid shooting Brian, an act 
that resulted in a three-year sentence for manslaughter.
When Sid returns from prison (and the novel begins), he gets a job as 
caretaker with the mysterious young invalid Gareth—another past lover of 
Brian’s and victim of Roy’s—and the two young men are soon involved in an 
intense sexual relationship. But Roy is still consumed with his plans for revenge 
on Sid, and Sid increasingly feels that Roy controls his destiny. After Roy rapes 
Gareth on Brian’s grave one night and challenges the dead man to intervene 
in the unfolding revenge plot, Brian appears and commands Roy to have Sid 
crucify him on the barn door before Brian’s dead eyes. When Sid arrives at 
Roy’s, ready to submit to the man who has shaped his life, Roy reveals Brian’s 
command and Sid acquiesces. Realizing that Sid had always loved Roy most, 
Gareth is outraged, driven to a jealous frenzy at the sight of his lover’s and rival’s 
tender lovemaking. When the police show up on the trail of Brian’s corpse, 
Gareth provokes a shoot-out that proves fatal for him, Roy, and Sid.
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Issues of Multiplicity: Resisting Binaries
As an example of this multiplicity at work in Narrow Rooms, let us look at a 
single character. Purdy has given him the name “Roy Sturtevant,” but he is 
constructed out of a variety of heterogeneous descriptors. He is: renderer, 
scissors-grinder, Leatherstocking, valedictorian, booger, tormentor, pris-
oner, nailed man, coach, sweetheart, husband. Purdy further complicates 
our understanding of this “Roy-assemblage” through his similes: Roy as 
virtuoso violinist, angel, Indian, Roman statue, pacemaker, shark, and so 
on. Not only does each descriptor resonate differently in me as I encounter 
it, but a single descriptor can elicit a multiplicity of responses. One of the 
sobriquets most commonly applied to Roy is that of the “renderer,” taken 
from his ancestor’s occupation of boiling the carcasses of animals to render 
up fat. The image of Roy as renderer is linked to feelings of revulsion, fear, 
morbid fascination, and a masochistic desire to submit, but it is further 
complicated by Purdy’s reminding us that the renderer’s fat can be used to 
make soap. What at first summons up negative associations is made to carry 
positive associations as well; the renderer not only destroys but transforms 
and purifies. No one element of this assemblage effaces or subsumes the 
rest: Purdy challenges us to think of the complexity of renderer alongside 
that of valedictorian, angel, and nailed man. For an artist does not simply 
adopt a universal vision of human nature but constructs new images, some 
that may move outside what is commonly accepted as “human,” such as 
the angel, shark, and pacemaker. The experience of encountering Narrow 
Rooms is different from that of encountering Pride and Prejudice or Crime 
and Punishment in part because Purdy constructs Jane Austen or Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky. He repeatedly makes violent connections that link oppos-
ing values: the civilized and the savage, the bestial and the spiritual, the 
destructive and the nurturing. The connections have the power to shock 
us into thought. For the “shock value” of Narrow Rooms lies less in the os-
tentatiously transgressive behavior of its characters (drug abuse, anal rape, 
illegal exhumation, self-laceration, crucifixion, and murder) than in the 
connections made between acts that are commonly held to be vicious and 
qualities commonly held to be virtues.
Even the cursory overview of the plot given above shows how Purdy’s 
treatment of love here is distinctive. He does not separate the oppositions 
but weaves them together inextricably. To appreciate this achievement we 
can begin by contrasting it to an easily imagined schematic of a horror nar-
rative at its most clichéd. Take a young, white, middle-class, heterosexual 
couple—the Lovers—and have them menaced by an Unspeakable Monster, 
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which is eventually vanquished by Stalwart Male (Menaced Female may 
prove to be plucky but is more inclined to scream). The Lovers embrace. End 
of narrative. Here the oppositions are molar: Normalcy (configured as white, 
middle-class, and appropriately gendered in its behavior) vs. Monstrosity 
(which is none of those things). Love and the Human are kept clearly on one 
side of the dichotomy, Death and the Monstrous on the other. Nothing here 
forces us to think: clichéd oppositions structure the entire narrative.
Deleuze and Guattari challenge the notion that the artist creates out of 
a void. Rather, creation takes place against a thick expanse of clichés that 
suffuse the culture and threaten to subdue the artist from the start: “The 
painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer 
write on the blank page: but the page or canvas is already so covered with 
preexisiting, preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to flat-
ten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings 
in the vision.”4 Narrow Rooms escapes the cliché of lovers vs. monster by 
combining the scenes of greatest horror with the most intense experience 
of intimacy between the lovers. Sid submits to the Renderer, only to learn 
that the terms of his submission are that he nail his master to the barn door 
and remove the nails at dawn, after having brought the corpse of Brian to 
witness the deed. Sid’s “passive” act of submission consists of playing the 
“active” role of torturer to the “passive” Roy. The oppositions are totally con-
founded. The prospect of this horrific act reduces Sid to tears, vomiting, and 
a blood-curdling wail, but when the moment to act arrives he is astonished 
to discover how easy it is and soon finds himself reveling in the task: “Hav-
ing put in the first nail he wanted to put in more, he had wanted as a matter 
of fact to cover entirely the scissors-grinder’s body with nails so numerous 
that he would look like he was clothed in an iron suit composed of shiny 
little silver heads.”5 This surrealistic image, in which the bloody, vulnerable 
body is transformed (into armor? into an idol? a fetish figure?), gives us a 
Sid who is so at one with the command he has been given that he envisions 
himself surpassing the possible by fulfilling beyond the nth degree. It is in 
this moment of delirious, hyperbolic submission, in which the boundaries 
between master and slave disappear, that Sid first realizes that he loves Roy 
in the same way that he loved his high school diving coach, “who had also 
commanded him to accomplish the impossible” (157). Sid and Roy both 
submit fully to each other and to the command of Brian McFee, “whom 
they had both loved equally” (158).
Purdy multiplies the connections: tormentor to nailed man to lover to 
coach. The “horrifying” image of a naked man nailed to a barn door con-
nects to the clean-cut, “All-American” image of a high school diver and his 
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coach working together to surpass limitations. The connection renders the 
wholesome cliché unfamiliar and dangerous, investing it with male/male 
eros, sexualized submissiveness, and transgressive ambition. “Accomplishing 
the impossible” is suddenly no longer a lazy and thoughtless exaggeration 
of coach-talk from the sports world but an image revealed in all its vital 
extremity, existing simultaneously at the respectable core of American mas-
culinity and beyond the pale. The insight is not unfamiliar to any reader of 
Deleuze and Guattari, for whom societies are not hermetically sealed, with 
clear divisions into inside and out. They are constantly springing leaks and 
generating lines of flight that confuse molarity.
Molecular Sexualities, Dangerous Becomings
Just as Purdy undermines the simple dichotomies that can structure the 
least thought-provoking examples of horror narrative, he also undermines, 
years before their appearance, the oppositions of the most sentimental 
variety of gay fiction. Instead of making his male “lovers” two men whose 
tender and totally unobjectionable affection for each other runs up against 
the heterosexist and homophobic structures of society, whether external or 
internalized (Brokeback Mountain, anyone?) and thus reiterating the molar 
oppositions of straight society, Purdy situates his novel on the fringes of 
that society. Unfolding primarily in a wilderness of cemeteries, decaying 
mansions, and deserted fields, Purdy’s work does not focus on whether 
his characters are socially acceptable to the mainstream or not. Instead he 
focuses on the powerful and complex impulses that can be released through 
male/male eros.
Narrow Rooms subverts our casual, unthinking certainty that the ef-
facement of boundaries in romantic love is necessarily distinct from the 
effacement of boundaries in monstrosity. Is there something perilous and 
potentially horrifying in the intensity that tramples down the boundaries 
between lovers, and is it perhaps, despite all our protestations, precisely what 
both lures us into and frightens us about intimacy? Does the feared-and- 
desired collapse release an experience of the chaos that underlies the tidy 
molar oppositions of sentimental romance, regardless of sexual orientation? 
Indeed, does the term “sexual orientation” reverberate as faintly oxymoronic, 
when the delirious movements of the sexual can be profoundly disorienting?
Sid recollects a sexual encounter he had with Roy in the shower of their 
high school locker room. It was so intense and violently disorienting that 
he hurled Roy to the floor, kicked him, and fled into the crowded school 
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corridor, naked. He recalls:“I thought he would pull my guts and soul out of 
me he pulled so hard. I felt my cock had been swallowed by a shark. The pain 
and pleasure, confound him, was too much” (91). The clichés of Freudian 
interpretosis would quickly substitute “castration” for shark, and soon Sid’s 
panic would be diagnosed as castration anxiety from a vagina dentate, which 
has been displaced onto a male mouth, which is displaced onto a shark. The 
gay critic would be quick to reduce Sid’s panic to internalized homophobia. 
A Deleuzean reading, however, would begin not by asking “What does it 
mean?” but “What does it do?” The event moves a male oral sex act into an 
encounter with a zone of oral/phallic intensity that is “becoming-shark.” 
What clichéd thought would oppose as pleasurable (sex) and horrible (shark 
attack) is conflated and offers a complete evacuation of Sid’s self—guts and 
soul—in becoming-shark.
Deleuze and Guattari are drawn to the becoming-animal as a way of 
challenging the anthropocentric limitations of humanism. The werewolf, the 
vampire, the animals of Kafka, the epic becoming-whale of Captain Ahab in 
Moby Dick: each provides the opportunity of a challenging encounter with 
the animal rather than the sentimental domestication of animals to corral 
them within the limitations of the human. Prior to the triumph of Western 
humanism, in which Man became the measure of all things, the sexual was 
frequently figured as the animal. Think of Ovid’s Metamorphoses: Jupiter’s 
becoming-swan, Io’s becoming-cow, Actaeon’s becoming-stag . . . These 
myths retain their vitality through the Italian Renaissance paintings of Titian, 
Tintoretto, and Veronese, and even make a comic appearance in Bottom’s 
becoming-ass in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Since then, thinking about 
“human sexuality” (a revealing term) has tended to keep it safely confined 
to the limits of the human. Narrow Rooms traces what Deleuze and Guattari 
call “lines of flight” from that. The young men not only become-shark, they 
become-horse, become-forest-animal, become-cat, become-insect. While a 
moralizing, hierarchical interpretation might use these images to argue that 
the characters, in their life of drugs, sex, and violence, are “no better than 
animals,” a Deleuzean reading sees these becomings as openings up to the 
possibilities of life beyond the so-called human.
While it lasts the saluchian blow job offers the possibility of Sid not 
being Sid—of not even being anyone. What if, Purdy suggests, sexuality is 
not constituitive of individual identity but profoundly disintegrative of it? 
Sid does not flee becoming-shark until after he has reached orgasm. The 
becoming of the sex act is totally consuming. It is only in the moment after 
that Roy returns to Roy and the panic and revulsion become violence and 
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flight. A flight that carries its chaos out into the society . . . the football hero 
launched into the school corridors, delirious and buck-naked.
Purdy swiftly draws the curtain on what ensues.
Concepts of Philosophy, Sensations of Art
The moment of becoming-shark provides an excellent example of how 
Deleuze and Guattari view the workings of art. They define the task of phi-
losophy as the construction of concepts; the task of art, the construction of 
sensations, which include percepts and affects. The division is not absolute, 
of course, although it is useful. The dialogues of Plato contain many artistic 
qualities; the plays of Tom Stoppard have many conceptual discussions. 
“Percepts” are sensations of perceptual material, but liberated from any 
individual perceiver. In literature we can encounter percepts without them 
being grounded in the perceptions of any individual character, thus attaining 
an impersonality. Consider the opening lines of Narrow Rooms:
 the human embryo is curled up in a ball with the nostrils placed 
between the two knees.
At death the pupil opens wide. (1)
We encounter these two percepts without their being grounded in space or 
time. We have no character to whom we can ascribe them as their author, 
reader, or thinker. Human life is bracketed by two totally impersonal images: 
one prenatal and closed in upon itself; the other, at the moment of death, 
expansive. Life is posed between contraction and expansion, but what, fi-
nally, does the pupil open onto? Is the openness of vision a function of the 
end of vision, of nothingness? No character will quote or expatiate upon 
these opening lines. We may consider them differently after having read the 
entire novel and noted Sid’s description of Roy as the “coach” and he as the 
“pupil”: is life a process of overcoming constriction, whose completion is 
found at life’s end? Are we to link this openness to Dr. Ulric’s contemplation 
of Gareth’s mother, Irene, as she enters the hospital room of her dying son, 
having “gone beyond grief into some other chamber that is reserved for those 
who have lost all hope, all hint of promise or benediction, and who have 
found a calm, if not a peace, in the acceptance of nothing” (190)?
This eloquent description is an example of what Deleuze and Guattari 
would call an “affect.” It goes beyond simply stating what Irene may be feeling 
to the evocation of a feeling state that can be contemplated independently 
of her. The slow, measured tempo of the passage, the balance established 
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between “lost” and “found,” leading us to the final koanlike presentation 
of “the acceptance of nothing,” all contribute to the solemn, almost sacred 
tonality of this affect. Purdy avoids using the conceptual term “nothingness,” 
which would have given the sentence a slightly existentialist cast, preferring 
the more tense and ambiguous juxtaposition of “acceptance” with “nothing.” 
For if I said in a casual conversation, “She accepts nothing,” I would acknowl-
edge “She doesn’t accept anything” as an accurate paraphrase of what I had 
just said, but I would not acknowledge it as an accurate paraphrase of “She 
accepts nothingness.” Purdy’s “acceptance of nothing” hovers between the 
two statements without being resolved into either. Purdy presents the act 
of acceptance from that other chamber beyond grief to us with the comfort 
neither of total understanding nor of character identification to anchor 
to it. Purdy invites us, like Dr. Ulric, to contemplate this state without the 
facile pleasure of identification: we cannot have the sentimental pleasure of 
claiming we “feel her pain.”
For a Deleuzean understanding of literature and film has nothing to do 
with the widespread belief that these arts make us better people by broaden-
ing our understanding of others through acts of identification. Identifica-
tions reduce multiplicities, encouraging us to see the world through a single 
set of eyes, usually one who flatters our vanity (the brave hero, the alluring 
heroine). By riveting ourselves to a single, fixed identity, our perception of 
molecularity dwindles down to clichés. We are better off engaging the text, 
moment to moment, in all its molecular becomings. Purdy helps us do this by 
discouraging a simple, vicarious identification with any individual character. 
He shifts from one set of thoughts to another, from dialogue and monologue 
to impersonal descriptions of nature. The experience of the novel refuses 
to be reduced to a single point of view—it is a world in flux. Similarly, for 
Deleuze and Guattari nothing is fixed; life is experienced through encounters 
of varying intensities. Two bodies, a barn door, a hammer and nails. Out of 
that, connections are made; events take place. he—to nail—blood—to 
spurt—force—to drive—he—to nail.
Through this charting of events, we see that Sid is not only acting but 
acted upon. He is driving nails but is also “driven by some force unknown 
to him” (156). Not an act of pure volition nor the result of hypnotic sugges-
tion, a traumatic childhood, or a neurosis, the event of driving drives nails, 
blood, Sid himself, with all the impersonality of an infinitive verb. Deleuze 
and Purdy concur in not domesticating events to the mere confines of our 
selves. Our passions, loves, and even our deaths do not merely come from 
within us, they come to us from without as well, with a sometimes horrifying 
impersonality. How else do we feel the fatality of Tristan and Isolde drink-
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ing the love potion, or Macbeth encountering the witches? So too, here: the 
event cuts across boundaries, impersonal.
Impersonal, too, is the horror of the scene. Where does it reside? Purdy 
does not describe Roy’s feelings as he is being nailed to the barn door, and 
Sid’s sense of horror at the deed vanishes as he begins to execute it. The hor-
ror of the event exists independently of the thoughts of either character. It 
even exists independently of interjections on the part of the narrator. (“But, 
dare I describe the horror of the scene? What fiend so possessed them?”) 
Indeed, affect of horror is intensified by the fact that the characters do not 
experience it. Horror, in Narrow Rooms, is something that we experience 
and move beyond, not vanquish. We as readers still experience horror as Sid 
leaves it behind, moving through exhilaration to love. By the final pages of 
the novel, Roy’s body, emaciated, scarred from strokes with a straight razor 
and bleeding from his nail wounds, does not horrify Sid, who washes him, 
caresses him, and sucks on his penis.
The love that lies beyond the horror shows itself to be even more imper-
sonal than the horror. Sid realizes that this love is not simply focused on Roy, 
or on his identification of Roy with the Renderer or Scissors-Grinder. It is a 
love that is one with a night of savage sex with a multiple murderer one night 
in the prison shower years ago, and carries him back eons to an “‘eternal’ 
lover, or husband, or sweetheart” (179). To be true to love in this novel is not 
to be true to beauty, brains, patience, or any of the “good points” that might 
render someone lovable in our common cultural understanding. It is not 
even to be true to a discrete individual. It is to be true to an impersonal eros 
beyond revulsion or horror. The emptying-out of self that had so transfixed 
Sid in the shower with Roy and horrified him afterward triumphs.
Deleuze and Guattari rejected the widespread understanding of love as 
merely a bond between two people. “What a depressing idea of love,” wrote 
Deleuze, “to make it a relation between two people, whose monotony must 
be vanquished as required by adding other people.”6 The intensity of love 
in Narrow Rooms spawns multiplicities: Roy sends Brian to Sid in his place; 
Brian takes to Gareth after his rejection by Sid; Roy reinstates Sid in Gareth’s 
bed. None of these moves cancel out the intensity—rather, they augment it. 
Ungenerous actions, on the other hand, usually spring from an inability to 
overcome a sense of self, and manifest themselves in acts of possessiveness, 
as though love carried with it a proprietary interest. When Irene fires Sid 
as Gareth’s caretaker because she finds the two of them in “almost uncon-
scious bliss” as they enjoy oral sex together, she is sufficiently self-aware to 
know that her reaction is fueled by “jealousy and envy” (57). She persists 
in dismissing Sid, however, even though she knows her son has improved 
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under Sid’s care. Similarly, Gareth’s possessiveness leads him to be “sickened 
and thrilled” (181) by the sight of his lover and rival in each other’s arms. 
Pride, usually in the form of social snobbishness, creates barriers that would 
prevent encounters. Sid’s brother Vance is revolted by the thought that his 
brother has taken a job that requires him to look after Gareth’s most intimate 
needs, finding it a humiliation. Gareth, in turn, is disgusted by Sid’s attrac-
tion to a social pariah like Roy. Sid’s growth throughout the novel is a result 
of his profound humility, his belief that there is nothing beneath him after 
his experience in prison. In Deleuzean terms, possessiveness and pride are 
“blocks” to the novel’s intense “flows.”
Ultimately, the intensity of these flows is so great that it ruptures its 
social confines and becomes an international media event. What we had 
been imagining as an isolated event in a rural backwater is broadcasted to 
the radios of the town and soon to television sets “all over the world” (185). 
From the little we learn of this transmission, it is clear that the report is not 
altogether accurate; the role of Brian, for instance, has been lost in the tell-
ing. But although it is distorted, it cannot be silenced. It blasts through any 
remnant of the closet, momentarily breaking down oppositions of center 
and margin, public and private, insider and outsider. With the speed and 
delirium of Sid bolting naked from the locker room, the story of Roy and 
Sid streaks through the world independently of them in an event that will 
prompt, in turn, new encounters and multiplicities.
The Joy and Horror of Becomings
The flows of intensities in the novel are generated, first and foremost, 
through encounters with Roy. A social outcast as far as the old families of 
Revolutionary War stock are concerned, he bears the stigma of being the 
descendant of a renderer. His body is gaunt, his hands are covered with cuts, 
his nails are black, and he has not taken a bath in a decade. When he finally 
does bathe, the bath water becomes brown with mud and dead vegetation. 
Drugs and sex flow through him, as do feelings of humiliation and rage. His 
body has become a vehicle of memory. He has scarred his face where Sid 
struck it, and he lacerates his body at the places that have enjoyed contact 
with Sid’s body. Roy is the locus of horror, both in his treatment of himself 
and others, and yet he is also the bearer of gifts, including marijuana, sexual 
pleasure, and dolls.
A Marxist critic in the throes of interpretosis could easily construe the 
novel as a tract on class conflict of molar identities, with the decadent rural 
aristocracy, trapped in their vast, decaying mansions filled with heirlooms 
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and outsize furniture, falling under the erotic and financial control of the 
scarred yet hypervirile Worker. But if we ask what this interclass eros does 
instead of what it means, we can contemplate Worker becoming-aristocrat, 
Landowner becoming-slave. The becomings are not symmetrical but release 
molecular flows. Landowners hold onto patrician markings even as they 
submit; the Worker may be becoming-Landowner but holds onto his mar-
ginality. The erotic creates new forms of intensity, mutations across class lines 
that call the very lines into question. Roy cuts his face with a razor where 
it was slapped—Sid emerges from jail with his body scarred from razor 
cuts—Roy takes a razor to himself. Roy, Sid, and Irene all grow thinner as 
the novel progresses, as if an impersonal leanness cuts across assemblages, 
rendering the fat off their bones.
Becoming-rendered, the event that elicits the greatest horror both in 
readers and characters, becomes the most desired of all becomings. What is 
the violence that the achievement of impersonality requires? Possible con-
nections beyond the limits of the book present themselves: to the practices 
of medieval flagellants, the sufferings of courtly lovers, and the private rituals 
of anorexia and cutting in contemporary society.
Narrow Rooms situates horror at the core of all its becomings. Does not 
any becoming worthy of the name elicit some fear of loss or dissolution that 
must be confronted? For Purdy, horror is not to be vanquished or evaded 
but embraced. While horror is often configured or understood in our culture 
as an impulse that turns us away from encounters, Purdy constructs an ac-
ceptance of horror as an expansion of our possibilities.
In this acceptance Purdy reveals a striking similarity to Deleuze and 
Guattari, who admired the philosophies of Spinoza, Nietzsche, and the Sto-
ics, all thinkers who urged a fundamentally joyful acceptance of whatever 
may befall us. This affirmative stance of amor fati strengthens our ability 
to live creatively, open to encounters and experiments. The pseudo-tragic 
attitudes that stress loss, absence, mourning, and melancholia, on the other 
hand, reduce our capacity for living. For Deleuze and Guattari, all art worthy 
of the name opens us up to the possibilities of life. One of the advantages 
of art, they observed, is that it can give us the insights of the drug addict 
without our taking drugs ourselves, the perceptions of the schizophrenic 
without suffering from schizophrenia.
From this Deleuzean point of view, the art of horror contains joy, an 
expanded sense of encountering and contemplating the extremities of fear 
and revulsion: “Yes, the essence of art is a kind of joy, and this is the very 
point of art. There can be no tragic work because there is a necessary joy 
in creation: art is necessarily a liberation that explodes everything, first 
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and foremost the tragic. No, there is no unhappy creation, it is always a vis 
comica.”7 The joy of constructing and linking sensations goes beyond the 
emotions of any of the characters in Narrow Rooms or any sense of loss or 
horror we may feel at their violent deaths. The creation of art transcends 
the horror of its subject matter.
As Irene holds Gareth, whose face is described as at once  “handsome” 
and “nothing but rivulets of blood” (191), her eyes seem opened wide and 
able to take in both beauty and horror, and Purdy invites us to do the same 
as his novel reaches its conclusion. As imaginative inhabitants of that other 
chamber, perhaps we overcome the revulsion inherent in horror by not 
denying it. Narrow Rooms both evokes horror and challenges us to deepen 
our understanding of its profundity and importance.
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Making Monsters
Ann C. Hall
Philosophical inquiries. Bride of Frankenstein. Son of Frankenstein. Ab-
bott and Costello Meet Frankensein. FrankenBerry breakfast cereal. Mary 
Shelley’s novel Frankenstein has bred a number of offspring, and some, like 
her monstrous character, are far from perfect. And while some are imperfect, 
misshapen creatures, it is difficult to ignore the novel’s focus on reproduction 
as well as its tendency to spawn offspring. The novel is so fecund for many 
reasons. A cynic might conclude that there are so many interpretations, so 
many versions, because there is so much money to be made, so many careers 
to be crafted, that anything really goes.  
But a careful reader will notice immediately that despite the differences 
of critical opinion, the novel highlights the perils of reproduction by its am-
biguous presentation of the creator and the monster. There is, for example, 
equally compelling evidence to suggest that (1) the novel sympathizes with 
Victor; (2) the novel sympathizes with his creation; (3) the novel does not 
sympathize with either; and (4) the novel sympathizes with both. 
Add to this interpretive maelstrom those who use biographical details 
to interpret the text, and we have further difficulties.1 Such readers use re-
production to interpret this novel of reproduction, seeking to understand 
the work through its conception, both emotional and intellectual. Evidence 
abounds for biographical interpretation. Mary Shelley’s tortured relation-
ship with her father, William Godwin; the death of her extremely talented 
mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, in childbirth; the difficulties Mary Shelley had 
conceiving children and bringing them to term, losing many babies before 
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their birth or shortly thereafter. And then there is the issue of the intellectual 
influences that helped her to conceive the monstrous story: Plato, Rousseau, 
Godwin, and her mother’s feminist philosophies.2 To carry the reproductive 
metaphor regarding the critical reception of the novel further, Frankenstein 
has helped to spawn the feminist literary criticism movement, as some 
critics have used the novel to demonstrate the power of female writers and 
female interpretation.3 
Clearly, the critical climate mimics the reproductive anxiety that ter-
rorizes the pages of the novel and two of its more popular offspring, the 
1931 Universal film and its sequel, The Bride of Frankenstein (1935). In the 
novel, the two films, and the scholarship, reproduction represents anxiety 
rather than the usual stereotypical responses: love, joy, new life. Examining 
the novel and the two Universal films through the work of philosopher/psy-
choanalyst Luce Irigaray, it is clear that these anxieties are not limited to 
Shelley’s life and personal matters. Instead, there is a cultural anxiety over 
reproduction, one that stems from the role of women in a patriarchal culture 
and, ironically, their role in reproduction.
One of the strengths of the work of Luce Irigaray is that she questioned 
the history of philosophy in her work Speculum of the Other Woman from 
a feminist perspective, arguing, in general terms, that representation itself 
in philosophy and in art reflects a desire to return to the womb, a desire to 
re-present reproduction for men in particular. In Speculum she interrogates 
the philosophical principles that are the foundation of the Western tradition 
and modern social constructions of self, gender, and identity. Her project is 
similar to Virginia Woolf ’s interrogation of the British Library and the study 
of literature in A Room of One’s Own; Irigaray interrupts the seamless nature 
of Western philosophical inquiry, inserting a feminist perspective—essen-
tially, she is like a precocious student in a history of philosophy lecture asking 
the questions no one wants to hear, let alone answer. Taking the speculum, 
a culturally defined female instrument, she enters the world of philosophy 
beginning with modern times and ending in Plato’s cave, the ultimate womb 
for Western culture. And through her travels, journeys, and investigations, 
she demonstrates that the speculum, the female tool, will not reflect, will not 
re-present, partriachy and its own desires to return to the womb.
The speculum, the mirror, serves as a metaphor for the place of the 
feminine in patriarchy, and through her journey to the center of philosophy, 
Irigaray concludes that the mirror will not reflect. It will not, once again 
borrowing from Virginia Woolf ’s A Room of One’s Own, reflect the image 
of man at twice his natural size (1957, 36). Of course, what is at stake here is 
more than an academic or rhetorical matter. At stake is the entire question 
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of identity. To paraphrase Freud’s famous description of penis envy: We see 
identity. We know that we are without it. And we realize that we must have 
it.4 For many, like Freud, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, and Luce Irigaray, 
the determining symbol of identity is in fact the penis, or what some prefer 
to call the phallus, with all its symbolic and cultural power. But for Irigaray 
and others, the penis/phallus is just a lure, a misleading and ultimately un-
suitable symbol upon which to hang identity hats. For it, like the speculum 
in the cave, will disappoint. To choose the phallus or the mirror as a means 
to determine identity is ultimately a fantasy, a trick. But despite the repeated 
indicators to the contrary, many continue to search for something, that other 
that will fulfill them, making them feel whole, complete, help them find the 
perfect identity. What Irigaray, Lacan, and Derrida hope to demonstrate 
is that this goal is impossible. Identity is always a misshapen, half-formed 
creature, full of desire, seeking completion. 
Tied to this pursuit is language and the question of interpretation. In a 
brilliant move, helping to rescue the works of Sigmund Freud from oblivion, 
Jacques Lacan (1977, 30–114) answers the question How do we know what 
the unconscious communicates or means? His answer is We know because 
it is structured like language. Trouble is, this conclusion does not necessarily 
mean clarity. As Elizabeth Grosz explains in her feminist introduction to 
Lacan: “Instead of Freud’s lucidity and concern to make psychoanalysis ac-
cessible and scientifically accessible, Lacan cultivates a deliberate obscurity; 
where Freud attributes the powers of discourse to the unconscious, Lacan 
explains what its ‘language’ consists in, what its effects on the discourses of 
consciousness are” (1990, 13). Given the rather unstable nature of the psyche 
and identity, how can interpretation occur? Another philosopher answers 
this question succinctly in his landmark essay “ Structure, Sign and Play.” 
According to Jacques Derrida:
There are two interpretations of interpretations, of structure, of sign, 
of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or 
an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which 
lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is 
no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass 
beyond man and humanisim, the name of the man being the name 
of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of the 
ontotheology—in other words, throughout his entire history—has 
dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and 
the end of play. (1978, 292)
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Not only does this solution reflect our desire for “an answer,” it also accounts 
for the dynamic nature of language, identity, and desire. Most important, 
what this solution offers is not relativism, a popular misreading regarding 
the importance of deconstruction. Instead, there is a certain kind of humility 
in the face of the reality of identity, language, and desire. We desire succinct, 
rigid, interpretations, whole and complete creatures, but what we live with 
are the unformed, misshapen texts and identities that are constantly being 
rewritten and reformed. For Derrida, Lacan, and Irigaray, this state of affairs 
is not entirely disconcerting, for this linguistic and psychological reality 
affords language and life the opportunity for new life, new ideas, and new 
uses of languages, the play of signification. From this perspective the novel 
serves as a metaphor of the human condition—monstrous creatures desiring 
fulfillment whose journey toward completion, albeit torturous and painful, 
entertains and creates.
In Irigaray’s work the novel also serves as a metaphor for gender rela-
tions. Like Mary Shelley, Irigaray is indebted to male “father figures” for 
her philosophical insights, but through her interactions with them she, 
like Shelley, breeds her own, revolutionary offspring, one that challenges 
the patriarchy that also spawned her work. The cave, for example, the open 
wound from which philosophical inquiry emerges, represents maternal 
origins for Irigaray. It has, of course, been re-presented negatively in order 
to valorize the importance and autonomy of the patriarchy. And while there 
may be some idealization of the maternal, the patriarchy, the masculine 
subject, denies indebtedness to the mother, proposes individualization, and 
reproduces sameness. No difference, that is, femininity, is allowed:
In other words, man does not get out of the “maternal waters” here 
but by freezing the path that would lead back to her, he gazes at 
himself, re-producing himself in that paraphragm. That hymen that 
will divide his soul with its mirroring surfaces just as it divides up 
the Universe. The search to perpetuate self-identity stops all contact 
dead, paralyzes all penetration for fear one may not find oneself 
always and eternally the same inside. . . . One never need pay off 
the debt, either in the past or in the future, if one can only attain 
the ideal of sameness, which of course defies deterioration of any 
kind. Alone at last. Fully equivalent to its being, based on none other, 
repeating being, close to himself alone. (Irigaray 1985a, 351)
The male desire for sameness, for reproduction not of new life but of 
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the same life—himself—deadens. Within the constraints of this patriarchal 
stranglehold, where the woman serves as mirror but is not recognized in 
servitude, there is nothing: “She herself knows nothing (of herself). And 
remembers nothing” (Irigaray 1985a, 345). She is told to remain silent, to 
“keep still”: “Indifferent one, keep still. When you stir, you disturb their order. 
You upset everything. You break the circle of their habits, the circularity of 
their exchanges, their knowledge, their desire. Their world. Indifferent one, 
you mustn’t move, or be moved, unless they call you. If they say ‘come,’ then 
you may go ahead. Barely. Adapting yourself to whatever need they have, 
or don’t have, for the presence of their own image” (Irigaray 1985b, 207–8). 
And yet her difference continues to appear, to disturb, to disrupt, to offer 
an alternative to the straight and narrow, the reproductive sameness, the 
persistence of phallocracy. There is feminine plurality, jouissance, which is 
a constant threat because, Irigaray notes, when women speak together, lips 
to lips, the result is multiplicity, more—oneness, connection without same-
ness, without slavish adherence to patriarchal expectations and models, in 
other words, sameness: “Open your lips: don’t open them simply. I don’t 
open them simply. We—you/I—are neither open nor closed. We never 
separate simply: a single word cannot be pronounced, produced, uttered 
by our mouths. Between our lips, yours and mine, several voices, several 
ways of speaking resound endlessly, back and forth. One is never separable 
from the other. You/I: we are always several at once” (209). There is a “way 
out” of the patriarchal oppression, a “way out” that embraces the maternal 
waters, the cave, the darkness, the layers of earth, reproduction, and mul-
tiplicity. It is a “way out” that Shelley also shares, a journey that reminds 
us of the origin, the maternal. In this way Shelley communicates her own 
views about reproduction, views that challenge the partriarchal construct of 
motherhood and speak volumes, not necessarily in a new language, such as 
Irigaray envisions, but in a language that highlights the multiplicity of the 
female experience, ironically in a way similar to the Derridean concept of 
interpretation—using the language of men to indict the language of men 
through a narrative about men trying to be women.
The novel Frankenstein establishes the ambivalent longings of the hu-
man condition through one of the relatively representative characters in 
the text, Robert Walton. Admittedly, he is an adventurer, exploring areas 
of the world that others only dream about, but he is an everyman—he had 
challenges in his childhood; he longs for fame and fortune; and he writes 
to his sister in the hopes of fostering at least one connection with another 
human being. The static representation of his sister could describe the role 
Making Monsters 217
of women throughout the entire novel—at home, waiting, getting messages 
from the menfolk. At the same time, however, the novel challenges such a 
conclusion by demonstrating that all men, even the innocuous Walton, have 
trouble with real intimacy, real relationships.
Walton expresses his ambivalence when it comes to intimacy. On the 
one hand, he longs to “satiate his ardent curiosity” regarding new lands, 
hoping to be the first man to cross virginal territory (Shelley 1992, 26),5 but 
then he also longs for a companion, someone with whom he may share his 
discoveries, triumphs, and tribulations. He alludes to Coleridge’s poem The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner and supposes that his love for adventure, the 
“marvellous,” has been influenced by his reading of modern poetry. That 
may be, but the reference to Coleridge may also remind us that the tale of 
the woeful mariner was told to those who needed to hear it—in other words, 
everyman. We, like Walton and the wedding guest in Coleridge’s poem, 
need to hear Frankenstein’s story, a story about one man’s herculean efforts 
to establish his own isolated, complete identity. For now Robert serves as 
a liaison between the tale of Frankenstein and Shelley’s readers, perhaps 
protecting the story, perhaps highlighting the verisimilitude of the story, but 
more likely establishing a reliable witness and commentator on the events 
we are about to discover.6 Walton’s prayers, he thinks, are answered by the 
appearance of Frankenstein, a man whose sensibilities, again he thinks, are 
not as brutal as those of the deckhands on the ship. We, of course, learn a 
new level of brutality through the Frankenstein tale.
Ironically, Frankenstein admits that the noblest of human desires is the 
desire for intimacy: “we are but unfashioned creatures, but half made up” 
(Shelley 1992, 36). The other, then, serves to perfect and fulfill us. He even 
admits that he had such a friend but confesses that he lost that friend—with-
out ever identifying who that singular person was—and says his life and the 
time of intimacy is over. Walton’s kindness, however, inspires Frankenstein 
to tell his tale, to once again engage in an intimate act. At this point it ap-
pears that Frankenstein’s words are true—intimacy involves making people 
better than they are singularly. And perhaps this is the hope of every writer. 
By communicating stories, engaging in a level of textual intimacy between 
author and reader, a new level of intimacy occurs that betters both.
Appropriately, Frankenstein’s monologue begins with his birth, his 
childhood, and his school days. We learn about his family, his mother’s 
sacrifice to save Elizabeth, the young woman who was raised by his family, 
from illness, and Frankenstein’s own feelings for Elizabeth. Again, as is the 
case with Walton, Frankenstein is not driven by the need to connect with 
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his family or the woman he loves. He is not inspired by a desire for wealth 
or by altruism, but by the “glory” that would attend his discovery, which 
will “render man invulnerable to any but a violent death” (Shelley 1992, 
45). Frankenstein’s words mimic Walton’s: “Treading in the steps already 
marked, I will pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers” (51). Again, 
the ambivalence regarding intimacy is expressed in intellectual terms. As 
one of his teachers remarks, even those scholars who were wrong light the 
way. Frankenstein, like it or not, is dependent on others, but his desire for 
independence is powerful, so much so that he struggles to connect with 
anyone. And while Frankenstein clearly appreciates the compassion he sees 
in his beloved Elizabeth and his friend Clerval, he does not seem impressed 
enough to model his behavior upon them, the very people supposedly there 
to make him better as a result of their intimate connection with him. Instead 
he throws himself more deeply into the study of science and finally into his 
project, to become like a god—powerful, isolated, and aloof, the ultimate 
designation in terms of identity.
Rather than genuinely interacting with those around him, Frankenstein 
uses his friends, as well as Walton, as mirrors for his own desires. Through 
them he constructs a whole and complete identity, a performance that casts 
him into the role of God—not just a better man than he once was, but God, 
the divine creator. As Irigaray mentions, this role is one for “Everyman”: 
“Completeness of one who is self-sufficient: this is the destiny to which the 
souls are called who have donned the nature of the living being most able to 
honor the Gods. This superior condition is the lot of the sex which, subse-
quently, will be called masculine” (1985a, 322). Frankenstein imagines what 
his life will be like with this creature: “a new species would bless me as its 
creator and source, many happy and excellent natures would owe their being 
to me” (Shelley 1992, 55). Of course, he is also aware he is overreaching. He 
realizes he is neglecting his family. He even chastises himself regarding this 
overindulgence, noting that “a human being in perfection ought always to 
preserve a calm and peaceful mind” and wonders about the destruction his 
passionate behavior will cause (57). It is important to remember, however, 
that these comments are made by Frankenstein the elder, not Frankenstein 
the younger. The elder has learned that his earlier behavior has not resulted 
in the positive results he had envisioned, but he still constructs a fantasy 
of identity—calmness and peace will result in power. At the time, however, 
he is still enamoured with a creature who will call him not just father but 
creator.
Of course these illusions are shattered with the birth of the creature, a 
birth so horrific of a creature so ugly that Frankenstein compares him to a 
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creature from Dante’s hell and flees the laboratory, thereby abandoning the 
creature he had hoped would adore him. Frankenstein turns to Clerval for 
support and conveniently sickens, thereby relinquishing any responsibility 
for the creature and his whereabouts. His creature will not mirror him, do 
him homage, bring him fame; in other words, the creature will not reflect, will 
not serve as the other whom Frankenstein had so hoped he would create.
At this point in the novel Frankenstein commits a number of cowardly 
and self-serving acts. Like the prodigal son, he returns to his family repen-
tant, and it appears that perhaps he has learned that his egomaniacal quest 
to make a name for himself has led to nothing. Despite the fact that he is 
surrounded by his kin, he is still essentially self-absorbed. He discovers 
that his younger brother has been murdered. And because he is so self-
absorbed, so convinced of his own uniqueness, it never occurs to him that 
his creation would behave exactly like him and try to return to his creator. 
Through a series of discoveries, Frankenstein realizes that the creature has 
not only killed his younger brother but has framed Justine for the crime. 
In a quick and unfair trial, the jury finds her guilty. Rather than admit the 
truth Frankenstein decides to keep his secret. And after the verdict he feels 
no compassion for Justine, only his selfish sense of self: “The tortures of the 
accused did not equal mine; she was sustained by innocence, but . . . fangs 
of remorse tore my bosom, and would not forgo their hold” (Shelley 1992, 
79). And while innocence may hold value for the woman in Victor’s view, 
it does not save her from a shameful death.7 Frankenstein’s response is to 
once again flee from the companionship and family that he says he so craves: 
“Solitude was my only consolation—deep, dark, deathlike solitude” (83). 
He retreats into himself further, only to be disturbed by the very creature 
he is hoping to avoid. Through this meeting we learn that the creature, too, 
seeks intimacy with others, but his attempts at connection are undermined, 
at least initially, by his horrific features rather than by his own selfishness. 
Through the course of his maturation, however, he learns that selfishness is 
the way of the human world. There are one or two exceptions, but for the 
most part, it is a winner-take-all world. And so, ironically, the creature be-
comes exactly like Frankenstein, monomaniacal. He, too, demands a mirror 
that will reflect his identity in a whole and complete way. He demands that 
Frankenstein create a mate for him.
Initially Frankenstein acquieces, but during a reflective moment in 
the lab he realizes that by creating a female version of the creature, more 
problems—and not just for him—would ensue. In one of his first moments 
of compassionate feeling, Frankenstein realizes that his actions have con-
sequences beyond his personal life: “Had I a right, for my own benefit, to 
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inflict this curse upon everlasting generations?” (Shelley 1992, 140). This 
moment, similar to the one experienced by Coleridge’s mariner, might 
signify a turning point for the good doctor. For the first time he thinks of 
the human race, not just himself, but then almost immediately he returns 
to self-absorption: “I shuddered to think that future ages might curse me as 
their pest” (141). According to Irigaray, reproduction in patriarchy reflects 
Frankenstein’s shift. Reproduction is about relationships among men, all 
about power, and concerns only the reproduction of patriarchal reputation. 
Thus it could be suggested that this shift in Frankenstein’s attitude, from 
compassion to selfishness, reflects reproduction within patriarchy. It is not 
about reproduction. It is about re-producing the masculine image. It is about 
control and perpetuating the status quo.
When the creature confronts Frankenstein, moreover, there appears to 
be more than compassion for future generations at stake. The problem for 
Frankenstein is that the monster is like him, like all of us, actually, drawn to 
others for intimacy and support, but he is also drawn to others for a sense 
of power and domination. When the creature says, “You are my creator, 
but I am your master—obey” (Shelley 1992, 142), this repressed anxiety is 
articulated. Frankenstein is not afraid of the offspring as much as he is afraid 
that his creature will be able to usurp his power by creating creatures of his 
own. While the creature is exactly like Frankenstein, the monster will not 
reflect his creator’s vision of himself; the creature will want to create a vision 
of his own, an identity of his own, and “father” offspring. Such usurpation 
must not occur, so he must be destroyed, in this case through eradication 
of the species.
Frankenstein is still so blinded by his own power that he presumes he 
will be able to marry Elizabeth and escape the monster’s wrath and revenge. 
Of course, none of this works. Frankenstein leads the very person who could 
promise some level of intimacy into danger and certain death, perhaps 
out of fear of any connection on an equal level. Though many lament the 
lackluster characterization of Elizabeth and other female characters in the 
novel, their roles are consistent with Irigaray’s philosophy of the other/fe-
male in a patriarchal culture. The role is to reflect, never to act. Elizabeth is 
just a prop in Victor’s identity fantasy. What is interesting about the novel 
is that another male, admittedly a deformed, misshapen, and now for all 
intents and purposes castrated creature serves as the other, the oppressed, 
the female in Victor’s patriarchal fantasy. Once Elizabeth is out of the way, 
Frankenstein and the creature can begin their real relationship, the one 
in which Frankenstein destroys the creature and saves the future, thereby 
reproducing his role as creator/god.
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It is telling that the final scenes are presented on ice, reflective surfaces. 
With Frankenstein, the creature, and now Walton all trying to establish 
their own identities, it is clear that such a pursuit is futile and illusory. The 
search for a complete identity is slippery business, subject to many changes 
and the dynamic nature of life. And though Frankenstein is not an entirely 
admirable character, neither is the creature at the end of the tale. Both are 
obsessed with power and self. It is ironic, then, that when Frankenstein 
dies, the creature takes his body to the North Pole, perhaps offering a vivid 
symbol for the quest for identity—the pursuit of a stable, static identity 
results in or can only be death, never life, with its constant change, shifts, 
and interrelationships.
Irigaray uses the metaphor of frozen water to illustrate the oppression 
of women in patriarchy. Ice is an apt metaphor, for the patriarchy seeks to 
control and order, while the feminine serves as a threat. It is interesting to 
note, then, that the final scenes of the novel take place on ice. The men have 
attempted to live lives without women, without recognizing their indebted-
ness to the “maternal waters,” so they are left with the frozen, dead mirror 
of ice. The novel, then, serves as a cautionary tale. We see the destruction 
wrought by the men who would be women and who would deny women, 
their difference, and their reproductive abilities.
The Universal 1931 version, of course, is a very loose adaptation of the 
novel, but the question of identity still prevails.8 What makes us who we 
are? The brain? How we are treated as children? How people see us? Judg-
ing from the opening images, eyes swirling in the background as the credits 
roll, the film suggests that sight and spectacle have an important role in the 
film and its issues. The focus on the visual, the spectacle is an interesting 
phenomenon because the use of sight in what Lacan and subsequently 
Irigaray call the mirror stage is essential. As psychoanalysis demonstrates, 
the visual is the primary sense for establishing identity and gender.9 The 
role of the camera is noteworthy as well, and it might be argued that many 
of these early Universal films are as much about the importance of film and 
the camera as they are about the stories they tell. For new film audiences, 
performers are seen in a way they have never been seen before. Information 
is presented in new ways. And here we see identity as represented in the 
human form and face—ironically, in this case, through a terribly disfigured 
monster—presented in a way that we have never seen before.
One of the first trompe l’oeil is the gravedigger. During the funeral ser-
vices the camera pans across the graveyard, with its predominantly Catholic 
symbols, and lingers on a well-dressed man. Once the graveside services are 
complete, however, the man takes off his coat and hat, and it is clear that 
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the coat may be the best piece of clothing he has. The vest and the backside 
of his garments are tattered, torn, worn, and darned in places. Thanks to 
the camera, we discover that things are not always what they seem. People, 
in particular, are not who they appear to be. The camera demonstrates that 
this man’s identity is not whole and complete; there are literally holes in his 
persona.
In many ways the entire film struggles for completion and consistency 
but never quite achieves this end. Victor is not the mad scientist. There is 
another brother, Henry, who works on his creature. The patriarch Fran-
kenstein is a baron who sounds more like a loveable farmer, while his sons 
sound like they have been trained in Britain. And the town is a mishmash 
of eastern European peasants. Thus, whereas the novel attempts to establish 
some connection with the characters and the plot, the film seems to make 
every effort to highlight the unusual and remarkable, once again establish-
ing the importance of the camera, but not necessarily the story it is to film. 
We, after all, rely on the camera to show us these spectacles, things we have 
never seen before.
In another distancing move, the film version provides the good doctor 
with a sidekick who ultimately makes the error that will condemn the crea-
ture to a life of violence and pain by bringing Henry the brain of a criminal, 
not a normal person. As a result the creature is born morally flawed and 
ugly, a relationship the film constantly highlights. Beauty makes virtue. 
Since the creature cannot stand to look at himself, he has no understanding 
of his identity. And since the human characters in the film cannot stand to 
look at him, he is nothing to anybody—a monster. But the audience, again 
thanks to the intervention of the camera, the ultimate instrument of sight 
and identity, can look at the creature. We want “to look,” “to see,” and we 
need the camera to help us fulfill that desire. In one of the final moments, 
the film illustrates the mirror and its effects on identity through a scene 
in the windmill during which Henry and his creature look at one another 
through a spinning wheel, a wheel reminiscent of one of film’s precursors, a 
zoetrope, simply a spinning wheel with stationary pictures inside that created 
the illusion of motion, motion pictures. As the creator and creature look at 
one another through this mechanism, it is clear that because they see each 
other, they are similar. Again, the film underscores the importance of the 
camera. Without it, you cannot see; without it, you are not you.
The final scene reunites Henry and Elizabeth, and once again, the cam-
era’s power is underscored. Here, however, it illustrates a private moment. 
The two are reunited, but here, as throughout the film, the role of the female 
is complicated but ultimately invisible. There are no mothers in the film, only 
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fathers who care so deeply about their children that they will risk everything 
to save them. Unlike most of the women in the novel, Elizabeth in the film 
is free to leave the confines of her home. She leaves the house, helps bring 
Henry home, nurses him back to health, and is even a helpmate to the doc-
tor and Victor Clerval. At one point Victor even proposes to Elizabeth in 
his friend’s absence, but Elizabeth remains true to “her man.” In this film, 
then, a film in which women are either victims or absent, the role of women 
is to mother their men, not their children. 
Henry’s infantile state is emphasized by the fact that he cannot complete 
what he started at all or without help. After creating the monster his doctor-
teacher sets about destroying the monster, but he is taken by surprise and 
killed. And in the end when Henry attempts to kill the creature, he is thrown 
from the windmill. That leaves the villagers, that loyal and obedient mob so 
frequently resorted to in the Universal arsenal of horror pictures. Through 
their loyalty to one another, as well as their loyalty to the baron, they appar-
ently destroy the creature and return the world to normalcy. In this way the 
film presents the question of identity in much simpler terms: you are who we 
say you are. The paternal, the Frankensteins, and the camera define selfhood. 
And in the end we are rewarded with another image of reproduction, in this 
case Elizabeth nursing her soon-to-be husband to health, not a challenge to 
patriarchal sameness but a monument to its reproduction.
In The Bride of Frankenstein, the camera presents its amazing power 
once again. Thanks to the camera, the opening scene presents a re-creation 
of the moment of re-creation of the novel. That is, the film shows Mary 
Shelley conceptualizing her novel. Lord Byron, Percy, and Mary Shelley sit 
around a fire, Bryon trying to bait Mary regarding her creation, her story. 
Mary stands her ground and appears to have the upper hand, an important 
point, given the double casting of Elsa Lanchester as both Mary and the 
bride. Such casting might lead some to conclude that the film implies that 
Mary is the monster, but in the scenes that virtually “bookend” the film, a 
woman disagrees with a man and defends her own views, thereby creating 
a refreshing representation of female independence and autonomy.
The film begins with the realization that the monster did not die, and he 
is on the loose. In one scene the monster learns about friendship through 
his relationship with a blind man. Here, as opposed to some great works of 
literature, as indicated in the novel, the monster learns about social activi-
ties, friendship, fine dining, sharing cigars, and drinking with companions. 
He learns to speak in a rudimentary fashion. But there is a moral here. The 
blind man clearly cannot see the monster, so he is deluded regarding the 
monster’s identity, so much so that the old man thinks that the monster has 
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been sent in answer to his prayers for a companion. Once again, identity 
and sight are linked. The camera presents truth.
With the serendipitous arrival of some local hunters, the blind man 
is saved from his monstrous friendship and the creation is on the move 
again. This time he meets a scientist, Dr. Pretorius. Here, however, the film 
illustrates the power of the camera to create fantasies through the wonder-
ful miniaturization scenes in the doctor’s office. The scenes also underscore 
Pretorius’s power—he, for example, restrains the lewd king from violating 
the queen.
Perhaps because of this power, perhaps because he is accustomed to 
deformity, Pretorius welcomes the creature into his home and toasts to “a 
new world of gods and monsters.” And while Pretorius is clearly driven 
by ambition, his curiosity also motivates his research. But like the earlier 
Frankenstein in the novel, he will go to any lengths to complete his proj-
ect. He holds Elizabeth hostage while Henry and he complete the bride of 
Frankenstein. As in the novel and the earlier film, male characters control 
the creation of the female and reproduction in general. Unlike the male 
creature, who was created through a criminal brain (which is never men-
tioned in this version), the female in this film relies heavily on a heart,which, 
as Caroline Picart notes, carries “on the cliche that men think and women 
feel” (2002, 53). Female characters in both the novel and the 1931 film play 
supporting roles.
Here, however, in a stellar performance by Elsa Lanchester, female desire 
is finally represented, not, tellingly, via words but through a scream and a 
visual response—again highlighting the power of the camera over the story. 
In this scene the bride refuses her bridgegroom. Female desire is portrayed 
and highlighted. Men may want to reproduce. Men may want women to do 
as they say. Men may want to be reflected at twice their natural size, but in 
this brief moment the film shows that women will say no to these matters. 
There is female power here, and though it is exercised in negation, it is there 
nonetheless. For Caroline Picart (2002), the moment represents female desire 
as monstrous and terrifying, and she faults the film for representing female 
desire and sexuality in this way. For Radu Florescu, the moment is much 
lighter, “a cunning slice of macabre comedy” (186). Truly the moment is an 
important one, and to laugh in the face of patriarchy’s promises is one of the 
few nonsexual powers available to women since Sarah laughed at the repro-
ductive news from the angel of God. For Irigaray, this position of laughter 
and negation is a powerful one, and it makes change, though perhaps not 
clearly or immediately. But what the bride indicates is her own unwillingness 
to be defined by patriarchy. And though change does not occur through the 
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expression of female desire, it is enough to cause us to pause, and the image 
of Elsa Lanchester responding in this way has become a pop icon.
Female desire. Female power is frightening, but that does not mean 
that it does not or cannot exist within the confines of the patriarchy. There 
are moments when “two lips” come together, when women in their mul-
tiplicity, diversity—and, by patriarchal standards, their perversity—exist, 
thrive, and threaten. As Irigaray advises all women: “Women, stop trying. 
You have been taught that you were property, private or public, belonging 
to one man or all. To family, tribe, State, even a Republic. That therein lay 
your pleasure. And that, unless you gave in to man’s, or men’s, desires, you 
would not know sexual pleasure. That pleasure was, for you, always tied to 
pain, but . . . such was your nature. If you disobeyed, you were the cause of 
your own unhappiness” (1985b, 203). Opening our mouths may be enough 
to make change happen, to challenge, to usurp.
In the final scenes of the film the relationship between the other and 
identity, specifically the reliance of the subject on the other to define iden-
tity, is clearly articulated. When the monster realizes that he cannot have 
Colin Clive, Elsa Lanchester, Boris Karloff, and Ernest Thesiger in Bride of Franken-
stein (1935). Directed by James Whale. (Universal Pictures/Photofest)
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his bride, he realizes he cannot exist. And while this may signify that the 
female must be destroyed because she will not cooperate as expected, the 
scene also suggests the important role the other, the repressed, the oppressed 
plays in the identity fantasy of the subject.
As the castle explodes around them the monster tells Pretorius to leave: 
“We belong dead.” On the one hand, he appears to sacrifice himself, saving 
Dr. Pretorius, and perhaps the rest of humanity, by choosing suicide. In this 
way the monster becomes the Frankenstein of the 1931 film and the novel, 
the master creator who saves the world for the future. On the other, the act 
is clearly motivated by his loss of identity. Without a bride, the monster is 
nothing. He has but a bit of power and that is to destroy himself and the 
mirror that will not reflect. Almost as if to resurrect the prominence of 
patriarchy, the film concludes with the explosion of the tower, a strangely 
orgasmic conclusion. All, we presume, is taken care of. The conclusion 
suggests that if women control reproduction, they cause problems for male 
performance, so they must be destroyed, but such a response also indicates 
the incredible power the female mirror, the female creation still wields in a 
patriarchal landscape. And, of course, the phallic tower is destroyed in the 
end, and it is the bride we remember, the bride who entertains, interests, 
and challenges audiences.
Notes
1. As Smith notes, “One aspect of Frankenstein’s critical history, then, is this ten-
dency not to examine the novel in its own right” (1992a, 189). A quick look at studies 
by recent critics illustrates that even the most complex theorists tend to use biography. 
See, for example, Gilbert and Gubar 1984; Ellis 1974; Poovey 1996; Moers 1996; and 
Johnson 1996.
2. See, for example, Levine 1996; Sterrenburg 1974; and Lipking 1996. Lipking 
argues that the entire work may be understood by one reference to the first page of 
Rousseau’s Emile.
3. Gilbert and Gubar’s Madwoman (1984) was one such important work. They 
not only demonstrated the utility of feminist criticism, they also highlighted the need 
to include female authors in the canon, leading the way for further developments in 
feminist criticism, today a rich and diverse field.
4. Freud’s line is infamous: “She has seen it and knows that she is without it and 
wants to have it” (1963, 188).
5. All references to the novel are from the 1831 edition, edited by Johanna Smith, 
which for many is the definitive edition. For a discussion of the changes between the 
1812 version and the 1831 version, see Smith 1992b, 14–15.
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6. The use of the embedded narrative in horror novels is commonplace. See Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula, Henry James’s Turn of the Screw, and Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights, 
among others.
7. Note the priest’s abusive role in Justine’s coerced confession: “Every since I was 
condemned, my confessor has besieged me; he threatened and menaced, until I almost 
began to think that I was the monster he said I was” (Shelley 1992, 80).
8. For a close analysis of the changes, see Picart 2002, 25–99.
9. As noted above on the female child’s experience with seeing the penis, Freud’s 
theory relies on sight. For the boy, the sight of the female genitals is equally disturbing, 
but perhaps in a different way: “The observation that finally breaks down the child’s 
unbelief [the male child’s denial regarding castration and finally the conclusion of the 
Oedipus complex] is the sight of the female genitalia. . . . With this, however, the loss of 
his own penis becomes imaginable, and the threat of castration achieves its delayed ef-
fect” (1963, 178). For Lacan, the “mirror stage” requires seeing the self in the mirror, and 
Irigaray also uses the mirror and the mirror stage to interrogate patriarachal principles. 
Such emphasis offered an important tool for film studies, and so many film theorists have 
looked to psychoanalytic principles for film criticism, particularly the visual construction 
of meaning, the unconscious participation in film, and so on. The most notorious essay 
is Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure” (1989), but a quick look at film criticism in general 
demonstrates the important role psychoanalytic theory plays therein.
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Kitsch and Camp and Things 
That Go Bump in the Night; 
or, Sontag and Adorno at the 
(Horror) Movies
David MacGregor Johnston
Many examples of Camp are things which, from a “serious” 
point of view, are either bad art or kitsch. Not all, though. Not 
only is Camp not necessarily bad art, but some art which can 
be approached as Camp . . . merits the most serious admiration 
and study.
—Susan Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp’”
At a very young age I was simultaneously introduced to kitsch and to camp 
and to classic horror films by “your friendly neighborhood vampire,” Sir 
Graves Ghastly, the Saturday afternoon movie host on Detroit’s local CBS 
affiliate, WJBK-TV Channel 2.1 With a ghoulish cackle Sir Graves began each 
show by bidding viewers to “turn out the lights, pull down the shades, draw 
the drapes, cuddle up in your favorite spot by the tele, and glue your little 
eyes to your TV screens for today’s tale of terror.” Viewers were treated to 
the full range of monster movies, science fiction adventures, and tales of the 
supernatural from 1930s classics to 1960s schlock. Sir Graves was as likely 
to introduce Frankenstein (1931) or The Mystery of Edwin Drood (1935) as 
he was to show The Slime People (1963) or The Crawling Hand (1963). It was 
the films that were my introduction to kitsch, but it was the characters who 
populated Sir Graves’s cemetery set that exhibited camp.
Sir Graves was the creation of Lawson J. Deming, as were all the other 
oddball characters on the Sir Graves Ghastly Presents show. As a vampire 
Sir Graves was anything but frightening. In fact he seemed more like a 
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supportive uncle or sympathetic grandfather as he praised young viewers’ 
drawings that were displayed during the show’s “Art Ghoulery” segment, 
Sir Graves’s equivalent of the family refrigerator. 2 Sir Graves was dressed in 
the traditional dark suit and red-lined cape, his signature look completed 
by an obviously fake moustache and goatee and slicked-down hair with a 
big swirl in the center of his forehead. The movies themselves were “dug 
up” by the diminutive Reel McCoy, the foot-tall cemetery caretaker, and 
immediately preceded by Sir Graves’s cousin, the German-accented Baron 
Boogaloff, who would point at the viewers and declare, “You vill vatch the 
movie und you vill enjoy it! Zat is an order!” A common sketch paired Sir 
Graves with the Voice of Doom, a mechanical skull with long red hair, to 
tell corny jokes sent in by viewers.
Other characters would usually appear as random interruptions to lip-
synch songs by the likes of Spike Jones, Gene Moss, Tom Lehrer, and the 
incomparable Mrs. Miller. Deming dressed in drag to perform the castle scul-
lery maid and “gorgeous cookie” Tilly Trollhouse, flipped his cape and lost the 
facial hair and pomade for Sir Graves’s slightly effeminate “alter ego” Walter, 
and donned wraparound sunglasses for the disembodied head of the beatnik 
Cool Ghoul. But my and my friends’ favorite was the Glob, a bizarre facial 
apparition that would appear on the full moon above Sir Graves’s cemetery. 
The Glob was created by painting a reversed nose and eyes on Sir Graves’s 
chin: his moustache became the Glob’s beard and his goatee became its hair. 
With the limited special effects capability of the time, Deming actually had 
to lie upside down for the extreme close-up shots of his lip-synching songs 
such as “Ghoul Days,” “The King Kong Stomp,” and “I Want to Bite Your 
Hand,” a parody of the Beatles’ “I Want to Hold Your Hand.”
Yes, the Sir Graves Ghastly Presents show was pure camp, as Susan Sontag 
defines the term. It was an intentionally tongue-in-cheek portrayal of the 
standard monster movie fare. In other words, Deming exaggerated aspects 
of one genre of kitsch, the formulaic horror film, to take them over the top. 
The familiar stereotypes and hackneyed characters of horror movies were 
perversely celebrated in Sir Graves’s ghoulishly twisted world.
Tales from the Kitsch
The horror genre has been popular with filmmakers almost since the inven-
tion of movies themselves. Georges Méliès, the French master of early special 
effects, is generally credited with making the first horror film, Le manoir 
du diable, in 1896, and Thomas Edison produced a version of Frankenstein 
in 1910. The German expressionist movement brought some of the earli-
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est feature-length horror films, such as The Golem (1915 and 1920), The 
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920), and Nosferatu (1922). About the same time 
in Hollywood, Lon Chaney, known as “the Man of a Thousand Faces” for 
his skill with makeup, became the first American horror movie star for his 
portrayals of the title roles in The Hunchback of Notre Dame (1923) and The 
Phantom of the Opera (1925).
With the advent of sound, Universal Pictures began production of a 
series of successful monster movies that not only launched the careers of 
Boris Karloff and Bela Lugosi but also generated a new genre of American 
cinema, often referred to as Universal Horror. With films such as Dracula and 
Frankenstein in 1931, The Mummy in 1932, The Invisible Man in 1933, and 
Bride of Frankenstein in 1935, Carl Laemmle Jr., son of the studio’s founder, 
helped create some of the genre’s trademarks, such as creaking staircases, 
cobwebbed castles, and mobs of torch-bearing angry peasants. When Laem-
mle lost control of the studio after several mainstream flops, the monsters 
took a hiatus from production, but the smashing success of the rereleased 
original monster movies convinced the new studio executives to green-light 
Son of Frankenstein in 1939. Universal had found a formula. Throughout 
the 1940s the studio brought us returns, ghosts, or revenges of all of their 
classic creatures and gathered them together in Frankenstein Meets the Wolf 
Man (1943), House of Frankenstein (1944), and House of Dracula (1945). 
Universal even teamed the monsters with their hit comedy duo Abbott and 
Costello for a series of films, but the golden age of Universal Horror came 
to a close soon after the 1954 release of Creature from the Black Lagoon in 
3-D and its sequels in 1955 and 1956.
While the original monster movies are rightly considered classics, the 
subsequent sequels and spin-offs, not to mention lesser works such as Night 
Monster (1942) or The Mole People (1956), are clear examples of kitsch, a 
word believed to have originated in the Munich art markets of the 1860s and 
1870s and used to describe the cheap, marketable paintings and sketches 
that appealed to the newly moneyed bourgeoisie. “To fill the demand of 
the new market, a new commodity was devised: ersatz culture, kitsch, des-
tined for those who, insensible to the values of genuine culture, are hungry 
nevertheless for the diversion that only culture of some sort can provide.”3 
Now generally understood to refer to an aesthetically impoverished work of 
shoddy production, the term was popularized beginning in the late 1930s 
by theorists such as Clement Greenberg, who contrasted avant-garde and 
kitsch, arguing that the latter is a threat to culture. More precisely, the mass 
culture associated with kitsch is a threat to the creative spirit and enlight-
enment enriched through the development of genuine artistic expressions 
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and the commensurate aesthetic sensibilities. When given a choice between 
“the bad, up-to-date old and the genuinely new,” mass culture mistakenly 
inclines people toward the former.4
In 1939 Greenberg published “Avant-garde and Kitsch,” in which he 
argued that avant-garde and modern art was a way to combat the dumbing-
down of culture through consumerism, that is, through the perfunctory art he 
called kitsch. Modern art explored the circumstances of our experience and 
understanding of the world, while kitsch turned art into something learnable 
and easily expressible through clear rules and standard formulations: “Kitsch, 
using for raw material the debased and academicized simulacra of genuine 
culture, welcomes and cultivates this insensibility. Kitsch is mechanical and 
operates by formulas. Kitsch is vicarious experience and faked sensations. 
Kitsch changes according to style, but remains always the same. Kitsch is 
the epitome of all that is spurious in the life of our times. Kitsch pretends to 
demand nothing of its customers except their money—not even their time.”5 
Kitsch is both directly and indirectly a result of the industrial revolution. 
Not only did the “methods of industrialism displace the handicrafts,” but 
consumers now have both the personal inclination and the financial ability 
to pretend to acquire the tastes and trappings of true culture.
Faced with an inundation of kitsch in the form of Norman Rockwell 
illustrations (or Anne Geddes baby photographs and “Hang in There” 
inspirational cat posters, for more contemporary examples) and even the 
New Yorker magazine, “which is fundamentally high-class kitsch for the 
luxury trade,” Greenberg turned toward the avant-garde to defend aesthetic 
standards and to rescue society from the decline of taste promoted by the 
consumer culture. “Hence it developed that the true and most important 
function of the avant-garde was not to ‘experiment,’ but to find a path along 
which it would be possible to keep culture moving in the midst of ideologi-
cal confusion and violence.”6 Since kitsch is nothing more than a simplistic 
rehashing of hackneyed art, it stagnates society. On the other hand, the 
avant-garde must be encountered on its own new terms and so enriches the 
aesthetic sensibilities of those enlightened individuals who take the time 
and make the effort needed to enjoy it.
The Kitsch from Another World
Theodor Adorno called the production of kitsch the “culture industry,” a term 
used in a chapter title in Dialectic of Enlightenment, a book cowritten with 
his Frankfurt School colleague Max Horkheimer. With the development of 
the culture industry comes a change, such that art’s commodity character 
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is deliberately acknowledged and art “abjures its autonomy.” Instead of art 
being valued in its purposelessness, that is, art for art’s sake, the value of art 
comes from its marketability. Instead of a genuine use value based on the 
mere enjoyment of art, products mediated by the culture industry have only 
an exchange value in the marketplace. “Everything has value only in so far 
as it can be exchanged, not in so far as it is something in itself.”7 Art that is 
autonomous, “something in itself,” challenges the viewer and promotes his 
or her critical tendencies and potential.
The culture industry, on the other hand, manipulates the population by 
producing art that is nonchallenging and that serves to distract people from 
the oppressiveness of the power structure. “The isolated moments of enjoy-
ment prove incompatible with the immanent constitution of the work of art, 
and whatever in the work goes beyond them to an essential perception is 
sacrificed to them. They are not bad in themselves but in their diversionary 
function.”8 The culture industry turns people into passive consumers who 
are content with the false needs created and satisfied by capitalism. The easy 
pleasures available through the consumption of popular culture obscure the 
true needs of freedom, creativity, and genuine happiness: “The commercial 
character of culture causes the difference between culture and practical 
life to disappear. Aesthetic semblance (Schein) turns into the sheen which 
commercial advertising lends to the commodities which absorb it in turn. 
But that moment of independence which philosophy specifically grasped 
under the idea of aesthetic semblance is lost in the process. On all sides 
the borderline between culture and empirical reality becomes more and 
more indistinct.”9 The culture industry blurs the line between true and false 
needs and does not allow the emergence of enough challenging material to 
disturb the status quo. Instead the culture industry produces works of art 
that appear different in their surface details, but that are in reality merely 
variations on the same theme.
Thus kitsch does not engage culture but repackages and stylizes it in a 
way that reinforces established conventions and appeals to the masses. As 
Thomas Kulka wrote, “The painter [of kitsch] should avoid all unpleasant 
or disturbing features of reality, leaving us only with those we can easily 
cope with and identify with. Kitsch comes to support our basic sentiments 
and beliefs, not to disturb or question them.” Of course, what seems most 
to bother contemporary critics of kitsch is precisely its reliance on senti-
mentality and cuteness. Kulka continues, “It works best when our attitude 
toward its object is patronizing. Puppies work better than dogs, kittens better 
than cats.”10 Kitsch is in opposition to the elevated consciousness generated 
by high art because it provokes superficial, unsophisticated, excessive, or 
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immature expressions of emotion. In this context sentimentality and im-
morality seem to go together, if only because kitsch manipulates our emo-
tions through cultural iconography guaranteed to elicit an instantaneous 
and predictable response.
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being, Milan Kundera suggests that kitsch 
is based on the universality of the emotions it provokes:
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear 
says: How nice to see children running on the grass!
The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all 
mankind, by children running on the grass!
It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.11
People who take pleasure in kitsch do so not only because of the spontaneity 
of the emotion but also because they know they are moved in the same way 
as everyone else. Thus kitsch relies on a familiar subject matter imbued with 
a clear emotional charge.
Still, not every depiction of that subject will count as kitsch. The subject 
must be instantly and effortlessly identifiable. “Kitsch never ventures into 
the avant-garde, or into styles not yet universally accepted. It can jump on 
the bandwagon only after the novelty wears off and becomes commonplace. 
. . . This is why kitsch is likely to be unexciting or even boring, from the 
artistic point of view.” A style that challenges the accepted representational 
framework can never be kitsch. Likewise, a work that transforms and in-
tensifies our experience, no matter how identifiably representational, is not 
kitsch. “Our [kitsch] artist should strive for a stereotype. The subject matter 
should be presented in the most standard and schematic manner, without 
any individual features . . . no ambiguities, no hidden meanings.”12
Perhaps this last consideration explains why horror films so easily fall 
into the realm of kitsch. Rarely do we find a horror film (Adorno would 
say any film) that is not a stereotype: that is, not a simple variation on a 
familiar theme. Although John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978) is generally 
credited as the first modern slasher film, the genre is more accurately traced 
to Bob Clark’s Black Christmas (1974). In any case a new genre was born, 
with Friday the 13th (1980) and A Nightmare on Elm Street (1984) soon to 
follow. To be sure, the many sequels in these film franchises are kitsch, as is 
the pairing of the villains in Freddie vs. Jason (2003), perhaps a throwback 
to Universal’s successful groupings of its monsters. Certainly, none of these 
later films has added anything to our experience of slasher films, of films 
generally, or of the worlds they represent. As Adorno reminds us, “This 
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selection [that has nothing to do with quality] reproduces itself in a fatal 
circle: the most familiar is the most successful and is therefore played again 
and again and made still more familiar.”13 When Child’s Play (1988) turned 
the monster into an evil doll, it added nothing to the genre. Chucky is just 
a reformulation of the now familiar stereotype, and the story merely repeats 
the standard slasher plot with minor variations.
When Steven Spielberg made Jaws in 1975, it was merely a variation on 
the standard Universal monster movie, albeit an excellent one. Instead of the 
monster’s terrorizing a small European town, the shark terrorizes the bucolic 
Amity Island. Instead of an angry mob with torches and pitchforks chasing 
the monster through the countryside, islanders and other fortune seekers 
take to their boats to hunt the shark with shotguns and dynamite. Instead 
of being trapped on the moors with no possibility of escape, our heroes are 
trapped at sea with no land in sight. Jaws even relies on the expert scientist 
to help the early believer kill the monster, this time with a gun and oxygen 
tank instead of a wooden stake or a silver bullet. Spielberg himself admits 
that Jaws is just a variation on his own feature-length directorial debut, the 
1971 made-for-television movie Duel, in which the leviathan stalking our 
hero is a seemingly supernatural semitrailer truck.
But beyond the rehashing of familiar themes, Jaws or Friday the 13th or 
any other familiar horror film is kitsch because of the emotions it provokes 
and because of the ease of its consumption. While such films are not cute 
or cuddly, as is the standard work of kitsch, they still appeal to our baser 
emotions. Instead of appealing to sappy sentimentality, horror films are 
frightening, but generally they are frightening in ways that do not chal-
lenge us to question these films, our responses to them, or the worlds they 
represent. “In the end the peasant will go back to kitsch when he feels like 
looking at pictures, for he can enjoy kitsch without effort.”14 In this respect, 
even the first Universal Pictures creature features are kitsch, as is the origi-
nal Halloween. We are not challenged when we watch these films. We are 
frightened in relatively familiar ways.
Revenge of the Camp
Still, several theorists suggest the possibility of rescuing kitsch. As Green-
berg writes, “Nor is every single item of kitsch altogether worthless. Now 
and then it produces something of merit, something that has authentic folk 
flavor.”15 For Adorno, that something of merit would cause the consumer to 
question the dominant beliefs and oppressive ideologies of his or her society. 
Consider John Carpenter’s 1998 release They Live, starring the professional 
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wrestler “Rowdy” Roddy Piper as Nada, a down-on-his-luck construction 
worker. After police destroy the tent community of homeless people he now 
calls home, Nada decides to investigate the neighboring church, where he 
has noticed some suspicious activity. In the church’s storage room he finds 
a cache of seemingly ordinary sunglasses. Much to his dismay the glasses 
reveal the true state of the world: members of an alien race hold all the 
positions of authority in society and maintain a hypnotic control over their 
human underlings. With the aid of the glasses Nada sees both the genuine 
skeletonlike faces of the aliens and the subliminal messages of billboards, 
magazine covers, and the like, in which the somnambulistic masses are 
ordered to “consume,” “reproduce,” and “obey.” Normally only high art in-
terrogates the world outside of the work, but They Live is a film that clearly 
intends to shock its viewers out of their acquiescence to the alienation that 
the culture industry promotes.
Robert Solomon directly criticizes the assumptions on which the 
usual negative assessment of kitsch is based. “Granted, kitsch may be bad 
art. Granted, it may show poor taste. But my question here is why it is the 
sentimentality of kitsch that should be condemned, why it is thought to be 
an ethical defect and a danger to society.” He suggests that instead of being 
based on a genuine aesthetic judgment of the work in question, the domi-
nant attitude toward kitsch is a learned behavior based on a particular social 
and cultural bias: “One cannot understand the attack on kitsch, I propose, 
without a sociological-historical hypothesis about the fact that the ‘high’ 
class of many societies associate themselves with emotional control and 
reject sentimentality as an expression of inferior, ill-bred beings, and male 
society has long used such a view to demean the ‘emotionality’ of women. . . . 
Indeed, much of the contempt for kitsch, I would suggest, is not the product 
of personal or cultivated taste at all but rather the ‘superficial’ criterion that 
teaches us that kitsch—immediately recognizable by its play on the tender 
sentiments—is unacceptable.”16 These comments suggest that we need to 
learn to engage kitsch on its own terms. To be sure, we must at least accept 
kitsch’s continued presence in the art world. As Kundera writes, “For none 
among us is superman enough to escape kitsch completely. No matter how 
we scorn it, kitsch is an integral part of the human condition.”17 But if we 
can come to recognize a difference between good and bad kitsch, we may 
be able to move beyond mere acceptance and come to embrace kitsch.
One way to embrace kitsch is through the concept of camp, “that category 
of cultural taste, which, more than anything else, shaped, defined, and negoti-
ated the way in which 1960s intellectuals were able to ‘pass’ as subscribers to 
the throwaway Pop aesthetic, and thus as patrons to the attractive world of 
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immediacy and disposability created by the culture industries.”18 Although 
the term can be traced to the late seventeenth century,19 it was popularized 
as an aesthetic category by Susan Sontag in her landmark 1964 essay “Notes 
on ‘Camp.’” In response to the standard attitude toward the relation between 
kitsch and high art, Sontag writes, “But there are other creative sensibilities 
besides the seriousness (both tragic and comic) of high culture and of the 
high style of evaluating people. And one cheats oneself, as a human being, 
if one has respect only for the style of high culture, whatever else one may 
do or feel on the sly.” Instead, the camp taste, or “sensibility” as she calls it, 
provides a way to appreciate and to take pleasure in some examples of kitsch 
(if not also high art) precisely because of the work’s artifice, excessiveness, 
theatricality, playfulness, and exaggeration. As such, the camp sensibility 
emphasizes style over content. “Camp sees everything in quotation marks. 
It’s not a lamp, but a ‘lamp’; not a woman, but a ‘woman.’ To perceive Camp 
in objects and persons is to understand Being-as-Playing-a-Role. It is the 
farthest extension, in sensibility, of the metaphor of life as theater.”20 What 
the camp sensibility prizes above all else is a work that is over the top.
Thus, while there is a close connection between kitsch and camp, only 
kitsch that is “bad to the point of being enjoyable” is appreciated as camp. 
To be sure, kitsch takes itself seriously, too seriously, in relation to high art. 
The camp sensibility appreciates that seriousness when it fails—or, more 
precisely, because of how it fails. “The experiences of Camp are based on the 
great discovery that the sensibility of high culture has no monopoly upon 
refinement. Camp asserts that good taste is not simply good taste; that there 
exists, indeed, a good taste of bad taste.”21 As such, camp taste is a particular 
way of seeing things. It is a refined aesthetic taste for the vulgar.
This elevation of kitsch can be found in several distinct but interrelated 
areas of inquiry. Sontag points to the “peculiar relation between Camp taste 
and homosexuality,” and many other theorists point to drag shows as the 
epitome of camp. The key to drag as camp is the intentional excessiveness 
and theatricality of performing the opposite gender. Drag performers are 
not impersonators: there is no attempt to deceive the spectator. In fact, the 
heart of the drag show is “a relish for the exaggeration of sexual character-
istics and personality mannerisms.”22 Returning to my childhood horror 
movie host, one could say that Lawson Deming performed vampire drag 
as Sir Graves Ghastly. While not exaggerating sexual characteristics, Sir 
Graves exaggerated the characteristics, personality, and mannerisms of the 
stereotypical vampire.
Sontag also distinguishes between deliberate and naive, or pure, camp. 
The former intentionally fails to be serious (whether it is a comedy or a 
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drama), while the latter does so only by accident. Sir Graves Ghastly Presents 
is intentionally campy, but it is based on Deming’s love of horror movies. 
“You can’t camp about something you don’t take seriously. You’re not mak-
ing fun of it; you’re making fun out of it. You’re expressing what’s basically 
serious to you in terms of fun and artifice and elegance.”23 Deming was 
making fun out of being a vampire. Alternately, one can discover camp in 
an otherwise worthless work. Ed Wood’s shoddily produced Plan 9 from 
Outer Space (1959) is campy only by accident, and perhaps only in retro-
spect. When Plan 9 was released it was just a bad film, but as time passed 
the film was rescued through a camp sensibility and transformed into a cult 
classic. That is, we the viewers can make fun out of the bad film. “Not only 
is there a Camp vision, a Camp way of looking at things. Camp is as well 
a quality discoverable in objects and the behavior of persons. . . . True, the 
Camp eye has the power to transform experience. But not everything can 
be seen as Camp. It’s not all in the eye of the beholder.”24 Kitsch that can be 
rescued by the camp sensibility must exhibit a certain originality and creative 
talent in a work that is obviously ridiculous or garish.
Thus the camp sensibility shares a concern with a lack of seriousness 
and a simultaneous attention to the quality of execution. “The whole point 
of Camp is to dethrone the serious. Camp is playful, anti-serious. More 
precisely, Camp involves a new, more complex relation to ‘the serious.’ One 
can be serious about the frivolous, frivolous about the serious.” We can 
view Plan 9 seriously as a candidate for the worst movie ever made, and we 
can watch Sir Graves as a frivolous romp through the horror genre. In each 
case we affirm “the ultimate Camp statement: it’s good because it’s awful.”25 
And we can understand the relation among deliberate camp, naive camp, 
and mere kitsch in terms of Isherwood’s distinction between making fun of 
and making fun out of something. With deliberate camp the creator of the 
work makes fun out of whatever it references. With naive camp the viewer 
makes fun out of the work itself. With mere kitsch the best we can do is 
make fun of it.
Attack of the Killer What?
Given the redemptive quality of the camp sensibility, “anything, given the 
right circumstances, could, in principle, be redeemed by camp.” When we 
watch the best or the worst of the Universal Horror genre, we can enjoy them 
because “camp is a rediscovery of history’s waste. Camp irreverently retrieves 
not only that which had been excluded from the serious high-cultural ‘tradi-
tion,’ but also the more unsalvageable material that has been picked over and 
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found wanting by purveyors of the ‘antique.’”26 In a literal sense, these films 
are awfully good. The infamous Plan 9 is perhaps the greatest example of 
a bad film rescued by the camp sensibility, but almost all 1950s sci-fi films 
are now viewed as camp. The camp sensibility is attracted to these films 
because we can now view them from a position divorced from their original 
social contexts and ramifications. “Camp is art that proposes itself seriously, 
but cannot be taken altogether seriously because it is ‘too much.’”27 When 
immersed in the cultural concerns of the 1950s, films such as The Day the 
Earth Stood Still (1951) or Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) appear all 
too serious. When we view them from the perspective of the twenty-first 
century, they become obviously “too much.”
Examples of intentionally campy horror films are less common but, 
understandably, more obviously “too much.” Perhaps the earliest example 
of deliberate camp horror occurs in Woody Allen’s 1972 film Everything 
You Always Wanted to Know about Sex* but Were Afraid to Ask, in which 
a giant human female breast terrorizes the countryside by squirting toxic 
milk. Mel Brooks’s deliberately campy Young Frankenstein (1974) is a clear 
homage to the Universal Horror films (Brooks even went so far as to procure 
the original laboratory set from the 1931 Frankenstein), but the historical 
reference may be overshadowed by the monster and young Dr. Franken-
stein, each dressed in top hat, white tie, and tails, performing “Puttin’ on 
the Ritz” before a scientific audience. Ghost Busters (1984) has “the proper 
mixture of the exaggerated, the fantastic, the passionate, and the naïve”28 
to be camp, especially when the world faces destruction in the form of the 
Stay Puft Marshmallow Man.
Attack of the Killer Tomatoes (1978) clearly and intentionally makes 
fun out of 1950s sci-fi and 1960s schlock, and may be the best deliberate 
example of a horror film that is “good because it’s awful.” Whether by dub-
bing the Japanese American scientist’s voice into English, by including a 
slow-speed car chase, or by simply reversing the film to show a tomato climb 
out of a sink for the first attack, the film is way over the top. Killer Klowns 
from Outer Space (1988) features grotesque parodies of circus clowns who 
shoot popcorn from ray guns, toss toxic cream pies, and wrap their victims 
in cotton candy cocoons as a source of sustenance. Perhaps the greatest 
example of a deliberately campy horror movie is The Rocky Horror Picture 
Show (1975). Of course there are the obvious drag elements and a general 
frivolous reverence for the horror stereotypes, but the film also relishes minor 
details such as Dr. Frank-N-Furter’s carving the formal dinner’s roast with 
a cheap electric knife.
For a more detailed analysis of the relation among deliberate camp, 
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naive camp, and mere kitsch, consider three more recent closely related 
films: Scream (1996), I Know What You Did Last Summer (1997), and Scary 
Movie (2000). In the first case, the filmmakers make fun out of the slasher 
genre. Furthermore, Scream challenges its viewers to interrogate the slasher 
genre, their responses to such films, and the roles such films play in their 
lives. As such, it can claim the status of an autonomous work of cinematic 
art. Although I Know What You Did Last Summer is kitsch to the extent that 
it reinforces the established conventions of the slasher genre and appeals to 
mass tastes, the camp sensibility can rescue it as viewers make fun out of the 
slasher film in question. In Scary Movie, the filmmakers merely make fun 
of the other two films. It does not challenge the viewers; it only requires us 
to join the fun and laugh at the jokes. Understood in this context, Scream 
is deliberate camp, I Know What You Did Last Summer is naive camp, and 
Scary Movie is mere kitsch.
When Wes Craven was tapped to direct Scream, the master of horror in 
the 1970s and 1980s had made several recent critical and commercial flops. In 
fact, he even at first turned down the opportunity to try his hand at another 
gory picture because he thought Scream was too violent. To be sure, the film’s 
screenwriter, Kevin Williamson, was steeped in the history of the slasher 
genre, and he brought a frivolous reverence for that history to his script. 
But within that script the characters are deadly serious about the frivolity of 
horror movies. While the basic plot of Scream does little to move beyond the 
standard slasher scenario, the film presents itself as a “clever, knowing, and 
ironic reworking of the slasher movie”29 that challenges viewers to rethink 
such films and the roles they play in their own lives. It has numerous subtle 
and not-so-subtle references to earlier horror films; characters watch horror 
films and comment on them and the genre; and, thanks to a covert attempt 
by a TV reporter to get a scoop, characters even watch the masked killer 
stalk other characters on a closed-circuit television monitor.
In this last situation, Randy (played by Jamie Kennedy) is alone in the 
house watching Halloween on TV and calls out for Jamie (Lee Curtis) to 
turn around to see the killer behind her, as we want to call out to Jamie 
(Kennedy) to turn around to see the killer behind him, and as the charac-
ters watching the monitor call out to Randy for the same reason. Of course, 
each of us is impotent in our attempt to warn the prey. Perhaps the most 
over-the-top moment that makes fun out of making a slasher film comes 
in a throw-away scene in which the high school principal greets Fred the 
custodian, actually Craven himself dressed as Freddy Krueger, the killer in 
Craven’s own A Nightmare on Elm Street. Of course, the fact that the killer in 
Scream is dressed in a semicomic ghost mask reminiscent of Edvard Munch’s 
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painting The Scream, an image that itself has entered the camp pantheon, 
cannot be discounted.
Although Kevin Williamson also wrote the screenplay for I Know What 
You Did Last Summer, it was adapted from a novel, whereas Scream was 
an original work. Certainly, Williamson is adept at realizing a taut slasher 
story, but I Know What You Did Last Summer lacks the intentional “spirit of 
extravagance” and “theatricalization of experience” that were the hallmark 
of Scream. Perhaps it is a result of relying too closely on the source material. 
Perhaps it is the result of having a less accomplished director who was not as 
versed in the slasher genre. In any case, I Know What You Did Last Summer 
comes off from an idle screening as mere kitsch. It takes itself seriously as a 
standard slasher film, but viewed with a camp sensibility, we can appreciate 
how it fails to be serious. In the same way that 1950s sci-fi films become 
campy when in retrospect we view them as “pure artifice,” we can enjoy I 
Know What You Did Last Summer as a stereotype of the genre. “Camp is a 
certain mode of aestheticism. It is one way of seeing the world as an aesthetic 
phenomenon. That way, the way of Camp, is not in terms of beauty, but in 
terms of the degree of artifice, of stylization.”30 I Know What You Did Last 
Summer can be rescued by the camp sensibility precisely because it is a well-
executed serious failure, because it is awfully good. In that way the viewers 
can question the slasher genre and their responses to such films.
The Wayans brothers’ Scary Movie, on the other hand, cannot be simi-
larly rescued. It does not challenge our notions of horror or of comedy. It 
places no demand on the viewer other than effortlessly to consume its coarse 
humor. It is not “too much” in a way that counts as camp. “When something 
is just bad (rather than Camp), it’s often because it is too mediocre in its 
ambition. The artist hasn’t attempted to do anything really outlandish.”31 
While Scary Movie is not bad as a comedy, it is kitsch. The film is genuinely 
funny and effectively satirizes both Scream and I Know What You Did Last 
Summer, but it doesn’t go over the top. It doesn’t attempt anything really 
outlandish. Certainly, there are kooky sight gags such as the ghost mask’s 
contorting when the killer gets stoned, but the bits generally rely on a strong 
familiarity with the films they spoof. There are plenty of references to ho-
mosexuality, but those gags lean more toward homophobia than toward a 
celebration of the camp sensibility.
The key point is that Scary Movie exhibits no reverence for the slasher 
genre. It is not clear that the Wayans brothers take seriously the films they 
parody. They make fun of those specific films, rather than making fun out 
of them. “What is extravagant in an inconsistent or an unpassionate way is 
not Camp. Neither can anything be Camp that does not seem to spring from 
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an irrepressible, a virtually uncontrolled sensibility. Without passion, one 
gets pseudo-Camp—what is merely decorative, safe, in a word, chic.”32 In 
the final analysis, Scary Movie is not a scary movie, and it does not pretend 
to be one. But neither is it camp. It is a film that seriously intends to be a 
comedy and that succeeds in that attempt. It is safe. It is easy to consume. 
Scary Movie plays to our base emotions through vulgarity and predictability. 
In a word, it is kitsch.
Were Lawson Deming to join the ranks of the undead and resurrect 
Sir Graves Ghastly Presents, I would expect Reel McCoy to dig up Scream 
and I Know What You Did Last Summer, but I would be surprised to find 
Scary Movie in their dungeon’s film vault. Aside from the fact that it is not 
a horror film, Scary Movie is not awfully good enough to be camp. “Camp 
is a vision of the world in terms of style—but a particular kind of style. It is 
the love of the exaggerated, the ‘off,’ of things-being-what-they-are-not.”33 
Sir Graves, or more precisely Deming, shared that vision and that love. 
He never made fun of the films he showed, but he always made fun out of 
them. More important, Deming let us viewers in on the fun he made out 
of his television program. I end this essay as he closed each show and bid 
you Happy Haunting.
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Whether through film, television, or popular fiction, horror engages audiences like no other genre. From the classic novel to the 
latest slasher flick, horror has struck fear in the 
hearts of generations of readers and viewers across 
the centuries. The thrill and exhilaration generated 
by a terrifying story not only excite the senses but 
also raise important questions about safety, justice, 
suffering, and other human concerns. 
The Philosophy of Horror examines why horror 
fascinates fans by exploring the social, moral, 
and artistic statements of the genre. Editor 
Thomas Fahy has assembled a team of scholars 
to investigate topics as diverse as the genre itself. 
From classic films such as Psycho (1960) and 
The Shining (1980) to contemporary and highly 
controversial torture-horror films like Hostel 
(2005) and the Saw series, the contributing 
authors trace the development of horror as a form 
of art and entertainment. The Philosophy of Horror 
explores the underlying philosophical concepts 
of classic horror fiction, such as Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, as well as works that have been 
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largely ignored in philosophical circles, including 
Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood and Patrick 
Süskind’s Perfume.
Together the essays follow the evolution of the 
horror genre across the decades, investigating 
the theoretical underpinnings of each work in the 
context of its time. This diverse collection explores 
horror from a variety of perspectives and draws on 
a wide range of interpretive approaches, including 
feminist, postcolonial, Marxist, and psychoanalytic 
criticism. The result is a comprehensive study of 
fundamental questions about morality, identity, 
social constructions, and other topics raised in 
horror narratives.
The Philosophy of Horror confirms what horror 
fans have known for decades—horror is not 
only entertaining but also deeply insightful. 
Inviting readers to ponder this genre’s various 
manifestations since the late 1700s, this collection 
of probing essays allows fans and philosophy 
buffs alike to view horror narratives with fresh 
eyes and consider their dark themes within the 
framework of philosophy. The Philosophy of 
Horror is a celebration of a strange, compelling, 
and disturbing tradition in art and entertainment. 
Horror not only excites and entertains audiences; 
it also leaves them searching for answers. 
 
thomas fahy, director of the 
American Studies Program at 
Long Island University, is the 
author or editor of numerous 
publications, including Freak 
Shows and the Modern American 
Imagination and two recent horror novels, 
Sleepless and The Unspoken. 9 780813 125732
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“The Philosophy of Horror captures some 
of the lively conversations occurring at the 
intersection of horror and philosophy. The 
volume collects a group of original essays 
that engage a wide variety of artifacts—TV 
shows like Ghost Hunters, classic films 
like The Black Cat, and novels such as In 
Cold Blood—and take up a wide variety of 
theoretical questions ranging from the ethics 
of retribution, to notion of the sublime, to 
human nature.”     
—kendall r. phillips, 
author of Projected Fears: 
Horror Films and American Culture
“A deadly serious contribution to scholarship 
on horror and a deliciously evil way of 
engaging philosophy.”                             
—eric bronson, 
author of Poker and Philosophy: 
Pocket Rockets and Philosopher Kings
the philosophy of popular culture
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